Commit Graph

543 Commits

  • permissions: remove cwd special path (#19841)
    ## Why
    
    The experimental `PermissionProfile` API had both `:cwd` and
    `:project_roots` special filesystem paths, which made the permission
    root ambiguous. This PR removes the unstable `current_working_directory`
    special path before the permissions API is stabilized, so callers use
    `:project_roots` for symbolic project-root access.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Removes `FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory` from protocol
    and app-server protocol models, plus regenerated app-server
    JSON/TypeScript schemas.
    - Replaces internal `:cwd` permission entries with `:project_roots`
    entries.
    - Keeps the existing cwd-update behavior for legacy-shaped
    workspace-write profiles, while removing the deleted
    `CurrentWorkingDirectory` case from that compatibility path.
    - Keeps `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` as the reusable symbolic
    workspace-write helper, with docs noting that `:project_roots` entries
    resolve at enforcement time.
    - Updates app-server docs/examples and approval UI labeling to stop
    advertising `:cwd` as a permission token.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Persisted rollout items may contain the old
    `{"kind":"current_working_directory"}` tag from earlier experimental
    `permissionProfile` snapshots. This PR keeps that tag as a
    deserialize-only alias for `ProjectRoots { subpath: None }`, while
    continuing to serialize only the new `project_roots` tag.
    
    ## Follow-up
    
    This PR intentionally does not introduce an explicit project-root set on
    `SessionConfiguration` or runtime sandbox resolution. Today, the
    resolver still uses the active cwd as the single implicit project root.
    A follow-up should model project roots separately from tool cwd so
    `:project_roots` entries can resolve against the configured project
    roots, and resolve to no entries when there are no project roots.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permissions:: --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_ --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_exec_permission_profile_project_roots_use_command_cwd --test
    all`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile
    --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    preset_matching_accepts_workspace_write_with_extra_roots --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`
  • [codex] Move config loading into codex-config (#19487)
    ## Why
    
    Config loading had become split across crates: `codex-config` owned the
    config types and merge logic, while `codex-core` still owned the loader
    that assembled the layer stack. This change consolidates that
    responsibility in `codex-config`, so the crate that defines config
    behavior also owns how configs are discovered and loaded.
    
    To make that move possible without reintroducing the old dependency
    cycle, the shell-environment policy types and helpers that
    `codex-exec-server` needs now live in `codex-protocol` instead of
    flowing through `codex-config`.
    
    This also makes the migrated loader tests more deterministic on machines
    that already have managed or system Codex config installed by letting
    tests override the system config and requirements paths instead of
    reading the host's `/etc/codex`.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - moved the config loader implementation from `codex-core` into
    `codex-config::loader` and deleted the old `core::config_loader` module
    instead of leaving a compatibility shim
    - moved shell-environment policy types and helpers into
    `codex-protocol`, then updated `codex-exec-server` and other downstream
    crates to import them from their new home
    - updated downstream callers to use loader/config APIs from
    `codex-config`
    - added test-only loader overrides for system config and requirements
    paths so loader-focused tests do not depend on host-managed config state
    - cleaned up now-unused dependency entries and platform-specific cfgs
    that were surfaced by post-push CI
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-config`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core config_loader_tests::`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol -p codex-exec-server -p
    codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-rmcp-client --lib`
    - `cargo test --lib -p codex-app-server-client -p codex-exec`
    - `cargo test --no-run --lib -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox --lib`
    - `cargo shear`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    
    ## Notes
    
    - I did not chase unrelated full-suite failures outside the migrated
    loader surface.
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` still hits unrelated proxy-sensitive
    failures on this machine, and Windows CI still shows unrelated
    long-running/timeouting test noise outside the loader migration itself.
  • permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
    ## Why
    
    This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
    merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
    runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
    
    `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
    because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
    enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
    `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
    still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
    profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
    profiles such as direct write roots.
    
    The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
    has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
    model migration.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
    `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
    while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
    - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
    filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
    synchronized.
    - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
    consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
    `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
    - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
    context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
    construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
    - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
    command/session profiles are narrowed.
    - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
    `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
    defaults.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * __->__ #19606
  • test: harden app-server integration tests (#19683)
    ## Why
    
    Windows Bazel runs in the permissions stack exposed that app-server
    integration tests were launching normal plugin startup warmups in every
    subprocess. Those warmups can call
    `https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/plugins/featured` when a test is not
    specifically exercising plugin startup, which adds slow background work,
    noisy stderr, and dependence on external network state. The relevant
    startup/featured-plugin behavior was introduced across #15042 and
    #15264.
    
    A few app-server tests also had long optional waits or unbounded cleanup
    paths, making failures expensive to diagnose and contributing to slow
    Windows shards. One external-agent config test from #18246 used a
    GitHub-style marketplace source, which was enough to exercise the
    pending remote-import path but also meant the background completion task
    could attempt a real clone.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds explicit `AppServerRuntimeOptions` / `PluginStartupTasks`
    plumbing and a hidden debug-only
    `--disable-plugin-startup-tasks-for-tests` app-server flag, so
    integration tests can suppress startup plugin warmups without adding a
    production env-var gate.
    - Has the app-server test harness pass that hidden flag by default,
    while opting plugin-startup coverage back in for tests that
    intentionally exercise startup sync and featured-plugin warmup behavior.
    - Lowers normal app-server subprocess logging from `info`/`debug` to
    `warn` to avoid multi-megabyte stderr output in Bazel logs.
    - Prevents the external-agent config test from attempting a real
    marketplace clone by using an invalid non-local source while still
    exercising the pending-import completion path.
    - Bounds optional filesystem/realtime waits and fake WebSocket
    test-server shutdown so failures produce targeted timeouts instead of
    hanging a shard.
    - Fixes the Unix script-resolution test in `rmcp-client` to exercise
    PATH resolution directly and include the actual spawn error in failures.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo check -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --tests -- -D warnings`
    - `cargo test -p codex-rmcp-client
    program_resolver::tests::test_unix_executes_script_without_extension`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all
    external_agent_config_import_sends_completion_notification_after_pending_plugins_finish
    -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all
    plugin_list_uses_warmed_featured_plugin_ids_cache_on_first_request --
    --nocapture`
    - Windows Local Bazel passed with this test-hardening bundle before it
    was extracted from #19606.
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19683).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * #19606
    * __->__ #19683
  • test: stabilize app-server path assertions on Windows (#19604)
    ## Why
    
    Windows can represent the same canonical local path with either a normal
    drive path or a verbatim device path prefix. The failure pattern that
    motivated this PR was an assertion diff like `C:\...` versus
    `\\?\C:\...`: different spellings, same file.
    
    That became visible while validating the permissions stack above this
    PR. The stack increasingly routes paths through `AbsolutePathBuf`, which
    normalizes supported Windows device prefixes, while several existing
    tests still built expected values directly with
    `std::fs::canonicalize()` or compared `AbsolutePathBuf::as_path()` to a
    raw `PathBuf`. On Windows, that can make tests fail because the two
    sides choose different textual forms for an otherwise equivalent
    canonical path.
    
    This PR is intentionally split out as the bottom PR below #19606. The
    runtime permissions migration should not carry unrelated Windows test
    stabilization, and reviewers should be able to verify this as a
    test-only change before looking at the larger permissions changes.
    
    ## Failure Modes Covered
    
    - `conversation_summary` expected rollout paths were built from raw
    canonicalized `PathBuf`s, while app-server responses could carry
    `AbsolutePathBuf`-normalized paths.
    - `thread_resume` compared returned thread paths directly to previously
    stored or fixture paths, so a verbatim-prefix spelling could fail an
    otherwise correct resume.
    - `marketplace_add` compared plugin install roots through `as_path()`
    against raw canonicalized paths, reproducing the same `C:\...` versus
    `\\?\C:\...` mismatch in both app-server and core-plugin coverage.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - In `app-server/tests/suite/conversation_summary.rs`, normalize both
    expected rollout paths and received `ConversationSummary.path` values
    through `AbsolutePathBuf` before comparing the full summary object.
    - In `app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_resume.rs`, normalize both sides
    of thread path comparisons before asserting equality. This keeps the
    tests focused on whether resume returned the same existing path, not
    whether Windows used the same string spelling.
    - In `app-server/tests/suite/v2/marketplace_add.rs` and
    `core-plugins/src/marketplace_add.rs`, compare install roots as
    `AbsolutePathBuf` values instead of comparing an absolute-path wrapper
    to a raw canonicalized `PathBuf`.
    
    ## Behavior
    
    This PR does not change production app-server or marketplace behavior.
    It only changes tests to assert semantic path identity across Windows
    path spelling variants. It also leaves API response values untouched;
    the normalization happens inside assertions only.
    
    ## Verification
    
    Targeted local checks run while extracting this fix:
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    get_conversation_summary_by_thread_id_reads_rollout`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    get_conversation_summary_by_relative_rollout_path_resolves_from_codex_home`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    thread_resume_prefers_path_over_thread_id`
    
    Windows-specific confidence comes from the Bazel Windows CI job for this
    PR, since the failure is platform-specific.
    
    ## Docs
    
    No docs update is needed because this is test-only infrastructure
    stabilization.
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19604).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * #19606
    * __->__ #19604
  • test: isolate remote thread store regression from plugin warmups (#19593)
    Follow-up to #19266.
    
    ## Why
    
    
    `thread_start_with_non_local_thread_store_does_not_create_local_persistence`
    is meant to catch accidental local thread persistence when a non-local
    thread store is configured. The Windows flake reported in [this
    BuildBuddy
    invocation](https://app.buildbuddy.io/invocation/0b75dde4-6828-4e7b-a35b-e45b73fb005d)
    showed that the assertion was tripping on an unexpected top-level `.tmp`
    entry:
    
    ```diff
     {
    +    ".tmp",
         "config.toml",
         "installation_id",
         "memories",
         "skills",
     }
    ```
    
    That `.tmp` does not appear to come from `tempfile::TempDir`; it comes
    from unrelated plugin startup work that can legitimately materialize
    `codex_home/.tmp`, including the startup remote plugin sync marker in
    [`core/src/plugins/startup_sync.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bce74c70ce058982534507330ff33f7b196708ef/codex-rs/core/src/plugins/startup_sync.rs#L13-L15)
    and the curated plugin snapshot under
    [`.tmp/plugins`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bce74c70ce058982534507330ff33f7b196708ef/codex-rs/core-plugins/src/startup_sync.rs#L25-L26).
    
    That makes the regression race unrelated background startup tasks
    instead of validating the thread-store invariant it was added to cover.
    Rather than weakening the assertion to allow arbitrary `.tmp` entries,
    this change isolates the test from plugin warmups so it can stay strict
    about unexpected local thread persistence artifacts.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - disable plugins in the generated config used by
    `app-server/tests/suite/v2/remote_thread_store.rs`
    - keep the existing `codex_home` assertions unchanged so the test still
    fails if local session or sqlite persistence is introduced
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    suite::v2::remote_thread_store::thread_start_with_non_local_thread_store_does_not_create_local_persistence
    -- --exact`
  • Add goal core runtime (4 / 5) (#18076)
    Adds the core runtime behavior for active goals on top of the model
    tools from PR 3.
    
    ## Why
    
    A long-running goal should be a core runtime concern, not something
    every client has to implement. Core owns the turn lifecycle, tool
    completion boundaries, interruptions, resume behavior, and token usage,
    so it is the right place to account progress, enforce budgets, and
    decide when to continue work.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Centralized goal lifecycle side effects behind
    `Session::goal_runtime_apply(GoalRuntimeEvent::...)`.
    - Starts goal continuation turns only when the session is idle; pending
    user input and mailbox work take priority.
    - Accounts token and wall-clock usage at turn, tool, mutation,
    interrupt, and resume boundaries; `get_thread_goal` remains read-only.
    - Preserves sub-second wall-clock remainder across accounting boundaries
    so long-running goals do not drift downward over time.
    - Treats token budget exhaustion as a soft stop by marking the goal
    `budget_limited` and injecting wrap-up steering instead of aborting the
    active turn.
    - Suppresses budget steering when `update_goal` marks a goal complete.
    - Pauses active goals on interrupt and auto-reactivates paused goals
    when a thread resumes outside plan mode.
    - Suppresses repeated automatic continuation when a continuation turn
    makes no tool calls.
    - Added continuation and budget-limit prompt templates.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Added focused core coverage for continuation scheduling, accounting
    boundaries, budget-limit steering, completion accounting, interrupt
    pause behavior, resume auto-activation, and wall-clock remainder
    accounting.
  • Add goal app-server API (2 / 5) (#18074)
    Adds the app-server v2 goal API on top of the persisted goal state from
    PR 1.
    
    ## Why
    
    Clients need a stable app-server surface for reading and controlling
    materialized thread goals before the model tools and TUI can use them.
    Goal changes also need to be observable by app-server clients, including
    clients that resume an existing thread.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Added v2 `thread/goal/get`, `thread/goal/set`, and `thread/goal/clear`
    RPCs for materialized threads.
    - Added `thread/goal/updated` and `thread/goal/cleared` notifications so
    clients can keep local goal state in sync.
    - Added resume/snapshot wiring so reconnecting clients see the current
    goal state for a thread.
    - Added app-server handlers that reconcile persisted rollout state
    before direct goal mutations.
    - Updated the app-server README plus generated JSON and TypeScript
    schema fixtures for the new API surface.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Added app-server v2 coverage for goal get/set/clear behavior,
    notification emission, resume snapshots, and non-local thread-store
    interactions.
  • permissions: remove legacy read-only access modes (#19449)
    ## Why
    
    `ReadOnlyAccess` was a transitional legacy shape on `SandboxPolicy`:
    `FullAccess` meant the historical read-only/workspace-write modes could
    read the full filesystem, while `Restricted` tried to carry partial
    readable roots. The partial-read model now belongs in
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `PermissionProfile`, so keeping it on
    `SandboxPolicy` makes every legacy projection reintroduce lossy
    read-root bookkeeping and creates unnecessary noise in the rest of the
    permissions migration.
    
    This PR makes the legacy policy model narrower and explicit:
    `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` and `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` represent
    the old full-read sandbox modes only. Split readable roots, deny-read
    globs, and platform-default/minimal read behavior stay in the runtime
    permissions model.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Removes `ReadOnlyAccess` from
    `codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy`, including the generated
    `access` and `readOnlyAccess` API fields.
    - Updates legacy policy/profile conversions so restricted filesystem
    reads are represented only by `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` /
    `PermissionProfile` entries.
    - Keeps app-server v2 compatible with legacy `fullAccess` read-access
    payloads by accepting and ignoring that no-op shape, while rejecting
    legacy `restricted` read-access payloads instead of silently widening
    them to full-read legacy policies.
    - Carries Windows sandbox platform-default read behavior with an
    explicit override flag instead of depending on
    `ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`.
    - Refreshes generated app-server schema/types and updates tests/docs for
    the simplified legacy policy shape.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol --tests`
    - `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol sandbox_policy_`
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19449).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * #19391
    * __->__ #19449
  • [codex] add non-local thread store regression harness (#19266)
    - Add an integration test that guarantees nothing gets written to codex
    home dir or sqlite when running a rollout with a non-local ThreadStore
    - Add an in-memory "spy" ThreadStore for tests like this
    
    Note I could not find a good way to also ensure there were no filesystem
    _reads_ that didn't go through threadstore. I explored a more elaborate
    sandboxed-subprocess approach but it isn't platform portable and felt
    like it wasn't (yet) worth it.
  • Migrate fork and resume reads to thread store (#18900)
    - Route cold thread/resume and thread/fork source loading through
    ThreadStore reads instead of direct rollout path operations
    - Keep lookups that explicitly specify a rollout-path using the local
    thread store methods but return an invalid-request error for remote
    ThreadStore configurations
    - Add some additional unit tests for code path coverage
  • [codex] Omit fork turns from thread started notifications (#19093)
    ## Why
    
    `thread/fork` responses intentionally include copied history so the
    caller can render the fork immediately, but `thread/started` is a
    lifecycle notification. The v2 `Thread` contract says notifications
    should return `turns: []`, and the fork path was reusing the response
    thread directly, causing copied turns to be emitted through
    `thread/started` as well.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Route app-server `thread/started` notification construction through a
    helper that clears `thread.turns` before sending.
    - Keep `thread/fork` responses unchanged so callers still receive copied
    history.
    - Add persistent and ephemeral fork coverage that asserts
    `thread/started` emits an empty `turns` array while the response retains
    fork history.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server`
  • respect workspace option for disabling plugins (#18907)
    Respects the workspace setting for plugins in Codex
    
    Plugins menu disappears
    Plugins do not load
    Plugins do not load in composer
    
    no plugins loaded
    <img width="809" height="226" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-23 at 3 20 45 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3a4dba8e-69c3-4046-a77e-f13ab77f84b4"
    />
    
    
    no plugins in menu
    <img width="293" height="204" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-23 at 3 20 35 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5cb9bf52-ad72-488f-b90c-5eb457da09a3"
    />
  • Fix hang on turn/interrupt (#18392)
    Fix a bug where the `turn/interrupt` RPC hangs when interrupting a turn
    that has already completed.
    
    Before this change, `turn/interrupt` requests were queued in app-server
    and only answered when a later TurnAborted event arrived. If the target
    turn was already complete, core treated Op::Interrupt as a no-op, so no
    abort event was emitted and the RPC could hang indefinitely.
    
    This change fixes that in two places:
    
    * Reject turn/interrupt immediately with `INVALID_REQUEST` when the
    requested turn is no longer the active turn.
    * Resolve any already-accepted pending interrupt requests when the turn
    reaches TurnComplete, covering the case where a turn finishes naturally
    after the interrupt request is accepted but before it aborts.
    
    I tested this by adding a failing test in
    707487c0634834f6741986b64f61886c2dc10108. You may view the results here:
    https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24585182419/
    
    <img width="1512" height="310" alt="CleanShot 2026-04-17 at 16 33 30@2x"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4a88228-b2a4-41f4-9aaa-ec82814096af"
    />
  • Update models.json and related fixtures (#19323)
    Supersedes #18735.
    
    The scheduled rust-release-prepare workflow force-pushed
    `bot/update-models-json` back to the generated models.json-only diff,
    which dropped the test and snapshot updates needed for CI.
    
    This PR keeps the latest generated `models.json` from #18735 and adds
    the corresponding fixture updates:
    - preserve model availability NUX in the app-server model cache fixture
    - update core/TUI expectations for the new `gpt-5.4` `xhigh` default
    reasoning
    - refresh affected TUI chatwidget snapshots for the `gpt-5.5`
    default/model copy changes
    
    Validation run locally while preparing the fix:
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server model_list`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core includes_no_effort_in_request`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    includes_default_reasoning_effort_in_request_when_defined_by_model_info`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui --lib chatwidget::tests`
    - `cargo insta pending-snapshots`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: aibrahim-oai <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
  • permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
    but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
    It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
    enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
    when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
    APIs.
    
    The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
    union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
    
    ```rust
    pub enum PermissionProfile {
        Managed {
            file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
        Disabled,
        External {
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
    }
    ```
    
    This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
    outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
    owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
    sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
    inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
    than a permissive one.
    
    ## How Existing Modeling Maps
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
    into the higher-fidelity profile model:
    
    - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
    with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
    policy.
    - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
    the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
    sandbox.
    - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
    `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
    filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
    - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
    express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
    network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
    `ExternalSandbox`.
    - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
    complete active runtime permissions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
    `disabled`, and `external`.
    - Keep partial permission grants separate with
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
    - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
    entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
    present.
    - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
    network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
    - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
    round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
    and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
    instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
    - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
    full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
    unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
    entries.
    - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
    update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
    `permissionProfile` shape.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
    compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
    `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
    `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
    intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
    permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
    - `just fix`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • [codex] Support remote plugin install writes (#18917)
    ## Summary
    - Add a remote plugin install write call that POSTs the selected remote
    plugin to the ChatGPT cloud plugin API.
    - Align remote install with the latest remote read contract:
    `pluginName` carries the backend remote plugin id directly, for example
    `plugins~Plugin_linear`, and install no longer synthesizes
    `<name>@<marketplace>` ids.
    - Validate remote install ids with the same character rules as remote
    read, return the same install response shape as local installs, and
    include mocked app-server coverage for the write path.
    
    ## Validation
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all plugin_install`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core-plugins`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
    - `just fix -p codex-core-plugins`
  • Add sticky environment API and thread state (#18897)
    ## Summary
    - add sticky environment selections to app-server v2 thread/start and
    turn/start request flow
    - carry thread-level selections through core session/thread state
    - add app-server coverage for sticky selections and turn overrides
    
    ## Stack
    1. This PR: API and thread persistence
    2. #18898: config.toml named environment loading
    3. #18899: downstream tool/runtime consumers
    
    ## Validation
    - Not run locally; split only.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat: expose AWS account state from account/read (#19048)
    ## Why
    
    AWS/Bedrock mode currently reports `account: null` with
    `requiresOpenaiAuth: false` from `account/read`. That suppresses the
    OpenAI-auth requirement, but it does not let app clients distinguish AWS
    auth from any other non-OpenAI custom provider. For the prototype AWS
    provider UX, clients need a simple provider-derived signal so they can
    suppress ChatGPT/API-key login and token-refresh paths without
    hardcoding Bedrock checks.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Adds an `aws` variant to the v2 `Account` protocol union.
    - Adds `ProviderAccountKind` to `codex-model-provider` so the runtime
    provider owns the app-visible account classification.
    - Makes Amazon Bedrock return `ProviderAccountKind::Aws` from the
    model-provider layer.
    - Updates app-server `account/read` to map `ProviderAccountKind` to the
    existing `GetAccountResponse` wire shape.
    - Preserves the existing `account: null, requiresOpenaiAuth: false`
    behavior for other non-OpenAI providers.
    - Regenerates the app-server protocol schema fixtures.
    - Adds coverage for provider account classification and for the Amazon
    Bedrock `account/read` response.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-model-provider`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server get_account_with_aws_provider`
    
    ## Notes
    
    I attempted `just bazel-lock-update` and `just bazel-lock-check`, but
    both are blocked in my local environment because `bazel` is not
    installed.
  • Add app-server marketplace upgrade RPC (#19074)
    ## Summary
    - add a v2 `marketplace/upgrade` app-server RPC that mirrors the
    existing configured Git marketplace upgrade path
    - expose typed request/response/error payloads and regenerate
    JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
    - add app-server integration coverage for all, named, already
    up-to-date, and invalid marketplace upgrade requests
    
    ## Tests
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server marketplace_upgrade`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
    - `just fmt`
  • Move marketplace add/remove and startup sync out of core. (#19099)
    Move more things to core-plugins.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Respect explicit untrusted project config (#18626)
    ## Why
    
    Fixes #18475. A `-c` override such as `projects.<cwd>.trust_level =
    "untrusted"` is meant to be a runtime config override, but app-server
    thread startup treated any non-trusted project as eligible for automatic
    trust persistence when a permissive sandbox/cwd was requested. That
    meant an explicit `untrusted` session override could still cause
    `config.toml` to be updated with `trusted`.
    
    ## What changed
    
    The app-server auto-trust path now runs only when the active project
    trust level is unknown. Explicit `trusted` and explicit `untrusted`
    values are both respected, regardless of whether they came from
    persisted config or session flags.
    
    A focused `thread/start` test now covers the explicit `untrusted` case
    with a permissive sandbox request.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • Add excludeTurns parameter to thread/resume and thread/fork (#19014)
    For callers who expect to be paginating the results for the UI, they can
    now call thread/resume or thread/fork with excludeturns:true so it will
    not fetch any pages of turns, and instead only set up the subscription.
    That call can be immediately followed by pagination requests to
    thread/turns/list to fetch pages of turns according to the UI's current
    interactions.
  • Support MCP tools in hooks (#18385)
    ## Summary
    
    Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
    `PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
    - hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
    - hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
    - core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings
    
    That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
    model-visible and stable
    
    This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
    payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.
    
    ## Reviewer Notes
    
    I think these are the key files
    - `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
    - `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`
    
    Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
    mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
    `command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.
    
    ## Changes
    
    - Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
    to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
    hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
    - Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
    model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
    as `tool_input`.
    - Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
    `McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
    - Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
    remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
    elicitation.
    - Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
    `mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
    patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • app-server: include filesystem entries in permission requests (#19086)
    ## Why
    
    `item/permissions/requestApproval` sends a requested permission profile
    to app-server clients. The core profile already stores filesystem
    permissions as `entries`, but the v2 compatibility conversion used the
    legacy `read`/`write` projection whenever possible and left `entries`
    unset.
    
    That made the request ambiguous for clients that consume the canonical
    v2 shape: `permissions.fileSystem.entries` was missing even though
    filesystem access was being requested. A client that rendered or echoed
    grants from `entries` could treat the request as having no filesystem
    permission entries, then return an empty or incomplete grant. The
    app-server intersects responses with the original request, so omitted
    filesystem permissions are denied.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Populate `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions.entries` when converting
    legacy read/write roots for request permission payloads, while
    preserving `read` and `write` for compatibility.
    - Mark `read` and `write` as transitional schema fields in the generated
    app-server schema.
    - Add regression coverage for the v2 conversion, the app-server
    `item/permissions/requestApproval` round trip, and TUI app-server
    approval conversion expectations.
    - Refresh generated JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_round_trip`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    converts_request_permissions_into_granted_permissions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    resolves_permissions_and_user_input_through_app_server_request_id`
  • Use remote plugin IDs for detail reads and enlarge list pages (#19079)
    1. For remote plugin use plugin id (plugin name) directly for read
    plugin details;
    2. Request up to 200 remote plugins per directory list page.
  • app-server: accept command permission profiles (#18283)
    ## Why
    
    `command/exec` is another app-server entry point that can run under
    caller-provided permissions. It needs to accept `PermissionProfile`
    directly so command execution is not left behind on `SandboxPolicy`
    while thread APIs move forward.
    
    Command-level profiles also need to preserve the semantics clients
    expect from profile-relative paths. `:cwd` and cwd-relative deny globs
    should be anchored to the resolved command cwd for a command-specific
    profile, while configured deny-read restrictions such as `**/*.env =
    none` still need to be enforced because they can come from config or
    requirements rather than the command override itself.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    This adds `permissionProfile` to `CommandExecParams`, rejects requests
    that combine it with `sandboxPolicy`, and converts accepted profiles
    into the runtime filesystem/network permissions used for command
    execution.
    
    When a command supplies a profile, the app-server resolves that profile
    against the command cwd instead of the thread/server cwd. It also
    preserves configured deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` on the
    effective filesystem policy so one-off command overrides cannot drop
    those read protections. The PR also updates app-server docs/schema
    fixtures and adds command-exec coverage for accepted, rejected,
    cwd-scoped, and deny-read-preserving profile paths.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_exec_permission_profile_cwd_uses_command_cwd`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_profile_preserves_configured_deny_read_restrictions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_exec_accepts_permission_profile`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_exec_rejects_sandbox_policy_with_permission_profile`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18283).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * __->__ #18283
  • Add safety check notification and error handling (#19055)
    Adds a new app-server notification that fires when a user account has
    been flagged for potential safety reasons.
  • feat(request-permissions) approve with strict review (#19050)
    ## Summary
    Allow the user to approve a request_permissions_tool request with the
    condition that all commands in the rest of the turn are reviewed by
    guardian, regardless of sandbox status.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Added unit tests
    - [x] Ran locally
  • app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared
    by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active
    profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when
    starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating
    through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands.
    
    This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform
    enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or
    rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's
    elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile
    overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including
    deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission
    override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as
    `**/*.env = deny`.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`,
    `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`.
    - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and
    the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread
    resume requests.
    - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network
    permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox
    projection used by existing execution paths.
    - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are
    equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests.
    - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when
    applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides.
    - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
    and regression coverage.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * #18282
    * #18281
    * #18280
    * __->__ #18279
  • feat: Fairly trim skill descriptions within context budget (#18925)
    Preserve skill name/path entries whenever possible and trim descriptions
    first, using round-robin character allocation so short descriptions do
    not waste budget.
  • Support multiple cwd filters for thread list (#18502)
    ## Summary
    
    - Teach app-server `thread/list` to accept either a single `cwd` or an
    array of cwd filters, returning threads whose recorded session cwd
    matches any requested path
    - Add `useStateDbOnly` as an explicit opt-in fast path for callers that
    want to answer `thread/list` from SQLite without scanning JSONL rollout
    files
    - Preserve backwards compatibility: by default, `thread/list` still
    scans JSONL rollouts and repairs SQLite state
    - Wire the new cwd array and SQLite-only options through app-server,
    local/remote thread-store, rollout listing, generated TypeScript/schema
    fixtures, proto output, and docs
    
    ## Test Plan
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-rollout`
    - `cargo test -p codex-thread-store`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_list`
    - `just fmt`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-rollout -p
    codex-thread-store -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo build -p codex-cli --bin codex`
  • feat: add explicit AgentIdentity auth mode (#18785)
    ## Summary
    
    This PR adds `CodexAuth::AgentIdentity` as an explicit auth mode.
    
    An AgentIdentity auth record is a standalone `auth.json` mode. When
    `AuthManager::auth().await` loads that mode, it registers one
    process-scoped task and stores it in runtime-only state on the auth
    value. Header creation stays synchronous after that because the task is
    initialized before callers receive the auth object.
    
    This PR also removes the old feature flag path. AgentIdentity is
    selected by explicit auth mode, not by a hidden flag or lazy mutation of
    ChatGPT auth records.
    
    Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
    
    ## Design Decisions
    
    - AgentIdentity is a real auth enum variant because it can be the only
    credential in `auth.json`.
    - The process task is ephemeral runtime state. It is not serialized and
    is not stored in rollout/session data.
    - Account/user metadata needed by existing Codex backend checks lives on
    the AgentIdentity record for now.
    - `is_chatgpt_auth()` remains token-specific.
    - `uses_codex_backend()` is the broader predicate for ChatGPT-token auth
    and AgentIdentity auth.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
    2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity
    crate
    3. This PR: explicit AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
    4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend
    auth callsites through AuthProvider
    5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs
    and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY`
    
    ## Testing
    
    Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
  • feat: Support remote plugin list/read. (#18452)
    Add a temporary internal remote_plugin feature flag that merges remote
    marketplaces into plugin/list and routes plugin/read through the remote
    APIs when needed, while keeping pure local marketplaces working as
    before.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Add turn-scoped environment selections (#18416)
    ## Summary
    - add experimental turn/start.environments params for per-turn
    environment id + cwd selections
    - pass selections through core protocol ops and resolve them with
    EnvironmentManager before TurnContext creation
    - treat omitted selections as default behavior, empty selections as no
    environment, and non-empty selections as first environment/cwd as the
    turn primary
    
    ## Testing
    - ran `just fmt`
    - ran `just write-app-server-schema`
    - not run: unit tests for this stacked PR
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Support multiple managed environments (#18401)
    ## Summary
    - refactor EnvironmentManager to own keyed environments with
    default/local lookup helpers
    - keep remote exec-server client creation lazy until exec/fs use
    - preserve disabled agent environment access separately from internal
    local environment access
    
    ## Validation
    - not run (per Codex worktree instruction to avoid tests/builds unless
    requested)
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • fix: fully revert agent identity runtime wiring (#18757)
    ## Summary
    
    This PR fully reverts the previously merged Agent Identity runtime
    integration from the old stack:
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
    
    It removes the Codex-side task lifecycle wiring, rollout/session
    persistence, feature flag plumbing, lazy `auth.json` mutation,
    background task auth paths, and request callsite changes introduced by
    that stack.
    
    This leaves the repo in a clean pre-AgentIdentity integration state so
    the follow-up PRs can reintroduce the pieces in smaller reviewable
    layers.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. This PR: full revert
    2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: move Agent Identity
    business logic into a crate
    3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: add explicit
    AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
    4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate auth callsites
    through AuthProvider
    
    ## Testing
    
    Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
  • app-server: implement device key v2 methods (#18430)
    ## Why
    
    The device-key protocol needs an app-server implementation that keeps
    local key operations behind the same request-processing boundary as
    other v2 APIs.
    
    app-server owns request dispatch, transport policy, documentation, and
    JSON-RPC error shaping. `codex-device-key` owns key binding, validation,
    platform provider selection, and signing mechanics. Keeping the adapter
    thin makes the boundary easier to review and avoids moving local
    key-management details into thread orchestration code.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Added `DeviceKeyApi` as the app-server adapter around
    `DeviceKeyStore`.
    - Converted protocol protection policies, payload variants, algorithms,
    and protection classes to and from the device-key crate types.
    - Encoded SPKI public keys and DER signatures as base64 protocol fields.
    - Routed `device/key/create`, `device/key/public`, and `device/key/sign`
    through `MessageProcessor`.
    - Rejected remote transports before provider access while allowing local
    `stdio` and in-process callers to reach the device-key API.
    - Added stdio, in-process, and websocket tests for device-key validation
    and transport policy.
    - Documented the device-key methods in the app-server v2 method list.
    
    ## Test coverage
    
    - `device_key_create_rejects_empty_account_user_id`
    - `in_process_allows_device_key_requests_to_reach_device_key_api`
    - `device_key_methods_are_rejected_over_websocket`
    
    ## Stack
    
    This is PR 3 of 4 in the device-key app-server stack. It is stacked on
    #18429.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server device_key`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • sandboxing: intersect permission profiles semantically (#18275)
    ## Why
    
    Permission approval responses must not be able to grant more access than
    the tool requested. Moving this flow to `PermissionProfile` means the
    comparison must be profile-shaped instead of `SandboxPolicy`-shaped, and
    cwd-relative special paths such as `:cwd` and `:project_roots` must stay
    anchored to the turn that produced the request.
    
    ## What changed
    
    This implements semantic `PermissionProfile` intersection in
    `codex-sandboxing` for file-system and network permissions. The
    intersection accepts narrower path grants, rejects broader grants,
    preserves deny-read carve-outs and glob scan depth, and materializes
    cwd-dependent special-path grants to absolute paths before they can be
    recorded for reuse.
    
    The request-permissions response paths now use that intersection
    consistently. App-server captures the request turn cwd before waiting
    for the client response, includes that cwd in the v2 approval params,
    and core stores the requested profile plus cwd for direct TUI/client
    responses and Guardian decisions before recording turn- or
    session-scoped grants. The TUI app-server bridge now preserves the
    app-server request cwd when converting permission approval params into
    core events.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing intersect_permission_profiles --
    --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_response --
    --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    request_permissions_response_materializes_session_cwd_grants_before_recording
    -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    app_server_request_permissions_preserves_file_system_permissions`
  • Refactor app-server config loading into ConfigManager (#18442)
    Localize app-server configuration loading in one place.
  • Propagate thread id in MCP tool metadata (#18093)
    ## Summary
    - attach the authoritative Codex thread id to MCP tool request
    `_meta.threadId` for model-initiated tool calls
    - attach the same thread id for manual `mcpServer/tool/call` requests
    before invoking the MCP server
    - cover both metadata helper behavior and the manual app-server MCP path
    in tests
    
    
    needed because the Rust app-server is the last place that still has
    authoritative knowledge of “this model-generated MCP tool call belongs
    to conversation/thread X” before the request leaves Codex and reaches
    Hoopa. It adds threadId to MCP request metadata in the model-generated
    tool-call path, using sess.conversation_id, and also does the same for
    the manual mcpServer/tool/call path.
    
    ## Test plan
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    mcp_tool_call_thread_id_meta_is_added_to_request_meta --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    mcp_server_tool_call_returns_tool_result`
    
    Paired Hoopa consumer PR: https://github.com/openai/openai/pull/833263
  • [tool search] support namespaced deferred dynamic tools (#18413)
    Deferred dynamic tools need to round-trip a namespace so a tool returned
    by `tool_search` can be called through the same registry key that core
    uses for dispatch.
    
    This change adds namespace support for dynamic tool specs/calls,
    persists it through app-server thread state, and routes dynamic tool
    calls by full `ToolName` while still sending the app the leaf tool name.
    Deferred dynamic tools must provide a namespace; non-deferred dynamic
    tools may remain top-level.
    
    It also introduces `LoadableToolSpec` as the shared
    function-or-namespace Responses shape used by both `tool_search` output
    and dynamic tool registration, so dynamic tools use the same wrapping
    logic in both paths.
    
    Validation:
    - `cargo test -p codex-tools`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core tool_search`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Sayan Sisodiya <sayan@openai.com>
  • Make MCP resource read threadless (#18292)
    ## Summary
    
    Making thread id optional so that we can better cache resources for MCPs
    for connectors since their resource templates is universal and not
    particular to projects.
    
    - Make `mcpServer/resource/read` accept an optional `threadId`
    - Read resources from the current MCP config when no thread is supplied
    - Keep the existing thread-scoped path when `threadId` is present
    - Update the generated schemas, README, and integration coverage
    
    ## Testing
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-mcp`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all mcp_resource`
    - `just fix -p codex-mcp`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • protocol: preserve glob scan depth in permission profiles (#18713)
    ## Why
    
    #18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
    shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
    `PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
    `glob_scan_max_depth`.
    
    That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
    On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
    glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
    loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
    permission entries look equivalent.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
    preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
    - Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
    force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
    not silently dropped.
    - Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
    `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
    and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
    - Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
    merging, and intersection.
    - Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
    deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
    - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * #18282
    * #18281
    * #18280
    * #18279
    * #18278
    * #18277
    * #18276
    * #18275
    * __->__ #18713
  • Add session config loader interface (#18208)
    ## Why
    
    Cloud-hosted sessions need a way for the service that starts or manages
    a thread to provide session-owned config without treating all config as
    if it came from the same user/project/workspace TOML stack.
    
    The important boundary is ownership: some values should be controlled by
    the session/orchestrator, some by the authenticated user, and later some
    may come from the executor. The earlier broad config-store shape made
    that boundary too fuzzy and overlapped heavily with the existing
    filesystem-backed config loader. This PR starts with the smaller piece
    we need now: a typed session config loader that can feed the existing
    config layer stack while preserving the normal precedence and merge
    behavior.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added `ThreadConfigLoader` and related typed payloads in
    `codex-config`.
    - `SessionThreadConfig` currently supports `model_provider`,
    `model_providers`, and feature flags.
    - `UserThreadConfig` is present as an ownership boundary, but does not
    yet add TOML-backed fields.
    - `NoopThreadConfigLoader` preserves existing behavior when no external
    loader is configured.
      - `StaticThreadConfigLoader` supports tests and simple callers.
    
    - Taught thread config sources to produce ordinary `ConfigLayerEntry`
    values so the existing `ConfigLayerStack` remains the place where
    precedence and merging happen.
    
    - Wired the loader through `ConfigBuilder`, the config loader, and
    app-server startup paths so app-server can provide session-owned config
    before deriving a thread config.
    
    - Added coverage for:
      - translating typed thread config into config layers,
    - inserting thread config layers into the stack at the right precedence,
    - applying session-provided model provider and feature settings when
    app-server derives config from thread params.
    
    ## Follow-Ups
    
    This intentionally stops short of adding the remote/service transport.
    The next pieces are expected to be:
    
    1. Define the proto/API shape for this interface.
    2. Add a client implementation that can source session config from the
    service side.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Added unit coverage in `codex-config` for the loader and layer
    conversion.
    - Added `codex-core` config loader coverage for thread config layer
    precedence.
    - Added app-server coverage that verifies session thread config wins
    over request-provided config for model provider and feature settings.
  • Add realtime silence tool (#18635)
    ## Summary
    
    Adds a second realtime v2 function tool, `remain_silent`, so the
    realtime model has an explicit non-speaking action when the
    collaboration mode or latest context says it should not answer aloud.
    This is stacked on #18597.
    
    ## Design
    
    - Advertise `remain_silent` alongside `background_agent` in realtime v2
    conversational sessions.
    - Parse `remain_silent` function calls into a typed
    `RealtimeEvent::NoopRequested` event.
    - Have core answer that function call with an empty
    `function_call_output` and deliberately avoid `response.create`, so no
    follow-up realtime response is requested.
    - Keep the event hidden from app-server/TUI surfaces; it is operational
    plumbing, not user-visible conversation content.
  • Read conversation summaries through thread store (#18716)
    Migrate the conversation summary App Server methods to ThreadStore
    
    Because this app server api allows explicitly fetching the thread by
    rollout path, intercept that case in the app server code and (a) route
    directly to underlying local thread store methods if we're using a local
    thread store, or (b) throw an unsupported error if we're using a remote
    thread store. This keeps the thread store API clean and all filesystem
    operations inside of the local thread store, which pushing the
    "fundamental incompatibility" check as early as possible.