Commit Graph

4 Commits

  • [codex] Remove codex-core config type shim (#16529)
    ## Why
    
    This finishes the config-type move out of `codex-core` by removing the
    temporary compatibility shim in `codex_core::config::types`. Callers now
    depend on `codex-config` directly, which keeps these config model types
    owned by the config crate instead of re-expanding `codex-core` as a
    transitive API surface.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Removed the `codex-rs/core/src/config/types.rs` re-export shim and the
    `core::config::ApprovalsReviewer` re-export.
    - Updated `codex-core`, `codex-cli`, `codex-tui`, `codex-app-server`,
    `codex-mcp-server`, and `codex-linux-sandbox` call sites to import
    `codex_config::types` directly.
    - Added explicit `codex-config` dependencies to downstream crates that
    previously relied on the `codex-core` re-export.
    - Regenerated `codex-rs/core/config.schema.json` after updating the
    config docs path reference.
  • fix: fix comment linter lint violations in Linux-only code (#16118)
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/16071 took care of this for
    Windows, so this takes care of things for Linux.
    
    We don't touch the CI jobs in this PR because
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/16106 is going to be the real fix
    there (including a major speedup!).
  • refactor: make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox (#13996)
    ## Summary
    - make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
    `use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
    - remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
    docs surfaces
    - update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
    tests/docs to match the new default
    - fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
    Linux read-only sandbox error text
  • feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293)
    ## Summary
    - Implement Linux proxy-only routing in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox` with a
    two-stage bridge: host namespace `loopback TCP proxy endpoint -> UDS`,
    then bwrap netns `loopback TCP listener -> host UDS`.
    - Add hidden `--proxy-route-spec` plumbing for outer-to-inner stage
    handoff.
    - Fail closed in proxy mode when no valid loopback proxy endpoints can
    be routed.
    - Introduce explicit network seccomp modes: `Restricted` (legacy
    restricted networking) and `ProxyRouted` (allow INET/INET6 for routed
    proxy access, deny `AF_UNIX` and `socketpair`).
    - Enforce that proxy bridge/routing is bwrap-only by validating
    `--apply-seccomp-then-exec` requires `--use-bwrap-sandbox`.
    - Keep landlock-only flows unchanged (no proxy bridge behavior outside
    bwrap).
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>