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143
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  rka-oaiandGitHub
|
33cc928d33 |
[codex] Use input items for Responses Lite tools (#27946)
When using Responses Lite, we should all use `additional_tools` and a developer item instead of the top level tools array & instructions field. This keeps things 1-to-1. Forced namespacing for _all_ tools will land in a following PR after some coordination & fixes in Responses API (around collisions & return items). The goal is to eventually expand the scope of this to _all_ requests from codex, but that will require larger coordination across providers & slower rollout. |
||
 Owen LinandGitHub
|
4a82ecc3c9 |
feat(core): store turn_id on ResponseItem metadata (#28360)
## Description This PR is a followup to https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/28355 and starts assigning `internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough.turn_id` to durable Responses API items created during a turn. The goal is that those items keep the `turn_id` that introduced them when Codex resends stateless HTTP context, reconstructs history for resume/fork paths, or reuses websocket response state. ## What changed - Set `internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough.turn_id` when missing as response items enter durable history, initial/replacement history, inter-agent communication history, and local compaction summaries. - Preserve existing item turn IDs instead of overwriting them during persistence, resume reconstruction, compaction, forked history, and websocket incremental reuse. - Keep `compaction_trigger` fieldless because it is a request control, not a durable response item. - Update focused history/request assertions and fixtures for stateless requests, websocket incrementals, compaction, thread injection, prompt debug, and related CI coverage. |
||
|
Owen LinandGitHub
|
5b95745eae |
core: rename metadata -> internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough (#28968)
## Description This PR cuts Codex over from generic `ResponseItem.metadata` (introduced here: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/28355) to `ResponseItem.internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough`, which is the blessed path and has strongly-typed keys. For now we have to drop this MAv2 usage of `metadata`: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/28561 until we figure out where that should live. |
||
 pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
f00f93d8c0 |
[codex] Assign response item IDs when recording history (#28814)
## Why Client-created response items enter history without IDs, so their identity is lost across rollout persistence and resume. IDs should be assigned once at the history-recording boundary, while IDs returned by the server must remain unchanged. The Responses API validates item IDs using type-specific prefixes. Locally generated IDs therefore use the matching prefix plus a hyphenated UUIDv7, keeping them valid while distinguishable from server-generated IDs. Because this changes persisted history and provider request shapes, the behavior is opt-in behind the under-development `item_ids` feature. Compaction triggers remain request controls whose API shape does not accept an ID. ## What changed - Register the disabled-by-default `item_ids` feature and expose it in `config.schema.json`. - Make supported optional `ResponseItem` IDs serializable and expose them in the generated app-server schemas. - When `item_ids` is enabled, assign an ID during conversation-history preparation if an item has no ID. - Generate type-prefixed, hyphenated UUIDv7 IDs using the Responses API item conventions. - Preserve existing server IDs without rewriting them. - Persist assigned IDs in rollouts and include them in subsequent Responses requests. - Remove the unsupported ID field from `CompactionTrigger` and document why it has no ID. - Add integration coverage for enabled ID persistence, preservation of server IDs, and omission of generated IDs while the feature is disabled. `prepare_conversation_items_for_history` is the single response-item ID allocation boundary. ## Test plan - `just test -p codex-features` - `just test -p codex-core response_item_ids_persist_across_resume_and_preserve_server_ids` - `just test -p codex-core non_openai_responses_requests_omit_item_turn_metadata` - `just test -p codex-core resize_all_images_prepares_failures_before_history_insertion` - `just test -p codex-protocol` - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just test -p codex-api azure_default_store_attaches_ids_and_headers` |
||
|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
dbd2857f4b |
[codex] Add optional IDs to response items (#28812)
## Why `ResponseItem` variants do not have a consistent internal ID shape: some variants carry required IDs, some carry optional IDs, and some cannot represent an ID at all. The existing fields also use inconsistent serde, TypeScript, and JSON-schema annotations. A single enum-level access path is needed before history recording can assign and retain IDs. This PR establishes that internal model only. It intentionally does not generate or serialize IDs; allocation and wire persistence are isolated in the stacked follow-up. ## What changed - Give every concrete `ResponseItem` variant an `Option<String>` ID field. - Apply the same internal-only annotations to every ID field: `#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]`, `#[ts(skip)]`, and `#[schemars(skip)]`. - Add `ResponseItem::id()` and `ResponseItem::set_id()` as the shared accessors. - Preserve IDs when history items are rewritten for truncation. - Adapt consumers that previously assumed reasoning and image-generation IDs were required. - Regenerate app-server schemas so the hidden fields are represented consistently. The serde catch-all `ResponseItem::Other` remains ID-less because it must remain a unit variant. ## Test plan - `cargo check --tests -p codex-core -p codex-api -p codex-rollout-trace -p codex-image-generation-extension` - `just test -p codex-protocol` - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just test -p codex-api -p codex-rollout-trace -p codex-image-generation-extension` - `just test -p codex-core event_mapping` |
||
 jifandGitHub
|
45f603302c |
Add join key for MAv2 inter-agent messages (#28561)
## Summary This keeps inter-agent communication on the existing raw response item path and adds a join key for MAv2 tool calls. MAv2 `spawn_agent`, `send_message`, and `followup_task` now stamp the originating tool call id into `ResponseItemMetadata.source_call_id` on the raw `ResponseItem::AgentMessage`. App-server clients can join that raw item back to the existing tool/activity event by call id, while using the raw agent message's existing sender, receiver, and content fields. No new app-server `ThreadItem` or notification type is added. ## Tests - `just fmt` - `just write-app-server-schema` - `just test -p codex-protocol` - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just test -p codex-core multi_agent_v2_spawn_returns_path_and_send_message_accepts_relative_path` - `just test -p codex-core multi_agent_v2_followup_task_completion_notifies_parent_on_every_turn` - `just fix -p codex-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-core` |
||
|
jifandGitHub
|
5b22a8e5b1 |
feat: render typed envelopes for multi-agent v2 messages (#28368)
## Why
Multi-agent v2 messages need a consistent, model-visible envelope that
identifies what kind of interaction occurred, who sent it, and which
agent it targets. Previously, encrypted deliveries exposed only
`encrypted_content`, while child completion used the legacy
`<subagent_notification>` shape. That meant the client could not
consistently present `NEW_TASK`, `MESSAGE`, and `FINAL_ANSWER` using the
same format.
This change adds the routing envelope as plaintext while keeping task
and message payloads encrypted. No new Responses API field is required:
an encrypted delivery is represented as an `input_text` header
immediately followed by its existing `encrypted_content` item.
Every envelope now follows this shape:
```text
Message Type: <NEW_TASK | MESSAGE | FINAL_ANSWER>
Task name: <recipient agent path>
Sender: <author agent path>
Payload:
<message payload>
```
## Message types
### `NEW_TASK`
`NEW_TASK` is used when the recipient should begin a new turn, including
an initial `spawn_agent` task and a later `followup_task`.
For a root agent spawning `/root/worker`, the request contains a
plaintext envelope followed by the encrypted task:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root",
"recipient": "/root/worker",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: NEW_TASK\nTask name: /root/worker\nSender: /root\nPayload:\n"
},
{
"type": "encrypted_content",
"encrypted_content": "<encrypted task payload>"
}
]
}
```
Conceptually, the model receives:
```text
Message Type: NEW_TASK
Task name: /root/worker
Sender: /root
Payload:
Review the authentication changes and report any regressions.
```
### `MESSAGE`
`MESSAGE` is used for a queued `send_message` delivery. It communicates
with an existing agent without starting a new turn.
For `/root/worker` reporting progress to the root agent, the request
contains:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root/worker",
"recipient": "/root",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: MESSAGE\nTask name: /root\nSender: /root/worker\nPayload:\n"
},
{
"type": "encrypted_content",
"encrypted_content": "<encrypted message payload>"
}
]
}
```
Conceptually, the model receives:
```text
Message Type: MESSAGE
Task name: /root
Sender: /root/worker
Payload:
The protocol tests pass; I am checking the resume path now.
```
### `FINAL_ANSWER`
`FINAL_ANSWER` is emitted when a child agent reaches a terminal state
and reports its result to its parent. Completion payloads are already
available locally, so the complete envelope is represented as plaintext
rather than as a plaintext header plus encrypted content.
For `/root/worker` completing work for the root agent, the request
contains:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root/worker",
"recipient": "/root",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: FINAL_ANSWER\nTask name: /root\nSender: /root/worker\nPayload:\nNo regressions found."
}
]
}
```
The model-visible form is:
```text
Message Type: FINAL_ANSWER
Task name: /root
Sender: /root/worker
Payload:
No regressions found.
```
Errored, shut down, and missing agents also use `FINAL_ANSWER`, with a
terminal-status description in the payload.
## What changed
- Render `NEW_TASK` or `MESSAGE` in
`InterAgentCommunication::to_model_input_item`, based on whether the
encrypted delivery starts a turn.
- Replace the multi-agent v2 `<subagent_notification>` completion
payload with a model-visible `FINAL_ANSWER` envelope.
- Document `Task name`, `Sender`, and `Payload` consistently in the
multi-agent developer instructions.
- Prevent local-only history projections from treating an encrypted
message's plaintext header as the complete assistant message.
- Preserve rollout-trace interaction edges when an agent message
contains both plaintext and encrypted content.
Legacy multi-agent behavior remains unchanged.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-protocol`
- `just test -p codex-rollout-trace`
- `just test -p codex-web-search-extension`
- `just test -p codex-core
encrypted_multi_agent_v2_spawn_sends_agent_message_to_child`
- `just test -p codex-core
plaintext_multi_agent_v2_completion_sends_agent_message`
- `just test -p codex-core
multi_agent_v2_followup_task_completion_notifies_parent_on_every_turn`
- `just test -p codex-core
multi_agent_v2_completion_queues_message_for_direct_parent`
|
||
 Adam Perry @ OpenAIandGitHub
|
46f17930b6 |
Use PathUri in filesystem permission paths for exec-server (#28165)
## Why Progress towards letting app-server and exec-server run on different platforms, specifically for sandbox configuration. ## What - Make the filesystem path containment hierarchy generic, defaulting to `AbsolutePathBuf` for now. - Have clients specify `AbsolutePathBuf` or `PathUri` directly where needed. - Use `PathUri` throughout exec-server filesystem protocol and trait boundaries. - Implement `From` for conversion to path URIs and `TryFrom` for fallible conversion to absolute paths through the generic type hierarchy. |
||
|
Owen LinandGitHub
|
040dafa32d |
feat(core): add metadata field to ResponseItem (#28355)
## Description This PR adds an optional `metadata` field to `ResponseItem` for Responses API calls. Only mechanical plumbing, no actual values populated and sent yet. Turns out just adding a new field to `ResponseItem` has quite a large blast radius already. This change is backwards compatible because `metadata` is optional and omitted when absent, so existing response items and rollout history without it still deserialize and requests that do not set it keep the same wire shape. For provider compatibility, we strip out `metadata` before non-OpenAI Responses requests so Azure and AWS Bedrock never see this field. My followup PR here will actually make use of it to start storing and passing along `turn_id`: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/28360 ## What changed - Added `ResponseItemMetadata` with optional `turn_id`, plus optional `metadata` on Responses API item variants and inter-agent communication. - Preserved item metadata through response-item rewrites such as truncation, missing tool-output synthesis, compaction history rebuilding, visible-history conversion, rollout/resume, and generated app-server schemas/types. - Strip item metadata from non-OpenAI Responses requests while preserving it for OpenAI-shaped requests. - Updated the mechanical fixture/test construction churn required by the new optional field. |
||
|
jifandGitHub
|
8f2d6416ce |
Support plaintext agent messages (#27830)
## Why Multi-agent v2 `send_message` deliveries already reach the receiving model as typed `agent_message` items with encrypted content. Child-completion notifications are generated by Codex itself, so their content is plaintext and previously fell back to a serialized JSON envelope inside an assistant message. With plaintext `input_text` supported for `agent_message`, both delivery paths can use the same model-visible type while preserving explicit author and recipient metadata. ## What changed - add plaintext `input_text` support to `AgentMessageInputContent` and regenerate the affected app-server schemas - preserve `InterAgentCommunication` as structured mailbox input instead of converting it to assistant text - record delivered communications as typed `agent_message` history items - persist a dedicated rollout item so local delivery metadata such as `trigger_turn` remains available without leaking into the Responses request - reconstruct typed agent messages on resume and preserve fork-turn truncation behavior - remove request-time assistant-content parsing - preserve plaintext and encrypted inter-agent deliveries in stage-one memory inputs - normalize and link plaintext and encrypted agent messages in rollout traces without treating inbound messages as child results - cover the real MultiAgent V2 child-completion path end to end with deterministic mailbox synchronization ## Verification - `just test -p codex-core plaintext_multi_agent_v2_completion_sends_agent_message` - `just test -p codex-core input_queue_drains_mailbox_in_delivery_order record_initial_history_reconstructs_typed_inter_agent_message fork_turn_positions_use_inter_agent_delivery_metadata` - `just test -p codex-memories-write serializes_inter_agent_communications_for_memory` - `just test -p codex-rollout-trace agent_messages_preserve_routing_and_content sub_agent_started_activity_creates_spawn_edge` - `just test -p codex-rollout-trace agent_result_edge_falls_back_to_child_thread_without_result_message` - `just test -p codex-protocol -p codex-rollout -p codex-app-server-protocol` |
||
 Curtis 'Fjord' HawthorneandGitHub
|
a6f435ea94 |
core: resize all history images behind a feature flag (#27247)
## Summary Adds complete client-side image preparation behind the default-off `resize_all_images` feature flag. When enabled, local image producers defer decoding and resizing. Images are prepared centrally before insertion into conversation history, covering user input, `view_image`, and structured tool-output images. ## Behavior - Processes base64 `data:` images in messages and function/custom tool outputs. - Leaves non-data URLs, including HTTP(S) URLs, unchanged. - Applies image-detail budgets: - `high` and omitted: 2048px maximum dimension and 2.5K 32px patches. - `original`: 6000px maximum dimension and 10K 32px patches. - `auto`: uses the same 2048px / 2.5K-patch budget as high. - `low`: unsupported and replaced with an actionable placeholder. - Preserves original image bytes when no resize or format conversion is needed. - Enforces the shared 1 GiB encoded and decoded data-URL sanity limits. - Replaces only an image that fails preparation, preserving sibling content and tool-output metadata. - Uses bounded placeholders distinguishing generic processing failures, oversized images, and unsupported `low` detail. - Prepares resumed and forked history before installing it as live history without modifying persisted rollouts. ## Flag-Off Behavior When `resize_all_images` is disabled: - Existing local user-input and `view_image` processing remains unchanged. - Existing decoding and error behavior remains unchanged. - Arbitrary tool-output images are not processed. - HTTP(S) image URLs continue to be forwarded unchanged. #### [git stack](https://github.com/magus/git-stack-cli) - ✅ `1` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27245 - 👉 `2` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27247 - ⏳ `3` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27246 - ⏳ `4` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27266 |
||
|
Curtis 'Fjord' HawthorneandGitHub
|
c72205239f |
image: add shared data URL preparation utilities (#27245)
## Summary Add shared image-processing primitives needed for centralized image preparation in a follow-up PR. - Add `load_data_url_for_prompt` for decoding and preparing base64 image data URLs. - Add configurable maximum-dimension and 32px patch-budget resizing. - Enforce a 1 GiB sanity limit on both encoded and decoded data-URL representations. - Preserve original PNG, JPEG, and WebP bytes when resizing is unnecessary. - Preserve the existing GIF-to-PNG behavior. - Move image utility tests into the existing sidecar test module. ## Behavior This PR is intended to be runtime behavior-preserving. Existing production callers continue using `PromptImageMode::ResizeToFit` and `PromptImageMode::Original` with their existing semantics. The new data-URL entrypoint and configurable resize mode have no production callers in this PR; they are used by the next PR in the stack. This PR does not change user-input handling, `view_image`, history insertion, request construction, HTTP image URL forwarding, or app-server behavior. #### [git stack](https://github.com/magus/git-stack-cli) - 👉 `1` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27245 - ⏳ `2` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27247 - ⏳ `3` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27246 - ⏳ `4` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/27266 |
||
|
jifandGitHub
|
5f4d06ef18 |
Encrypt multi-agent v2 message payloads (#26210)
## Why
Multi-agent v2 currently routes agent instructions through normal tool
arguments and inter-agent context. That means the parent model can emit
plaintext task text, Codex can persist it in history/rollouts, and the
recipient can receive it as ordinary assistant-message JSON.
This changes the v2 path so agent instructions stay encrypted between
model calls: Responses encrypts the `message` argument returned by the
model, Codex forwards only that ciphertext, and Responses decrypts it
internally for the recipient model.
## What changed
- Mark the v2 `message` parameter as encrypted for `spawn_agent`,
`send_message`, and `followup_task`.
- Treat multi-agent v2 tool `message` values as ciphertext
unconditionally.
- Store v2 inter-agent task text in
`InterAgentCommunication.encrypted_content` with empty plaintext
`content`.
- Convert encrypted inter-agent communications into the Responses
`agent_message` input item before sending the child request.
- Preserve `agent_message` items across history, rollout, compaction,
telemetry, and app-server schema paths.
- Leave multi-agent v1 unchanged.
## Message shape
The model still calls the v2 tools with a `message` argument, but that
value is now ciphertext:
```json
{
"name": "spawn_agent",
"arguments": {
"task_name": "worker",
"message": "<ciphertext>"
}
}
```
Codex stores the task as encrypted inter-agent communication:
```json
{
"author": "/root",
"recipient": "/root/worker",
"content": "",
"encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>",
"trigger_turn": true
}
```
When Codex builds the recipient request, it forwards the ciphertext
using the new Responses input item:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root",
"recipient": "/root/worker",
"content": [
{
"type": "encrypted_content",
"encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>"
}
]
}
```
Responses decrypts that item internally for the recipient model.
## Context impact
- Parent context no longer carries plaintext v2 agent task instructions
from these tool arguments.
- Codex rollout/history stores ciphertext for v2 agent instructions.
- Recipient requests receive an `agent_message` item instead of
assistant commentary JSON for encrypted task delivery.
- Plaintext completion/status notifications are still plaintext because
they are Codex-generated status messages, not encrypted model tool
arguments.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-tools`
- `just test -p codex-protocol`
- `just test -p codex-rollout`
- `just test -p codex-rollout-trace`
- `just test -p codex-otel`
- `just write-app-server-schema`
|
||
 Won ParkandGitHub
|
57ab4c89e0 |
Expose local image paths to models (#25944)
## Why Local image attachments include image bytes, but the adjacent model-visible label omits the source path. Exposing the path lets model-selected workflows refer back to the intended local image explicitly. ## What changed - Include an escaped `path` attribute in model-visible local image opening tags. - Reuse the path-aware marker generator in rollout coverage. - Update protocol, replay, and rollout coverage for the new request shape. ## Validation - `just fmt` - `just test -p codex-protocol` - `just test -p codex-core skips_local_image_label_text` - `just test -p codex-core copy_paste_local_image_persists_rollout_request_shape` - `git diff --check` |
||
 Michael BolinandGitHub
|
593df8773d |
core: derive built-in permission profiles from raw policies (#25739)
## Why
Permission profiles that extend a built-in profile should behave like
other TOML inheritance: parent entries provide defaults, and child keys
override matching fields before the profile is compiled.
That was not true for `:workspace`. Previously, a profile with `extends
= ":workspace"` seeded the compiled runtime
`PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` policy and then appended child
filesystem entries. A child override such as `":tmpdir" = "read"`
therefore left the inherited `":tmpdir" = "write"` entry in the final
policy. Since same-target `write` wins over `read` during runtime
resolution, the child override was ineffective.
This also needs a clear source of truth for the built-in profiles. The
protocol-level sandbox policy constructors now define the raw built-in
filesystem entries, and both `PermissionProfile` presets and
config-profile inheritance derive from those same values.
## What Changed
- Add a canonical `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only()` constructor
while keeping the read-only and workspace-write raw filesystem entries
explicit and independent.
- Derive `PermissionProfile::read_only()` from
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only()`;
`PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` continues to derive from
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()`.
- Build extensible `:read-only` and `:workspace` parent profiles by
projecting those canonical sandbox policies into
`PermissionProfileToml`, then merge user overrides at the TOML layer
before compilation.
- Add config parsing support for `:slash_tmp` so the built-in
`:workspace` parent can be expressed in the same TOML-shaped filesystem
table as user profiles.
- Document that `PermissionsToml::resolve_profile()` returns an
already-merged `PermissionProfileToml`, and return that profile directly
after removing the resolved-profile wrapper.
- Extend the config test for `extends = ":workspace"` to assert that
inherited `":slash_tmp" = "write"` is preserved and that a child
`":tmpdir" = "read"` entry replaces the inherited `write` entry.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-config`
- `just test -p codex-protocol`
- `just test -p codex-core
permissions_profiles_resolve_extends_parent_first_with_child_overrides`
- `just test -p codex-core
default_permissions_profile_can_extend_builtin_workspace`
- `just test -p codex-core`
- Result: 2596 passed, 4 failed, 1 timed out.
- The failures were existing sandbox/environment-sensitive tests
unrelated to this permissions change:
`suite::user_shell_cmd::user_shell_command_does_not_set_network_sandbox_env_var`,
`suite::user_shell_cmd::user_shell_command_history_is_persisted_and_shared_with_model`,
`suite::abort_tasks::interrupt_persists_turn_aborted_marker_in_next_request`,
`suite::abort_tasks::interrupt_tool_records_history_entries`, and
`thread_manager::tests::start_thread_uses_all_default_environments_from_codex_home`.
|
||
 Alexi ChristakisandGitHub
|
e92c952b2e |
[codex] Add user input client ids (#24653)
## Summary Adds an optional `clientId` field to app-server v2 `UserInput` and carries it through the core `UserInput` model so clients can correlate echoed user input items without relying on payload equality. ## Details - Adds `client_id: Option<String>` to core `UserInput` variants. - Exposes the v2 app-server field as `clientId` on the wire and in generated TypeScript. - Preserves the id when converting between app-server v2 and core protocol types. - Regenerates app-server schema fixtures. ## Validation - `just fmt` - `just write-app-server-schema` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-protocol` - `git diff --check` |
||
 rhan-oaiandGitHub
|
dc4e54d061 |
Restore legacy image detail values (#24644)
## Why Older persisted rollouts can contain `input_image.detail` values of `auto` or `low` from before `ImageDetail` was narrowed to `high`/`original`. Current deserialization rejects those values, which can make resume skip later compacted checkpoints and reconstruct an oversized raw suffix before the next compaction attempt. Confirmed Sentry reports fixed by this compatibility path: - [CODEX-1H3F](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7500642496/) - [CODEX-1H6N](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7501025347/) - [CODEX-1JDP](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7504549065/) - [CODEX-1HW6](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7503407986/) ## Background [openai/codex#20693](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/20693) added image-detail plumbing for app-server `UserInput` so input images could explicitly request `detail: original`. The Slack discussion behind that PR was about ScreenSpot / bridge evals where user input images were resized, while tool output images already had MCP/code-mode ways to request image detail. In review, the intended new API surface was narrowed to `high` and `original`: default to `high`, allow `original` when callers need unchanged image handling, and avoid encouraging new `auto` or `low` usage. That policy still makes sense for newly emitted values. The missing compatibility piece is persisted history. Older rollouts can already contain `auto` and `low`, and resume reconstructs typed history by deserializing those rollout records. Rejecting old values at that boundary causes valid compacted checkpoints to be skipped. This PR restores `auto` and `low` as real variants so old records deserialize and round-trip without being rewritten as `high`, while product paths can continue to default to `high` and avoid emitting `auto` for new behavior. ## What changed - Restored `ImageDetail::Auto` and `ImageDetail::Low` as first-class protocol values. - Preserved `auto`/`low` through rollout deserialization, MCP image metadata, code-mode image output, and schema/type generation. - Kept local image byte handling conservative: only `original` switches to original-resolution loading; `auto`/`low`/`high` continue through the resize-to-fit path while retaining their detail value. - Added regression coverage for enum round-tripping and code-mode `low` detail handling. ## Testing - `just write-app-server-schema` - `just test -p codex-protocol` - `just test -p codex-tools` - `just test -p codex-code-mode` - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just test -p codex-core suite::rmcp_client::stdio_image_responses_preserve_original_detail_metadata` - `just test -p codex-core suite::code_mode::code_mode_can_use_mcp_image_result_with_image_helper` - Loaded broken rollouts on local fixed builds, and started/completed new turns. I also attempted `just test -p codex-core`; the local broad run did not finish green: 2559 tests run, 2467 passed, 55 flaky, 91 failed, 1 timed out. The failures were broad timeout/deadline failures across unrelated areas; targeted changed-path core tests above passed. |
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pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
46391f7efa |
[codex] remove plain image wrapper spans (#24652)
## Why Remote image submissions currently wrap native `input_image` spans in literal `` text spans. Those extra prompt tokens add structure without providing label or routing information. ## What Changed - Serialize `UserInput::Image` directly as an `input_image` content span. - Preserve named local-image framing and legacy wrapper parsing for labeled attachments and existing histories. - Update existing request-shape expectations for drag-and-drop images, model switching, and compaction. ## Validation - `just test -p codex-protocol` - Focused `codex-core` run covering `drag_drop_image_persists_rollout_request_shape`, `model_change_from_image_to_text_strips_prior_image_content`, and `snapshot_request_shape_pre_turn_compaction_including_incoming_user_message` ## Notes - A broader `just test -p codex-core` run was attempted; the affected tests passed, while the overall run failed in unrelated CLI, MCP, and tooling tests plus a `thread_manager` timeout. |
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 sayan-oaiandGitHub
|
a22706dfae |
standalone websearch extension (#23823)
## Summary Add the extension-backed standalone `web.run` tool so Codex can call the standalone search endpoint through the `codex-api` search client and return its encrypted output to Responses. - gate the new tool behind `standalone_web_search` - install the extension in the app-server thread registry and hide hosted `web_search` when standalone search is enabled for OpenAI providers so the two paths stay mutually exclusive - build search context from persisted history using a small tail heuristic: previous user message, assistant text between the last two user turns capped at about 1k tokens, and current user message ## Test Plan - `cargo test -p codex-web-search-extension` - `cargo test -p codex-api` - `cargo test -p codex-core hosted_tools_follow_provider_auth_model_and_config_gates` |
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 viyatb-oaiandGitHub
|
fe7c069fe6 |
feat(permissions): resolve permission profile inheritance (#22270)
## Stack This is the foundation PR for the permission-profile inheritance stack. - This PR adds config-level `extends` resolution and merge semantics. - Follow-up: #23705 applies resolved profiles at runtime and updates the active-profile protocol surfaces. ## Why Permission profiles are starting to carry enough policy that copy-pasting near-identical definitions becomes hard to review and easy to drift. Before the runtime can consume inherited profiles, the config layer needs one explicit resolver that can merge parent chains and reject unsafe or invalid inheritance shapes. ## What changed - Add `extends` to permission-profile TOML and resolve parent chains in inheritance order. - Merge inherited profile TOML with the existing config merge behavior while preserving the permission-specific normalization needed for network domain keys. - Keep parent descriptions out of resolved child profiles and record inherited profile names separately for downstream consumers. - Reject undefined parents, unsupported built-in parents, and inheritance cycles with targeted errors. - Cover resolver behavior with TOML fixture tests and refresh the generated config schema. ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-config` - `cargo test -p codex-core permissions_profiles_` |
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sayan-oaiandGitHub
|
34aad43684 |
add encryptedcontent to functioncalloutput (#23500)
add new `EncryptedContent` variant to `FunctionCallOutputContentItem` ahead of standalone websearch. we need to be able to receive and pass encrypted function call output from the new web search endpoint back to responsesapi, as we cannot expose direct search results. |
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viyatb-oaiandGitHub
|
3c76081876 |
Make deny canonical for filesystem permission entries (#23493)
## Why Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`. ## What changed - rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny` - serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value - retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config compatibility - update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the canonical spelling - refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire shape ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-core read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib` Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed cleanly. |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
9025550709 |
app-server-protocol: remove PermissionProfile from API (#22924)
## Why The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally; exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand details that should remain implementation-level. The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type space and the core protocol model. Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so we don't need to be too finicky about these changes. ## What Changed - Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface, including generated schema and TypeScript exports. - Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to `ActivePermissionProfile`. - Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics. - Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims. |
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Curtis 'Fjord' HawthorneandGitHub
|
8543e39885 |
Preserve image detail in app-server inputs (#20693)
## Summary - Add optional image detail to user image inputs across core, app-server v2, thread history/event mapping, and the generated app-server schemas/types. - Preserve requested detail when serializing Responses image inputs: omitted detail stays on the existing `high` default, while explicit `original` keeps local images on the original-resolution path. - Support `high`/`original` consistently for tool image outputs, including MCP `codex/imageDetail`, code-mode image helpers, and `view_image`. |
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jif-oaiandGitHub
|
0322ac3df8 |
[codex] Use compaction_trigger item for remote compaction v2 (#22809)
## Why
Remote compaction v2 was still using `context_compaction` as both the
request trigger and the compacted output shape. The Responses API now
has the landed contract for this flow: Codex sends a dedicated `{
"type": "compaction_trigger" }` input item, and the backend returns the
standard `compaction` output item with encrypted content.
This aligns the v2 path with that wire contract while preserving the
existing local compacted-history post-processing behavior.
## What changed
- Add `ResponseItem::CompactionTrigger` and regenerate the app-server
protocol schema fixtures.
- Send `compaction_trigger` from `remote_compaction_v2` instead of a
payload-less `context_compaction`.
- Collect exactly one backend `compaction` output item, then reuse the
existing compacted-history rebuilding path.
- Treat the trigger item as a transient request marker rather than model
output or persisted rollout/memory content.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol compaction_trigger`
- `cargo test -p codex-core remote_compact_v2`
- `cargo test -p codex-core compact_remote_v2`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
responses_websocket_sends_response_processed_after_remote_compaction_v2`
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
c25d905f61 |
permissions: support workspace roots in profiles (#22610)
## Why This is the configuration/model half of the alternative permissions migration we discussed as a comparison point for [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) and [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402). The old `workspace-write` model mixes three concerns that we want to keep separate: - reusable profile rules that should stay immutable once selected - user/runtime workspace roots from `cwd`, `--add-dir`, and legacy workspace-write config - internal Codex writable roots such as memories, which should not be shown as user workspace roots This PR gives permission profiles first-class `workspace_roots` so users can opt multiple repositories into the same `:workspace_roots` rules without using broad absolute-path write grants. It also starts separating the raw selected profile from the effective runtime profile by making `Permissions` expose explicit accessors instead of public mutable fields. A representative `config.toml` looks like this: ```toml default_permissions = "dev" [permissions.dev.workspace_roots] "~/code/openai" = true "~/code/developers-website" = true [permissions.dev.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" ".codex" = "read" ".git" = "read" ".vscode" = "read" ``` If Codex starts in `~/code/codex` with that profile selected, the effective workspace-root set becomes: - `~/code/codex` from the runtime `cwd` - `~/code/openai` from the profile - `~/code/developers-website` from the profile The `:workspace_roots` rules are materialized across each root, so `.git`, `.codex`, and `.vscode` stay scoped the same way everywhere. Runtime additions such as `--add-dir` can still layer on later stack entries without mutating the selected profile. ## Stack Shape This PR intentionally stops before the profile-identity cleanup in [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) so the base review stays focused on config loading, workspace-root materialization, and compatibility with legacy `workspace-write`. The representation in this PR is therefore transitional: `Permissions` carries enough state to distinguish the raw constrained profile from the effective runtime profile, and there are still call sites that must keep the active profile identity and constrained profile value in sync. The follow-up PR replaces that with a single resolved profile state (`ResolvedPermissionProfile` / `PermissionProfileState`) that keeps the profile id, immutable `PermissionProfile`, and profile-declared workspace roots together. That follow-up removes APIs such as `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` where separate arguments could drift out of sync. Downstream PRs then build on this base to switch app-server turn updates to profile ids plus runtime workspace roots and to finish the user-visible summary behavior. Reviewers should judge this PR as the workspace-roots foundation, not as the final in-memory shape of selected permission profiles. ## Review Guide Suggested review order: 1. Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs`. This is the main shape change in the base slice. `Permissions` now stores a private raw `Constrained<PermissionProfile>` plus runtime `workspace_roots`. Callers use `permission_profile()` when they need the raw constrained value and `effective_permission_profile()` when they need a materialized runtime profile. As noted above, [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) replaces this transitional shape with a resolved profile state that keeps identity and profile data together. 2. Review `codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs` and `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs`. These add `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]`, resolve enabled entries relative to the policy cwd, and keep `:workspace_roots` deny-read glob patterns symbolic until the actual roots are known. 3. Review `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` and `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`. These add the policy/profile materialization helpers that expand exact `:workspace_roots` entries and scoped deny-read globs over every workspace root. This is also where `ActivePermissionProfileModification` is removed from the core model. 4. Review the legacy bridge in `Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides` and `Config::set_legacy_sandbox_policy`. This is where legacy `workspace-write` roots become runtime workspace roots, while Codex internal writable roots stay internal and do not appear as user-facing workspace roots. 5. Then skim downstream call sites. The interesting pattern is raw-vs-effective access: state/proxy/bwrap paths keep the raw constrained profile, while execution, summaries, and user-visible status use the effective profile and workspace-root list. ## What Changed - added `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` to the config model and schema - added runtime `workspace_roots` state to `Config`/`Permissions` and `ConfigOverrides` - made `Permissions` profile fields private and replaced direct mutation with accessors/setters - added `PermissionProfile` and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for materializing `:workspace_roots` exact paths and deny-read globs across all roots - moved legacy additional writable roots into runtime workspace-root state instead of active profile modifications - removed `ActivePermissionProfileModification` and its app-server protocol/schema export - updated sandbox/status summary paths so internal writable roots are not reported as user workspace roots ## Verification Strategy The targeted tests cover the behavior at the layers where regressions are most likely: - `codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs` verifies config loading, legacy workspace-root seeding, effective profile materialization, and memory-root handling. - `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs` verifies profile `workspace_roots` parsing and `:workspace_roots` scoped/glob compilation. - `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` unit tests verify exact and glob materialization over multiple workspace roots. - `codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs` and `codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs` verify the user-facing summaries show effective workspace roots and hide internal writes. I also ran `cargo check --tests` locally after the latest stack refresh to catch cross-crate API breakage from the private-field/accessor changes. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22610). * #22612 * #22611 * #22683 * __->__ #22610 |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
01d93fd9fc |
permissions: canonicalize workspace_roots and danger-full-access names (#22624)
## Why This is a small precursor to the larger permissions-migration work. Both the comparison stack in [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) / [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402) and the alternate stack in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) / [#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611) / [#22612](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22612) are easier to review if the terminology is already settled underneath them. Because `:project_roots` and `:danger-no-sandbox` have not shipped as stable user-facing surface area, carrying them forward as aliases would just add more migration logic to the later stacks. This PR removes that ambiguity now so the follow-on work can rely on one spelling for each built-in concept. ## What Changed - renamed the config-facing special filesystem key from `:project_roots` to `:workspace_roots` - dropped unpublished `:project_roots` parsing support in `core/src/config/permissions.rs`, so new config only recognizes `:workspace_roots` - renamed the built-in full-access permission profile id from `:danger-no-sandbox` to `:danger-full-access` - dropped unpublished `:danger-no-sandbox` support entirely, including the old active-profile canonicalization path, and added explicit rejection coverage for the legacy id - introduced shared built-in permission-profile id constants in `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs` - updated `core`, `app-server`, and `tui` call sites that special-case built-in profiles to use the shared constants and canonical ids - updated tests and the Linux sandbox README to use `:workspace_roots` / `:danger-full-access` ## Verification I focused verification on the three places this rename can regress: config parsing, active-profile identity surfaced back out of `core`, and user/server call sites that special-case built-in profiles. Targeted checks: - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_table` - `config::tests::default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications` - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile` - `config::tests::legacy_danger_no_sandbox_is_rejected` - `workspace_root` filtered `codex-core` tests - `request_processors::thread_processor::thread_processor_tests::thread_processor_behavior_tests::requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` - `suite::v2::turn_start::turn_start_rejects_invalid_permission_selection_before_starting_turn` - `status::tests::status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions` - `status::tests::status_permissions_full_disk_managed_with_network_is_danger_full_access` - `app_server_session::tests::embedded_turn_permissions_use_active_profile_selection` |
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|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
83decfa300 |
[codex] Remove unused legacy shell tools (#22246)
## Why Recent session history showed no active use of the raw `shell`, `local_shell`, or `container.exec` execution surfaces. Keeping those handlers/specs wired into core leaves duplicate shell execution paths alongside the supported `shell_command` and unified exec tools. ## What changed - Removed the raw `shell` handler/spec and its `ShellToolCallParams` protocol helper. - Removed the legacy `local_shell` and `container.exec` handler/spec plumbing while preserving persisted-history compatibility for old response items. - Normalized model/config `default` and `local` shell selections to `shell_command`. - Pruned tests that exercised removed raw-shell/local-shell/apply-patch variants and kept coverage on `shell_command`, unified exec, and freeform `apply_patch`. ## Verification - `git diff --check` - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-tools` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::shell` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::spec` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::router` - `cargo test -p codex-core active_call_preserves_triggering_command_context` - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_serialization` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_command_` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all local_shell` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all otel::` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all hooks::` - `just fix -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-tools` |
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|
d927f61208 |
feat: add remote compaction v2 Responses client path (#20773)
## Why This adds the `remote_compaction_v2` client path so remote compaction can run through the normal Responses stream and install a `context_compaction` item that trigger a compaction. The goal is to migrate some of the compaction logic on the client side We keeps the v2 transport behind a feature flag while letting follow-up requests reuse the compacted context instead of falling back to the legacy compaction item shape. ## What changed - add `ResponseItem::ContextCompaction` and refresh the generated app-server / schema / TypeScript fixtures that expose response items on the wire - add `core/src/compact_remote_v2.rs` to send compaction through the standard streamed Responses client, require exactly one `context_compaction` output item, and install that item into compacted history - route manual compact and auto-compaction through the v2 path when `remote_compaction_v2` is enabled, while keeping the existing remote compaction path as the fallback - preserve the new item type across history retention, follow-up request construction, telemetry, rollout persistence, and rollout-trace normalization - add targeted coverage for the feature flag, `context_compaction` serialization, rollout-trace normalization, and remote-compaction follow-up behavior ## Verification - added protocol tests for `context_compaction` serialization/deserialization in `protocol/src/models.rs` - added rollout-trace coverage for `context_compaction` normalization in `rollout-trace/src/reducer/conversation_tests.rs` - added remote compaction integration coverage for v2 follow-up reuse and mixed compaction output streams in `core/tests/suite/compact_remote.rs` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
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ac4332c05b | permissions: expose active profile metadata (#20095) | ||
 friel-openaiandGitHub
|
598bbcdb58 | Preserve assistant phase for replayed messages (#19832) | ||
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pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
4e05f3053c |
Remove ghost snapshots (#19481)
## Summary - Remove `ghost_snapshot` / `GhostCommit` from the Responses API surface and generated SDK/schema artifacts. - Keep legacy config loading compatible, but make undo a no-op that reports the feature is unavailable. - Clean up core history, compaction, telemetry, rollout, and tests to stop carrying ghost snapshot items. ## Testing - Unit tests passed for `codex-protocol`, `codex-core` targeted undo and compaction flows, `codex-rollout`, and `codex-app-server-protocol`. - Regenerated config and app-server schemas plus Python SDK artifacts and verified they match the checked-in outputs. |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
755880ef9c |
permissions: derive config defaults as profiles (#19772)
## Why This continues the permissions migration by making legacy config default resolution produce the canonical `PermissionProfile` first. The legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection should stay available at compatibility boundaries, but config loading should not create a legacy policy just to immediately convert it back into a profile. Specifically, when `default_permissions` is not specified in `config.toml`, instead of creating a `SandboxPolicy` in `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs` and then trying to derive a `PermissionProfile` from it, we use `derive_permission_profile()` to create a more faithful `PermissionProfile` using the values of `ConfigToml` directly. This also keeps the existing behavior of `sandbox_workspace_write` and extra writable roots after #19841 replaced `:cwd` with `:project_roots`. Legacy workspace-write defaults are represented as symbolic `:project_roots` write access plus symbolic project-root metadata carveouts. Extra absolute writable roots are still added directly and continue to get concrete metadata protections for paths that exist under those roots. The platform sandboxes differ when a symbolic project-root subpath does not exist yet. * **Seatbelt** can encode literal/subpath exclusions directly, so macOS emits project-root metadata subpath policies even if `.git`, `.agents`, or `.codex` do not exist. * **bwrap** has to materialize bind-mount targets. Binding `/dev/null` to a missing `.git` can create a host-visible placeholder that changes Git repo discovery. Binding missing `.agents` would not affect Git discovery, but it would still create a host-visible project metadata placeholder from an automatic compatibility carveout. Linux therefore skips only missing automatic `.git` and `.agents` read-only metadata masks; missing `.codex` remains protected so first-time project config creation goes through the protected-path approval flow. User-authored `read` and `none` subpath rules keep normal bwrap behavior, and `none` can still mask the first missing component to prevent creation under writable roots. ## What Changed - Adds profile-native helpers for legacy workspace-write semantics, including `PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with()`, `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()`, and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots()`. - Makes `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()` the single legacy workspace-write constructor so both `from_legacy_sandbox_policy()` and `From<&SandboxPolicy>` include the project-root metadata carveouts. - Removes the no-carveout `legacy_workspace_write_base_policy()` path and the `prune_read_entries_under_writable_roots()` cleanup that was only needed by that split construction. - Adds `ConfigToml::derive_permission_profile()` for legacy sandbox-mode fallback resolution; named `default_permissions` profiles continue through the permissions profile pipeline instead of being reconstructed from `sandbox_mode`. - Updates `Config::load()` to start from the derived profile, validate that it still has a legacy compatibility projection, and apply additional writable roots directly to managed workspace-write filesystem policies. - Updates Linux bwrap argument construction so missing automatic `.git`/`.agents` symbolic project-root read-only carveouts are skipped before emitting bind args; missing `.codex`, user-authored `read`/`none` subpath rules, and existing missing writable-root behavior are preserved. - Adds coverage that legacy workspace-write config produces symbolic project-root metadata carveouts, extra legacy workspace writable roots still protect existing metadata paths such as `.git`, and bwrap skips missing `.git`/`.agents` project-root carveouts while preserving missing `.codex` and user-authored missing subpath rules. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19772). * #19776 * #19775 * #19774 * #19773 * __->__ #19772 |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
4b55979755 |
permissions: remove cwd special path (#19841)
## Why
The experimental `PermissionProfile` API had both `:cwd` and
`:project_roots` special filesystem paths, which made the permission
root ambiguous. This PR removes the unstable `current_working_directory`
special path before the permissions API is stabilized, so callers use
`:project_roots` for symbolic project-root access.
## What changed
- Removes `FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory` from protocol
and app-server protocol models, plus regenerated app-server
JSON/TypeScript schemas.
- Replaces internal `:cwd` permission entries with `:project_roots`
entries.
- Keeps the existing cwd-update behavior for legacy-shaped
workspace-write profiles, while removing the deleted
`CurrentWorkingDirectory` case from that compatibility path.
- Keeps `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` as the reusable symbolic
workspace-write helper, with docs noting that `:project_roots` entries
resolve at enforcement time.
- Updates app-server docs/examples and approval UI labeling to stop
advertising `:cwd` as a permission token.
## Compatibility
Persisted rollout items may contain the old
`{"kind":"current_working_directory"}` tag from earlier experimental
`permissionProfile` snapshots. This PR keeps that tag as a
deserialize-only alias for `ProjectRoots { subpath: None }`, while
continuing to serialize only the new `project_roots` tag.
## Follow-up
This PR intentionally does not introduce an explicit project-root set on
`SessionConfiguration` or runtime sandbox resolution. Today, the
resolver still uses the active cwd as the single implicit project root.
A follow-up should model project roots separately from tool cwd so
`:project_roots` entries can resolve against the configured project
roots, and resolve to no entries when there are no project roots.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permissions:: --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_ --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
command_exec_permission_profile_project_roots_use_command_cwd --test
all`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile
--lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
preset_matching_accepts_workspace_write_with_extra_roots --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`
|
||
 Andrey MishchenkoandGitHub
|
35bc6e3d01 |
Delete unused ResponseItem::Message.end_turn (#19605)
This field is unused. Delete it. |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
deaa307fb2 |
permissions: derive compatibility policies from profiles (#19392)
## Why After #19391, `PermissionProfile` and the split filesystem/network policies could still be stored in parallel. That creates drift risk: a profile can preserve deny globs, external enforcement, or split filesystem entries while a cached projection silently loses those details. This PR makes the profile the runtime source and derives compatibility views from it. ## What Changed - Removes stored filesystem/network sandbox projections from `Permissions` and `SessionConfiguration`; their accessors now derive from the canonical `PermissionProfile`. - Derives legacy `SandboxPolicy` snapshots from profiles only where an older API still needs that field. - Updates MCP connection and elicitation state to track `PermissionProfile` instead of `SandboxPolicy` for auto-approval decisions. - Adds semantic filesystem-policy comparison so cwd changes can preserve richer profiles while still recognizing equivalent legacy projections independent of entry ordering. - Updates config/session tests to assert profile-derived projections instead of parallel stored fields. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots` - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19392). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * __->__ #19392 |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
4d7ce3447d |
permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
## Why This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the runtime-config change needed a fresh PR. `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231 because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External` enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime profiles such as direct write roots. The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions model migration. ## What Changed - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state, while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection. - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections synchronized. - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through `SandboxPolicy` exactly. - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions. - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when command/session profiles are narrowed. - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy defaults. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots` - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * #19392 * __->__ #19606 |
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Michael BolinandGitHub
|
13e0ec1614 |
permissions: make legacy profile conversion cwd-free (#19414)
## Why The profile conversion path still required a `cwd` even when it was only translating a legacy `SandboxPolicy` into a `PermissionProfile`. That made profile producers invent an ambient `cwd`, which is exactly the anchoring we are trying to remove from permission-profile data. A legacy workspace-write policy can be represented symbolically instead: `:cwd = write` plus read-only `:project_roots` metadata subpaths. This PR creates that cwd-free base so the rest of the stack can stop threading cwd through profile construction. Callers that actually need a concrete runtime filesystem policy for a specific cwd still have an explicitly named cwd-bound conversion. ## What Changed - `PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` now takes only `&SandboxPolicy`. - `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` is now the symbolic, cwd-free projection for profiles. - The old concrete projection is retained as `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd` for runtime/boundary code that must materialize legacy cwd behavior. - Workspace-write profiles preserve `CurrentWorkingDirectory` and `ProjectRoots` special entries instead of materializing cwd into absolute paths. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics --tests` - `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19414). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * #19392 * #19391 * __->__ #19414 |
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|
Michael BolinandGitHub
|
4816b89204 |
permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.
The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
Managed {
file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
Disabled,
External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
}
```
This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.
## How Existing Modeling Maps
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:
- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.
## What Changed
- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.
## Compatibility
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
## Verification
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
|
||
|
Michael BolinandGitHub
|
18a26d7bbc |
app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
## Why `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands. This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as `**/*.env = deny`. ## What changed - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`. - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread resume requests. - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox projection used by existing execution paths. - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests. - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides. - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures and regression coverage. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures` - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * __->__ #18279 |
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|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
2a226096f6 |
Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. (#18813)
Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. |
||
|
Michael BolinandGitHub
|
3d2f123895 |
protocol: preserve glob scan depth in permission profiles (#18713)
## Why #18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to `PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata: `glob_scan_max_depth`. That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`. On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible permission entries look equivalent. ## What changed - Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`. - Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is not silently dropped. - Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas, and app-server/TUI conversion call sites. - Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization, merging, and intersection. - Carry the merged scan depth into the effective `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture` - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * #18277 * #18276 * #18275 * __->__ #18713 |
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|
Michael BolinandGitHub
|
dcec516313 |
protocol: canonicalize file system permissions (#18274)
## Why `PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent. ## What changed This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and `PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as full-disk legacy access. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-protocol root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture` |
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|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
53b1570367 |
Update image outputs to default to high detail (#18386)
Do not assume the default `detail`. |
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|
Won ParkandGitHub
|
a58a0f083d |
Feat/auto review dev message marker (#18369)
supporting guardian's rebrand to auto-review! |
||
|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
9effa0509f |
Refactor config loading to use filesystem abstraction (#18209)
Initial pass propagating FileSystem through config loading. |
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|
Curtis 'Fjord' HawthorneandGitHub
|
9e2fc31854 |
Support original-detail metadata on MCP image outputs (#17714)
## Summary - honor `_meta["codex/imageDetail"] == "original"` on MCP image content and map it to `detail: "original"` where supported - strip that detail back out when the active model does not support original-detail image inputs - update code-mode `image(...)` to accept individual MCP image blocks - teach `js_repl` / `codex.emitImage(...)` to preserve the same hint from raw MCP image outputs - document the new `_meta` contract and add generic RMCP-backed coverage across protocol, core, code-mode, and js_repl paths |
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|
pakrym-oaiandGitHub
|
413c1e1fdf |
[codex] reduce module visibility (#16978)
## Summary - reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports - update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate APIs instead of reaching through module trees - add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md ## Validation - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed before the final fix/format pass - `just fix` completed successfully - `just fmt` completed successfully - `git diff --check` passed |
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|
Michael BolinandGitHub
|
61dfe0b86c |
chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)
## Why `argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage: the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path. This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated. ## What changed - mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches - updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to `--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set - fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are preserved with a single separator - documented the new default behavior in `tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md` - updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins` That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux- and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling `--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by additional lint findings in those lanes. ## Validation - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins` - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests` - `just argument-comment-lint` - `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint` - `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection` ## Follow-up - Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation. - Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation. |
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|
jif-oaiandGitHub
|
2c85ca6842 | Use codex-utils-template for sandbox mode prompts (#15998) |