Commit Graph

25 Commits

  • feat: run zsh fork shell tool via shell-escalation (#12649)
    ## Why
    
    This PR switches the `shell_command` zsh-fork path over to
    `codex-shell-escalation` so the new shell tool can use the shared
    exec-wrapper/escalation protocol instead of the `zsh_exec_bridge`
    implementation that was introduced in
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052. `zsh_exec_bridge` relied on
    UNIX domain sockets, which is not as tamper-proof as the FD-based
    approach in `codex-shell-escalation`.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added a Unix zsh-fork runtime adapter in `core`
    (`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`) that:
    - runs zsh-fork commands through
    `codex_shell_escalation::run_escalate_server`
      - bridges exec-policy / approval decisions into `ShellActionProvider`
    - executes escalated commands via a `ShellCommandExecutor` that calls
    `process_exec_tool_call`
    - Updated `ShellRuntime` / `ShellCommandHandler` / tool spec wiring to
    select a `shell_command` backend (`classic` vs `zsh-fork`) while leaving
    the generic `shell` tool path unchanged.
    - Removed the `zsh_exec_bridge`-based session service and deleted
    `core/src/zsh_exec_bridge/mod.rs`.
    - Moved exec-wrapper entrypoint dispatch to `arg0` by handling the
    `codex-execve-wrapper` arg0 alias there, and removed the old
    `codex_core::maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode()` hooks from `cli` and
    `app-server` mains.
    - Added the needed `codex-shell-escalation` dependencies for `core` and
    `arg0`.
    
    ## Tests
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server turn_start_shell_zsh_fork --
    --nocapture`
    - verifies zsh-fork command execution and approval flows through the new
    backend
    - includes subcommand approve/decline coverage using the shared zsh
    DotSlash fixture in `app-server/tests/suite/zsh`
    - To test manually, I added the following to `~/.codex/config.toml`:
    
    ```toml
    zsh_path = "/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh"
    
    [features]
    shell_zsh_fork = true
    ```
    
    Then I ran `just c` to run the dev build of Codex with these changes and
    sent it the message:
    
    ```
    run `echo $0`
    ```
    
    And it replied with:
    
    ```
      echo $0 printed:
    
      /Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh
    
      In this tool context, $0 reflects the script path used to invoke the shell, not just zsh.
    ```
    
    so the tool appears to be wired up correctly.
    
    ## Notes
    
    - The zsh subcommand-decline integration test now uses `rm` under a
    `WorkspaceWrite` sandbox. The previous `/usr/bin/true` scenario is
    auto-allowed by the new `shell-escalation` policy path, which no longer
    produces subcommand approval prompts.
  • feat(core) Introduce Feature::RequestPermissions (#11871)
    ## Summary
    Introduces the initial implementation of Feature::RequestPermissions.
    RequestPermissions allows the model to request that a command be run
    inside the sandbox, with additional permissions, like writing to a
    specific folder. Eventually this will include other rules as well, and
    the ability to persist these permissions, but this PR is already quite
    large - let's get the core flow working and go from there!
    
    <img width="1279" height="541" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-15 at 2 26 22鈥疨M"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ee3ec0f-02ec-4509-91a2-809ac80be368"
    />
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Added tests
    - [x] Tested locally
    - [x] Feature
  • Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)
    ## Summary
    Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
    moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
    Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
    treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
    
    - Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
    - Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
    prompts.
    - Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
    - Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
    future matching requests.
    - Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
    
    Example:
    - 3 calls: 
      - a.com (line 443)
      - b.com (line 443)
      - a.com (line 443)
    => 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
    - a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
    
    ## Testing
    - `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
    - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
    integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
  • feat(core): zsh exec bridge (#12052)
    zsh fork PR stack:
    - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 
    - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052 馃憟 
    
    ### Summary
    This PR introduces a feature-gated native shell runtime path that routes
    shell execution through a patched zsh exec bridge, removing MCP-specific
    behavior from the shell hot path while preserving existing
    CommandExecution lifecycle semantics.
    
    When shell_zsh_fork is enabled, shell commands run via patched zsh with
    per-`execve` interception through EXEC_WRAPPER. Core receives wrapper
    IPC requests over a Unix socket, applies existing approval policy, and
    returns allow/deny before the subcommand executes.
    
    ### What鈥檚 included
    **1) New zsh exec bridge runtime in core**
    - Wrapper-mode entrypoint (maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode) for
    EXEC_WRAPPER invocations.
    - Per-execution Unix-socket IPC handling for wrapper requests/responses.
    - Approval callback integration using existing core approval
    orchestration.
    - Streaming stdout/stderr deltas to existing command output event
    pipeline.
    - Error handling for malformed IPC, denial/abort, and execution
    failures.
    
    **2) Session lifecycle integration**
    SessionServices now owns a `ZshExecBridge`.
    Session startup initializes bridge state; shutdown tears it down
    cleanly.
    
    **3) Shell runtime routing (feature-gated)**
    When `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled:
    - Build execution env/spec as usual.
    - Add wrapper socket env wiring.
    - Execute via `zsh_exec_bridge.execute_shell_request(...)` instead of
    the regular shell path.
    - Non-zsh-fork behavior remains unchanged.
    
    **4) Config + feature wiring**
    - Added `Feature::ShellZshFork` (under development).
    - Added config support for `zsh_path` (optional absolute path to patched
    zsh):
    - `Config`, `ConfigToml`, `ConfigProfile`, overrides, and schema.
    - Session startup validates that `zsh_path` exists/usable when zsh-fork
    is enabled.
    - Added startup test for missing `zsh_path` failure mode.
    
    **5) Seatbelt/sandbox updates for wrapper IPC**
    - Extended seatbelt policy generation to optionally allow outbound
    connection to explicitly permitted Unix sockets.
    - Wired sandboxing path to pass wrapper socket path through to seatbelt
    policy generation.
    - Added/updated seatbelt tests for explicit socket allow rule and
    argument emission.
    
    **6) Runtime entrypoint hooks**
    - This allows the same binary to act as the zsh wrapper subprocess when
    invoked via `EXEC_WRAPPER`.
    
    **7) Tool selection behavior**
    - ToolsConfig now prefers ShellCommand type when shell_zsh_fork is
    enabled.
    - Added test coverage for precedence with unified-exec enabled.
  • feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
    ### Description
    #### Summary
    Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
    
    #### What changed
    - Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
    - Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
    semantics.
    - Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
    decisions.
    - Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
    - Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
    - Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
    layer.
    
    #### Why
    establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
    yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
    
    #### Notes
    - Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
    - Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
    integration.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
  • feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
    ## Summary
    - expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
    (`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
    tool-specific variants)
    - harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
    inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
    malformed
    - thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
    isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
    - add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
    and Linux sandbox argument wiring
  • feat: include NetworkConfig through ExecParams (#11105)
    This PR adds the following field to `Config`:
    
    ```rust
    pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
    ```
    
    Though for the moment, it will always be initialized as `None` (this
    will be addressed in a subsequent PR).
    
    This PR does the work to thread `network` through to `execute_exec_env()`, `process_exec_tool_call()`, and `UnifiedExecRuntime.run()` to ensure it is available whenever we span a process.
  • feat(linux-sandbox): add bwrap support (#9938)
    ## Summary
    This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The
    curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including
    Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation
    model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some
    directories read-only and granular network controls.
    
    This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before
    making it the default.
    
    - Added temporary rollout flag:
      - `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`
    - Preserved existing default path when the flag is off.
    - In Bubblewrap mode:
    - Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted
    by the host/container.
  • remove sandbox globals. (#9797)
    Threads sandbox updates through OverrideTurnContext for active turn
    Passes computed sandbox type into safety/exec
  • feat: introduce ExternalSandbox policy (#8290)
    ## Description
    
    Introduced `ExternalSandbox` policy to cover use case when sandbox
    defined by outside environment, effectively it translates to
    `SandboxMode#DangerFullAccess` for file system (since sandbox configured
    on container level) and configurable `network_access` (either Restricted
    or Enabled by outside environment).
    
    as example you can configure `ExternalSandbox` policy as part of
    `sendUserTurn` v1 app_server API:
    
    ```
     {
                "conversationId": <id>,
                "cwd": <cwd>,
                "approvalPolicy": "never",
                "sandboxPolicy": {
                      "type": ""external-sandbox",
                      "network_access": "enabled"/"restricted"
                },
                "model": <model>,
                "effort": <effort>,
                ....
            }
    ```
  • better name for windows sandbox features (#8077)
    `--enable enable...` is a bad look
  • Removed experimental "command risk assessment" feature (#7799)
    This experimental feature received lukewarm reception during internal
    testing. Removing from the code base.
  • refactoring with_escalated_permissions to use SandboxPermissions instead (#7750)
    helpful in the future if we want more granularity for requesting
    escalated permissions:
    e.g when running in readonly sandbox, model can request to escalate to a
    sandbox that allows writes
  • Wire with_remote_overrides to construct model families (#7621)
    - This PR wires `with_remote_overrides` and make the
    `construct_model_families` an async function
    - Moves getting model family a level above to keep the function `sync`
    - Updates the tests to local, offline, and `sync` helper for model
    families
  • remove model_family from `config (#7571)
    - Remove `model_family` from `config`
    - Make sure to still override config elements related to `model_family`
    like supporting reasoning
  • Migrate model preset (#7542)
    - Introduce `openai_models` in `/core`
    - Move `PRESETS` under it
    - Move `ModelPreset`, `ModelUpgrade`, `ReasoningEffortPreset`,
    `ReasoningEffortPreset`, and `ReasoningEffortPreset` to `protocol`
    - Introduce `Op::ListModels` and `EventMsg::AvailableModels`
    
    Next steps:
    - migrate `app-server` and `tui` to use the introduced Operation
  • Fixed regression in experimental "sandbox command assessment" feature (#7308)
    Recent model updates caused the experimental "sandbox tool assessment"
    to time out most of the time leaving the user without any risk
    assessment or tool summary. This change explicitly sets the reasoning
    effort to medium and bumps the timeout.
    
    This change has no effect if the user hasn't enabled the
    `experimental_sandbox_command_assessment` feature flag.
  • feat: update process_exec_tool_call() to take a cancellation token (#6972)
    This updates `ExecParams` so that instead of taking `timeout_ms:
    Option<u64>`, it now takes a more general cancellation mechanism,
    `ExecExpiration`, which is an enum that includes a
    `Cancellation(tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken)` variant.
    
    If the cancellation token is fired, then `process_exec_tool_call()`
    returns in the same way as if a timeout was exceeded.
    
    This is necessary so that in #6973, we can manage the timeout logic
    external to the `process_exec_tool_call()` because we want to "suspend"
    the timeout when an elicitation from a human user is pending.
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/6972).
    * #7005
    * #6973
    * __->__ #6972
  • execpolicy2 core integration (#6641)
    This PR threads execpolicy2 into codex-core.
    
    activated via feature flag: exec_policy (on by default)
    
    reads and parses all .codexpolicy files in `codex_home/codex`
    
    refactored tool runtime API to integrate execpolicy logic
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
  • core: widen sandbox to allow certificate ops when network is enabled (#5980)
    This allows `gh api` to work in the workspace-write sandbox w/ network
    enabled. Without this we see e.g.
    
    ```
    $ codex debug seatbelt --full-auto gh api repos/openai/codex/pulls --paginate -X GET -F state=all
    Get "https://api.github.com/repos/openai/codex/pulls?per_page=100&state=all": tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: OSStatus -26276
    ```
  • Changes to sandbox command assessment feature based on initial experiment feedback (#6091)
    * Removed sandbox risk categories; feedback indicates that these are not
    that useful and "less is more"
    * Tweaked the assessment prompt to generate terser answers
    * Fixed bug in orchestrator that prevents this feature from being
    exposed in the extension
  • Windows Sandbox - Alpha version (#4905)
    - Added the new codex-windows-sandbox crate that builds both a library
    entry point (run_windows_sandbox_capture) and a CLI executable to launch
    commands inside a Windows restricted-token sandbox, including ACL
    management, capability SID provisioning, network lockdown, and output
    capture
    (windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs:167, windows-sandbox-rs/src/main.rs:54).
    - Introduced the experimental WindowsSandbox feature flag and wiring so
    Windows builds can opt into the sandbox:
    SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken, the in-process execution path, and
    platform sandbox selection now honor the flag (core/src/features.rs:47,
    core/src/config.rs:1224, core/src/safety.rs:19,
    core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs:69, core/src/exec.rs:79,
    core/src/exec.rs:172).
    - Updated workspace metadata to include the new crate and its
    Windows-specific dependencies so the core crate can link against it
    (codex-rs/
        Cargo.toml:91, core/Cargo.toml:86).
    - Added a PowerShell bootstrap script that installs the Windows
    toolchain, required CLI utilities, and builds the workspace to ease
    development
        on the platform (scripts/setup-windows.ps1:1).
    - Landed a Python smoke-test suite that exercises
    read-only/workspace-write policies, ACL behavior, and network denial for
    the Windows sandbox
        binary (windows-sandbox-rs/sandbox_smoketests.py:1).
  • Delegate review to codex instance (#5572)
    In this PR, I am exploring migrating task kind to an invocation of
    Codex. The main reason would be getting rid off multiple
    `ConversationHistory` state and streamlining our context/history
    management.
    
    This approach depends on opening a channel between the sub-codex and
    codex. This channel is responsible for forwarding `interactive`
    (`approvals`) and `non-interactive` events. The `task` is responsible
    for handling those events.
    
    This opens the door for implementing `codex as a tool`, replacing
    `compact` and `review`, and potentially subagents.
    
    One consideration is this code is very similar to `app-server` specially
    in the approval part. If in the future we wanted an interactive
    `sub-codex` we should consider using `codex-mcp`
  • Added model summary and risk assessment for commands that violate sandbox policy (#5536)
    This PR adds support for a model-based summary and risk assessment for
    commands that violate the sandbox policy and require user approval. This
    aids the user in evaluating whether the command should be approved.
    
    The feature works by taking a failed command and passing it back to the
    model and asking it to summarize the command, give it a risk level (low,
    medium, high) and a risk category (e.g. "data deletion" or "data
    exfiltration"). It uses a new conversation thread so the context in the
    existing thread doesn't influence the answer. If the call to the model
    fails or takes longer than 5 seconds, it falls back to the current
    behavior.
    
    For now, this is an experimental feature and is gated by a config key
    `experimental_sandbox_command_assessment`.
    
    Here is a screen shot of the approval prompt showing the risk assessment
    and summary.
    
    <img width="723" height="282" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4597dd7c-d5a0-4e9f-9d13-414bd082fd6b"
    />
  • chore: rework tools execution workflow (#5278)
    Re-work the tool execution flow. Read `orchestrator.rs` to understand
    the structure