Commit Graph

334 Commits

  • Add experimental remote thread store config (#18714)
    Add experimental config to use remote thread store rather than local
    thread store implementation in app server
  • Fix stale model test fixtures (#18719)
    Fixes stale test fixtures left after the active bundled model catalog
    updates in #18586 and #18388. Those changes made `gpt-5.4` the current
    default and removed several older hardcoded slugs, which left Windows
    Bazel shards failing TUI and config tests.
    
    What changed:
    - Refresh TUI model migration, availability NUX, plan-mode, status, and
    snapshot fixtures to use active bundled model slugs.
    - Update the config edit test expectation for the TOML-quoted
    `"gpt-5.2"` migration key.
    - Move the model catalog tests into
    `codex-rs/tui/src/app/tests/model_catalog.rs` so touching them does not
    trip the blob-size policy for `app.rs`.
    
    Verification:
    - CI Bazel/lint checks are expected to cover the affected test shards.
  • Update models.json (#18586)
    - Replace the active models-manager catalog with the deleted core
    catalog contents.
    - Replace stale hardcoded test model slugs with current bundled model
    slugs.
    - Keep this as a stacked change on top of the cleanup PR.
  • [codex] Use background agent task auth for backend calls (#18094)
    ## Summary
    
    Introduces a single background/control-plane agent task for ChatGPT
    backend requests that do not have a thread-scoped task, with
    `AuthManager` owning the default ChatGPT backend authorization decision.
    
    Callers now ask `AuthManager` for the default ChatGPT backend
    authorization header. `AuthManager` decides whether that is bearer or
    background AgentAssertion based on config/internal state, while
    low-level bootstrap paths can explicitly request bearer-only auth.
    
    This PR is stacked on PR4 and focuses on the shared background task auth
    plumbing plus the first tranche of backend/control-plane consumers. The
    remaining callsite wiring is split into PR4.2 to keep review size down.
    
    ## Stack
    
    - PR1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17385 - add
    `features.use_agent_identity`
    - PR2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17386 - register agent
    identities when enabled
    - PR3: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387 - register agent tasks
    when enabled
    - PR3.1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17978 - persist and
    prewarm registered tasks per thread
    - PR4: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17980 - use task-scoped
    `AgentAssertion` for downstream calls
    - PR4.1: this PR - introduce AuthManager-owned background/control-plane
    `AgentAssertion` auth
    - PR4.2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18260 - use background
    task auth for additional backend/control-plane calls
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - add background task registration and assertion minting inside
    `codex-login`
    - persist `agent_identity.background_task_id` separately from
    per-session task state
    - make `BackgroundAgentTaskManager` private to `codex-login`; call sites
    do not instantiate or pass it around
    - teach `AuthManager` the ChatGPT backend base URL and feature-derived
    background auth mode from resolved config
    - expose bearer-only helpers for bootstrap/registration/refresh-style
    paths that must not use AgentAssertion
    - wire `AuthManager` default ChatGPT authorization through app listing,
    connector directory listing, remote plugins, MCP status/listing,
    analytics, and core-skills remote calls
    - preserve bearer fallback when the feature is disabled, the backend
    host is unsupported, or background task registration is not available
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
    codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
    codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
    codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
    - `cargo test -p codex-login agent_identity`
    - `cargo test -p codex-model-provider bearer_auth_provider`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core agent_assertion`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server remote_control`
    - `cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements fetch_cloud_requirements`
    - `cargo test -p codex-models-manager manager::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-cloud-tasks`
    - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
    codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
    codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
    codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
    - `git diff --check`
  • feat: add --ignore-user-config and --ignore-rules (#18646)
    Add those 2 flags to be able to fully isolate a run of `codex exec` from
    any rules or tools.
    This will be used by Chronicle
  • chore(multiagent) skills instructions toggle (#18596)
    ## Summary
    Support toggling the skills message off.
    
    ## Test Plan
    - [x] Updated unit tests
  • [5/6] Wire executor-backed MCP stdio (#18212)
    ## Summary
    - Add the executor-backed RMCP stdio transport.
    - Wire MCP stdio placement through the executor environment config.
    - Cover local and executor-backed stdio paths with the existing MCP test
    helpers.
    
    ## Stack
    ```text
    o  #18027 [6/6] Fail exec client operations after disconnect
    │
    @  #18212 [5/6] Wire executor-backed MCP stdio
    │
    o  #18087 [4/6] Abstract MCP stdio server launching
    │
    o  #18020 [3/6] Add pushed exec process events
    │
    o  #18086 [2/6] Support piped stdin in exec process API
    │
    o  #18085 [1/6] Add MCP server environment config
    │
    o  main
    ```
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • [TUI] add external config migration prompt when start TUI (#17891)
    - add a TUI startup migration prompt for external agent config
    - support migrating external configs including config, skills, AGENTS.md
    and plugins
    - gate the prompt behind features.external_migrate (default false)
    
    <img width="1037" height="480" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-14 at 9 29 14 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6060849b-03cb-429a-9c13-c7bb46ad2e65"
    />
    <img width="713" height="183" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-14 at 9 29 26 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d13f177e-d4c4-479c-8736-ef29636081e1"
    />
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
  • fix: trust-gate project hooks and exec policies (#14718)
    ## Summary
    - trust-gate project `.codex` layers consistently, including repos that
    have `.codex/hooks.json` or `.codex/execpolicy/*.rules` but no
    `.codex/config.toml`
    - keep disabled project layers in the config stack so nested trusted
    project layers still resolve correctly, while preventing hooks and exec
    policies from loading until the project is trusted
    - update app-server/TUI onboarding copy to make the trust boundary
    explicit and add regressions for loader, hooks, exec-policy, and
    onboarding coverage
    
    ## Security
    Before this change, an untrusted repo could auto-load project hooks or
    exec policies from `.codex/` as long as `config.toml` was absent. This
    makes trust the single gate for project-local config, hooks, and exec
    policies.
    
    ## Stack
    - Parent of #15936
    
    ## Test
    - cargo test -p codex-core without_config_toml
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat: config aliases (#18140)
    Rename `no_memories_if_mcp_or_web_search` →
    `disable_on_external_context` with backward compatibility
    
    While doing so, we add a key alias system on our layer merging system.
    What we try to avoid is a case where a company managed config use an old
    name while the user has a new name in it's local config (which would
    make the deserialization fail)
  • feat(config): support managed deny-read requirements (#17740)
    ## Summary
    - adds managed requirements support for deny-read filesystem entries
    - constrains config layers so managed deny-read requirements cannot be
    widened by user-controlled config
    - surfaces managed deny-read requirements through debug/config plumbing
    
    This PR lets managed requirements inject deny-read filesystem
    constraints into the effective filesystem sandbox policy.
    User-controlled config can still choose the surrounding permission
    profile, but it cannot remove or weaken the managed deny-read entries.
    
    ## Managed deny-read shape
    A managed requirements file can declare exact paths and glob patterns
    under `[permissions.filesystem]`:
    
    ```toml
    # /etc/codex/requirements.toml
    [permissions.filesystem]
    deny_read = [
      "/Users/alice/.gitconfig",
      "/Users/alice/.ssh",
      "./managed-private/**/*.env",
    ]
    ```
    
    Those entries are compiled into the effective filesystem policy as
    `access = none` rules, equivalent in shape to filesystem permission
    entries like:
    
    ```toml
    [permissions.workspace.filesystem]
    "/Users/alice/.gitconfig" = "none"
    "/Users/alice/.ssh" = "none"
    "/absolute/path/to/managed-private/**/*.env" = "none"
    ```
    
    The important difference is that the managed entries come from
    requirements, so lower-precedence user config cannot remove them or make
    those paths readable again.
    
    Relative managed `deny_read` entries are resolved relative to the
    directory containing the managed requirements file. Glob entries keep
    their glob suffix after the non-glob prefix is normalized.
    
    ## Runtime behavior
    - Managed `deny_read` entries are appended to the effective
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` after the selected permission profile is
    resolved.
    - Exact paths become `FileSystemPath::Path { access: None }`; glob
    patterns become `FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { access: None }`.
    - When managed deny-read entries are present, `sandbox_mode` is
    constrained to `read-only` or `workspace-write`; `danger-full-access`
    and `external-sandbox` cannot silently bypass the managed read-deny
    policy.
    - On Windows, the managed deny-read policy is enforced for direct file
    tools, but shell subprocess reads are not sandboxed yet, so startup
    emits a warning for that platform.
    - `/debug-config` shows the effective managed requirement as
    `permissions.filesystem.deny_read` with its source.
    
    ## Stack
    1. #15979 - glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support
    2. #18096 - macOS and Linux sandbox enforcement
    3. This PR - managed deny-read requirements
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Refactor config loading to use filesystem abstraction (#18209)
    Initial pass propagating FileSystem through config loading.
  • feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement (#18096)
    ## Summary
    - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns
    - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap,
    including canonical symlink targets
    - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal
    or Bazel test environments
    - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command`
    with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not
    reach the model
    
    ## Linux glob expansion
    
    ```text
    Prefer:   rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
    Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
    Failure:  any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
    ```
    
    ```
    [permissions.workspace.filesystem]
    glob_scan_max_depth = 2
    
    [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
    "**/*.env" = "none"
    ```
    
    
    This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction
    depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for
    another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently
    omitting deny-read masks.
    
    ## Platform support
    - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex
    deny rules
    - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing
    glob matches and masking them in bwrap
    - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main`
    from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed
    when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement,
    rather than silently running unsandboxed
    
    ## Stack
    1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read
    policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows
    2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows
    fail-closed clarification
    3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
    
    ## Verification
    - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob
    deny-read enforcement
    - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Add server-level approval defaults for custom MCP servers (#17843)
    ## Summary
    - Add `default_tools_approval_mode` support for custom MCP server
    configs, matching the existing `codex_apps` behavior
    - Apply approval precedence as per-tool override, then server default,
    then `auto`
    - Update config serialization, CLI display, schema generation, docs, and
    tests
    
    ## Testing
    - `cargo check -p codex-config`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core`
    - `just write-config-schema`
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-config`
    - Targeted `codex-core` tests for config parsing, config writes, and MCP
    approval precedence
    - `just fix -p codex-config -p codex-core`
  • Refactor AGENTS.md discovery into AgentsMdManager (#18035)
    Encapsulate Agents MD processing a bit and drop user_instructions_path
    from config.
  • feat(permissions): add glob deny-read policy support (#15979)
    ## Summary
    - adds first-class filesystem policy entries for deny-read glob patterns
    - parses config such as :project_roots { "**/*.env" = "none" } into
    pattern entries
    - enforces deny-read patterns in direct read/list helpers
    - fails closed for sandbox execution until platform backends enforce
    glob patterns in #18096
    - preserves split filesystem policy in turn context only when it cannot
    be reconstructed from legacy sandbox policy
    
    ## Stack
    1. This PR - glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support
    2. #18096 - macOS and Linux sandbox enforcement
    3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
    
    ## Verification
    - just fmt
    - cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing --tests
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • [1/8] Add MCP server environment config (#18085)
    ## Summary
    - Add an MCP server environment setting with local as the default.
    - Thread the default through config serialization, schema generation,
    and existing config fixtures.
    
    ## Stack
    ```text
    o  #18027 [8/8] Fail exec client operations after disconnect
    │
    o  #18025 [7/8] Cover MCP stdio tests with executor placement
    │
    o  #18089 [6/8] Wire remote MCP stdio through executor
    │
    o  #18088 [5/8] Add executor process transport for MCP stdio
    │
    o  #18087 [4/8] Abstract MCP stdio server launching
    │
    o  #18020 [3/8] Add pushed exec process events
    │
    o  #18086 [2/8] Support piped stdin in exec process API
    │
    @  #18085 [1/8] Add MCP server environment config
    │
    o  main
    ```
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Async config loading (#18022)
    Parts of config will come from executor. Prepare for that by making
    config loading methods async.
  • removing network proxy for yolo (#17742)
    **Summary**
    - prevent managed requirements.toml network settings from leaking into
    DangerFullAccess / yolo turns by gating managed proxy attachment on
    sandbox mode
    - keep guardian/sandboxed modes on the managed proxy path, while making
    true yolo bypass the proxy entirely, including /shell full-access
    commands
  • Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)
    Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code.
  • fix: Revert danger-full-access denylist-only mode (#17732)
    ## Summary
    
    - Reverts openai/codex#16946 and removes the danger-full-access
    denylist-only network mode.
    - Removes the corresponding config requirements, app-server
    protocol/schema, config API, TUI debug output, and network proxy
    behavior.
    - Drops stale tests that depended on the reverted mode while preserving
    newer managed allowlist-only coverage.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-config network_requirements`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core network_proxy_spec`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    managed_network_proxy_decider_survives_full_access_start`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server map_requirements_toml_to_api`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui debug_config_output`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-config -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol
    -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui`
    - `git diff --cached --check`
    
    Not run: full workspace `cargo test` (repo instructions ask for
    confirmation before that broader run).
  • Refactor plugin loading to async (#17747)
    Simplifies skills migration.
  • Add supports_parallel_tool_calls flag to included mcps (#17667)
    ## Why
    
    For more advanced MCP usage, we want the model to be able to emit
    parallel MCP tool calls and have Codex execute eligible ones
    concurrently, instead of forcing all MCP calls through the serial block.
    
    The main design choice was where to thread the config. I made this
    server-level because parallel safety depends on the MCP server
    implementation. Codex reads the flag from `mcp_servers`, threads the
    opted-in server names into `ToolRouter`, and checks the parsed
    `ToolPayload::Mcp { server, .. }` at execution time. That avoids relying
    on model-visible tool names, which can be incomplete in
    deferred/search-tool paths or ambiguous for similarly named
    servers/tools.
    
    ## What was added
    
    Added `supports_parallel_tool_calls` for MCP servers.
    
    Before:
    
    ```toml
    [mcp_servers.docs]
    command = "docs-server"
    ```
    
    After:
    
    ```toml
    [mcp_servers.docs]
    command = "docs-server"
    supports_parallel_tool_calls = true
    ```
    
    MCP calls remain serial by default. Only tools from opted-in servers are
    eligible to run in parallel. Docs also now warn to enable this only when
    the server’s tools are safe to run concurrently, especially around
    shared state or read/write races.
    
    ## Testing
    
    Tested with a local stdio MCP server exposing real delay tools. The
    model/Responses side was mocked only to deterministically emit two MCP
    calls in the same turn.
    
    Each test called `query_with_delay` and `query_with_delay_2` with `{
    "seconds": 25 }`.
    
    | Build/config | Observed | Wall time |
    | --- | --- | --- |
    | main with flag enabled | serial | `58.79s` |
    | PR with flag enabled | parallel | `31.73s` |
    | PR without flag | serial | `56.70s` |
    
    PR with flag enabled showed both tools start before either completed;
    main and PR-without-flag completed the first delay before starting the
    second.
    
    Also added an integration test.
    
    Additional checks:
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-tools` passed
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    mcp_parallel_support_uses_exact_payload_server` passed
    - `git diff --check` passed
  • feat: ignore keyring on 0.0.0 (#17221)
    To prevent the spammy: 
    <img width="424" height="172" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-09 at 13 36 16"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b5ece9e3-c561-422f-87ec-041e7bd6813d"
    />
  • Remove context status-line meter (#17420)
    Addresses #17313
    
    Problem: The visual context meter in the status line was confusing and
    continued to draw negative feedback, and context reporting should remain
    an explicit opt-in rather than part of the default footer.
    
    Solution: Remove the visual meter, restore opt-in context remaining/used
    percentage items that explicitly say "Context", keep existing
    context-usage configs working as a hidden alias, and update the setup
    text and snapshots.
  • Fix thread/list cwd filtering for Windows verbatim paths (#17414)
    Addresses #17302
    
    Problem: `thread/list` compared cwd filters with raw path equality, so
    `resume --last` could miss Windows sessions when the saved cwd used a
    verbatim path form and the current cwd did not.
    
    Solution: Normalize cwd comparisons through the existing path comparison
    utilities before falling back to direct equality, and add Windows
    regression coverage for verbatim paths. I made this a general utility
    function and replaced all of the duplicated instance of it across the
    code base.
  • make webrtc the default experience (#17188)
    ## Summary
    - make realtime default to the v2 WebRTC path
    - keep partial realtime config tables inheriting
    `RealtimeConfig::default()`
    
    ## Validation
    - CI found a stale config-test expectation; fixed in 974ba51bb3
    - just fmt
    - git diff --check
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Default realtime startup to v2 model (#17183)
    - Default realtime sessions to v2 and gpt-realtime-1.5 when no override
    is configured.
    - Add Op::RealtimeConversationStart integration coverage and keep
    v1-specific tests explicit.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Add TUI notification condition config (#17175)
    Problem: TUI desktop notifications are hard-gated on terminal focus, so
    terminal/IDE hosts that want in-focus notifications cannot opt in.
    
    Solution: Add a flat `[tui] notification_condition` setting (`unfocused`
    by default, `always` opt-in), carry grouped TUI notification settings
    through runtime config, apply method + condition together in the TUI,
    and regenerate the config schema.
  • Add realtime voice selection (#17176)
    - Add realtime voice selection for realtime/start.
    - Expose the supported v1/v2 voice lists and cover explicit, configured,
    default, and invalid voice paths.
  • Update guardian output schema (#17061)
    ## Summary
    - Update guardian output schema to separate risk, authorization,
    outcome, and rationale.
    - Feed guardian rationale into rejection messages.
    - Split the guardian policy into template and tenant-config sections.
    
    ## Validation
    - `cargo test -p codex-core mcp_tool_call`
    - `env -u CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED INSTA_UPDATE=always cargo test
    -p codex-core guardian::`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Owen Lin <owen@openai.com>
  • [codex] Support remote exec cwd in TUI startup (#17142)
    When running with remote executor the cwd is the remote path. Today we
    check for existence of a local directory on startup and attempt to load
    config from it.
    
    For remote executors don't do that.
  • Add realtime transport config (#17097)
    Adds realtime.transport config with websocket as the default and webrtc
    wired through the effective config.
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Show global AGENTS.md in /status (#17091)
    Addresses #3793
    
    Problem: /status only reported project-level AGENTS files, so sessions
    with a loaded global $CODEX_HOME/AGENTS.md still showed Agents.md as
    <none>.
    
    Solution: Track the global instructions file loaded during config
    initialization and prepend that path to the /status Agents.md summary,
    with coverage for AGENTS.md, AGENTS.override.md, and global-plus-project
    ordering.
  • Configure multi_agent_v2 spawn agent hints (#17071)
    Allow multi_agent_v2 features to have its own temporary configuration
    under `[features.multi_agent_v2]`
    
    ```
    [features.multi_agent_v2]
    enabled = true
    usage_hint_enabled = false
    usage_hint_text = "Custom delegation guidance."
    hide_spawn_agent_metadata = true
    ```
    
    Absent `usage_hint_text` means use the default hint.
    
    ```
    [features]
    multi_agent_v2 = true
    ```
    
    still works as the boolean shorthand.
  • fix: refresh network proxy settings when sandbox mode changes (#17040)
    ## Summary
    
    Fix network proxy sessions so changing sandbox mode recomputes the
    effective managed network policy and applies it to the already-running
    per-session proxy.
    
    ## Root Cause
    
    `danger_full_access_denylist_only` injects `"*"` only while building the
    proxy spec for Full Access. Sessions built that spec once at startup, so
    a later permission switch to Full Access left the live proxy in its
    original restricted policy. Switching back needed the same recompute
    path to remove the synthetic wildcard again.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Preserve the original managed network proxy config/requirements so the
    effective spec can be recomputed for a new sandbox policy.
    - Refresh the current session proxy when sandbox settings change, then
    reapply exec-policy network overlays.
    - Add an in-place proxy state update path while rejecting
    listener/port/SOCKS changes that cannot be hot-reloaded.
    - Keep runtime proxy settings cheap to snapshot and update.
    - Add regression coverage for workspace-write -> Full Access ->
    workspace-write.
  • [codex] Make AbsolutePathBuf joins infallible (#16981)
    Having to check for errors every time join is called is painful and
    unnecessary.
  • Preserve null developer instructions (#16976)
    Preserve explicit null developer-instruction overrides across app-server
    resume and fork flows.
  • [codex] reduce module visibility (#16978)
    ## Summary
    - reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
    or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
    - update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
    APIs instead of reaching through module trees
    - add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
    
    ## Validation
    - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
    before the final fix/format pass
    - `just fix` completed successfully
    - `just fmt` completed successfully
    - `git diff --check` passed
  • Honor null thread instructions (#16964)
    - Treat explicit null thread instructions as a blank-slate override
    while preserving omitted-field fallback behavior.
    - Preserve null through rollout resume/fork and keep explicit empty
    strings distinct.
    - Add app-server v2 start/fork coverage for the tri-state instruction
    params.
  • [codex] Add danger-full-access denylist-only network mode (#16946)
    ## Summary
    
    This adds `experimental_network.danger_full_access_denylist_only` for
    orgs that want yolo / danger-full-access sessions to keep full network
    access while still enforcing centrally managed deny rules.
    
    When the flag is true and the session sandbox is `danger-full-access`,
    the network proxy starts with:
    
    - domain allowlist set to `*`
    - managed domain `deny` entries enforced
    - upstream proxy use allowed
    - all Unix sockets allowed
    - local/private binding allowed
    
    Caveat: the denylist is best effort only. In yolo / danger-full-access
    mode, Codex or the model can use an allowed socket or other
    local/private network path to bypass the proxy denylist, so this should
    not be treated as a hard security boundary.
    
    The flag is intentionally scoped to `SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess`.
    Read-only and workspace-write modes keep the existing managed/user
    allowlist, denylist, Unix socket, and local-binding behavior. This does
    not enable the non-loopback proxy listener setting; that still requires
    its own explicit config.
    
    This also threads the new field through config requirements parsing,
    app-server protocol/schema output, config API mapping, and the TUI debug
    config output.
    
    ## How to use
    
    Add the flag under `[experimental_network]` in the network policy config
    that is delivered to Codex. The setting is not under `[permissions]`.
    
    ```toml
    [experimental_network]
    enabled = true
    danger_full_access_denylist_only = true
    
    [experimental_network.domains]
    "blocked.example.com" = "deny"
    "*.blocked.example.com" = "deny"
    ```
    
    With that configuration, yolo / danger-full-access sessions get broad
    network access except for the managed denied domains above. The denylist
    remains a best-effort proxy policy because the session may still use
    allowed sockets to bypass it. Other sandbox modes do not get the
    wildcard domain allowlist or the socket/local-binding relaxations from
    this flag.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-config network_requirements`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core network_proxy_spec`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server map_requirements_toml_to_api`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui debug_config_output`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `just fmt`
    - `just fix -p codex-config -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol
    -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui`
    - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-config`
    - `git diff --check`
    - `cargo clean`
  • Refactor config types into a separate crate (#16962)
    Move config types into a separate crate because their macros expand into
    a lot of new code.
  • app-server: centralize AuthManager initialization (#16764)
    Extract a shared helper that builds AuthManager from Config and applies
    the forced ChatGPT workspace override in one place.
    
    Create the shared AuthManager at MessageProcessor call sites so that
    upcoming new transport's initialization can reuse the same handle, and
    keep only external auth refresher wiring inside `MessageProcessor`.
    
    Remove the now-unused `AuthManager::shared_with_external_auth` helper.
  • feat(requirements): support allowed_approval_reviewers (#16701)
    ## Description
    
    Add requirements.toml support for `allowed_approvals_reviewers =
    ["user", "guardian_subagent"]`, so admins can now restrict the use of
    guardian mode.
    
    Note: If a user sets a reviewer that isn’t allowed by requirements.toml,
    config loading falls back to the first allowed reviewer and emits a
    startup warning.
    
    The table below describes the possible admin controls.
    | Admin intent | `requirements.toml` | User `config.toml` | End result |
    |---|---|---|---|
    | Leave Guardian optional | omit `allowed_approvals_reviewers` or set
    `["user", "guardian_subagent"]` | user chooses `approvals_reviewer =
    "user"` or `"guardian_subagent"` | Guardian off for `user`, on for
    `guardian_subagent` + `approval_policy = "on-request"` |
    | Force Guardian off | `allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]` | any
    user value | Effective reviewer is `user`; Guardian off |
    | Force Guardian on | `allowed_approvals_reviewers =
    ["guardian_subagent"]` and usually `allowed_approval_policies =
    ["on-request"]` | any user reviewer value; user should also have
    `approval_policy = "on-request"` unless policy is forced | Effective
    reviewer is `guardian_subagent`; Guardian on when effective approval
    policy is `on-request` |
    | Allow both, but default to manual if user does nothing |
    `allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user", "guardian_subagent"]` | omit
    `approvals_reviewer` | Effective reviewer is `user`; Guardian off |
    | Allow both, and user explicitly opts into Guardian |
    `allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user", "guardian_subagent"]` |
    `approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"` and `approval_policy =
    "on-request"` | Guardian on |
    | Invalid admin config | `allowed_approvals_reviewers = []` | anything |
    Config load error |
  • [codex] allow disabling environment context injection (#16745)
    This adds an `include_environment_context` config/profile flag that
    defaults on, and guards both initial injection and later environment
    updates to allow skipping injection of `<environment_context>`.
  • [codex] allow disabling prompt instruction blocks (#16735)
    This PR adds root and profile config switches to omit the generated
    `<permissions instructions>` and `<apps_instructions>` prompt blocks
    while keeping both enabled by default, and it gates both the initial
    developer-context injection and later permissions diff injection so
    turning the permissions block off stays effective across turn-context
    overrides.
    
    Also added a prompt debug tool that can be used as `codex debug
    prompt-input "hello"` and dumps the constructed items list.
  • Remove OPENAI_BASE_URL config fallback (#16720)
    The `OPENAI_BASE_URL` environment variable has been a significant
    support issue, so we decided to deprecate it in favor of an
    `openai_base_url` config key. We've had the deprecation warning in place
    for about a month, so users have had time to migrate to the new
    mechanism. This PR removes support for `OPENAI_BASE_URL` entirely.
  • Fix Windows Bazel app-server trust tests (#16711)
    ## Why
    
    Extracted from [#16528](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/16528) so
    the Windows Bazel app-server test failures can be reviewed independently
    from the rest of that PR.
    
    This PR targets:
    
    -
    `suite::v2::thread_shell_command::thread_shell_command_runs_as_standalone_turn_and_persists_history`
    -
    `suite::v2::thread_start::thread_start_with_elevated_sandbox_trusts_project_and_followup_loads_project_config`
    -
    `suite::v2::thread_start::thread_start_with_nested_git_cwd_trusts_repo_root`
    
    There were two Windows-specific assumptions baked into those tests and
    the underlying trust lookup:
    
    - project trust keys were persisted and looked up using raw path
    strings, but Bazel's Windows test environment can surface canonicalized
    paths with `\\?\` / UNC prefixes or normalized symlink/junction targets,
    so follow-up `thread/start` requests no longer matched the project entry
    that had just been written
    - `item/commandExecution/outputDelta` assertions compared exact trailing
    line endings even though shell output chunk boundaries and CRLF handling
    can differ on Windows, and Bazel made that timing-sensitive mismatch
    visible
    
    There was also one behavior bug separate from the assertion cleanup:
    `thread/start` decided whether to persist trust from the final resolved
    sandbox policy, but on Windows an explicit `workspace-write` request may
    be downgraded to `read-only`. That incorrectly skipped writing trust
    even though the request had asked to elevate the project, so the new
    logic also keys off the requested sandbox mode.
    
    ## What
    
    - Canonicalize project trust keys when persisting/loading `[projects]`
    entries, while still accepting legacy raw keys for existing configs.
    - Persist project trust when `thread/start` explicitly requests
    `workspace-write` or `danger-full-access`, even if the resolved policy
    is later downgraded on Windows.
    - Make the Windows app-server tests compare persisted trust paths and
    command output deltas in a path/newline-normalized way.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - Existing app-server v2 tests cover the three failing Windows Bazel
    cases above.