Commit Graph

107 Commits

  • Require absolute cwd in thread settings (#26532)
    ## Why
    
    Thread settings cwd overrides are expected to be resolved before they
    enter core. Keeping this boundary as a plain `PathBuf` made it easy for
    core/session code to keep fallback normalization and relative-path
    resolution logic in places that should only receive an already-resolved
    cwd.
    
    This is intentionally the absolute-cwd-only slice: it does not change
    environment selection stickiness or cwd-to-default-environment fallback
    behavior.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Changes `ThreadSettingsOverrides.cwd`,
    `CodexThreadSettingsOverrides.cwd`, and `SessionSettingsUpdate.cwd` to
    use `AbsolutePathBuf`.
    - Removes core-side cwd normalization/resolution from session settings
    updates.
    - Updates affected core/app-server test helpers and callsites to pass
    existing absolute cwd values or use `abs()` helpers.
    
    ## Validation
    
    Opening as draft so CI can start while local validation continues.
  • [codex] Support model-defined reasoning efforts (#26444)
    ## Summary
    - accept non-empty model-defined reasoning effort values while
    preserving built-in effort behavior
    - propagate the non-Copy effort type through core, app-server, TUI,
    telemetry, and persistence call sites
    - preserve string wire encoding and expose an open-string schema for
    clients
    - update model selection and shortcut behavior for model-advertised
    effort values
    
    ## Root cause
    `ReasoningEffort` gained a string-backed custom variant, so it could no
    longer implement `Copy` or rely on derived closed-enum serialization.
    Existing consumers still moved effort values from shared references and
    assumed a fixed built-in value set.
    
    ## Validation
    - `just fmt`
    - Local tests and compilation were not run per request; relying on CI.
  • Route AGENTS.md loading through environment filesystems (#26205)
    ## Why
    
    Workspace-specific `AGENTS.md` loading needs to use the selected
    environment filesystem so remote workspaces and child agents read
    instructions from their actual environment instead of the host
    filesystem. The app-server should report the same instruction sources
    the initialized thread actually loaded, rather than independently
    rescanning configuration and filesystem state.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Introduce `LoadedAgentsMd` to retain ordered user, project, and
    internal instructions with their provenance.
    - Load and canonicalize workspace `AGENTS.md` paths through the primary
    `EnvironmentManager` environment, then render the loaded instructions
    when constructing turn context.
    - Expose cached loaded instruction sources from initialized threads and
    use them for app-server start, resume, and fork responses.
    - Preserve global `CODEX_HOME` loading and separator behavior while
    excluding empty project files that did not supply model-visible
    instructions.
    - Add integration coverage for CLI injection, selected-environment
    provenance and rendering, empty environment selection, and cached
    sources on loaded-thread resume.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `just test -p codex-core agents_md`
    - `just test -p codex-core
    selected_environment_sources_match_model_visible_instructions`
    - `just test -p codex-exec agents_md`
    - `just test -p codex-app-server instruction_sources`
    - `just test -p codex-app-server --status-level fail`
  • chore: mechanical rename (#26156)
    Rename `Session::conversation_id` to `Session::thread_id` with an auto
    refactor in RustRover
  • core: stop passing legacy SandboxPolicy to guardian reviews (#25911)
    ## Why
    
    Guardian review turns already submit a read-only `PermissionProfile`,
    which is the permissions model the runtime should honor. Passing the
    equivalent legacy `SandboxPolicy` through `ThreadSettingsOverrides`
    keeps two representations of the same read-only constraint alive on this
    path and makes the guardian flow depend on compatibility plumbing that
    is being phased out.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Set `sandbox_policy` to `None` when the guardian review session
    submits its child `Op::UserInput`.
    - Keep `permission_profile: Some(PermissionProfile::read_only())` and
    `approval_policy: Some(AskForApproval::Never)`, so the guardian review
    remains read-only and cannot request approvals.
    - Remove the now-unused `SandboxPolicy` import and redundant comment
    from `codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs`.
    
    ## Verification
    
    Not run locally; this is a narrow cleanup of redundant thread-settings
    override state.
  • [app-server][core] Add connector-level Guardian reviewer overrides (#25167)
    Context: https://openai.slack.com/archives/C0B4JAF0Q2C/p1779912328647229
    
    ```
    approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"
    
    [apps.connector_5f3c8c41a1e54ad7a76272c89e2554fa]
    enabled = true
    approvals_reviewer = "user"
    default_tools_approval_mode = "prompt"
    ```
    
    <img width="230" height="84" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-31 at 11 56 34 AM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e319f8f7-0983-42a7-98cd-3302732fa406"
    />
    
    <img width="841" height="233" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-31 at 11 52 42 AM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ac76645-4e90-4d00-8242-f031146a22a5"
    />
    
    -------
    
    ```
    approvals_reviewer = "user"
    
    [apps.connector_5f3c8c41a1e54ad7a76272c89e2554fa]
    enabled = true
    approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"
    default_tools_approval_mode = "prompt"
    ```
    <img width="195" height="83" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-31 at 12 02 27 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3d374dc8-8aa2-466f-a13f-e4ed8567aa2e"
    />
    <img width="771" height="207" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-31 at 12 05 42 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/105c2575-68d6-4ca6-8e69-dc8c82da36a2"
    />
    
    
    
    ## Summary
    - add `apps.<connector_id>.approvals_reviewer` to override Guardian or
    user review routing per connected app
    - apply overrides across direct app MCP calls, delegated MCP prompts,
    and app-server MCP elicitation review while preserving global behavior
    for non-app MCP servers
    - expose and document the config through app-server v2 and generated
    schemas, while honoring global managed reviewer requirements
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
  • [codex-rs] auto-review model override (#23767)
    ## Why
    
    Guardian auto-review normally uses the provider-preferred review model
    when one is available. Some parent models need model-catalog metadata to
    select a different review model while keeping older `/models` payloads
    compatible when that metadata is absent.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Added optional `ModelInfo::auto_review_model_override` metadata to the
    public model payload as a review-model slug.
    - Updated Guardian review model selection to prefer the catalog override
    when present, while preserving the existing provider preferred-model
    path and parent-model fallback when it is omitted.
    - Added focused Guardian coverage for override and no-override model
    selection.
    - Added an `auto_review` core integration suite test that loads override
    metadata from a remote model catalog path and asserts the strict
    auto-review `/responses` request uses the catalog-selected review model.
    - Updated existing `ModelInfo` fixtures and local catalog constructors
    for the new optional field.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    model_info_defaults_availability_nux_to_none_when_omitted`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_review_uses_`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    remote_model_override_uses_catalog_model_for_strict_auto_review --test
    all`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `just fmt`
    - `git diff --check`
  • store and expose parent_thread_id on Threads (#25113)
    ## Why
    
    This PR
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/24161#discussion_r3325692763
    revealed a subagent data modeling issue, where we overloaded
    `forked_from_id` to also mean `parent_thread_id`. That's incorrect since
    guardian and review subagents can be a subagent and NOT fork the main
    thread's history.
    
    The solution here is to explicitly store a new `parent_thread_id` on
    `SessionMeta`, alongside `forked_from_id` which already exists. While
    we're at it, also expose it in the app-server protocol on the `Thread`
    object.
    
    A thread->subagent relationship and a fork of thread history are
    orthogonal concepts.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added top-level `parent_thread_id` persistence on `SessionMeta` and
    runtime/session plumbing through `SessionConfiguredEvent`,
    `CodexSpawnArgs`, `SessionConfiguration`, `ThreadConfigSnapshot`,
    `TurnContext`, and `ModelClient`.
    - Made turn metadata, request headers, analytics, and subagent-start
    events read the separate runtime/top-level parent field instead of
    deriving general parent lineage from `SessionSource` or
    `forked_from_thread_id`.
    - Passed parent lineage separately at delegated subagent, review,
    guardian, agent-job, and multi-agent spawn construction sites;
    copied-history fork lineage remains derived only from `InitialHistory`.
    - Persisted and exposed parent lineage through rollout/thread-store
    projections and app-server v2 `Thread.parentThreadId`.
    - Updated app-server README text and regenerated app-server schema
    fixtures for the additive `parentThreadId` response field.
  • Surface filesystem permission profiles in prompt context (#23924)
    ## Summary
    Some permission profiles can encode filesystem reads that should remain
    unavailable to the agent. Before this change, the model-visible context
    and automatic approval review prompt summarized the effective
    permissions as a legacy sandbox mode, which can omit permission-profile
    filesystem entries from escalation decisions.
    
    For example, a profile can grant workspace access while denying a
    private subtree across every workspace root:
    
    ```toml
    default_permissions = "restricted-workspace"
    
    [permissions.restricted-workspace.workspace_roots]
    "/Users/alice/project" = true
    "/Users/alice/other-project" = true
    
    [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem]
    ":minimal" = "read"
    
    [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
    "." = "write"
    "private" = "deny"
    "private/**" = "deny"
    ```
    
    The context window now describes the workspace roots and effective
    filesystem side of the `PermissionProfile` directly, with deny entries
    marked as non-escalatable:
    
    ```xml
    <environment_context>
      <cwd>/Users/alice/project</cwd>
      <shell>zsh</shell>
      <filesystem><workspace_roots><root>/Users/alice/project</root><root>/Users/alice/other-project</root></workspace_roots><permission_profile type="managed"><file_system type="restricted"><entry access="read"><special>:minimal</special></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/project</path></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/other-project</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/other-project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/project/private/**</glob></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/other-project/private/**</glob></entry></file_system></permission_profile></filesystem>
    </environment_context>
    ```
    
    Managed requirements can impose the same kind of deny-read restriction:
    
    ```toml
    [permissions.filesystem]
    deny_read = [
      "/Users/alice/project/private",
      "/Users/alice/project/private/**",
    ]
    ```
    
    The automatic approval review prompt also receives the parent turn's
    denied-read context, so review decisions can account for the active
    permission profile.
    
    ## What Changed
    - Render the effective filesystem profile in `<environment_context>`,
    including profile type, filesystem entries, workspace roots, and
    non-escalatable deny entries.
    - Persist effective `workspace_roots` in `TurnContextItem` so
    resumed/replayed context does not have to bind `:workspace_roots`
    through legacy `cwd` fallback.
    - Add explicit permission instructions that denied reads are policy
    restrictions, not escalation targets.
    - Pass the parent turn's denied-read context into automatic approval
    reviews.
    - Add targeted coverage for prompt rendering, workspace-root
    materialization, replay context, and review prompt context.
    - Keep the prompt-context test expectations platform-aware so the same
    filesystem rendering assertions pass on Unix and Windows paths.
    
    ## Testing
    - `just test -p codex-core
    context::environment_context::tests::serialize_environment_context_with_full_filesystem_profile`
    - `just test -p codex-core
    context::environment_context::tests::turn_context_item_filesystem_uses_workspace_roots_instead_of_cwd`
    - `just test -p codex-core
    context::permissions_instructions::permissions_instructions_tests::builds_permissions_from_profile_with_denied_reads`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    
    I also attempted `just test -p codex-core`; the changed prompt-context
    tests passed, but the full local run did not complete cleanly in this
    sandboxed macOS environment due unrelated user-shell `CODEX_SANDBOX*`
    expectations and integration-test timeouts.
  • Add Guardian review metrics (#24897)
    ## Why
    
    Guardian reviews already emit analytics events, but we do not expose
    aggregate OpenTelemetry metrics for review volume, latency, token usage,
    or terminal outcomes. That makes it harder to monitor Guardian behavior
    during rollouts and to compare review outcomes by source, action type,
    session kind, model, and failure mode.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added Guardian review metric names for count, total duration, time to
    first token, and token usage in `codex-rs/otel`.
    - Added `core/src/guardian/metrics.rs` to convert
    `GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult` into sanitized metric tags covering
    decision, terminal status, failure reason, approval request source,
    reviewed action, session kind, risk/outcome, model, reasoning effort,
    and context/truncation state.
    - Emitted the new metrics from `track_guardian_review` for each terminal
    Guardian review result.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - Added
    `guardian_review_metrics_record_counts_durations_and_token_usage`, which
    verifies the emitted count, duration, TTFT, token usage histograms, and
    tag set through the in-memory metrics exporter.
  • [codex] Fix Guardian argument comment lint (#24902)
    ## Summary
    - Add the required `/*parent_thread_id*/` argument comment at the
    Guardian review session test callsite flagged by CI.
    
    ## Validation
    - `just fmt`
    - Not run: clippy/tests, per request; CI will cover them.
  • Assert Guardian prompt cache key reuse (#24894)
    Split from the Guardian prompt cache key change. This PR only updates
    codex-rs/core/src/guardian/tests.rs. Validation was not run per request;
    this branch is expected to rely on the companion split PRs.
  • Add Guardian review prompt cache key (#24893)
    Split from the Guardian prompt cache key change. This PR only updates
    codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs. Validation was not run per
    request; this branch is expected to rely on the companion split PRs.
  • Export Guardian prompt cache key helper (#24892)
    Split from the Guardian prompt cache key change. This PR only updates
    codex-rs/core/src/guardian/mod.rs. Validation was not run per request;
    this branch is expected to rely on the companion split PRs.
  • fix(auto-review) skip legacy notify for auto review threads (#24714)
    ## Summary
    Clear inherited legacy `notify` from Guardian review session config,
    since we should not be passing auto review threads into `notify`
    targets. Keeps legacy notify payload and hook runtime behavior unchanged
    for normal user turns.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] add a Guardian config regression and dedicated Guardian
    integration test so review sessions cannot inherit parent notify hooks
  • Add experimental turn additional context (#24154)
    ## Summary
    
    Adds experimental `additionalContext` support to `turn/start` and
    `turn/steer` so clients can provide ephemeral external context, such as
    browser or automation state, without turning that plumbing into a
    visible user prompt or triggering user-prompt lifecycle behavior.
    
    ## API Shape
    
    The parameter shape is:
    
    ```ts
    additionalContext?: Record<string, {
      value: string
      kind: "untrusted" | "application"
    }> | null
    ```
    
    Example:
    
    ```json
    {
      "additionalContext": {
        "browser_info": {
          "value": "Active tab is CI failures.",
          "kind": "untrusted"
        },
        "automation_info": {
          "value": "CI rerun is in progress.",
          "kind": "application"
        }
      }
    }
    ```
    
    The keys are opaque and caller-defined.
    
    ## Context Injection
    
    When provided, accepted entries are inserted into model context as
    hidden contextual message items, not as visible thread user-message
    items.
    
    `kind: "untrusted"` entries are inserted with role `user`:
    
    ```text
    <external_${key}>${value}</external_${key}>
    ```
    
    `kind: "application"` entries are inserted with role `developer`:
    
    ```text
    <${key}>${value}</${key}>
    ```
    
    Values are not escaped. Each value is truncated to 1k approximate tokens
    before wrapping.
    
    For `turn/start`, accepted additional context is inserted before normal
    user input. For `turn/steer`, additional context is merged only when the
    steer includes non-empty user input; context-only steers still reject as
    empty input.
    
    ## Dedupe Strategy
    
    `AdditionalContextStore` lives on session state and stores the latest
    complete additional-context map.
    
    Each `turn/start` or non-empty `turn/steer` treats its
    `additionalContext` as the current complete set of values. Entries are
    injected only when the key is new or the exact entry for that key
    changed, including `value` or `kind`. After merging, the store is
    replaced with the provided map, so omitted keys are removed from the
    retained set and can be injected again later if reintroduced.
    
    Omitting `additionalContext`, passing `null`, or passing an empty object
    resets the store to empty and injects nothing.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Threads experimental v2 `additionalContext` through app-server into
    core turn start and steer handling.
    - Adds separate contextual fragment types for untrusted user-role
    context and application developer-role context.
    - Uses pending response input items so additional context can be
    combined with normal user input without treating it as prompt text.
    - Adds integration coverage for start/steer flow, role routing,
    dedupe/reset behavior, deletion/re-add behavior, hook-blocked input
    behavior, empty context-only steer rejection, external-fragment marker
    matching, and truncation.
  • core: refresh active permission profiles at runtime (#22931)
    ## Why
    
    Once a named permission profile is selected, runtime state has to keep
    that profile identity intact instead of collapsing back to anonymous
    effective permissions. The session refresh path also needs to rebuild
    profile-derived network proxy state so active profile switches take
    effect consistently.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Preserve the active permission profile through session updates.
    - Rebuild profile-derived runtime/network configuration when the active
    profile changes.
    - Keep the runtime path aligned with the current session configuration
    APIs.
    - Tighten the affected tests, including the Windows delete-pending
    memory-file case that was intermittently tripping CI.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. **This PR**: runtime/session/network propagation for active
    permission profiles.
    2. [#23708](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23708): TUI selection
    plumbing and guardrail flow.
    3. [#21559](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/21559): profile-aware
    `/permissions` menu and custom profile display.
    
    <img width="1296" height="906" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/077fa3a7-80cb-4925-80b1-d2395018d90a"
    />
  • Remove unused ARC monitor path (#23573)
    ## Summary
    - remove the unreachable ARC monitor path from MCP tool approval
    handling
    - delete the unused ARC monitor module/tests and trim the orphaned
    safety-monitor decision plumbing
    - keep `always allow` approvals on the existing auto-approval
    short-circuit without a dead monitor hop
    
    ## Testing
    - `cargo test -p codex-core mcp_tool_call`
    - `just fmt`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `git diff --check`
    
    ## Additional validation
    - Attempted `cargo test -p codex-core`; the library test target passed,
    then the integration target failed in this local environment.
    - The narrower MCP-focused rerun passed its unit coverage and only hit
    missing local `test_stdio_server` binaries in filtered integration
    cases.
  • Add body_after_prefix auto-compact token limit scope (#22870)
    ## Why
    
    `model_auto_compact_token_limit` has only been able to budget the full
    active context. That makes it hard to set a small "growth since
    compaction" budget for sessions that preserve a large carried window
    prefix: the preserved prefix can consume the whole budget and force
    immediate repeated compaction.
    
    This PR adds an opt-in `body_after_prefix` scope so callers can apply
    `model_auto_compact_token_limit` to sampled output and later growth
    after the current carried prefix, while still forcing compaction before
    the full model context window is exhausted.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Adds `AutoCompactTokenLimitScope` with the existing `total` behavior
    as the default and a new `body_after_prefix` mode:
    [`config_types.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/973806b1cb35792555bead994cb3ed94656eb171/codex-rs/protocol/src/config_types.rs#L24-L37).
    - Threads `model_auto_compact_token_limit_scope` through config loading,
    `Config`, `core-api`, and app-server v2 schema/TypeScript generation.
    - Records the first observed input-token count for a `body_after_prefix`
    compaction window and uses it as the baseline when deciding whether the
    scoped auto-compaction budget is exhausted:
    [`turn.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/973806b1cb35792555bead994cb3ed94656eb171/codex-rs/core/src/session/turn.rs#L743-L781).
    - Keeps a hard context-window cap in `body_after_prefix`, so scoped
    budgeting cannot let the active context overrun the usable window.
    
    ## Verification
    
    Added compact-suite coverage for the two key behaviors:
    `body_after_prefix` does not re-compact just because the carried prefix
    is larger than the scoped budget, and it still compacts when the total
    active context reaches the configured context window:
    [`compact.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/973806b1cb35792555bead994cb3ed94656eb171/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/compact.rs#L3003-L3128).
  • [3 of 7] Remove UserTurn (#23075)
    **Stack position:** [3 of 7]
    
    ## Summary
    
    This PR finishes the input-op consolidation by moving the remaining
    `Op::UserTurn` callers onto `Op::UserInput` and deleting `Op::UserTurn`.
    This touches a lot of files, but it is a low-risk mechanical migration.
    
    ## Stack
    
    1. [1 of 7] [Add thread settings to
    UserInput](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23080)
    2. [2 of 7] [Remove
    UserInputWithTurnContext](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23081)
    3. [3 of 7] [Remove
    UserTurn](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23075) (this PR)
    4. [4 of 7] [Placeholder for OverrideTurnContext
    cleanup](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23087)
    5. [5 of 7] [Replace OverrideTurnContext with
    ThreadSettings](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22508)
    6. [6 of 7] [Add app-server thread settings
    API](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22509)
    7. [7 of 7] [Sync TUI thread
    settings](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22510)
  • test: construct permission profiles directly (#23030)
    ## Why
    
    `SandboxPolicy` is now a legacy compatibility shape, but several tests
    still built a `SandboxPolicy` only to immediately convert it into
    `PermissionProfile` for APIs that already accept canonical runtime
    permissions. Those detours make it harder to audit where legacy sandbox
    policy is still required, because boundary-only usages are mixed
    together with ordinary test setup.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Updated tests in `codex-core`, `codex-exec`, `codex-analytics`, and
    `codex-config` to construct `PermissionProfile` values directly when the
    code under test takes a permission profile.
    - Changed exec-policy, request-permissions, session, and sandbox test
    helpers to pass `PermissionProfile` through instead of converting from
    `SandboxPolicy` internally.
    - Left `SandboxPolicy` in place where tests are explicitly exercising
    legacy compatibility or request/response boundaries.
    
    ## Test Plan
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-analytics -p codex-config`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib safety::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_policy::tests::`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib guardian_review_session_config`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::network_approval::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
    tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib managed_network`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions::`
    - `cargo test -p codex-exec sandbox`
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23030).
    * #23036
    * __->__ #23030
  • guardian: use permission profile for review sandbox (#22789)
    ## Why
    
    `SandboxPolicy` is being pushed back toward legacy config loading and
    compatibility boundaries. Guardian review sessions already want the
    built-in read-only permission behavior; carrying that as an active
    `PermissionProfile` makes the review sandbox follow the new permissions
    path instead of configuring the child session through the legacy policy
    API.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Configure the guardian review session with
    `PermissionProfile::read_only()`.
    - Send the read-only profile through the guardian child `Op::UserTurn`.
    - Keep the legacy `sandbox_policy` field populated with
    `SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()` declared next to the profile so
    the two remain visibly in sync until the compatibility field goes away.
    
    ## How To Review
    
    Start in `codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs`. The important
    check is that both the guardian config and the child turn now use the
    read-only permission profile, while the remaining
    `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` assignment is only the compatibility field
    required by the current turn protocol.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    guardian_review_session_config_clears_parent_developer_instructions`
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22789).
    * #22795
    * #22792
    * #22791
    * #22790
    * __->__ #22789
  • permissions: resolve profile identity with constraints (#22683)
    ## Why
    
    This PR is the invariant-cleanup layer that follows the workspace-roots
    base merged in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610).
    
    #22610 adds `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` and keeps runtime
    workspace roots separate from the raw permission profile, but its
    in-memory representation is intentionally transitional: `Permissions`
    still carries the selected profile identity next to a constrained
    `PermissionProfile`. That makes APIs such as
    `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` fragile
    because the id and value only mean the right thing when every caller
    keeps them in sync.
    
    This PR introduces a single resolved profile state so profile identity,
    `extends`, the profile value, and profile-declared workspace roots
    travel together. The next PR,
    [#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611), builds on this by
    changing the app-server turn API to select permission profiles by id
    plus runtime workspace roots.
    
    ## Stack Context
    
    - #22610, now merged: adds profile-declared `workspace_roots`, runtime
    workspace roots, and `:workspace_roots` materialization.
    - This PR: replaces the parallel active-profile/profile-value fields
    with `PermissionProfileState`.
    - #22611: switches app-server turn updates toward profile ids plus
    runtime workspace roots.
    - #22612: updates TUI/exec summaries to show the effective workspace
    roots.
    
    Keeping this separate from #22611 is deliberate: reviewers can validate
    the internal state invariant before reviewing the app-server protocol
    migration.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added `ResolvedPermissionProfile::{Legacy, BuiltIn, Named}` and
    `PermissionProfileState`.
    - Typed built-in profile ids with `BuiltInPermissionProfileId`.
    - Moved selected profile identity and profile-declared workspace roots
    into the resolved state.
    - Replaced `Permissions` parallel profile fields with one
    `permission_profile_state`.
    - Removed `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()`
    from session sync paths.
    - Kept trusted session replay/`SessionConfigured` compatibility through
    explicit session snapshot helpers.
    - Updated session configuration, MCP initialization, app-server, exec,
    TUI, and guardian call sites to consume `&PermissionProfile` directly.
    
    ## Review Guide
    
    Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/resolved_permission_profile.rs`; it
    is the new invariant boundary. Then review
    `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs` to see how config loading records
    active profile identity and profile workspace roots. The remaining
    call-site changes are mostly mechanical fallout from
    `Permissions::permission_profile()` returning `&PermissionProfile`
    instead of `&Constrained<PermissionProfile>`.
    
    ## Verification
    
    The existing config/session coverage now constructs and asserts through
    `PermissionProfileState`. The workspace-root config test also asserts
    that profile-declared roots are preserved in the resolved state, which
    is the behavior #22611 relies on when runtime roots become mutable
    through the app-server API.
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22683).
    * #22612
    * #22611
    * __->__ #22683
  • permissions: support workspace roots in profiles (#22610)
    ## Why
    
    This is the configuration/model half of the alternative permissions
    migration we discussed as a comparison point for
    [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) and
    [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402).
    
    The old `workspace-write` model mixes three concerns that we want to
    keep separate:
    - reusable profile rules that should stay immutable once selected
    - user/runtime workspace roots from `cwd`, `--add-dir`, and legacy
    workspace-write config
    - internal Codex writable roots such as memories, which should not be
    shown as user workspace roots
    
    This PR gives permission profiles first-class `workspace_roots` so users
    can opt multiple repositories into the same `:workspace_roots` rules
    without using broad absolute-path write grants. It also starts
    separating the raw selected profile from the effective runtime profile
    by making `Permissions` expose explicit accessors instead of public
    mutable fields.
    
    A representative `config.toml` looks like this:
    
    ```toml
    default_permissions = "dev"
    
    [permissions.dev.workspace_roots]
    "~/code/openai" = true
    "~/code/developers-website" = true
    
    [permissions.dev.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
    "." = "write"
    ".codex" = "read"
    ".git" = "read"
    ".vscode" = "read"
    ```
    
    If Codex starts in `~/code/codex` with that profile selected, the
    effective workspace-root set becomes:
    - `~/code/codex` from the runtime `cwd`
    - `~/code/openai` from the profile
    - `~/code/developers-website` from the profile
    
    The `:workspace_roots` rules are materialized across each root, so
    `.git`, `.codex`, and `.vscode` stay scoped the same way everywhere.
    Runtime additions such as `--add-dir` can still layer on later stack
    entries without mutating the selected profile.
    
    ## Stack Shape
    
    This PR intentionally stops before the profile-identity cleanup in
    [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) so the base review
    stays focused on config loading, workspace-root materialization, and
    compatibility with legacy `workspace-write`.
    
    The representation in this PR is therefore transitional: `Permissions`
    carries enough state to distinguish the raw constrained profile from the
    effective runtime profile, and there are still call sites that must keep
    the active profile identity and constrained profile value in sync. The
    follow-up PR replaces that with a single resolved profile state
    (`ResolvedPermissionProfile` / `PermissionProfileState`) that keeps the
    profile id, immutable `PermissionProfile`, and profile-declared
    workspace roots together. That follow-up removes APIs such as
    `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` where
    separate arguments could drift out of sync.
    
    Downstream PRs then build on this base to switch app-server turn updates
    to profile ids plus runtime workspace roots and to finish the
    user-visible summary behavior. Reviewers should judge this PR as the
    workspace-roots foundation, not as the final in-memory shape of selected
    permission profiles.
    
    ## Review Guide
    
    Suggested review order:
    
    1. Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs`.
    This is the main shape change in the base slice. `Permissions` now
    stores a private raw `Constrained<PermissionProfile>` plus runtime
    `workspace_roots`. Callers use `permission_profile()` when they need the
    raw constrained value and `effective_permission_profile()` when they
    need a materialized runtime profile. As noted above,
    [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) replaces this
    transitional shape with a resolved profile state that keeps identity and
    profile data together.
    
    2. Review `codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs` and
    `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs`.
    These add `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]`, resolve enabled entries
    relative to the policy cwd, and keep `:workspace_roots` deny-read glob
    patterns symbolic until the actual roots are known.
    
    3. Review `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` and
    `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`.
    These add the policy/profile materialization helpers that expand exact
    `:workspace_roots` entries and scoped deny-read globs over every
    workspace root. This is also where `ActivePermissionProfileModification`
    is removed from the core model.
    
    4. Review the legacy bridge in
    `Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides` and
    `Config::set_legacy_sandbox_policy`.
    This is where legacy `workspace-write` roots become runtime workspace
    roots, while Codex internal writable roots stay internal and do not
    appear as user-facing workspace roots.
    
    5. Then skim downstream call sites.
    The interesting pattern is raw-vs-effective access: state/proxy/bwrap
    paths keep the raw constrained profile, while execution, summaries, and
    user-visible status use the effective profile and workspace-root list.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - added `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` to the config model and
    schema
    - added runtime `workspace_roots` state to `Config`/`Permissions` and
    `ConfigOverrides`
    - made `Permissions` profile fields private and replaced direct mutation
    with accessors/setters
    - added `PermissionProfile` and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for
    materializing `:workspace_roots` exact paths and deny-read globs across
    all roots
    - moved legacy additional writable roots into runtime workspace-root
    state instead of active profile modifications
    - removed `ActivePermissionProfileModification` and its app-server
    protocol/schema export
    - updated sandbox/status summary paths so internal writable roots are
    not reported as user workspace roots
    
    ## Verification Strategy
    
    The targeted tests cover the behavior at the layers where regressions
    are most likely:
    - `codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs` verifies config loading,
    legacy workspace-root seeding, effective profile materialization, and
    memory-root handling.
    - `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs` verifies profile
    `workspace_roots` parsing and `:workspace_roots` scoped/glob
    compilation.
    - `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` unit tests verify exact and
    glob materialization over multiple workspace roots.
    - `codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs` and
    `codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs` verify the
    user-facing summaries show effective workspace roots and hide internal
    writes.
    
    I also ran `cargo check --tests` locally after the latest stack refresh
    to catch cross-crate API breakage from the private-field/accessor
    changes.
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22610).
    * #22612
    * #22611
    * #22683
    * __->__ #22610
  • chore(features) rm Feature::ApplyPatchFreeform (#22711)
    ## Summary
    Removes the feature since this is effectively on by default in all cases
    where we should use it, or can be configured via models.json.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] unit tests pass
  • Deprecate TurnContext cwd and resolve_path (#22519)
    ## Why
    
    `TurnContext::cwd` and `TurnContext::resolve_path` are being phased out
    in favor of using the selected turn environment cwd directly.
    Deprecating both APIs makes any new direct dependency visible while
    preserving the existing migration path for current callers.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Marked `TurnContext::cwd` and `TurnContext::resolve_path` as
    deprecated with guidance to use the selected turn environment cwd
    instead.
    - Added exact `#[allow(deprecated)]` suppressions at each existing
    direct usage site, including tests, rather than adding crate-wide
    suppression.
    - Kept the change behavior-preserving: current cwd reads, writes, and
    path resolution continue to use the same values.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
    - `git diff --check`
  • feat: route guardian review model selection through providers (#22258)
    ## Why
    
    Guardian review selection was hard-coded in `core`, which worked for the
    default OpenAI path but did not give provider implementations a way to
    choose backend-specific reviewer model IDs. That matters for Amazon
    Bedrock: guardian review should run through the Bedrock/Mantle provider
    using Bedrock's `openai.gpt-5.4` model ID, instead of accidentally
    selecting a reviewer model that implies the OpenAI backend.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added provider-owned approval review model selection via
    `ModelProvider::approval_review_model_selection`.
    - Moved the existing default selection policy into the provider
    abstraction: prefer the requested reviewer model when it is available,
    otherwise fall back to the active turn model, preferring `Low` reasoning
    when supported.
    - Added an Amazon Bedrock override that pins guardian review to
    `openai.gpt-5.4` with `Low` reasoning.
  • [codex-analytics] emit terminal review events (#18748)
    ## Why
    
    Review telemetry should describe reviews as first-class events, not only
    as counters denormalized onto terminal tool-item events. That lets us
    analyze guardian and user reviews consistently across command execution,
    file changes, permissions, and network access, while still preserving
    the terminal item summaries that existing tool analytics need.
    
    To make those review events accurate, analytics also needs the observed
    completion time for each review and enough command metadata to
    distinguish `shell` from `unified_exec` reviews.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - emit generic `codex_review_event` rows for completed user and guardian
    reviews, with review subjects, reviewer, trigger, terminal status,
    resolution, and observed duration
    - reduce approval request / response / abort facts into review events
    for command execution, file change, and permissions flows
    - keep denormalized review counts, final approval outcome, and
    permission-request flags on terminal tool-item events for
    item-associated reviews
    - plumb review completion timing so user-review responses and aborts use
    app-server-observed completion times, while guardian analytics reuse the
    same terminal timestamps emitted on guardian assessment events
    - carry command approval `source` through the protocol and app-server
    layers so review analytics can distinguish `shell` from `unified_exec`
    - add analytics coverage for user-review emission, guardian-review
    emission, permission reviews that should not denormalize onto tool
    items, item-summary isolation across threads, and the serialized
    review-event shape
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-analytics`
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18748).
    * __->__ #18748
    * #21434
    * #18747
    * #17090
    * #17089
    * #20514
  • Make auto-review denial short-circuit use a rolling review window (#22110)
    ## Why
    
    Long-running turns can accumulate enough denied auto-review decisions to
    trip the global short-circuit even when those denials are spread far
    apart. The breaker should still stop genuinely bad loops, but it should
    judge recent behavior instead of lifetime turn history.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Replaced the lifetime `10 total denials` threshold with `10 denials in
    the last 50 reviews`.
    - Kept the existing `3 consecutive denials` interrupt behavior
    unchanged.
    - Tracked recent auto-review outcomes in the circuit breaker and updated
    the warning copy to report the rolling-window count.
    - Renamed the new rolling-window coverage to `auto_review_*` test names.
    - Added coverage that confirms older denials fall out of the 50-review
    window and no longer trigger the breaker.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_rejection_circuit_breaker --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core auto_review_rejection_circuit_breaker --lib`
  • [codex-analytics] plumb protocol-native review timing (#21434)
    ## Why
    
    We want terminal tool review analytics, but the reducer should not stamp
    review timing from its own wall clock.
    
    This PR plumbs review timing through the real protocol and app-server
    seams so downstream analytics can consume the emitter's timestamps
    directly. Guardian reviews keep their enriched `started_at` /
    `completed_at` analytics fields by deriving those legacy second-based
    values from the same protocol-native millisecond lifecycle timestamps,
    rather than sampling a separate analytics clock.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - add `started_at_ms` to user approval request payloads
    - add `started_at_ms` / `completed_at_ms` to guardian review
    notifications
    - preserve Guardian review `started_at` / `completed_at` enrichment from
    the protocol-native timing source
    - stamp typed `ServerResponse` analytics facts with app-server-observed
    `completed_at_ms`
    - thread the new timing fields through core, protocol, app-server, TUI,
    and analytics fixtures
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server outgoing_message --manifest-path
    codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol guardian --manifest-path
    codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui guardian --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
    - `cargo test -p codex-analytics analytics_client_tests --manifest-path
    codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21434).
    * #18748
    * __->__ #21434
    * #18747
    * #17090
    * #17089
    * #20514
  • 2- Use string service tiers in session protocol (#20971)
    ## Summary
    - break service tier session/op/app-server protocol fields from the
    closed enum to string tier ids
    - send the service tier string directly through model requests, prewarm,
    compaction, memories, and TUI/app-server turn starts
    - regenerate app-server protocol JSON/TypeScript schemas, removing the
    standalone ServiceTier TS enum
    
    ## Verification
    - just fmt
    - cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui
    - just write-app-server-schema
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • codex: use ThreadStore history for core review forks (#20577)
    - fork loaded parent threads from `ThreadStore` history in core agent
    control paths
    - migrate guardian review fork history to loaded session history instead
    of rereading rollout files
    
    ## Verification
    - `cargo test -p codex-core spawn_agent_fork`
  • Gate multi-agent v2 tools independently of collab (#20246)
    ## Why
    
    `multi_agents_v2` is meant to be independently gated from the older
    `collab` feature. The tool registry still treated the
    collaboration-style agent tools as `collab`-only, so enabling
    `multi_agents_v2` without `collab` omitted the v2 agent tools. Review
    and guardian sub-sessions also need to keep agent spawning disabled even
    when the outer session has `multi_agents_v2` enabled.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Include the collab-backed agent tools when either `multi_agents_v2` or
    `collab` is enabled.
    - Explicitly disable `multi_agents_v2` for review and guardian review
    sub-sessions, matching the existing `spawn_csv` and `collab`
    restrictions.
    - Add a registry test that enables `multi_agents_v2`, disables `collab`,
    and verifies the v2 agent tools are present while legacy `send_input`
    and `resume_agent` remain hidden.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - Added
    `test_build_specs_multi_agent_v2_does_not_require_collab_feature`.
  • [codex-analytics] prevent stale guardian events from satisfying reused reviews (#20080)
    ## Why
    
    Reused Guardian review trunks can still have older child-turn events
    queued when a later review starts. The review waiter currently accepts
    the first terminal event it sees from the shared child session, so a
    stale `TurnComplete` can be attributed to the new review. That produces
    impossible analytics combinations such as non-null TTFT with sub-10 ms
    completion latency and zero token deltas on `trunk_reused` reviews.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Preserve the child turn id returned by the Guardian review
    `Op::UserTurn` submission.
    - Restrict Guardian review waiting to events correlated with that
    submitted child turn.
    - Restrict timeout/abort draining to terminal events for the same child
    turn.
    - Add regression coverage for stale prior-turn completions, stale
    prior-turn errors, and interrupt draining in
    `codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs`.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian::review_session::tests::`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --tests -- -D warnings`
  • Include auto-review rollout in feedback uploads (#20064)
    ## Summary
    
    - include the live auto-review trunk rollout when `/feedback` uploads
    logs
    - upload that attachment as
    `auto-review-rollout-<parent-thread-id>.jsonl` so it is distinguishable
    from the parent rollout
    - show the same auto-review attachment name in the TUI consent popup
    
    ## Scope
    
    - this only covers the live cached auto-review trunk for the current
    parent thread
    - it does not add durable historical parent->auto-review lookup
    - it does not add persisted rollout support for ephemeral parallel
    review forks
    
    ## UI 
    
    <img width="599" height="185" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-28 at 1 17 18 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a0e79c2-5d21-4702-8a89-f765778bc9e9"
    />
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    cached_guardian_subagent_exposes_its_rollout_path`
    - `cargo test -p codex-feedback`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui feedback_upload_consent_popup_snapshot`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    feedback_good_result_consent_popup_includes_connectivity_diagnostics_filename`
    
    ## Known unrelated local failures
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in the pre-existing proxy
    env snapshot test
    `tools::runtimes::tests::maybe_wrap_shell_lc_with_snapshot_keeps_user_proxy_env_when_proxy_inactive`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui` currently hits pre-existing `status::*`
    snapshot drift unrelated to this change
    
    ## Follow-Up 
    - persist parallel auto-review fork sessions so /feedback can include
    their rollout history too
    - attach each persisted fork as its own clearly named file, for example
    auto-review-rollout-<parent-thread-id>-fork <n>.jsonl, instead of
    merging multiple Guardian sessions into one attachment
    - keep the same live-session-only scope initially; durable historical
    parent -> auto-review lookup can remain a separate decision if we later
    need feedback from resumed sessions
  • Clarify network approval auto-review prompts (#19907)
    ## Why
    
    Network access approval prompts were showing the generic retry reason,
    which made auto-review focus on the blocked connection instead of the
    command that caused it. This makes network approvals easier to assess by
    telling the reviewer to evaluate whether the triggering command was
    authorised by the user and within policy, and to treat the network call
    as acceptable when it is a reasonable consequence of that command.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Split guardian approval request prompt rendering so `NetworkAccess`
    has a dedicated branch.
    - For network requests, show `Network approval context` and `Network
    access JSON` instead of `Retry reason` / `Planned action JSON`.
    - Added regression coverage for the network approval prompt wording and
    for omitting retry reason in this case.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    guardian::tests::build_guardian_prompt_items_explains_network_access_review_scope`
  • Add /auto-review-denials retry approval flow (#19058)
    ## Why
    
    Auto-review can deny an action that the user later decides they want to
    retry. Today there is no TUI surface for selecting a recent denial and
    sending explicit approval context back into the session, so users have
    to restate intent manually and the retry can be reviewed without the
    original denied action context.
    
    This adds a narrow TUI-driven path for approving a recent denied action
    while still keeping the retry inside the normal auto-review flow.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added `/auto-review-denials` to open a picker of recent denied
    auto-review actions.
    - Added a small in-memory TUI store for the 10 most recent denied
    auto-review events.
    - Selecting a denial sends the structured denied event back through the
    existing core/app-server op path.
    - Core now injects a developer message containing the approved action
    JSON rather than the full assessment event.
    - Auto-review transcript collection now preserves this specific approval
    developer message so follow-up review sessions can see the user approval
    context.
    - Added TUI snapshot/unit coverage for the picker and approval dispatch
    path.
    - Added core coverage for retaining the approval developer message in
    the auto-review transcript.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    collect_guardian_transcript_entries_keeps_manual_approval_developer_message`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui auto_review_denials`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    approving_recent_denial_emits_structured_core_op_once`
    
    ## Notes
    
    This intentionally keeps retries going through auto-review. The approval
    signal is context for the exact previously denied action, not a blanket
    bypass for similar future actions.
  • permissions: migrate approval and sandbox consumers to profiles (#19393)
    ## Why
    
    Runtime decisions should not infer permissions from the lossy legacy
    sandbox projection once `PermissionProfile` is available. In particular,
    `Disabled` and `External` need to remain distinct, and managed profiles
    with split filesystem or deny-read rules should not be collapsed before
    approval, network, safety, or analytics code makes decisions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Changes managed network proxy setup and network approval logic to use
    `PermissionProfile` when deciding whether a managed sandbox is active.
    - Migrates patch safety, Guardian/user-shell approval paths, Landlock
    helper setup, analytics sandbox classification, and selected
    turn/session code to profile-backed permissions.
    - Validates command-level profile overrides against the constrained
    `PermissionProfile` rather than a strict `SandboxPolicy` round trip.
    - Preserves configured deny-read restrictions when command profiles are
    narrowed.
    - Adds coverage for profile-backed trust, network proxy/approval
    behavior, patch safety, analytics classification, and command-profile
    narrowing.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19393).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * __->__ #19393
  • [codex] Move config loading into codex-config (#19487)
    ## Why
    
    Config loading had become split across crates: `codex-config` owned the
    config types and merge logic, while `codex-core` still owned the loader
    that assembled the layer stack. This change consolidates that
    responsibility in `codex-config`, so the crate that defines config
    behavior also owns how configs are discovered and loaded.
    
    To make that move possible without reintroducing the old dependency
    cycle, the shell-environment policy types and helpers that
    `codex-exec-server` needs now live in `codex-protocol` instead of
    flowing through `codex-config`.
    
    This also makes the migrated loader tests more deterministic on machines
    that already have managed or system Codex config installed by letting
    tests override the system config and requirements paths instead of
    reading the host's `/etc/codex`.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - moved the config loader implementation from `codex-core` into
    `codex-config::loader` and deleted the old `core::config_loader` module
    instead of leaving a compatibility shim
    - moved shell-environment policy types and helpers into
    `codex-protocol`, then updated `codex-exec-server` and other downstream
    crates to import them from their new home
    - updated downstream callers to use loader/config APIs from
    `codex-config`
    - added test-only loader overrides for system config and requirements
    paths so loader-focused tests do not depend on host-managed config state
    - cleaned up now-unused dependency entries and platform-specific cfgs
    that were surfaced by post-push CI
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-config`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core config_loader_tests::`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol -p codex-exec-server -p
    codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-rmcp-client --lib`
    - `cargo test --lib -p codex-app-server-client -p codex-exec`
    - `cargo test --no-run --lib -p codex-app-server`
    - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox --lib`
    - `cargo shear`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    
    ## Notes
    
    - I did not chase unrelated full-suite failures outside the migrated
    loader surface.
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` still hits unrelated proxy-sensitive
    failures on this machine, and Windows CI still shows unrelated
    long-running/timeouting test noise outside the loader migration itself.
  • permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
    ## Why
    
    This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
    merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
    runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
    
    `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
    because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
    enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
    `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
    still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
    profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
    profiles such as direct write roots.
    
    The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
    has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
    model migration.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
    `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
    while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
    - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
    filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
    synchronized.
    - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
    consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
    `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
    - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
    context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
    construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
    - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
    command/session profiles are narrowed.
    - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
    `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
    defaults.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * __->__ #19606
  • permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
    but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
    It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
    enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
    when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
    APIs.
    
    The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
    union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
    
    ```rust
    pub enum PermissionProfile {
        Managed {
            file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
        Disabled,
        External {
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
    }
    ```
    
    This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
    outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
    owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
    sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
    inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
    than a permissive one.
    
    ## How Existing Modeling Maps
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
    into the higher-fidelity profile model:
    
    - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
    with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
    policy.
    - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
    the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
    sandbox.
    - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
    `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
    filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
    - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
    express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
    network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
    `ExternalSandbox`.
    - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
    complete active runtime permissions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
    `disabled`, and `external`.
    - Keep partial permission grants separate with
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
    - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
    entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
    present.
    - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
    network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
    - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
    round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
    and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
    instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
    - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
    full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
    unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
    entries.
    - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
    update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
    `permissionProfile` shape.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
    compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
    `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
    `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
    intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
    permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
    - `just fix`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • feat: let model providers own model discovery (#18950)
    ## Why
    
    `codex-models-manager` had grown to own provider-specific concerns:
    constructing OpenAI-compatible `/models` requests, resolving provider
    auth, emitting request telemetry, and deciding how provider catalogs
    should be sourced. That made the manager harder to reuse for providers
    whose model catalog is not fetched from the OpenAI `/models` endpoint,
    such as Amazon Bedrock.
    
    This change moves provider-specific model discovery behind
    provider-owned implementations, so the models manager can focus on
    refresh policy, cache behavior, picker ordering, and model metadata
    merging.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Introduced a `ModelsManager` trait with separate `OpenAiModelsManager`
    and `StaticModelsManager` implementations.
    - Added `ModelsEndpointClient` so OpenAI-compatible HTTP fetching lives
    outside `codex-models-manager`.
    - Moved `/models` request construction, provider auth resolution,
    timeout handling, and request telemetry into `codex-model-provider` via
    `OpenAiModelsEndpoint`.
    - Added provider-owned `models_manager(...)` construction so configured
    OpenAI-compatible providers use `OpenAiModelsManager`, while
    static/catalog-backed providers can return `StaticModelsManager`.
    - Added an Amazon Bedrock static model catalog for the GPT OSS Bedrock
    model IDs.
    - Updated core/session/thread manager code and tests to depend on
    `Arc<dyn ModelsManager>`.
    - Moved offline model test helpers into
    `codex_models_manager::test_support`.
    ## Metadata References
    
    The Bedrock catalog metadata is based on the official Amazon Bedrock
    OpenAI model documentation:
    
    - [Amazon Bedrock OpenAI
    models](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-parameters-openai.html)
    lists the Bedrock model IDs, text input/output modalities, and `128,000`
    token context window for `gpt-oss-20b` and `gpt-oss-120b`.
    - [Amazon Bedrock `gpt-oss-120b` model
    card](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-card-openai-gpt-oss-120b.html)
    lists the `bedrock-runtime` model ID `openai.gpt-oss-120b-1:0`, the
    `bedrock-mantle` model ID `openai.gpt-oss-120b`, text-only modalities,
    and `128K` context window.
    - [OpenAI `gpt-oss-120b` model
    docs](https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/models/gpt-oss-120b)
    document configurable reasoning effort with `low`, `medium`, and `high`,
    plus text input/output modality.
    
    The display names, default reasoning effort, and priority ordering are
    Codex-local catalog choices.
    
    ## Test Plan
    - Manually verified app-server model listing with an AWS profile:
    
    ```shell
    CODEX_HOME="$(mktemp -d)" cargo run -p codex-app-server-test-client -- \
      --codex-bin ./target/debug/codex \
      -c 'model_provider="amazon-bedrock"' \
      -c 'model_providers.amazon-bedrock.aws.profile="codex-bedrock"' \
      -c 'model_providers.amazon-bedrock.aws.region="us-west-2"' \
      model-list
    ```
    
    The response returned the Bedrock catalog with `openai.gpt-oss-120b-1:0`
    as the default model and `openai.gpt-oss-20b-1:0` as the second listed
    model, both text-only and supporting low/medium/high reasoning effort.
  • tui: carry permission profiles on user turns (#18285)
    ## Why
    
    Per-turn permission overrides should use the same canonical profile
    abstraction as session configuration. That lets TUI submissions preserve
    exact configured permissions without round-tripping through legacy
    sandbox fields.
    
    ## What changed
    
    This adds `permission_profile` to user-turn operations, threads it
    through TUI/app-server submission paths, fills the new field in existing
    test fixtures, and adds coverage that composer submission includes the
    configured profile.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
    --nocapture`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18285).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * __->__ #18285
  • Use Auto-review wording for fallback rationale (#19168)
    ## Why
    
    PR #18797 currently surfaces fallback rationale text that names Guardian
    directly.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Updated the bare allow and bare deny fallback rationales in
    `codex-rs/core/src/guardian/prompt.rs` from Guardian to Auto-review.
    - Updated the existing bare allow parser test and added explicit bare
    deny parser coverage.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core parse_guardian_assessment_treats_bare`
  • [codex] Route live thread writes through ThreadStore (#18882)
    Begin migrating the thread write codepaths to ThreadStore.
    
    This starts using ThreadStore inside of core session code, not only in
    the app server code.
    
    Rework the interfaces around thread recording/persistence. We're left
    with the following:
    
    * `ThreadManager`: owns the process-level registry of loaded threads and
    handles cross-thread orchestration: start, resume, fork, lookup, remove,
    and route ops to running CodexThreads.
    * `CodexThread`: represents one loaded/running thread from the outside.
    It is the handle app-server and callers use to submit ops, inspect
    session metadata, and shut the thread down.
    * `LiveThread`: session-owned persistence lifecycle handle for one
    active thread. Core session code uses it to append rollout items,
    materialize lazy persistence, flush, shutdown, discard init-failed
    writers, and load that thread’s persisted history.
    * `ThreadStore`: storage backend abstraction. It answers “how are
    threads persisted, read, listed, updated, archived?” Local and remote
    implementations live behind this trait.
    * `LocalThreadStore`: local ThreadStore implementation. It owns the
    file/sqlite-specific details and keeps RolloutRecorder as a local
    implementation detail.
    
    This is a few too many Thread abstractions for my liking, but they do
    all represent different concepts / needs / layers.
    
    Migration note: in places where the core code explicitly requires a
    path, rather than a thread ID, throw an error if we're running with a
    remote store.
    
    Cover the new local live-writer lifecycle with focused tests and
    preserve app-server thread-start behavior, including ephemeral pathless
    sessions.