## Why
App-server clients sometimes need argv-based local process execution
while sandbox policy is controlled outside Codex. Those environments can
reject sandbox-disabling paths before a command ever starts, even when
the caller intentionally wants unsandboxed execution.
This PR adds a distinct `process/*` API for that use case instead of
extending `command/exec` with another sandbox-disabling shape. Keeping
the new surface separate also makes the future removal of `command/exec`
simpler: clients that need explicit process lifecycle control can move
to the newer handle-based API without depending on `command/exec`
business logic.
## What changed
- Added v2 process lifecycle methods: `process/spawn`,
`process/writeStdin`, `process/resizePty`, and `process/kill`.
- Added process notifications: `process/outputDelta` for streamed
stdout/stderr chunks and `process/exited` for final exit status and
buffered output.
- Made `process/spawn` intentionally unsandboxed and omitted
sandbox-selection fields such as `sandboxPolicy` and
`permissionProfile`.
- Added client-supplied, connection-scoped `processHandle` values for
follow-up control requests and notification routing.
- Supported cwd, environment overrides, PTY mode and size, stdin
streaming, stdout/stderr streaming, per-stream output caps, and timeout
controls.
- Killed active process sessions when the originating app-server
connection closes.
- Wired the implementation through the modular `request_processors/`
app-server layout, with process-handle request serialization for
follow-up control calls.
- Updated generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures and documented the
new API in `codex-rs/app-server/README.md`.
- Added v2 app-server integration coverage in
`codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/process_exec.rs` for spawn
acknowledgement before exit, buffered output caps, and process
termination.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server`
---------
Co-authored-by: Owen Lin <owen@openai.com>
## Why
[#17088](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17088) changed
`OutgoingMessageSender::new` to require an `AnalyticsEventsClient`, but
one `command_exec` test added earlier on `main` still called the old
one-argument constructor. That leaves current `main` failing to compile
in Bazel and argument-comment-lint jobs.
## What changed
- Pass `AnalyticsEventsClient::disabled()` to the missed
`OutgoingMessageSender::new` test call site in `command_exec.rs`.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
timeout_or_cancellation_reports_cancellation_without_timeout_exit_code`
## Why
Codex analytics needs a typed seam for app-server-originated
request/response traffic so future tool-approval analytics can consume
those facts without adding bespoke callsite tracking each time. Server
responses arrive as JSON-RPC `id + result` payloads, so analytics has to
reconstruct the matching typed response from the original typed request
while that request context still exists in app-server.
This also puts analytics on the app-server outbound path, which needs to
avoid keeping the runtime alive during shutdown. The final ownership fix
keeps the normal strong auth-manager retention in analytics and makes
the external-auth refresh bridge hold a weak back-reference to
`OutgoingMessageSender`, breaking the runtime cycle at the bridge
boundary instead of exposing retention policy through the analytics
client API.
## What changed
- Adds typed `ServerRequest` and `ServerResponse` analytics facts, plus
`AnalyticsEventsClient::track_server_request` and
`track_server_response`.
- Renames the existing client-side facts to `ClientRequest` and
`ClientResponse` so reducers can distinguish client-to-server traffic
from server-to-client traffic.
- Adds `ServerRequest::response_from_result`, allowing a stored typed
request to decode the matching typed server response from a raw JSON-RPC
result payload.
- Threads `AnalyticsEventsClient` through `OutgoingMessageSender` and
records targeted server requests, replayed targeted requests, and
matching targeted responses with the responding connection id needed for
correlation.
- Intentionally leaves broadcast server requests/responses out of
analytics for now because the current model is per connection, while
broadcasts fan one logical request out across multiple connections.
- Breaks the app-server shutdown cycle by storing
`Weak<OutgoingMessageSender>` in `ExternalAuthRefreshBridge` and
upgrading it only when an external-auth refresh is actually requested.
- Keeps reducer ingestion of the new server-side facts as no-ops for
now; this PR is plumbing for later tool-approval analytics work.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-analytics`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server outgoing_message::tests::`
- Covers typed-response reconstruction plus the targeted, replayed,
broadcast-exclusion, and response-attribution analytics paths.
## Follow-up
This PR intentionally stops at ingestion plumbing, so `ServerRequest`
and `ServerResponse` facts are still reducer no-ops. Once a follow-up PR
adds real downstream analytics output for those facts:
- replace the temporary pre-reducer observation seam with reducer tests
for the emitted event shape;
- add end-to-end coverage in `app-server/tests/suite/v2/analytics.rs`
for the real app-server workflow and captured analytics payload;
- remove the temporary sender-level observer tests added here in favor
of the real-output coverage above.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/17088).
* #18748
* #18747
* #17090
* #17089
* #20241
* #20239
* __->__ #17088
## Why
This bug is exposed by Guardian/auto-review approvals. With the managed
network proxy enabled, a blocked network request can be reported back
through the network approval service as an approval denial after the
command has already started. Before this change, the shell and unified
exec runtimes registered those network approval calls, but did not have
a way to observe an async proxy denial as a cancellation/failure signal
for the running process.
The result was confusing: Guardian/auto-review could correctly deny
network access, but the command path could keep running or unregister
the approval without surfacing the denial as the command failure.
## What Changed
- `NetworkApprovalService` now attaches a cancellation token to active
and deferred network approvals.
- Proxy-denial outcomes are recorded only for active registrations,
cancel the owning token, and are consumed when the approval is
finalized.
- The shell runtime combines the normal command timeout with the
network-denial cancellation token.
- Unified exec stores the deferred network approval object, terminates
tracked processes when the proxy denial arrives, and returns the denial
as a process failure while polling or completing the process.
- Tool orchestration passes the active network approval cancellation
token into the sandbox attempt and preserves deferred approval errors
instead of silently unregistering them.
- App-server `command/exec` now handles the combined
timeout-or-cancellation expiration variant used by the runtime.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core network_approval --lib`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
App-server request handling had a lot of repeated JSON-RPC error
construction and one-off `send_error`/`return` branches. This made small
handlers noisy and pushed error response details into leaf code that
otherwise only needed to validate input or call the underlying API.
## What Changed
- Added shared JSON-RPC error constructors in
`codex-rs/app-server/src/error_code.rs`.
- Lifted straightforward request result emission into
`codex-rs/app-server/src/message_processor.rs` so response/error
dispatch happens at the request boundary.
- Reused the result helpers across command exec, config, filesystem,
device-key, external-agent config, fs-watch, and outgoing-message paths.
- Removed leaf wrapper handlers where the method body was only
forwarding to a response helper.
- Returned request validation errors upward in the simple cases instead
of sending an error locally and immediately returning.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib command_exec::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib outgoing_message::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib in_process::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all v2::fs`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all v2::config_rpc`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all v2::external_agent_config`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all v2::initialize`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `git diff --check`
Note: full `cargo test -p codex-app-server` was attempted and stopped in
`message_processor::tracing_tests::turn_start_jsonrpc_span_parents_core_turn_spans`
with a stack overflow after unrelated tests had already passed.
## Why
This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
`PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
`SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
profiles such as direct write roots.
The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
model migration.
## What Changed
- Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
`SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
- Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
synchronized.
- Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
`SandboxPolicy` exactly.
- Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
- Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
command/session profiles are narrowed.
- Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
`PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
defaults.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
- `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* __->__ #19606
## Why
`ReadOnlyAccess` was a transitional legacy shape on `SandboxPolicy`:
`FullAccess` meant the historical read-only/workspace-write modes could
read the full filesystem, while `Restricted` tried to carry partial
readable roots. The partial-read model now belongs in
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `PermissionProfile`, so keeping it on
`SandboxPolicy` makes every legacy projection reintroduce lossy
read-root bookkeeping and creates unnecessary noise in the rest of the
permissions migration.
This PR makes the legacy policy model narrower and explicit:
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` and `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` represent
the old full-read sandbox modes only. Split readable roots, deny-read
globs, and platform-default/minimal read behavior stay in the runtime
permissions model.
## What changed
- Removes `ReadOnlyAccess` from
`codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy`, including the generated
`access` and `readOnlyAccess` API fields.
- Updates legacy policy/profile conversions so restricted filesystem
reads are represented only by `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` /
`PermissionProfile` entries.
- Keeps app-server v2 compatible with legacy `fullAccess` read-access
payloads by accepting and ignoring that no-op shape, while rejecting
legacy `restricted` read-access payloads instead of silently widening
them to full-read legacy policies.
- Carries Windows sandbox platform-default read behavior with an
explicit override flag instead of depending on
`ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`.
- Refreshes generated app-server schema/types and updates tests/docs for
the simplified legacy policy shape.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol sandbox_policy_`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19449).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* #19391
* __->__ #19449
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`
Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
* Add
`OutgoingMessageSender::send_server_notification_to_connection_and_wait`
which returns only once message is written to websocket (or failed to do
so)
* Use this mechanism to apply back pressure to stdout/stderr streams of
processes spawned by `command/exec`, to limit them to at most one
message in-memory at a time
* Use back pressure signal to also batch smaller chunks into ≈64KiB ones
This should make commands execution more robust over
high-latency/low-throughput networks
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Why
`#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
has already separated those concerns.
This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
that actually matters.
## What changed
- threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
`TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
- updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
`core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy`
- updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
- kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
- updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
pass the split policies explicitly
## Verification
- added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
- added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
- updated Linux sandbox coverage in
`linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
exec path
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* __->__ #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
* Add an ability to stream stdin, stdout, and stderr
* Streaming of stdout and stderr has a configurable cap for total amount
of transmitted bytes (with an ability to disable it)
* Add support for overriding environment variables
* Add an ability to terminate running applications (using
`command/exec/terminate`)
* Add TTY/PTY support, with an ability to resize the terminal (using
`command/exec/resize`)
Ruslan Nigmatullin ·
sayan-oai ·
rhan-oai ·
viyatb-oai ·
pakrym-oai ·
Michael Bolin ·
Ahmed Ibrahim ·
iceweasel-oai ·