Commit Graph

10 Commits

  • Apply argument comment lint across codex-rs (#14652)
    ## Why
    
    Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
    checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
    applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
    positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
    
    The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
    by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
    intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
    existing signatures stay in place.
    
    After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
    introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
    of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
    almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
    crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
    update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
    overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
    - mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
    `codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
    `tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
    - keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
    `/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
    - cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
    registry/git metadata in the lint job
    - split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
    runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
    - continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
    product-code enforcement is unchanged
    
    Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
    comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
    - parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
    
    ---
    
    * -> #14652
    * #14651
  • fix: support managed network allowlist controls (#12752)
    ## Summary
    - treat `requirements.toml` `allowed_domains` and `denied_domains` as
    managed network baselines for the proxy
    - in restricted modes by default, build the effective runtime policy
    from the managed baseline plus user-configured allowlist and denylist
    entries, so common hosts can be pre-approved without blocking later user
    expansion
    - add `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` to pin
    the effective allowlist to managed entries, ignore user allowlist
    additions, and hard-deny non-managed domains without prompting
    - apply `managed_allowed_domains_only` anywhere managed network
    enforcement is active, including full access, while continuing to
    respect denied domains from all sources
    - add regression coverage for merged-baseline behavior, managed-only
    behavior, and full-access managed-only enforcement
    
    ## Behavior
    Assuming `requirements.toml` defines both
    `experimental_network.allowed_domains` and
    `experimental_network.denied_domains`.
    
    ### Default mode
    - By default, the effective allowlist is
    `experimental_network.allowed_domains` plus user or persisted allowlist
    additions.
    - By default, the effective denylist is
    `experimental_network.denied_domains` plus user or persisted denylist
    additions.
    - Allowlist misses can go through the network approval flow.
    - Explicit denylist hits and local or private-network blocks are still
    hard-denied.
    - When `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true`, only
    managed `allowed_domains` are respected, user allowlist additions are
    ignored, and non-managed domains are hard-denied without prompting.
    - Denied domains continue to be respected from all sources.
    
    ### Full access
    - With managed requirements present, the effective allowlist is pinned
    to `experimental_network.allowed_domains`.
    - With managed requirements present, the effective denylist is pinned to
    `experimental_network.denied_domains`.
    - There is no allowlist-miss approval path in full access.
    - Explicit denylist hits are hard-denied.
    - `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` now also
    applies in full access, so managed-only behavior remains in effect
    anywhere managed network enforcement is active.
  • refactor: remove proxy admin endpoint (#13687)
    ## Summary
    - delete the network proxy admin server and its runtime listener/task
    plumbing
    - remove the admin endpoint config, runtime, requirement, protocol,
    schema, and debug-surface fields
    - update proxy docs to reflect the remaining HTTP and SOCKS listeners
    only
  • feat(network-proxy): add MITM support and gate limited-mode CONNECT (#9859)
    ## Description
    - Adds MITM support (CA load/issue, TLS termination, optional body
    inspection).
    - Adds `codex-network-proxy init` to create
    `CODEX_HOME/network_proxy/mitm`.
    - Enforces limited-mode HTTPS correctly: `CONNECT` requires MITM,
    otherwise blocked with `mitm_required`.
    - Keeps `origin/main` layering/reload semantics (managed layers included
    in reload checks).
    - Centralizes block reasons (`REASON_MITM_REQUIRED`) and removes
    `println!`.
    - Scope is MITM-only (no SOCKS changes).
    
    gated by `mitm=false` (default)
  • fix(network-proxy): add unix socket allow-all and update seatbelt rules (#11368)
    ## Summary
    Adds support for a Unix socket escape hatch so we can bypass socket
    allowlisting when explicitly enabled.
    
    ## Description
    * added a new flag, `network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` as an
    explicit escape hatch
    * In codex-network-proxy, enabling that flag now allows any absolute
    Unix socket path from x-unix-socket instead of requiring each path to be
    explicitly allowlisted. Relative paths are still rejected.
    * updated the macOS seatbelt path in core so it enforces the same Unix
    socket behavior:
      * allowlisted sockets generate explicit network* subpath rules
      * allow-all generates a broad network* (subpath "/") rule
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
  • Enable SOCKS defaults for common local network proxy use cases (#11362)
    ## Summary
    - enable local-use defaults in network proxy settings: SOCKS5 on, SOCKS5
    UDP on, upstream proxying on, and local binding on
    - add a regression test that asserts the full
    `NetworkProxySettings::default()` baseline
    - Fixed managed listener reservation behavior.
    Before: we always reserved a loopback SOCKS listener, even when
    enable_socks5 = false.
    Now: SOCKS listener is only reserved when SOCKS is enabled.
    - Fixed /debug-config env output for SOCKS-disabled sessions.
    ALL_PROXY now shows the HTTP proxy URL when SOCKS is disabled (instead
    of incorrectly showing socks5h://...).
    
    
    ## Validation
    - just fmt
    - cargo test -p codex-network-proxy
    - cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets
  • feat: retain NetworkProxy, when appropriate (#11207)
    As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
    `Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
    
    Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
    instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
    
    Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
    create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
    `NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
    implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
    when it is dropped.)
    
    The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
    the appropriate places.
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
    * #11285
    * __->__ #11207
  • refactor(network-proxy): flatten network config under [network] (#10965)
    Summary:
    - Rename config table from network_proxy to network.
    - Flatten allowed_domains, denied_domains, allow_unix_sockets, and
    allow_local_binding onto NetworkProxySettings.
    - Update runtime, state constraints, tests, and README to the new config
    shape.
  • feat(network-proxy): add a SOCKS5 proxy with policy enforcement (#9803)
    ### Summary
    - Adds an optional SOCKS5 listener via `rama-socks5`
    - SOCKS5 is disabled by default and gated by config
    - Reuses existing policy enforcement and blocked-request recording
    - Blocks SOCKS5 in limited mode to prevent method-policy bypass
    - Applies bind clamping to the SOCKS5 listener
    
    ### Config
    New/used fields under `network_proxy`:
    - `enable_socks5`
    - `socks_url`
    - `enable_socks5_udp`
    
    ### Scope
    - Changes limited to `codex-rs/network-proxy` (+ `codex-rs/Cargo.lock`)
    
    ### Testing
    ```bash
    cd codex-rs
    just fmt
    cargo test -p codex-network-proxy --offline
  • feat: introducing a network sandbox proxy (#8442)
    This add a new crate, `codex-network-proxy`, a local network proxy
    service used by Codex to enforce fine-grained network policy (domain
    allow/deny) and to surface blocked network events for interactive
    approvals.
    
    - New crate: `codex-rs/network-proxy/` (`codex-network-proxy` binary +
    library)
    - Core capabilities:
      - HTTP proxy support (including CONNECT tunneling)
      - SOCKS5 proxy support (in the later PR)
    - policy evaluation (allowed/denied domain lists; denylist wins;
    wildcard support)
      - small admin API for polling/reload/mode changes
    - optional MITM support for HTTPS CONNECT to enforce “limited mode”
    method restrictions (later PR)
    
    Will follow up integration with codex in subsequent PRs.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cd codex-rs && cargo build -p codex-network-proxy`
    - `cd codex-rs && cargo run -p codex-network-proxy -- proxy`