## Why
Clients need a stable app-server protocol surface for enrolling a local
device key, retrieving its public key, and producing a device-bound
proof.
The protocol reports `protectionClass` explicitly so clients can
distinguish hardware-backed keys from an explicitly allowed OS-protected
fallback. Signing uses a tagged `DeviceKeySignPayload` enum rather than
arbitrary bytes so each signed statement is auditable at the API
boundary.
## What changed
- Added v2 JSON-RPC methods for `device/key/create`,
`device/key/public`, and `device/key/sign`.
- Added request/response types for device-key metadata, SPKI public
keys, protection classes, and ECDSA signatures.
- Added `DeviceKeyProtectionPolicy` with hardware-only default behavior
and an explicit `allow_os_protected_nonextractable` option.
- Added the initial `remoteControlClientConnection` signing payload
variant.
- Regenerated JSON Schema and TypeScript fixtures for app-server
clients.
## Stack
This is PR 1 of 4 in the device-key app-server stack.
## Validation
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
Ruslan Nigmatullin