Commit Graph

51 Commits

  • Add persisted hook enablement state (#19840)
    ## Why
    
    After `hooks/list` exposes the hook inventory, clients need a way to
    persist user hook preferences, make those changes effective in
    already-open sessions, and distinguish user-controllable hooks from
    managed requirements without adding another bespoke app-server write
    API.
    
    ## What
    
    - Extends `hooks/list` entries with effective `enabled` state.
    - Persists user-level hook state under `hooks.state.<hook-id>` so the
    model can grow beyond a single boolean over time.
    - Uses the existing `config/batchWrite` path for hook state updates
    instead of introducing a dedicated hook write RPC.
    - Refreshes live session hook engines after config writes so
    already-open threads observe updated enablement without a restart.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. openai/codex#19705
    2. openai/codex#19778
    3. This PR - openai/codex#19840
    4. openai/codex#19882
    
    ## Reviewer Notes
    
    The generated schema files account for much of the raw diff. The core
    behavior is in:
    
    - `hooks/src/config_rules.rs`, which resolves per-hook user state from
    the config layer stack.
    - `hooks/src/engine/discovery.rs`, which projects effective enablement
    into `hooks/list` from source-derived managedness.
    - `config/src/hook_config.rs`, which defines the new `hooks.state`
    representation.
    - `core/src/session/mod.rs`, which rebuilds live hook state after user
    config reloads.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Make multi-agent v2 ignore agents.max_depth (#20180)
    ## Why
    
    `agents.max_depth` is a legacy multi-agent v1 guard. Multi-agent v2 uses
    task-path routing and its own session/thread limits, so v2 should not
    reject nested `spawn_agent` calls just because the thread-spawn depth
    has reached the v1 maximum.
    
    Keeping the v1 depth guard active in v2 prevents deeper task trees even
    though the v2 path still needs the depth value only for lineage and
    task-path metadata.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Removed the depth-limit rejection from the multi-agent v2
    `spawn_agent` handler while still computing child depth for lineage/path
    metadata.
    - Made the depth-based disabling of legacy `SpawnCsv`/`Collab` tools
    apply only when `Feature::MultiAgentV2` is disabled.
    - Added `multi_agent_v2_spawn_agent_ignores_configured_max_depth` to
    cover a v2 child spawning another agent when `agent_max_depth = 1`,
    while the existing v1 depth-limit tests continue to enforce the legacy
    behavior.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    multi_agent_v2_spawn_agent_ignores_configured_max_depth -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core depth_limit -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::multi_agents::tests --
    --nocapture`
  • Support disabling tool suggest for specific tools. (#20072)
    ## Summary
    - Add `disable_tool_suggest` to app and plugin config, schema, and
    TypeScript output
    - Exclude disabled connectors and plugins from tool suggestion discovery
    - Persist "never show again" tool-suggestion choices back into
    `config.toml`
    - Update config docs and add coverage for connector and plugin
    suppression
    
    ## Testing
    - Added and updated unit tests for config persistence and tool-suggest
    filtering
    - Not run (not requested)
  • feat: split memories part 2 (#19860)
    Keep extracting memories out of core and moving the write trigger in the
    app-server
    This is temporary and it should move at the client level as a follow-up
    This makes core fully independant from `codex-memories-write`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Add MultiAgentV2 root and subagent context hints (#19805)
    ## Why
    
    MultiAgentV2 sessions need startup guidance that matches the role of the
    thread that is actually being created. Root agents and subagents have
    different responsibilities, and forked subagents can inherit parent
    rollout history. If the parent hint is carried into the child context,
    the child can see stale or conflicting developer guidance before its own
    session-specific context is added.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Added `features.multi_agent_v2.root_agent_usage_hint_text` and
    `features.multi_agent_v2.subagent_usage_hint_text` config fields,
    including schema/config parsing support.
    - Injected the matching root or subagent hint into the initial context
    as its own developer message when `multi_agent_v2` is enabled.
    - Filtered configured MultiAgentV2 usage-hint developer messages out of
    forked parent history so a child thread receives fresh guidance for its
    own session source/config.
    - Added targeted coverage for config parsing, initial-context rendering,
    feature-config deserialization, and forked-history filtering.
    
    ## Context examples
    
    With this config:
    
    ```toml
    [features.multi_agent_v2]
    enabled = true
    root_agent_usage_hint_text = "Root guidance."
    subagent_usage_hint_text = "Subagent guidance."
    ```
    
    A root thread initial context renders the root hint as a standalone
    developer message:
    
    ```text
    [developer]
    <existing developer context, when present>
    
    [developer]
    Root guidance.
    ```
    
    A subagent thread initial context renders the subagent hint instead:
    
    ```text
    [developer]
    <existing developer context, when present>
    
    [developer]
    Subagent guidance.
    ```
    
    When a subagent forks parent history, any parent developer message whose
    text exactly matches the configured MultiAgentV2 root or subagent hint
    is omitted from the forked history before the child receives its fresh
    subagent hint.
  • Remove ghost snapshots (#19481)
    ## Summary
    - Remove `ghost_snapshot` / `GhostCommit` from the Responses API surface
    and generated SDK/schema artifacts.
    - Keep legacy config loading compatible, but make undo a no-op that
    reports the feature is unavailable.
    - Clean up core history, compaction, telemetry, rollout, and tests to
    stop carrying ghost snapshot items.
    
    ## Testing
    - Unit tests passed for `codex-protocol`, `codex-core` targeted undo and
    compaction flows, `codex-rollout`, and `codex-app-server-protocol`.
    - Regenerated config and app-server schemas plus Python SDK artifacts
    and verified they match the checked-in outputs.
  • chore: split memories part 1 (#19818)
    Extract memories into 2 different crates
  • permissions: migrate approval and sandbox consumers to profiles (#19393)
    ## Why
    
    Runtime decisions should not infer permissions from the lossy legacy
    sandbox projection once `PermissionProfile` is available. In particular,
    `Disabled` and `External` need to remain distinct, and managed profiles
    with split filesystem or deny-read rules should not be collapsed before
    approval, network, safety, or analytics code makes decisions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Changes managed network proxy setup and network approval logic to use
    `PermissionProfile` when deciding whether a managed sandbox is active.
    - Migrates patch safety, Guardian/user-shell approval paths, Landlock
    helper setup, analytics sandbox classification, and selected
    turn/session code to profile-backed permissions.
    - Validates command-level profile overrides against the constrained
    `PermissionProfile` rather than a strict `SandboxPolicy` round trip.
    - Preserves configured deny-read restrictions when command profiles are
    narrowed.
    - Adds coverage for profile-backed trust, network proxy/approval
    behavior, patch safety, analytics classification, and command-profile
    narrowing.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19393).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * __->__ #19393
  • [codex] Move config loading into codex-config (#19487)
    ## Why
    
    Config loading had become split across crates: `codex-config` owned the
    config types and merge logic, while `codex-core` still owned the loader
    that assembled the layer stack. This change consolidates that
    responsibility in `codex-config`, so the crate that defines config
    behavior also owns how configs are discovered and loaded.
    
    To make that move possible without reintroducing the old dependency
    cycle, the shell-environment policy types and helpers that
    `codex-exec-server` needs now live in `codex-protocol` instead of
    flowing through `codex-config`.
    
    This also makes the migrated loader tests more deterministic on machines
    that already have managed or system Codex config installed by letting
    tests override the system config and requirements paths instead of
    reading the host's `/etc/codex`.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - moved the config loader implementation from `codex-core` into
    `codex-config::loader` and deleted the old `core::config_loader` module
    instead of leaving a compatibility shim
    - moved shell-environment policy types and helpers into
    `codex-protocol`, then updated `codex-exec-server` and other downstream
    crates to import them from their new home
    - updated downstream callers to use loader/config APIs from
    `codex-config`
    - added test-only loader overrides for system config and requirements
    paths so loader-focused tests do not depend on host-managed config state
    - cleaned up now-unused dependency entries and platform-specific cfgs
    that were surfaced by post-push CI
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-config`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core config_loader_tests::`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol -p codex-exec-server -p
    codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-rmcp-client --lib`
    - `cargo test --lib -p codex-app-server-client -p codex-exec`
    - `cargo test --no-run --lib -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox --lib`
    - `cargo shear`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    
    ## Notes
    
    - I did not chase unrelated full-suite failures outside the migrated
    loader surface.
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` still hits unrelated proxy-sensitive
    failures on this machine, and Windows CI still shows unrelated
    long-running/timeouting test noise outside the loader migration itself.
  • permissions: derive compatibility policies from profiles (#19392)
    ## Why
    
    After #19391, `PermissionProfile` and the split filesystem/network
    policies could still be stored in parallel. That creates drift risk: a
    profile can preserve deny globs, external enforcement, or split
    filesystem entries while a cached projection silently loses those
    details. This PR makes the profile the runtime source and derives
    compatibility views from it.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Removes stored filesystem/network sandbox projections from
    `Permissions` and `SessionConfiguration`; their accessors now derive
    from the canonical `PermissionProfile`.
    - Derives legacy `SandboxPolicy` snapshots from profiles only where an
    older API still needs that field.
    - Updates MCP connection and elicitation state to track
    `PermissionProfile` instead of `SandboxPolicy` for auto-approval
    decisions.
    - Adds semantic filesystem-policy comparison so cwd changes can preserve
    richer profiles while still recognizing equivalent legacy projections
    independent of entry ordering.
    - Updates config/session tests to assert profile-derived projections
    instead of parallel stored fields.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19392).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * __->__ #19392
  • permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
    ## Why
    
    This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
    merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
    runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
    
    `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
    because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
    enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
    `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
    still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
    profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
    profiles such as direct write roots.
    
    The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
    has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
    model migration.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
    `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
    while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
    - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
    filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
    synchronized.
    - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
    consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
    `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
    - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
    context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
    construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
    - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
    command/session profiles are narrowed.
    - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
    `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
    defaults.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * __->__ #19606
  • Add goal core runtime (4 / 5) (#18076)
    Adds the core runtime behavior for active goals on top of the model
    tools from PR 3.
    
    ## Why
    
    A long-running goal should be a core runtime concern, not something
    every client has to implement. Core owns the turn lifecycle, tool
    completion boundaries, interruptions, resume behavior, and token usage,
    so it is the right place to account progress, enforce budgets, and
    decide when to continue work.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Centralized goal lifecycle side effects behind
    `Session::goal_runtime_apply(GoalRuntimeEvent::...)`.
    - Starts goal continuation turns only when the session is idle; pending
    user input and mailbox work take priority.
    - Accounts token and wall-clock usage at turn, tool, mutation,
    interrupt, and resume boundaries; `get_thread_goal` remains read-only.
    - Preserves sub-second wall-clock remainder across accounting boundaries
    so long-running goals do not drift downward over time.
    - Treats token budget exhaustion as a soft stop by marking the goal
    `budget_limited` and injecting wrap-up steering instead of aborting the
    active turn.
    - Suppresses budget steering when `update_goal` marks a goal complete.
    - Pauses active goals on interrupt and auto-reactivates paused goals
    when a thread resumes outside plan mode.
    - Suppresses repeated automatic continuation when a continuation turn
    makes no tool calls.
    - Added continuation and budget-limit prompt templates.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Added focused core coverage for continuation scheduling, accounting
    boundaries, budget-limit steering, completion accounting, interrupt
    pause behavior, resume auto-activation, and wall-clock remainder
    accounting.
  • feat: Compress skill paths with root aliases (#19098)
    Add skill root tracking so model-visible skill lists can use short path
    aliases when absolute paths would exceed the metadata budget.
  • permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
    but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
    It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
    enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
    when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
    APIs.
    
    The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
    union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
    
    ```rust
    pub enum PermissionProfile {
        Managed {
            file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
        Disabled,
        External {
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
    }
    ```
    
    This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
    outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
    owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
    sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
    inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
    than a permissive one.
    
    ## How Existing Modeling Maps
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
    into the higher-fidelity profile model:
    
    - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
    with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
    policy.
    - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
    the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
    sandbox.
    - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
    `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
    filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
    - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
    express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
    network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
    `ExternalSandbox`.
    - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
    complete active runtime permissions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
    `disabled`, and `external`.
    - Keep partial permission grants separate with
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
    - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
    entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
    present.
    - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
    network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
    - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
    round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
    and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
    instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
    - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
    full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
    unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
    entries.
    - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
    update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
    `permissionProfile` shape.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
    compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
    `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
    `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
    intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
    permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
    - `just fix`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • feat: let model providers own model discovery (#18950)
    ## Why
    
    `codex-models-manager` had grown to own provider-specific concerns:
    constructing OpenAI-compatible `/models` requests, resolving provider
    auth, emitting request telemetry, and deciding how provider catalogs
    should be sourced. That made the manager harder to reuse for providers
    whose model catalog is not fetched from the OpenAI `/models` endpoint,
    such as Amazon Bedrock.
    
    This change moves provider-specific model discovery behind
    provider-owned implementations, so the models manager can focus on
    refresh policy, cache behavior, picker ordering, and model metadata
    merging.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Introduced a `ModelsManager` trait with separate `OpenAiModelsManager`
    and `StaticModelsManager` implementations.
    - Added `ModelsEndpointClient` so OpenAI-compatible HTTP fetching lives
    outside `codex-models-manager`.
    - Moved `/models` request construction, provider auth resolution,
    timeout handling, and request telemetry into `codex-model-provider` via
    `OpenAiModelsEndpoint`.
    - Added provider-owned `models_manager(...)` construction so configured
    OpenAI-compatible providers use `OpenAiModelsManager`, while
    static/catalog-backed providers can return `StaticModelsManager`.
    - Added an Amazon Bedrock static model catalog for the GPT OSS Bedrock
    model IDs.
    - Updated core/session/thread manager code and tests to depend on
    `Arc<dyn ModelsManager>`.
    - Moved offline model test helpers into
    `codex_models_manager::test_support`.
    ## Metadata References
    
    The Bedrock catalog metadata is based on the official Amazon Bedrock
    OpenAI model documentation:
    
    - [Amazon Bedrock OpenAI
    models](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-parameters-openai.html)
    lists the Bedrock model IDs, text input/output modalities, and `128,000`
    token context window for `gpt-oss-20b` and `gpt-oss-120b`.
    - [Amazon Bedrock `gpt-oss-120b` model
    card](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-card-openai-gpt-oss-120b.html)
    lists the `bedrock-runtime` model ID `openai.gpt-oss-120b-1:0`, the
    `bedrock-mantle` model ID `openai.gpt-oss-120b`, text-only modalities,
    and `128K` context window.
    - [OpenAI `gpt-oss-120b` model
    docs](https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/models/gpt-oss-120b)
    document configurable reasoning effort with `low`, `medium`, and `high`,
    plus text input/output modality.
    
    The display names, default reasoning effort, and priority ordering are
    Codex-local catalog choices.
    
    ## Test Plan
    - Manually verified app-server model listing with an AWS profile:
    
    ```shell
    CODEX_HOME="$(mktemp -d)" cargo run -p codex-app-server-test-client -- \
      --codex-bin ./target/debug/codex \
      -c 'model_provider="amazon-bedrock"' \
      -c 'model_providers.amazon-bedrock.aws.profile="codex-bedrock"' \
      -c 'model_providers.amazon-bedrock.aws.region="us-west-2"' \
      model-list
    ```
    
    The response returned the Bedrock catalog with `openai.gpt-oss-120b-1:0`
    as the default model and `openai.gpt-oss-20b-1:0` as the second listed
    model, both text-only and supporting low/medium/high reasoning effort.
  • Add sticky environment API and thread state (#18897)
    ## Summary
    - add sticky environment selections to app-server v2 thread/start and
    turn/start request flow
    - carry thread-level selections through core session/thread state
    - add app-server coverage for sticky selections and turn overrides
    
    ## Stack
    1. This PR: API and thread persistence
    2. #18898: config.toml named environment loading
    3. #18899: downstream tool/runtime consumers
    
    ## Validation
    - Not run locally; split only.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • [rollout_trace] Add debug trace reduction command (#18880)
    ## Summary
    
    Adds the debug CLI entry point for reducing recorded rollout traces.
    This gives developers a direct way to inspect whether the emitted trace
    stream reduces into the expected conversation/runtime model.
    
    ## Stack
    
    This is PR 5/5 in the rollout trace stack.
    
    - [#18876](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18876): Add rollout
    trace crate
    - [#18877](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18877): Record core
    session rollout traces
    - [#18878](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18878): Trace tool and
    code-mode boundaries
    - [#18879](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18879): Trace sessions
    and multi-agent edges
    - [#18880](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18880): Add debug trace
    reduction command
    
    ## Review Notes
    
    This PR is intentionally last: it depends on the trace crate, core
    recorder, runtime/tool events, and session/agent edge data all existing.
    The command should remain a debug/developer tool and avoid adding new
    runtime behavior.
    
    The useful review question is whether the CLI exposes the reducer in the
    smallest practical way for local inspection without turning the debug
    command into a supported user-facing workflow.
  • refactor: route Codex auth through AuthProvider (#18811)
    ## Summary
    
    This PR moves Codex backend request authentication from direct
    bearer-token handling to `AuthProvider`.
    
    The new `codex-auth-provider` crate defines the shared request-auth
    trait. `CodexAuth::provider()` returns a provider that can apply all
    headers needed for the selected auth mode.
    
    This lets ChatGPT token auth and AgentIdentity auth share the same
    callsite path:
    - ChatGPT token auth applies bearer auth plus account/FedRAMP headers
    where needed.
    - AgentIdentity auth applies AgentAssertion plus account/FedRAMP headers
    where needed.
    
    Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
    
    ## Callsite Migration
    
    | Area | Change |
    | --- | --- |
    | backend-client | accepts an `AuthProvider` instead of a raw
    token/header |
    | chatgpt client/connectors | applies auth through
    `CodexAuth::provider()` |
    | cloud tasks | keeps Codex-backend gating, applies auth through
    provider |
    | cloud requirements | uses Codex-backend auth checks and provider
    headers |
    | app-server remote control | applies provider headers for backend calls
    |
    | MCP Apps/connectors | gates on `uses_codex_backend()` and keys caches
    from generic account getters |
    | model refresh | treats AgentIdentity as Codex-backend auth |
    | OpenAI file upload path | rejects non-Codex-backend auth before
    applying headers |
    | core client setup | keeps model-provider auth flow and allows
    AgentIdentity through provider-backed OpenAI auth |
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
    2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity
    crate
    3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: explicit AgentIdentity
    auth mode and startup task allocation
    4. This PR: migrate Codex backend auth callsites through AuthProvider
    5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs
    and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY`
    
    ## Testing
    
    Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
  • [codex] Route live thread writes through ThreadStore (#18882)
    Begin migrating the thread write codepaths to ThreadStore.
    
    This starts using ThreadStore inside of core session code, not only in
    the app server code.
    
    Rework the interfaces around thread recording/persistence. We're left
    with the following:
    
    * `ThreadManager`: owns the process-level registry of loaded threads and
    handles cross-thread orchestration: start, resume, fork, lookup, remove,
    and route ops to running CodexThreads.
    * `CodexThread`: represents one loaded/running thread from the outside.
    It is the handle app-server and callers use to submit ops, inspect
    session metadata, and shut the thread down.
    * `LiveThread`: session-owned persistence lifecycle handle for one
    active thread. Core session code uses it to append rollout items,
    materialize lazy persistence, flush, shutdown, discard init-failed
    writers, and load that thread’s persisted history.
    * `ThreadStore`: storage backend abstraction. It answers “how are
    threads persisted, read, listed, updated, archived?” Local and remote
    implementations live behind this trait.
    * `LocalThreadStore`: local ThreadStore implementation. It owns the
    file/sqlite-specific details and keeps RolloutRecorder as a local
    implementation detail.
    
    This is a few too many Thread abstractions for my liking, but they do
    all represent different concepts / needs / layers.
    
    Migration note: in places where the core code explicitly requires a
    path, rather than a thread ID, throw an error if we're running with a
    remote store.
    
    Cover the new local live-writer lifecycle with focused tests and
    preserve app-server thread-start behavior, including ephemeral pathless
    sessions.
  • Add safety check notification and error handling (#19055)
    Adds a new app-server notification that fires when a user account has
    been flagged for potential safety reasons.
  • Default Fast service tier for eligible ChatGPT plans (#19053)
    ## Why
    
    Enterprise and business-like ChatGPT plans should get Codex's Fast
    service tier by default when the user or caller has not made an explicit
    service-tier choice. At the same time, callers need a durable way to
    choose standard routing without adding a new persisted `standard`
    service tier value. This keeps existing config compatibility while
    letting core own the managed default policy.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Resolve the effective service tier in core at session creation:
    explicit `fast` or `flex` wins, explicit null/clear or
    `[notice].fast_default_opt_out = true` resolves to standard routing, and
    otherwise eligible ChatGPT plans resolve to Fast when FastMode is
    enabled.
    - Add `[notice].fast_default_opt_out` as the persisted opt-out marker
    for managed Fast defaults.
    - Treat app-server/TUI `service_tier: null` as an explicit
    standard/clear choice by preserving that intent through config loading.
    - Update TUI rendering to use core's effective service tier for startup
    and status surfaces while still keeping `config.service_tier` as the
    explicit configured choice.
    - Update `/fast off` to clear `service_tier`, persist the opt-out
    marker, and send explicit standard for subsequent turns.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Added unit coverage for config override/notice handling, service-tier
    resolution, runtime null clearing, and `/fast off` turn propagation.
    - `cargo build -p codex-cli`
    
    Full test suite was not run locally per author request.
  • protocol: report session permission profiles (#18282)
    ## Why
    
    Clients that observe `SessionConfigured` need the same canonical
    permission view that app-server thread responses provide. Reporting the
    profile in protocol events lets clients keep their local state
    synchronized without reinterpreting legacy sandbox fields.
    
    ## What changed
    
    This adds `permission_profile` to `SessionConfigured` and propagates it
    through core, exec JSON output, MCP server messages, and TUI
    history/widget handling.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
    --nocapture`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18282).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * __->__ #18282
  • feat(request-permissions) approve with strict review (#19050)
    ## Summary
    Allow the user to approve a request_permissions_tool request with the
    condition that all commands in the rest of the turn are reviewed by
    guardian, regardless of sandbox status.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Added unit tests
    - [x] Ran locally
  • app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared
    by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active
    profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when
    starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating
    through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands.
    
    This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform
    enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or
    rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's
    elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile
    overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including
    deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission
    override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as
    `**/*.env = deny`.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`,
    `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`.
    - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and
    the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread
    resume requests.
    - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network
    permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox
    projection used by existing execution paths.
    - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are
    equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests.
    - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when
    applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides.
    - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
    and regression coverage.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * #18282
    * #18281
    * #18280
    * __->__ #18279
  • feat: Fairly trim skill descriptions within context budget (#18925)
    Preserve skill name/path entries whenever possible and trim descriptions
    first, using round-robin character allocation so short descriptions do
    not waste budget.
  • Add plumbing to approve stored Auto-Review denials (#18955)
    ## Summary
    
    This adds the structural plumbing needed for an app-server client to
    approve a previously denied Guardian review and carry that approval
    context into the next model turn.
    
    This PR does not add the actual `/auto-review-denials` tool 
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added app-server v2 RPC `thread/approveGuardianDeniedAction`.
    - Added generated JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures for
    `ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedAction*`.
    - Added core `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction`.
    - Added a core handler that validates the event is a denied Guardian
    assessment and injects a developer message containing the stored denial
    event JSON.
    - Queues the approval context for the next turn if there is no active
    turn yet.
    - Added the TUI app-server bridge so `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction {
    event }` is routed to the app-server request.
    
    ## What This Does Not Do
    
    - Does not add `/auto-review-denials`.
    - Does not add chat widget recent-denial state.
    - Does not add popup/list UI.
    - Does not add a product-facing denial lookup/store.
    - Does not change where Guardian denials are originally emitted or
    persisted.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_approve_guardian_denied_action`
  • [rollout_trace] Record core session rollout traces (#18877)
    ## Summary
    
    Wires rollout trace recording into `codex-core` session and turn
    execution. This records the core model request/response, compaction, and
    session lifecycle boundaries needed for replay without yet tracing every
    nested runtime/tool boundary.
    
    ## Stack
    
    This is PR 2/5 in the rollout trace stack.
    
    - [#18876](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18876): Add rollout
    trace crate
    - [#18877](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18877): Record core
    session rollout traces
    - [#18878](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18878): Trace tool and
    code-mode boundaries
    - [#18879](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18879): Trace sessions
    and multi-agent edges
    - [#18880](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18880): Add debug trace
    reduction command
    
    ## Review Notes
    
    This layer is the first live integration point. The important review
    question is whether trace recording is isolated from normal session
    behavior: trace failures should not become user-visible execution
    failures, and recording should preserve the existing turn/session
    lifecycle semantics.
    
    The PR depends on the reducer/data model from the first stack entry and
    only introduces the core recorder surface that later PRs use for richer
    runtime and relationship events.
  • fix: wait_agent timeout for queued mailbox mail (#18968)
    ## Why
    
    `wait_agent` can be called while mailbox mail is already pending. The
    previous implementation subscribed for future mailbox sequence changes
    and then waited for the next notification. If the mail was queued before
    that wait started, no new notification arrived, so the tool could sit
    until `timeout_ms` even though mail was ready to deliver.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added `Session::has_pending_mailbox_items()` for checking pending
    mailbox mail through the session API.
    - Updated `multi_agents_v2::wait` to return immediately when pending
    mailbox mail already exists before sleeping on a new mailbox sequence
    update.
    - Reworked the regression coverage in `multi_agents_tests.rs` so already
    queued mailbox mail must wake `wait_agent` promptly.
    
    Relevant code:
    - [`wait_agent` pending-mail
    check](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/aa8ca06e83cf2a3dc22f86f37caec6cc2d9533ea/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_v2/wait.rs#L55-L60)
    -
    [`Session::has_pending_mailbox_items`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/aa8ca06e83cf2a3dc22f86f37caec6cc2d9533ea/codex-rs/core/src/session/mod.rs#L2979-L2981)
    -
    [`multi_agent_v2_wait_agent_returns_for_already_queued_mail`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/aa8ca06e83cf2a3dc22f86f37caec6cc2d9533ea/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_tests.rs#L2854)
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    multi_agent_v2_wait_agent_returns_for_already_queued_mail`
  • [codex-analytics] guardian review analytics events emission (#17693)
    ## Why
    
    Guardian approvals now run as review sessions, but Codex analytics did
    not have a terminal event for those reviews. That made it hard to
    measure approval outcomes, failure modes, Guardian session reuse, model
    metadata, token usage, and timing separately from the parent turn.
    
    ## What changed
    
    Adds `codex_guardian_review` analytics emission for Guardian approval
    reviews. The event is emitted from the Guardian review path with review
    identity, target item id, approval request source, a PII-minimized
    reviewed-action shape, terminal decision/status, failure reason,
    Guardian assessment fields, Guardian session metadata, token usage, and
    timing metadata.
    
    The reviewed-action payload intentionally omits high-risk fields such as
    shell commands, working directories, argv, file paths, network
    targets/hosts, rationale, retry reason, and permission justifications.
    It also classifies prompt-build failures separately from Guardian
    session/runtime failures so fail-closed cases are distinguishable in
    analytics.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Guardian review analytics tests cover terminal success,
    timeout/cancel/fail-closed paths, session metadata, and token usage
    plumbing.
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib --tests -- -D warnings`
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/17693).
    * #17696
    * #17695
    * __->__ #17693
  • Add turn-scoped environment selections (#18416)
    ## Summary
    - add experimental turn/start.environments params for per-turn
    environment id + cwd selections
    - pass selections through core protocol ops and resolve them with
    EnvironmentManager before TurnContext creation
    - treat omitted selections as default behavior, empty selections as no
    environment, and non-empty selections as first environment/cwd as the
    turn primary
    
    ## Testing
    - ran `just fmt`
    - ran `just write-app-server-schema`
    - not run: unit tests for this stacked PR
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Support multiple managed environments (#18401)
    ## Summary
    - refactor EnvironmentManager to own keyed environments with
    default/local lookup helpers
    - keep remote exec-server client creation lazy until exec/fs use
    - preserve disabled agent environment access separately from internal
    local environment access
    
    ## Validation
    - not run (per Codex worktree instruction to avoid tests/builds unless
    requested)
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • fix: fully revert agent identity runtime wiring (#18757)
    ## Summary
    
    This PR fully reverts the previously merged Agent Identity runtime
    integration from the old stack:
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
    
    It removes the Codex-side task lifecycle wiring, rollout/session
    persistence, feature flag plumbing, lazy `auth.json` mutation,
    background task auth paths, and request callsite changes introduced by
    that stack.
    
    This leaves the repo in a clean pre-AgentIdentity integration state so
    the follow-up PRs can reintroduce the pieces in smaller reviewable
    layers.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. This PR: full revert
    2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: move Agent Identity
    business logic into a crate
    3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: add explicit
    AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
    4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate auth callsites
    through AuthProvider
    
    ## Testing
    
    Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
  • sandboxing: intersect permission profiles semantically (#18275)
    ## Why
    
    Permission approval responses must not be able to grant more access than
    the tool requested. Moving this flow to `PermissionProfile` means the
    comparison must be profile-shaped instead of `SandboxPolicy`-shaped, and
    cwd-relative special paths such as `:cwd` and `:project_roots` must stay
    anchored to the turn that produced the request.
    
    ## What changed
    
    This implements semantic `PermissionProfile` intersection in
    `codex-sandboxing` for file-system and network permissions. The
    intersection accepts narrower path grants, rejects broader grants,
    preserves deny-read carve-outs and glob scan depth, and materializes
    cwd-dependent special-path grants to absolute paths before they can be
    recorded for reuse.
    
    The request-permissions response paths now use that intersection
    consistently. App-server captures the request turn cwd before waiting
    for the client response, includes that cwd in the v2 approval params,
    and core stores the requested profile plus cwd for direct TUI/client
    responses and Guardian decisions before recording turn- or
    session-scoped grants. The TUI app-server bridge now preserves the
    app-server request cwd when converting permission approval params into
    core events.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing intersect_permission_profiles --
    --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_response --
    --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    request_permissions_response_materializes_session_cwd_grants_before_recording
    -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    app_server_request_permissions_preserves_file_system_permissions`
  • Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. (#18813)
    Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments.
  • chore: document intentional await-holding cases (#18423)
    ## Why
    
    This PR prepares the stack to enable Clippy await-holding lints that
    were left disabled in #18178. The mechanical lock-scope cleanup is
    handled separately; this PR is the documentation/configuration layer for
    the remaining await-across-guard sites.
    
    Without explicit annotations, reviewers and future maintainers cannot
    tell whether an await-holding warning is a real concurrency smell or an
    intentional serialization boundary.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Configures `clippy.toml` so `await_holding_invalid_type` also covers
    `tokio::sync::{MutexGuard,RwLockReadGuard,RwLockWriteGuard}`.
    - Adds targeted `#[expect(clippy::await_holding_invalid_type, reason =
    ...)]` annotations for intentional async guard lifetimes.
    - Documents the main categories of intentional cases: active-turn state
    transitions that must remain atomic, session-owned MCP manager accesses,
    remote-control websocket serialization, JS REPL kernel/process
    serialization, OAuth persistence, external bearer token refresh
    serialization, and tests that intentionally serialize shared global or
    session-owned state.
    - For external bearer token refresh, documents the existing
    serialization boundary: holding `cached_token` across the provider
    command prevents concurrent cache misses from starting duplicate refresh
    commands, and the current behavior is small enough that an explicit
    expectation is easier to maintain than adding another synchronization
    primitive.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-login --all-targets`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-connectors --all-targets`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets`
    - The follow-up PR #18698 enables `await_holding_invalid_type` and
    `await_holding_lock` as workspace `deny` lints, so any undocumented
    remaining offender will fail Clippy.
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18423).
    * #18698
    * __->__ #18423
  • Organize context fragments (#18794)
    Organize context fragments under `core/context`. Implement same trait on
    all of them.
  • feat(auto-review) Handle request_permissions calls (#18393)
    ## Summary
    When auto-review is enabled, it should handle request_permissions tool.
    We'll need to clean up the UX but I'm planning to do that in a separate
    pass
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Ran locally
    <img width="893" height="396" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-17 at 1 16 13 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c045c5f-1138-4c6c-ac6e-2cb6be4514d8"
    />
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • refactor: use semaphores for async serialization gates (#18403)
    This is the second cleanup in the await-holding lint stack. The
    higher-level goal, following https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18178
    and https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18398, is to enable Clippy
    coverage for guards held across `.await` points without carrying broad
    suppressions.
    
    The stack is working toward enabling Clippy's
    [`await_holding_lock`](https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#await_holding_lock)
    lint and the configurable
    [`await_holding_invalid_type`](https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#await_holding_invalid_type)
    lint for Tokio guard types.
    
    Several existing fields used `tokio::sync::Mutex<()>` only as
    one-at-a-time async gates. Those guards intentionally lived across
    `.await` while an operation was serialized. A mutex over `()` suggests
    protected data and trips the await-holding lint shape; a single-permit
    `tokio::sync::Semaphore` expresses the intended serialization directly.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Replace `Mutex<()>` serialization gates with `Semaphore::new(1)` for
    agent identity ensure, exec policy updates, guardian review session
    reuse, plugin remote sync, managed network proxy refresh, auth token
    refresh, and RMCP session recovery.
    - Update call sites from `lock().await` / `try_lock()` to
    `acquire().await` / `try_acquire()`.
    - Map closed-semaphore errors into the existing local error types, even
    though these semaphores are owned for the lifetime of their managers.
    - Update session test builders for the new
    `managed_network_proxy_refresh_lock` type.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - The split stack was verified at the final lint-enabling head with
    `just clippy`.
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18403).
    * #18698
    * #18423
    * #18418
    * __->__ #18403
  • [codex] Use background agent task auth for backend calls (#18094)
    ## Summary
    
    Introduces a single background/control-plane agent task for ChatGPT
    backend requests that do not have a thread-scoped task, with
    `AuthManager` owning the default ChatGPT backend authorization decision.
    
    Callers now ask `AuthManager` for the default ChatGPT backend
    authorization header. `AuthManager` decides whether that is bearer or
    background AgentAssertion based on config/internal state, while
    low-level bootstrap paths can explicitly request bearer-only auth.
    
    This PR is stacked on PR4 and focuses on the shared background task auth
    plumbing plus the first tranche of backend/control-plane consumers. The
    remaining callsite wiring is split into PR4.2 to keep review size down.
    
    ## Stack
    
    - PR1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17385 - add
    `features.use_agent_identity`
    - PR2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17386 - register agent
    identities when enabled
    - PR3: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387 - register agent tasks
    when enabled
    - PR3.1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17978 - persist and
    prewarm registered tasks per thread
    - PR4: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17980 - use task-scoped
    `AgentAssertion` for downstream calls
    - PR4.1: this PR - introduce AuthManager-owned background/control-plane
    `AgentAssertion` auth
    - PR4.2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18260 - use background
    task auth for additional backend/control-plane calls
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - add background task registration and assertion minting inside
    `codex-login`
    - persist `agent_identity.background_task_id` separately from
    per-session task state
    - make `BackgroundAgentTaskManager` private to `codex-login`; call sites
    do not instantiate or pass it around
    - teach `AuthManager` the ChatGPT backend base URL and feature-derived
    background auth mode from resolved config
    - expose bearer-only helpers for bootstrap/registration/refresh-style
    paths that must not use AgentAssertion
    - wire `AuthManager` default ChatGPT authorization through app listing,
    connector directory listing, remote plugins, MCP status/listing,
    analytics, and core-skills remote calls
    - preserve bearer fallback when the feature is disabled, the backend
    host is unsupported, or background task registration is not available
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
    codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
    codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
    codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
    - `cargo test -p codex-login agent_identity`
    - `cargo test -p codex-model-provider bearer_auth_provider`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core agent_assertion`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server remote_control`
    - `cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements fetch_cloud_requirements`
    - `cargo test -p codex-models-manager manager::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-cloud-tasks`
    - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
    codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
    codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
    codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
    - `git diff --check`
  • feat: add metric to track the number of turns with memory usage (#18662)
    Add a metric `codex.turn.memory` to know if a turn used memories or not.
    This is not part of the other turn metrics as a label to limit
    cardinality
  • chore(multiagent) skills instructions toggle (#18596)
    ## Summary
    Support toggling the skills message off.
    
    ## Test Plan
    - [x] Updated unit tests
  • Persist and prewarm agent tasks per thread (#17978)
    ## Summary
    - persist registered agent tasks in the session state update stream so
    the thread can reuse them
    - prewarm task registration once identity registration succeeds, while
    keeping startup failures best-effort
    - isolate the session-side task lifecycle into a dedicated module so
    AgentIdentityManager and RegisteredAgentTask do not leak across as many
    core layers
    
    ## Testing
    - cargo test -p codex-core startup_agent_task_prewarm
    - cargo test -p codex-core
    cached_agent_task_for_current_identity_clears_stale_task
    - cargo test -p codex-core record_initial_history_
  • [5/6] Wire executor-backed MCP stdio (#18212)
    ## Summary
    - Add the executor-backed RMCP stdio transport.
    - Wire MCP stdio placement through the executor environment config.
    - Cover local and executor-backed stdio paths with the existing MCP test
    helpers.
    
    ## Stack
    ```text
    o  #18027 [6/6] Fail exec client operations after disconnect
    │
    @  #18212 [5/6] Wire executor-backed MCP stdio
    │
    o  #18087 [4/6] Abstract MCP stdio server launching
    │
    o  #18020 [3/6] Add pushed exec process events
    │
    o  #18086 [2/6] Support piped stdin in exec process API
    │
    o  #18085 [1/6] Add MCP server environment config
    │
    o  main
    ```
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat: Budget skill metadata and surface trimming as a warning (#18298)
    Cap the model-visible skills section to a small share of the context
    window, with a fallback character budget, and keep only as many implicit
    skills as fit within that budget.
    
    Emit a non-fatal warning when enabled skills are omitted, and add a new
    app-server warning notification
    
    Record thread-start skill metrics for total enabled skills, kept skills,
    and whether truncation happened
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Matthew Zeng <mzeng@openai.com>
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • refactor: narrow async lock guard lifetimes (#18211)
    Follow-up to https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18178, where we called
    out enabling the await-holding lint as a follow-up.
    
    The long-term goal is to enable Clippy coverage for async guards held
    across awaits. This PR is intentionally only the first, low-risk cleanup
    pass: it narrows obvious lock guard lifetimes and leaves
    `codex-rs/Cargo.toml` unchanged so the lint is not enabled until the
    remaining cases are fixed or explicitly justified. It intentionally
    leaves the active-turn/turn-state locking pattern alone because those
    checks and mutations need to stay atomic.
    
    ## Common fixes used here
    
    These are the main patterns reviewers should expect in this PR, and they
    are also the patterns to reach for when fixing future `await_holding_*`
    findings:
    
    - **Scope the guard to the synchronous work.** If the code only needs
    data from a locked value, move the lock into a small block, clone or
    compute the needed values, and do the later `.await` after the block.
    - **Use direct one-line mutations when there is no later await.** Cases
    like `map.lock().await.remove(&id)` are acceptable when the guard is
    only needed for that single mutation and the statement ends before any
    async work.
    - **Drain or clone work out of the lock before notifying or awaiting.**
    For example, the JS REPL drains pending exec senders into a local vector
    and the websocket writer clones buffered envelopes before it serializes
    or sends them.
    - **Use a `Semaphore` only when serialization is intentional across
    async work.** The test serialization guards intentionally span awaited
    setup or execution, so using a semaphore communicates "one at a time"
    without holding a mutex guard.
    - **Remove the mutex when there is only one owner.** The PTY stdin
    writer task owns `stdin` directly; the old `Arc<Mutex<_>>` did not
    protect shared access because nothing else had access to the writer.
    - **Do not split locks that protect an atomic invariant.** This PR
    deliberately leaves active-turn/turn-state paths alone because those
    checks and mutations need to stay atomic. Those cases should be fixed
    separately with a design change or documented with `#[expect]`.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Narrow scoped async mutex guards in app-server, JS REPL, network
    approval, remote-control websocket, and the RMCP test server.
    - Replace test-only async mutex serialization guards with semaphores
    where the guard intentionally lives across async work.
    - Let the PTY pipe writer task own stdin directly instead of wrapping it
    in an async mutex.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-rmcp-client -p
    codex-shell-escalation -p codex-utils-pty -p codex-utils-readiness`
    - `just clippy -p codex-core`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-rmcp-client -p
    codex-shell-escalation -p codex-utils-pty -p codex-utils-readiness` was
    run; the app-server suite passed, and `codex-core` failed in the local
    sandbox on six otel approval tests plus
    `suite::user_shell_cmd::user_shell_command_does_not_set_network_sandbox_env_var`,
    which appear to depend on local command approval/default rules and
    `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED=1` in this environment.