## Why
`sandbox_permissions = "require_escalated"` is treated as an explicit
request to approve the command and run it outside the
filesystem/platform sandbox. Before this change, shell and unified exec
still registered managed network approval context and could inject
Codex-managed proxy state into the child process, which meant an
approved escalated command could still hit a second network approval
path.
This PR makes that escalation boundary consistent: once a command is
explicitly approved to run outside the sandbox, Codex does not also
route that process through the managed network proxy.
## Security impact
Command/filesystem sandbox approval now implies network approval for
that command. If an untrusted command or script is allowed to run with
`require_escalated`, its network calls are unsandboxed: Codex-managed
network allowlists and denylists are not respected for that process, so
the command can exfiltrate any data it can read.
## What changed
- Skip managed network approval specs for
`SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated`.
- Pass `network: None` into shell, zsh-fork shell, and unified exec
sandbox preparation for explicitly escalated requests.
- Strip Codex-managed proxy environment variables when
`CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE` is present, while preserving user proxy env
when the Codex marker is absent.
- Add regression coverage for the prepared exec request so the old
behavior cannot silently reappear.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core explicit_escalation`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`
## Why
`ReadOnlyAccess` was a transitional legacy shape on `SandboxPolicy`:
`FullAccess` meant the historical read-only/workspace-write modes could
read the full filesystem, while `Restricted` tried to carry partial
readable roots. The partial-read model now belongs in
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `PermissionProfile`, so keeping it on
`SandboxPolicy` makes every legacy projection reintroduce lossy
read-root bookkeeping and creates unnecessary noise in the rest of the
permissions migration.
This PR makes the legacy policy model narrower and explicit:
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` and `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` represent
the old full-read sandbox modes only. Split readable roots, deny-read
globs, and platform-default/minimal read behavior stay in the runtime
permissions model.
## What changed
- Removes `ReadOnlyAccess` from
`codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy`, including the generated
`access` and `readOnlyAccess` API fields.
- Updates legacy policy/profile conversions so restricted filesystem
reads are represented only by `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` /
`PermissionProfile` entries.
- Keeps app-server v2 compatible with legacy `fullAccess` read-access
payloads by accepting and ignoring that no-op shape, while rejecting
legacy `restricted` read-access payloads instead of silently widening
them to full-read legacy policies.
- Carries Windows sandbox platform-default read behavior with an
explicit override flag instead of depending on
`ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`.
- Refreshes generated app-server schema/types and updates tests/docs for
the simplified legacy policy shape.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol sandbox_policy_`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19449).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* #19391
* __->__ #19449
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.
The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
Managed {
file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
Disabled,
External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
}
```
This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.
## How Existing Modeling Maps
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:
- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.
## What Changed
- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.
## Compatibility
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
## Verification
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
## Why
Shell escalation still has adapter code that expects a legacy sandbox
policy, but command approvals should carry the resolved
`PermissionProfile` so callers can reason about the granted permissions
canonically.
## What changed
This introduces profile-shaped resolved escalation permissions while
retaining the derived legacy sandbox policy for the Unix escalation
adapter. It updates approval types, the escalation server protocol, and
tests that inspect escalated command permissions.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all handle_container_exec_ --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all handle_sandbox_ -- --nocapture`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18287).
* #18288
* __->__ #18287
## Summary
Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
`PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
- hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
- hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
- core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings
That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
model-visible and stable
This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.
## Reviewer Notes
I think these are the key files
- `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
- `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`
Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
`command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.
## Changes
- Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
- Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
as `tool_input`.
- Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
`McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
- Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
elicitation.
- Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
`mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
Allow the user to approve a request_permissions_tool request with the
condition that all commands in the rest of the turn are reviewed by
guardian, regardless of sandbox status.
## Testing
- [x] Added unit tests
- [x] Ran locally
## Summary
Give guardian network-access reviews the command context that triggered
a managed-network approval. The prompt JSON now includes the originating
tool call id, tool name, command argv, cwd, sandbox permissions,
additional permissions, justification, and tty state when a single
active tool call can be attributed.
The implementation keeps the trigger shape canonical by serializing
`GuardianNetworkAccessTrigger` directly and lets each runtime build that
trigger from its `ToolCtx`. Non-guardian approval prompts avoid cloning
the full trigger payload.
## UX changes
Guardian network-access reviews now include a `trigger` object that
explains what command caused the network approval. Instead of seeing
only the requested host, the guardian reviewer can also see the
originating tool call, argv, working directory, sandbox mode,
justification, and tty state.
Example payload the guardian reviewer can see:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"target": "https://api.github.com:443",
"host": "api.github.com",
"protocol": "https",
"port": 443,
"trigger": {
"callId": "call_abc123",
"toolName": "shell",
"command": ["gh", "api", "/repos/openai/codex/pulls/18197"],
"cwd": "/workspace/codex",
"sandboxPermissions": "require_escalated",
"justification": "Fetch PR metadata from GitHub.",
"tty": false
}
}
```
The network review itself remains scoped to the network decision:
`target_item_id` stays `null`. `trigger.callId` is attribution context
only, so clients can still distinguish network reviews from
item-targeted command reviews.
## Verification
- Added coverage for serializing network trigger context in guardian
approval JSON.
- Added regression coverage that network guardian reviews do not reuse
`trigger.callId` as `target_item_id`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
The exec-server still needs platform sandbox inputs, but the migration
should preserve the `PermissionProfile` that produced them. Keeping only
the derived legacy sandbox map would keep `SandboxPolicy` as the
effective abstraction and would make full-disk vs. restricted profiles
harder to preserve as the permissions stack starts round-tripping
profiles.
`PermissionProfile` entries can also be cwd-sensitive (`:cwd`,
`:project_roots`, relative globs), so the exec-server must carry the
request sandbox cwd instead of resolving those entries against the
long-lived exec-server process cwd.
## What changed
`FileSystemSandboxContext` now carries `permissions: PermissionProfile`
plus an optional `cwd`:
- removed `sandboxPolicy`, `sandboxPolicyCwd`,
`fileSystemSandboxPolicy`, and `additionalPermissions`
- added `permissions` and `cwd`
- kept the platform knobs `windowsSandboxLevel`,
`windowsSandboxPrivateDesktop`, and `useLegacyLandlock`
Core turn and apply-patch paths populate the context from the active
runtime permissions and request cwd. Exec-server derives platform
`SandboxPolicy`/`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` at the filesystem boundary,
adds helper runtime reads there, and rejects cwd-dependent profiles that
arrive without a cwd.
The legacy `FileSystemSandboxContext::new(SandboxPolicy)` constructor
now preserves the old workspace-write conversion semantics for
compatibility tests/callers.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server sandbox_cwd -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server
sandbox_context_new_preserves_legacy_workspace_write_read_only_subpaths
-- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
file_system_sandbox_context_uses_active_attempt -- --nocapture`
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16732.
## Why
`apply_patch` is Codex's primary file edit path, but it was not emitting
`PreToolUse` or `PostToolUse` hook events. That meant hook-based policy,
auditing, and write coordination could observe shell commands while
missing the actual file mutation performed by `apply_patch`.
The issue also exposed that the hook runtime serialized command hook
payloads with `tool_name: "Bash"` unconditionally. Even if `apply_patch`
supplied hook payloads, hooks would either fail to match it directly or
receive misleading stdin that identified the edit as a Bash tool call.
## What Changed
- Added `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` payload support to
`ApplyPatchHandler`.
- Exposed the raw patch body as `tool_input.command` for both
JSON/function and freeform `apply_patch` calls.
- Taught tool hook payloads to carry a handler-supplied hook-facing
`tool_name`.
- Preserved existing shell compatibility by continuing to emit `Bash`
for shell-like tools.
- Serialized the selected hook `tool_name` into hook stdin instead of
hardcoding `Bash`.
- Relaxed the generated hook command input schema so `tool_name` can
represent tools other than `Bash`.
## Verification
Added focused handler coverage for:
- JSON/function `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Freeform `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Successful `apply_patch` output producing a `PostToolUse` payload.
- Shell and `exec_command` handlers continuing to expose `Bash`.
Added end-to-end hook coverage for:
- A `PreToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` blocking the patch before
the target file is created.
- A `PostToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` receiving the patch
input and tool response, then adding context to the follow-up model
request.
- Non-participating tools such as the plan tool continuing not to emit
`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` hook events.
Also validated manually with a live `codex exec` smoke test using an
isolated temp workspace and temp `CODEX_HOME`. The smoke test confirmed
that a real `apply_patch` edit emits `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` with
`tool_name: "apply_patch"`, a shell command still emits `tool_name:
"Bash"`, and a denying `PreToolUse` hook prevents the blocked patch file
from being created.
## Summary
This is the runtime/foundation half of the Windows sandbox unified-exec
work.
- add Windows sandbox `unified_exec` session support in
`windows-sandbox-rs` for both:
- the legacy restricted-token backend
- the elevated runner backend
- extend the PTY/process runtime so driver-backed sessions can support:
- stdin streaming
- stdout/stderr separation
- exit propagation
- PTY resize hooks
- add Windows sandbox runtime coverage in `codex-windows-sandbox` /
`codex-utils-pty`
This PR does **not** enable Windows sandbox `UnifiedExec` for product
callers yet because hooking this up to app-server comes in the next PR.
Windows sandbox advertising is intentionally kept aligned with `main`,
so sandboxed Windows callers still fall back to `ShellCommand`.
This PR isolates the runtime/session layer so it can be reviewed
independently from product-surface enablement.
---------
Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This fixes a stale-environment path in shell snapshot restoration. A
sandboxed command can source a shell snapshot that was captured while an
older proxy process was running. If that proxy has died and come back on
a different port, the snapshot can otherwise put old proxy values back
into the command environment, which is how tools like `pip` end up
talking to a dead proxy.
The wrapper now captures the live process environment before sourcing
the snapshot and then restores or clears every proxy env var from the
proxy crate's canonical list. That makes proxy state after shell
snapshot restoration match the current command environment, rather than
whatever proxy values happened to be present in the snapshot. On macOS,
the Codex-generated `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` is refreshed when the SOCKS
listener changes, while custom SSH wrappers are still left alone.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
## What changed
This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
`PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
full-disk legacy access.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
## Summary
- pass split filesystem sandbox policy/cwd through apply_patch contexts,
while omitting legacy-equivalent policies to keep payloads small
- keep the fs helper compatible with legacy Landlock by avoiding helper
read-root permission expansion in that mode and disabling helper network
access
## Root Cause
`d626dc38950fb40a1a5ad0a8ffab2485e3348c53` routed exec-server filesystem
operations through a sandboxed helper. That path forwarded legacy
Landlock into a helper policy shape that could require direct
split-policy enforcement. Sandboxed `apply_patch` hit that edge through
the filesystem abstraction.
The same 0.121 edit-regression path is consistent with #18354: normal
writes route through the `apply_patch` filesystem helper, fail under
sandbox, and then surface the generic retry-without-sandbox prompt.
Fixes#18069Fixes#18354
## Validation
- `cd codex-rs && just fmt`
- earlier branch validation before merging current `origin/main` and
dropping the now-separate PATH fix:
- `cd codex-rs && cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `cd codex-rs && cargo test -p codex-core file_system_sandbox_context`
- `cd codex-rs && just fix -p codex-exec-server`
- `cd codex-rs && just fix -p codex-core`
- `git diff --check`
- `cd codex-rs && cargo clean`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
We need `PermissionRequest` hook support!
Also addresses:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16301
- run a script on Hook to do things like play a sound to draw attention
but actually no-op so user can still approve
- can omit the `decision` object from output or just have the script
exit 0 and print nothing
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15311
- let the script approve/deny on its own
- external UI what will run on Hook and relay decision back to codex
## Reviewer Note
There's a lot of plumbing for the new hook, key files to review are:
- New hook added in `codex-rs/hooks/src/events/permission_request.rs`
- Wiring for network approvals
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/network_approval.rs`
- Wiring for tool orchestrator `codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs`
- Wiring for execve
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`
## What
- Wires shell, unified exec, and network approval prompts into the
`PermissionRequest` hook flow.
- Lets hooks allow or deny approval prompts; quiet or invalid hooks fall
back to the normal approval path.
- Uses `tool_input.description` for user-facing context when it helps:
- shell / `exec_command`: the request justification, when present
- network approvals: `network-access <domain>`
- Uses `tool_name: Bash` for shell, unified exec, and network approval
permission-request hooks.
- For network approvals, passes the originating command in
`tool_input.command` when there is a single owning call; otherwise falls
back to the synthetic `network-access ...` command.
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a shell
approval</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "rm -f /tmp/example"
}
}
```
</details>
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for an escalated
`exec_command` request</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "cp /tmp/source.json /Users/alice/export/source.json",
"description": "Need to copy a generated file outside the workspace"
}
}
```
</details>
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a network
approval</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "curl http://codex-network-test.invalid",
"description": "network-access http://codex-network-test.invalid"
}
}
```
</details>
## Follow-ups
- Implement the `PermissionRequest` semantics for `updatedInput`,
`updatedPermissions`, `interrupt`, and suggestions /
`permission_suggestions`
- Add `PermissionRequest` support for the `request_permissions` tool
path
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- route apply_patch runtime execution through the selected Environment
filesystem instead of the local self-exec path
- keep the standalone apply_patch command surface intact while restoring
its launcher/test/docs contract
- add focused apply_patch filesystem sandbox regression coverage
## Validation
- remote devbox Bazel run in progress
- passed: //codex-rs/apply-patch:apply-patch-unit-tests
--test_filter=test_read_file_utf8_with_context_reports_invalid_utf8
- in progress / follow-up: focused core and exec Bazel test slices on
dev
## Follow-up under review
- remote pre-verification and approval/retry behavior still need
explicit scrutiny for delete/update flows
- runtime sandbox-denial classification may need a tighter assertion
path than rendered stderr matching
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- add an exec-server `envPolicy` field; when present, the server starts
from its own process env and applies the shell environment policy there
- keep `env` as the exact environment for local/embedded starts, but
make it an overlay for remote unified-exec starts
- move the shell-environment-policy builder into `codex-config` so Core
and exec-server share the inherit/filter/set/include behavior
- overlay only runtime/sandbox/network deltas from Core onto the
exec-server-derived env
## Why
Remote unified exec was materializing the shell env inside Core and
forwarding the whole map to exec-server, so remote processes could
inherit the orchestrator machine's `HOME`, `PATH`, etc. This keeps the
base env on the executor while preserving Core-owned runtime additions
like `CODEX_THREAD_ID`, unified-exec defaults, network proxy env, and
sandbox marker env.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib unified_exec::process_manager::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_env::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_env_tests` (compile-only; filter
matched 0 tests)
- `cargo test -p codex-config --lib shell_environment` (compile-only;
filter matched 0 tests)
- `just bazel-lock-update`
## Known local validation issue
- `just bazel-lock-check` is not runnable in this checkout: it invokes
`./scripts/check-module-bazel-lock.sh`, which is missing.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: pakrym-oai <pakrym@openai.com>
**Summary**
This PR treats Guardian timeouts as distinct from explicit denials in
the core approval paths.
Timeouts now return timeout-specific guidance instead of Guardian
policy-rejection messaging.
It updates the command, shell, network, and MCP approval flows and adds
focused test coverage.
Addresses #17302
Problem: `thread/list` compared cwd filters with raw path equality, so
`resume --last` could miss Windows sessions when the saved cwd used a
verbatim path form and the current cwd did not.
Solution: Normalize cwd comparisons through the existing path comparison
utilities before falling back to direct equality, and add Windows
regression coverage for verbatim paths. I made this a general utility
function and replaced all of the duplicated instance of it across the
code base.
## Summary
- Add `TimedOut` to Guardian/review carrier types:
- `ReviewDecision::TimedOut`
- `GuardianAssessmentStatus::TimedOut`
- app-server v2 `GuardianApprovalReviewStatus::TimedOut`
- Regenerate app-server JSON/TypeScript schemas for the new wire shape.
- Wire the new status through core/app-server/TUI mappings with
conservative fail-closed handling.
- Keep `TimedOut` non-user-selectable in the approval UI.
**Does not change runtime behavior yet; emitting `TimeOut` and
parent-model timeout messaging will come in followup PRs**
## Description
This PR introduces `review_id` as the stable identifier for guardian
reviews and exposes it in app-server `item/autoApprovalReview/started`
and `item/autoApprovalReview/completed` events.
Internally, guardian rejection state is now keyed by `review_id` instead
of the reviewed tool item ID. `target_item_id` is still included when a
review maps to a concrete thread item, but it is no longer overloaded as
the review lifecycle identifier.
## Motivation
We'd like to give users the ability to preempt a guardian review while
it's running (approve or decline).
However, we can't implement the API that allows the user to override a
running guardian review because we didn't have a unique `review_id` per
guardian review. Using `target_item_id` is not correct since:
- with execve reviews, there can be multiple execve calls (and therefore
guardian reviews) per shell command
- with network policy reviews, there is no target item ID
The PR that actually implements user overrides will use `review_id` as
the stable identifier.
## Summary
- preserve legacy Windows elevated sandbox behavior for existing
policies
- add elevated-only support for split filesystem policies that can be
represented as readable-root overrides, writable-root overrides, and
extra deny-write carveouts
- resolve those elevated filesystem overrides during sandbox transform
and thread them through setup and policy refresh
- keep failing closed for explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts and
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts
- for explicit read-only-under-writable-root carveouts, materialize
missing carveout directories during elevated setup before applying the
deny-write ACL
- document the elevated vs restricted-token support split in the core
README
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
"C:/scratch" = "write"
```
the elevated backend now provisions the readable-root overrides,
writable-root overrides, and extra deny-write carveouts during setup and
refresh instead of collapsing back to the legacy workspace-only shape.
If a read-only carveout under a writable root is missing at setup time,
elevated setup creates that carveout as an empty directory before
applying its deny-write ACE; otherwise the sandboxed command could
create it later and bypass the carveout. This is only for explicit
policy carveouts. Best-effort workspace protections like `.codex/` and
`.agents/` still skip missing directories.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the elevated backend does not reopen
writable descendants under read-only carveouts yet.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- detect remote exec-server sessions in the unified-exec runtime
- bypass the local shell-snapshot bootstrap only for those remote
sessions
- preserve existing local snapshot wrapping, PowerShell UTF-8 prefixing,
sandbox orchestration, and zsh-fork handling
## Why
The shell snapshot file is currently captured and stored next to Core.
If Core wraps a remote command with `. /path/to/local/snapshot`, the
process starts on the executor and tries to source a path from the
orchestrator filesystem. This keeps remote commands from receiving that
known-local path until shell snapshots are captured/restored on the
executor side.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::runtimes::tests`
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`
Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
## Summary
- run apply_patch through the executor filesystem when a remote
environment is present instead of shelling out to the local process
- thread the executor FileSystem into apply_patch interception and keep
existing local behavior for non-remote turns
- make the apply_patch integration harness use the executor filesystem
for setup/assertions
- add remote-aware skips for turn-diff coverage that still reads the
test-runner filesystem
## Why
Remote apply_patch needed to mutate the remote workspace instead of the
local checkout. The tests also needed to seed and assert workspace state
through the same filesystem abstraction so local and remote runs
exercise the same behavior.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`
- `cargo check -p core_test_support --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all
suite::shell_serialization::apply_patch_custom_tool_call -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all
suite::apply_patch_cli::apply_patch_cli_updates_file_appends_trailing_newline
-- --nocapture`
- remote `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli --
--nocapture` (229 passed)
- Migrate apply-patch verification and application internals to use the
async `ExecutorFileSystem` abstraction from `exec-server`.
- Convert apply-patch `cwd` handling to `AbsolutePathBuf` through the
verifier/parser/handler boundary.
Doesn't change how the tool itself works.
Addresses #15527
Problem: Nested `codex exec` commands could source a shell snapshot that
re-exported the parent `CODEX_THREAD_ID`, so commands inside the nested
session were attributed to the wrong thread.
Solution: Reapply the live command env's `CODEX_THREAD_ID` after
sourcing the snapshot.
## Summary
- reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
- update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
APIs instead of reaching through module trees
- add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
## Validation
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
before the final fix/format pass
- `just fix` completed successfully
- `just fmt` completed successfully
- `git diff --check` passed
## Summary
- make `CODEX_EXEC_SERVER_URL=none` map to an explicit disabled
environment mode instead of inferring from a missing URL
- expose environment capabilities (`exec_enabled`, `filesystem_enabled`)
so tool building can gate behavior explicitly and future
multi-environment work has a clearer seam
- suppress env-backed tools when the relevant capability is unavailable,
including exec tools, `js_repl`, `apply_patch`, `list_dir`, and
`view_image`
- keep handler/runtime backstops so disabled environments still reject
execution if a tool path somehow bypasses registration
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-tools
disabled_environment_omits_environment_backed_tools`
- `cargo test -p codex-tools
environment_capabilities_gate_exec_and_filesystem_tools_independently`
- remote devbox Bazel build via `codex-applied-devbox`:
`//codex-rs/cli:cli`
Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- split `models-manager` out of `core` and add `ModelsManagerConfig`
plus `Config::to_models_manager_config()` so model metadata paths stop
depending on `core::Config`
- move login-owned/auth-owned code out of `core` into `codex-login`,
move model provider config into `codex-model-provider-info`, move API
bridge mapping into `codex-api`, move protocol-owned types/impls into
`codex-protocol`, and move response debug helpers into a dedicated
`response-debug-context` crate
- move feedback tag emission into `codex-feedback`, relocate tests to
the crates that now own the code, and keep broad temporary re-exports so
this PR avoids a giant import-only rewrite
## Major moves and decisions
- created `codex-models-manager` as the owner for model
cache/catalog/config/model info logic, including the new
`ModelsManagerConfig` struct
- created `codex-model-provider-info` as the owner for provider config
parsing/defaults and kept temporary `codex-login`/`codex-core`
re-exports for old import paths
- moved `api_bridge` error mapping + `CoreAuthProvider` into
`codex-api`, while `codex-login::api_bridge` temporarily re-exports
those symbols and keeps the `auth_provider_from_auth` wrapper
- moved `auth_env_telemetry` and `provider_auth` ownership to
`codex-login`
- moved `CodexErr` ownership to `codex-protocol::error`, plus
`StreamOutput`, `bytes_to_string_smart`, and network policy helpers to
protocol-owned modules
- created `codex-response-debug-context` for
`extract_response_debug_context`, `telemetry_transport_error_message`,
and related response-debug plumbing instead of leaving that behavior in
`core`
- moved `FeedbackRequestTags`, `emit_feedback_request_tags`, and
`emit_feedback_request_tags_with_auth_env` to `codex-feedback`
- deferred removal of temporary re-exports and the mechanical import
rewrites to a stacked follow-up PR so this PR stays reviewable
## Test moves
- moved auth refresh coverage from `core/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs` to
`login/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs`
- moved text encoding coverage from
`core/tests/suite/text_encoding_fix.rs` to
`protocol/src/exec_output_tests.rs`
- moved model info override coverage from
`core/tests/suite/model_info_overrides.rs` to
`models-manager/src/model_info_overrides_tests.rs`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates,
which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module
instead of the actual owner crate.
Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf
crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this
reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following
files:
```
codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml
codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml
```
## What
- Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by
`codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`,
`codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`.
- Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`.
- Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the
owning `codex-*` crate.
- Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner
crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.
## Why
`codex-rs/tools/src/lib.rs` already defines the [canonical `codex_tools`
export
surface](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bf081b9e286e620d25c1d61cf0f38f74a0f982ce/codex-rs/tools/src/lib.rs#L83-L88)
for `ToolsConfig`, `ToolsConfigParams`, and the shell backend config
types. Re-exporting those same types from `core/src/tools/spec.rs` gives
`codex-core` two import paths for one API and blurs which crate owns
those config definitions.
This PR removes that duplicate path so `codex-core` callsites depend on
`codex_tools` directly.
## What
- Remove the five `codex_tools` re-exports from
`core/src/tools/spec.rs`.
- Update `codex-core` production and test callsites to import
`ShellCommandBackendConfig`, `ToolsConfig`, `ToolsConfigParams`,
`UnifiedExecShellMode`, and `ZshForkConfig` from `codex_tools`.
## Verification
- Ran `cargo test -p codex-core`.
- The package run is currently red in five unrelated config tests in
`core/src/config/config_tests.rs` (`approvals_reviewer_*` and
`smart_approvals_alias_*`), while the tool/spec and shell tests touched
by this import cleanup passed.
## Description
Previously the `action` field on `EventMsg::GuardianAssessment`, which
describes what Guardian is reviewing, was typed as an arbitrary JSON
blob. This PR cleans it up and defines a sum type representing all the
various actions that Guardian can review.
This is a breaking change (on purpose), which is fine because:
- the Codex app / VSCE does not actually use `action` at the moment
- the TUI code that consumes `action` is updated in this PR as well
- rollout files that serialized old `EventMsg::GuardianAssessment` will
just silently drop these guardian events
- the contract is defined as unstable, so other clients have a fair
warning :)
This will make things much easier for followup Guardian work.
## Why
The old guardian review payloads worked, but they pushed too much shape
knowledge into downstream consumers. The TUI had custom JSON parsing
logic for commands, patches, network requests, and MCP calls, and the
app-server protocol was effectively just passing through an opaque blob.
Typing this at the protocol boundary makes the contract clearer.
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.
Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
## What changed
- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Why
`SandboxCommand.program` represents an executable path, but keeping it
as `String` forced path-backed callers to run `to_string_lossy()` before
the sandbox layer ever touched the command. That loses fidelity earlier
than necessary and adds avoidable conversions in runtimes that already
have a `PathBuf`.
## What changed
- Changed `SandboxCommand.program` to `OsString`.
- Updated `SandboxManager::transform` to keep the program and argv in
`OsString` form until the `SandboxExecRequest` conversion boundary.
- Switched the path-backed `apply_patch` and `js_repl` runtimes to pass
`into_os_string()` instead of `to_string_lossy()`.
- Updated the remaining string-backed builders and tests to match the
new type while preserving the existing Linux helper `arg0` behavior.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in unrelated existing
config tests: `config::tests::approvals_reviewer_*` and
`config::tests::smart_approvals_alias_*`
This PR partially rebase `unified_exec` on the `exec-server` and adapt
the `exec-server` accordingly.
## What changed in `exec-server`
1. Replaced the old "broadcast-driven; process-global" event model with
process-scoped session events. The goal is to be able to have dedicated
handler for each process.
2. Add to protocol contract to support explicit lifecycle status and
stream ordering:
- `WriteResponse` now returns `WriteStatus` (Accepted, UnknownProcess,
StdinClosed, Starting) instead of a bool.
- Added seq fields to output/exited notifications.
- Added terminal process/closed notification.
3. Demultiplexed remote notifications into per-process channels. Same as
for the event sys
4. Local and remote backends now both implement ExecBackend.
5. Local backend wraps internal process ID/operations into per-process
ExecProcess objects.
6. Remote backend registers a session channel before launch and
unregisters on failed launch.
## What changed in `unified_exec`
1. Added unified process-state model and backend-neutral process
wrapper. This will probably disappear in the future, but it makes it
easier to keep the work flowing on both side.
- `UnifiedExecProcess` now handles both local PTY sessions and remote
exec-server processes through a shared `ProcessHandle`.
- Added `ProcessState` to track has_exited, exit_code, and terminal
failure message consistently across backends.
2. Routed write and lifecycle handling through process-level methods.
## Some rationals
1. The change centralizes execution transport in exec-server while
preserving policy and orchestration ownership in core, avoiding
duplicated launch approval logic. This comes from internal discussion.
2. Session-scoped events remove coupling/cross-talk between processes
and make stream ordering and terminal state explicit (seq, closed,
failed).
3. The failure-path surfacing (remote launch failures, write failures,
transport disconnects) makes command tool output and cleanup behavior
deterministic
## Follow-ups:
* Unify the concept of thread ID behind an obfuscated struct
* FD handling
* Full zsh-fork compatibility
* Full network sandboxing compatibility
* Handle ws disconnection
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Summary
- move skill loading and management into codex-core-skills
- leave codex-core with the thin integration layer and shared wiring
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Migrate `cwd` and related session/config state to `AbsolutePathBuf` so
downstream consumers consistently see absolute working directories.
Add test-only `.abs()` helpers for `Path`, `PathBuf`, and `TempDir`, and
update branch-local tests to use them instead of
`AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(...)`.
For the remaining TUI/app-server snapshot coverage that renders absolute
cwd values, keep the snapshots unchanged and skip the Windows-only cases
where the platform-specific absolute path layout differs.
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
## Why
`shell-tool-mcp` and the Bash fork are no longer needed, but the patched
zsh fork is still relevant for shell escalation and for the
DotSlash-backed zsh-fork integration tests.
Deleting the old `shell-tool-mcp` workflow also deleted the only
pipeline that rebuilt those patched zsh binaries. This keeps the package
removal, while preserving a small release path that can be reused
whenever `codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch`
changes.
## What changed
- removed the `shell-tool-mcp` workspace package, its npm
packaging/release jobs, the Bash test fixture, and the remaining
Bash-specific compatibility wiring
- deleted the old `.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp.yml` and
`.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp-ci.yml` workflows now that their
responsibilities have been replaced or removed
- kept the zsh patch under
`codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch` and updated
the `codex-rs/shell-escalation` docs/code to describe the zsh-based flow
directly
- added `.github/workflows/rust-release-zsh.yml` to build only the three
zsh binaries that `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` needs today:
- `aarch64-apple-darwin` on `macos-15`
- `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- `aarch64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- extracted the shared zsh build/smoke-test/stage logic into
`.github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`, made that helper
directly executable, and now invoke it directly from the workflow so the
Linux and macOS jobs only keep the OS-specific setup in YAML
- wired those standalone `codex-zsh-*.tar.gz` assets into
`rust-release.yml` and added `.github/dotslash-zsh-config.json` so
releases also publish a `codex-zsh` DotSlash file
- updated the checked-in `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` fixture
comments to explain that new releases come from the standalone zsh
assets, while the checked-in fixture remains pinned to the latest
historical release until a newer zsh artifact is published
- tightened a couple of follow-on cleanups in
`codex-rs/shell-escalation`: the `ExecParams::command` comment now
describes the shell `-c`/`-lc` string more clearly, and the README now
points at the same `git.code.sf.net` zsh source URL that the workflow
uses
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `bash -n .github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core`; unrelated existing failures
remain, but the touched `tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::*`
coverage passed during that run
viyatb-oaiandGitHub
Michael BolinandGitHub
Dylan HurdandGitHub
Felipe CouryandGitHub
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
Won ParkandGitHub
Eric TrautandGitHub
Owen LinandGitHub
