## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.
Concretely, it:
- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format
## Why
The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.
## Backward Compatibility
### Backward compatible
- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.
### Not backward compatible
- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.
Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- treat `requirements.toml` `allowed_domains` and `denied_domains` as
managed network baselines for the proxy
- in restricted modes by default, build the effective runtime policy
from the managed baseline plus user-configured allowlist and denylist
entries, so common hosts can be pre-approved without blocking later user
expansion
- add `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` to pin
the effective allowlist to managed entries, ignore user allowlist
additions, and hard-deny non-managed domains without prompting
- apply `managed_allowed_domains_only` anywhere managed network
enforcement is active, including full access, while continuing to
respect denied domains from all sources
- add regression coverage for merged-baseline behavior, managed-only
behavior, and full-access managed-only enforcement
## Behavior
Assuming `requirements.toml` defines both
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` and
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.
### Default mode
- By default, the effective allowlist is
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` plus user or persisted allowlist
additions.
- By default, the effective denylist is
`experimental_network.denied_domains` plus user or persisted denylist
additions.
- Allowlist misses can go through the network approval flow.
- Explicit denylist hits and local or private-network blocks are still
hard-denied.
- When `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true`, only
managed `allowed_domains` are respected, user allowlist additions are
ignored, and non-managed domains are hard-denied without prompting.
- Denied domains continue to be respected from all sources.
### Full access
- With managed requirements present, the effective allowlist is pinned
to `experimental_network.allowed_domains`.
- With managed requirements present, the effective denylist is pinned to
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.
- There is no allowlist-miss approval path in full access.
- Explicit denylist hits are hard-denied.
- `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` now also
applies in full access, so managed-only behavior remains in effect
anywhere managed network enforcement is active.
## Summary
- delete the network proxy admin server and its runtime listener/task
plumbing
- remove the admin endpoint config, runtime, requirement, protocol,
schema, and debug-surface fields
- update proxy docs to reflect the remaining HTTP and SOCKS listeners
only
## Summary
Adds support for a Unix socket escape hatch so we can bypass socket
allowlisting when explicitly enabled.
## Description
* added a new flag, `network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` as an
explicit escape hatch
* In codex-network-proxy, enabling that flag now allows any absolute
Unix socket path from x-unix-socket instead of requiring each path to be
explicitly allowlisted. Relative paths are still rejected.
* updated the macOS seatbelt path in core so it enforces the same Unix
socket behavior:
* allowlisted sockets generate explicit network* subpath rules
* allow-all generates a broad network* (subpath "/") rule
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
- enable local-use defaults in network proxy settings: SOCKS5 on, SOCKS5
UDP on, upstream proxying on, and local binding on
- add a regression test that asserts the full
`NetworkProxySettings::default()` baseline
- Fixed managed listener reservation behavior.
Before: we always reserved a loopback SOCKS listener, even when
enable_socks5 = false.
Now: SOCKS listener is only reserved when SOCKS is enabled.
- Fixed /debug-config env output for SOCKS-disabled sessions.
ALL_PROXY now shows the HTTP proxy URL when SOCKS is disabled (instead
of incorrectly showing socks5h://...).
## Validation
- just fmt
- cargo test -p codex-network-proxy
- cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets
As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
`Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
`NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
when it is dropped.)
The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
the appropriate places.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
* #11285
* __->__ #11207
Summary:
- Rename config table from network_proxy to network.
- Flatten allowed_domains, denied_domains, allow_unix_sockets, and
allow_local_binding onto NetworkProxySettings.
- Update runtime, state constraints, tests, and README to the new config
shape.
### Summary
- Adds an optional SOCKS5 listener via `rama-socks5`
- SOCKS5 is disabled by default and gated by config
- Reuses existing policy enforcement and blocked-request recording
- Blocks SOCKS5 in limited mode to prevent method-policy bypass
- Applies bind clamping to the SOCKS5 listener
### Config
New/used fields under `network_proxy`:
- `enable_socks5`
- `socks_url`
- `enable_socks5_udp`
### Scope
- Changes limited to `codex-rs/network-proxy` (+ `codex-rs/Cargo.lock`)
### Testing
```bash
cd codex-rs
just fmt
cargo test -p codex-network-proxy --offline
This add a new crate, `codex-network-proxy`, a local network proxy
service used by Codex to enforce fine-grained network policy (domain
allow/deny) and to surface blocked network events for interactive
approvals.
- New crate: `codex-rs/network-proxy/` (`codex-network-proxy` binary +
library)
- Core capabilities:
- HTTP proxy support (including CONNECT tunneling)
- SOCKS5 proxy support (in the later PR)
- policy evaluation (allowed/denied domain lists; denylist wins;
wildcard support)
- small admin API for polling/reload/mode changes
- optional MITM support for HTTPS CONNECT to enforce “limited mode”
method restrictions (later PR)
Will follow up integration with codex in subsequent PRs.
## Testing
- `cd codex-rs && cargo build -p codex-network-proxy`
- `cd codex-rs && cargo run -p codex-network-proxy -- proxy`
Michael Bolin ·
Celia Chen ·
viyatb-oai ·