Commit Graph

115 Commits

  • feat: add remote compaction v2 Responses client path (#20773)
    ## Why
    
    This adds the `remote_compaction_v2` client path so remote compaction
    can run through the normal Responses stream and install a
    `context_compaction` item that trigger a compaction.
    
    The goal is to migrate some of the compaction logic on the client side
    
    We keeps the v2 transport behind a feature flag while letting follow-up
    requests reuse the compacted context instead of falling back to the
    legacy compaction item shape.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - add `ResponseItem::ContextCompaction` and refresh the generated
    app-server / schema / TypeScript fixtures that expose response items on
    the wire
    - add `core/src/compact_remote_v2.rs` to send compaction through the
    standard streamed Responses client, require exactly one
    `context_compaction` output item, and install that item into compacted
    history
    - route manual compact and auto-compaction through the v2 path when
    `remote_compaction_v2` is enabled, while keeping the existing remote
    compaction path as the fallback
    - preserve the new item type across history retention, follow-up request
    construction, telemetry, rollout persistence, and rollout-trace
    normalization
    - add targeted coverage for the feature flag, `context_compaction`
    serialization, rollout-trace normalization, and remote-compaction
    follow-up behavior
    
    ## Verification
    
    - added protocol tests for `context_compaction`
    serialization/deserialization in `protocol/src/models.rs`
    - added rollout-trace coverage for `context_compaction` normalization in
    `rollout-trace/src/reducer/conversation_tests.rs`
    - added remote compaction integration coverage for v2 follow-up reuse
    and mixed compaction output streams in
    `core/tests/suite/compact_remote.rs`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Remove ghost snapshots (#19481)
    ## Summary
    - Remove `ghost_snapshot` / `GhostCommit` from the Responses API surface
    and generated SDK/schema artifacts.
    - Keep legacy config loading compatible, but make undo a no-op that
    reports the feature is unavailable.
    - Clean up core history, compaction, telemetry, rollout, and tests to
    stop carrying ghost snapshot items.
    
    ## Testing
    - Unit tests passed for `codex-protocol`, `codex-core` targeted undo and
    compaction flows, `codex-rollout`, and `codex-app-server-protocol`.
    - Regenerated config and app-server schemas plus Python SDK artifacts
    and verified they match the checked-in outputs.
  • permissions: derive config defaults as profiles (#19772)
    ## Why
    
    This continues the permissions migration by making legacy config default
    resolution produce the canonical `PermissionProfile` first. The legacy
    `SandboxPolicy` projection should stay available at compatibility
    boundaries, but config loading should not create a legacy policy just to
    immediately convert it back into a profile.
    
    Specifically, when `default_permissions` is not specified in
    `config.toml`, instead of creating a `SandboxPolicy` in
    `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs` and then trying to derive a
    `PermissionProfile` from it, we use `derive_permission_profile()` to
    create a more faithful `PermissionProfile` using the values of
    `ConfigToml` directly.
    
    This also keeps the existing behavior of `sandbox_workspace_write` and
    extra writable roots after #19841 replaced `:cwd` with `:project_roots`.
    Legacy workspace-write defaults are represented as symbolic
    `:project_roots` write access plus symbolic project-root metadata
    carveouts. Extra absolute writable roots are still added directly and
    continue to get concrete metadata protections for paths that exist under
    those roots.
    
    The platform sandboxes differ when a symbolic project-root subpath does
    not exist yet.
    
    * **Seatbelt** can encode literal/subpath exclusions directly, so macOS
    emits project-root metadata subpath policies even if `.git`, `.agents`,
    or `.codex` do not exist.
    * **bwrap** has to materialize bind-mount targets. Binding `/dev/null`
    to a missing `.git` can create a host-visible placeholder that changes
    Git repo discovery. Binding missing `.agents` would not affect Git
    discovery, but it would still create a host-visible project metadata
    placeholder from an automatic compatibility carveout. Linux therefore
    skips only missing automatic `.git` and `.agents` read-only metadata
    masks; missing `.codex` remains protected so first-time project config
    creation goes through the protected-path approval flow. User-authored
    `read` and `none` subpath rules keep normal bwrap behavior, and `none`
    can still mask the first missing component to prevent creation under
    writable roots.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds profile-native helpers for legacy workspace-write semantics,
    including `PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with()`,
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()`, and
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots()`.
    - Makes `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()` the single legacy
    workspace-write constructor so both `from_legacy_sandbox_policy()` and
    `From<&SandboxPolicy>` include the project-root metadata carveouts.
    - Removes the no-carveout `legacy_workspace_write_base_policy()` path
    and the `prune_read_entries_under_writable_roots()` cleanup that was
    only needed by that split construction.
    - Adds `ConfigToml::derive_permission_profile()` for legacy sandbox-mode
    fallback resolution; named `default_permissions` profiles continue
    through the permissions profile pipeline instead of being reconstructed
    from `sandbox_mode`.
    - Updates `Config::load()` to start from the derived profile, validate
    that it still has a legacy compatibility projection, and apply
    additional writable roots directly to managed workspace-write filesystem
    policies.
    - Updates Linux bwrap argument construction so missing automatic
    `.git`/`.agents` symbolic project-root read-only carveouts are skipped
    before emitting bind args; missing `.codex`, user-authored `read`/`none`
    subpath rules, and existing missing writable-root behavior are
    preserved.
    - Adds coverage that legacy workspace-write config produces symbolic
    project-root metadata carveouts, extra legacy workspace writable roots
    still protect existing metadata paths such as `.git`, and bwrap skips
    missing `.git`/`.agents` project-root carveouts while preserving missing
    `.codex` and user-authored missing subpath rules.
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19772).
    * #19776
    * #19775
    * #19774
    * #19773
    * __->__ #19772
  • permissions: remove cwd special path (#19841)
    ## Why
    
    The experimental `PermissionProfile` API had both `:cwd` and
    `:project_roots` special filesystem paths, which made the permission
    root ambiguous. This PR removes the unstable `current_working_directory`
    special path before the permissions API is stabilized, so callers use
    `:project_roots` for symbolic project-root access.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Removes `FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory` from protocol
    and app-server protocol models, plus regenerated app-server
    JSON/TypeScript schemas.
    - Replaces internal `:cwd` permission entries with `:project_roots`
    entries.
    - Keeps the existing cwd-update behavior for legacy-shaped
    workspace-write profiles, while removing the deleted
    `CurrentWorkingDirectory` case from that compatibility path.
    - Keeps `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` as the reusable symbolic
    workspace-write helper, with docs noting that `:project_roots` entries
    resolve at enforcement time.
    - Updates app-server docs/examples and approval UI labeling to stop
    advertising `:cwd` as a permission token.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Persisted rollout items may contain the old
    `{"kind":"current_working_directory"}` tag from earlier experimental
    `permissionProfile` snapshots. This PR keeps that tag as a
    deserialize-only alias for `ProjectRoots { subpath: None }`, while
    continuing to serialize only the new `project_roots` tag.
    
    ## Follow-up
    
    This PR intentionally does not introduce an explicit project-root set on
    `SessionConfiguration` or runtime sandbox resolution. Today, the
    resolver still uses the active cwd as the single implicit project root.
    A follow-up should model project roots separately from tool cwd so
    `:project_roots` entries can resolve against the configured project
    roots, and resolve to no entries when there are no project roots.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permissions:: --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_ --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    command_exec_permission_profile_project_roots_use_command_cwd --test
    all`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile
    --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui
    preset_matching_accepts_workspace_write_with_extra_roots --lib`
    - `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`
  • permissions: derive compatibility policies from profiles (#19392)
    ## Why
    
    After #19391, `PermissionProfile` and the split filesystem/network
    policies could still be stored in parallel. That creates drift risk: a
    profile can preserve deny globs, external enforcement, or split
    filesystem entries while a cached projection silently loses those
    details. This PR makes the profile the runtime source and derives
    compatibility views from it.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Removes stored filesystem/network sandbox projections from
    `Permissions` and `SessionConfiguration`; their accessors now derive
    from the canonical `PermissionProfile`.
    - Derives legacy `SandboxPolicy` snapshots from profiles only where an
    older API still needs that field.
    - Updates MCP connection and elicitation state to track
    `PermissionProfile` instead of `SandboxPolicy` for auto-approval
    decisions.
    - Adds semantic filesystem-policy comparison so cwd changes can preserve
    richer profiles while still recognizing equivalent legacy projections
    independent of entry ordering.
    - Updates config/session tests to assert profile-derived projections
    instead of parallel stored fields.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19392).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * __->__ #19392
  • permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
    ## Why
    
    This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
    merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
    runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
    
    `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
    because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
    enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
    `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
    still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
    profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
    profiles such as direct write roots.
    
    The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
    has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
    model migration.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
    `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
    while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
    - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
    filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
    synchronized.
    - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
    consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
    `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
    - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
    context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
    construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
    - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
    command/session profiles are narrowed.
    - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
    `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
    defaults.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
    requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * __->__ #19606
  • permissions: make legacy profile conversion cwd-free (#19414)
    ## Why
    
    The profile conversion path still required a `cwd` even when it was only
    translating a legacy `SandboxPolicy` into a `PermissionProfile`. That
    made profile producers invent an ambient `cwd`, which is exactly the
    anchoring we are trying to remove from permission-profile data. A legacy
    workspace-write policy can be represented symbolically instead: `:cwd =
    write` plus read-only `:project_roots` metadata subpaths.
    
    This PR creates that cwd-free base so the rest of the stack can stop
    threading cwd through profile construction. Callers that actually need a
    concrete runtime filesystem policy for a specific cwd still have an
    explicitly named cwd-bound conversion.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - `PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` now takes only
    `&SandboxPolicy`.
    - `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` is now the
    symbolic, cwd-free projection for profiles.
    - The old concrete projection is retained as
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd` for
    runtime/boundary code that must materialize legacy cwd behavior.
    - Workspace-write profiles preserve `CurrentWorkingDirectory` and
    `ProjectRoots` special entries instead of materializing cwd into
    absolute paths.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo check -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p
    codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p
    codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p
    codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics --tests`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol
    -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p
    codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics`
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19414).
    * #19395
    * #19394
    * #19393
    * #19392
    * #19391
    * __->__ #19414
  • permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
    but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
    It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
    enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
    when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
    APIs.
    
    The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
    union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
    
    ```rust
    pub enum PermissionProfile {
        Managed {
            file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
        Disabled,
        External {
            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        },
    }
    ```
    
    This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
    outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
    owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
    sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
    inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
    than a permissive one.
    
    ## How Existing Modeling Maps
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
    into the higher-fidelity profile model:
    
    - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
    with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
    policy.
    - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
    the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
    sandbox.
    - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
    `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
    filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
    - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
    express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
    network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
    `ExternalSandbox`.
    - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
    complete active runtime permissions.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
    `disabled`, and `external`.
    - Keep partial permission grants separate with
    `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
    - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
    entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
    present.
    - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
    network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
    - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
    round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
    and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
    instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
    - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
    full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
    unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
    entries.
    - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
    update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
    `permissionProfile` shape.
    
    ## Compatibility
    
    Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
    compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
    `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
    `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
    intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just write-app-server-schema`
    - `cargo check --tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
    permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
    - `just fix`
    - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
    - `just fix -p codex-core`
    - `just fix -p codex-app-server`
  • app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared
    by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active
    profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when
    starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating
    through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands.
    
    This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform
    enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or
    rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's
    elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile
    overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including
    deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission
    override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as
    `**/*.env = deny`.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`,
    `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`.
    - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and
    the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread
    resume requests.
    - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network
    permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox
    projection used by existing execution paths.
    - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are
    equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests.
    - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when
    applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides.
    - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
    and regression coverage.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries`
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * #18282
    * #18281
    * #18280
    * __->__ #18279
  • Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. (#18813)
    Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments.
  • protocol: preserve glob scan depth in permission profiles (#18713)
    ## Why
    
    #18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
    shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
    `PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
    `glob_scan_max_depth`.
    
    That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
    On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
    glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
    loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
    permission entries look equivalent.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
    preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
    - Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
    force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
    not silently dropped.
    - Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
    `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
    and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
    - Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
    merging, and intersection.
    - Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
    `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
    deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
    - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
    
    
    
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
    * #18288
    * #18287
    * #18286
    * #18285
    * #18284
    * #18283
    * #18282
    * #18281
    * #18280
    * #18279
    * #18278
    * #18277
    * #18276
    * #18275
    * __->__ #18713
  • protocol: canonicalize file system permissions (#18274)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
    it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
    canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
    profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
    
    ## What changed
    
    This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
    `PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
    entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
    those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
    write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
    full-disk legacy access.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
    root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
    - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
  • Update image outputs to default to high detail (#18386)
    Do not assume the default `detail`.
  • Feat/auto review dev message marker (#18369)
    supporting guardian's rebrand to auto-review!
  • Refactor config loading to use filesystem abstraction (#18209)
    Initial pass propagating FileSystem through config loading.
  • Support original-detail metadata on MCP image outputs (#17714)
    ## Summary
    - honor `_meta["codex/imageDetail"] == "original"` on MCP image content
    and map it to `detail: "original"` where supported
    - strip that detail back out when the active model does not support
    original-detail image inputs
    - update code-mode `image(...)` to accept individual MCP image blocks
    - teach `js_repl` / `codex.emitImage(...)` to preserve the same hint
    from raw MCP image outputs
    - document the new `_meta` contract and add generic RMCP-backed coverage
    across protocol, core, code-mode, and js_repl paths
  • [codex] reduce module visibility (#16978)
    ## Summary
    - reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
    or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
    - update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
    APIs instead of reaching through module trees
    - add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
    
    ## Validation
    - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
    before the final fix/format pass
    - `just fix` completed successfully
    - `just fmt` completed successfully
    - `git diff --check` passed
  • chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)
    ## Why
    
    `argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
    many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
    the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
    examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
    `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
    
    This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
    path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
    enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
    the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
    - updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
    `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
    `--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
    - fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
    preserved with a single separator
    - documented the new default behavior in
    `tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
    - updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
    invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
    Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
    
    That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
    already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
    and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
    `--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
    intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
    additional lint findings in those lanes.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
    - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
    - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
    - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
    - `just argument-comment-lint`
    - `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
    - `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
    
    ## Follow-up
    
    - Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
    Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
    - Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
    the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
  • permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
    still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
    `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
    approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
    longer want to expose.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
    `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
    schema/TypeScript artifacts.
    - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
    `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
    construction.
    - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
    read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
    profile extension.
    - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
    deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
    - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
    empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
    actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
    permissions.
  • Move git utilities into a dedicated crate (#15564)
    - create `codex-git-utils` and move the shared git helpers into it with
    file moves preserved for diff readability
    - move the `GitInfo` helpers out of `core` so stacked rollout work can
    depend on the shared crate without carrying its own git info module
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • chore(context) Include guardian approval context (#15366)
    ## Summary
    Include the guardian context in the developer message for approvals
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Updated unit tests
  • chore(core) update prefix_rule guidance (#15231)
    ## Summary
    Small tweaks to the prefix_rule guidance.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] in progress
  • Return image URL from view_image tool (#15072)
    Cleanup image semantics in code mode.
    
    `view_image` now returns `{image_url:string, details?: string}` 
    
    `image()` now allows both string parameter and `{image_url:string,
    details?: string}`
  • Add notify to code-mode (#14842)
    Allows model to send an out-of-band notification.
    
    The notification is injected as another tool call output for the same
    call_id.
  • Add FS abstraction and use in view_image (#14960)
    Adds an environment crate and environment + file system abstraction.
    
    Environment is a combination of attributes and services specific to
    environment the agent is connected to:
    File system, process management, OS, default shell.
    
    The goal is to move most of agent logic that assumes environment to work
    through the environment abstraction.
  • generate an internal json schema for RolloutLine (#14434)
    ### Why
    i'm working on something that parses and analyzes codex rollout logs,
    and i'd like to have a schema for generating a parser/validator.
    
    `codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema` writes an
    `RolloutLine.json` file
    
    while doing this, i noticed we have a writer <> reader mismatch issue on
    `FunctionCallOutputPayload` and reasoning item ID -- added some schemars
    annotations to fix those
    
    ### Test
    
    ```
    $ just codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema --out ./foo
    ```
    
    generates an `RolloutLine.json` file, which i validated against jsonl
    files on disk
    
    `just codex app-server --help` doesn't expose the
    `generate-internal-json-schema` option by default, but you can do `just
    codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema --help` if you know the
    command
    
    everything else still works
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat: search_tool migrate to bring you own tool of Responses API (#14274)
    ## Why
    
    to support a new bring your own search tool in Responses
    API(https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/tools-tool-search#client-executed-tool-search)
    we migrating our bm25 search tool to use official way to execute search
    on client and communicate additional tools to the model.
    
    ## What
    - replace the legacy `search_tool_bm25` flow with client-executed
    `tool_search`
    - add protocol, SSE, history, and normalization support for
    `tool_search_call` and `tool_search_output`
    - return namespaced Codex Apps search results and wire namespaced
    follow-up tool calls back into MCP dispatch
  • Add realtime start instructions config override (#14270)
    - add `realtime_start_instructions` config support
    - thread it into realtime context updates, schema, docs, and tests
  • chore: add a separate reject-policy flag for skill approvals (#14271)
    ## Summary
    - add `skill_approval` to `RejectConfig` and the app-server v2
    `AskForApproval::Reject` payload so skill-script prompts can be
    configured independently from sandbox and rule-based prompts
    - update Unix shell escalation to reject prompts based on the actual
    decision source, keeping prefix rules tied to `rules`, unmatched command
    fallbacks tied to `sandbox_approval`, and skill scripts tied to
    `skill_approval`
    - regenerate the affected protocol/config schemas and expand
    unit/integration coverage for the new flag and skill approval behavior
  • feat: Add additional macOS Sandbox Permissions for Launch Services, Contacts, Reminders (#14155)
    Add additional macOS Sandbox Permissions levers for the following:
    
    - Launch Services
    - Contacts
    - Reminders
  • Add output schema to MCP tools and expose MCP tool results in code mode (#14236)
    Summary
    - drop `McpToolOutput` in favor of `CallToolResult`, moving its helpers
    to keep MCP tooling focused on the final result shape
    - wire the new schema definitions through code mode, context, handlers,
    and spec modules so MCP tools serialize the exact output shape expected
    by the model
    - extend code mode tests to cover multiple MCP call scenarios and ensure
    the serialized data matches the new schema
    - refresh JS runner helpers and protocol models alongside the schema
    changes
    
    Testing
    - Not run (not requested)
  • Reuse McpToolOutput in McpHandler (#14229)
    We already have a type to represent the MCP tool output, reuse it
    instead of the custom McpHandlerOutput
  • feat(approvals) RejectConfig for request_permissions (#14118)
    ## Summary
    We need to support allowing request_permissions calls when using
    `Reject` policy
    
    <img width="1133" height="588" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-09 at 12 06
    40 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a8df987f-c225-4866-b8ab-5590960daec5"
    />
    
    Note that this is a backwards-incompatible change for Reject policy. I'm
    not sure if we need to add a default based on our current use/setup
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] Added tests
    - [x] Tested locally
  • guardian initial feedback / tweaks (#13897)
    ## Summary
    - remove the remaining model-visible guardian-specific `on-request`
    prompt additions so enabling the feature does not change the main
    approval-policy instructions
    - neutralize user-facing guardian wording to talk about automatic
    approval review / approval requests rather than a second reviewer or
    only sandbox escalations
    - tighten guardian retry-context handling so agent-authored
    `justification` stays in the structured action JSON and is not also
    injected as raw retry context
    - simplify guardian review plumbing in core by deleting dead
    prompt-append paths and trimming some request/transcript setup code
    
    ## Notable Changes
    - delete the dead `permissions/approval_policy/guardian.md` append path
    and stop threading `guardian_approval_enabled` through model-facing
    developer-instruction builders
    - rename the experimental feature copy to `Automatic approval review`
    and update the `/experimental` snapshot text accordingly
    - make approval-review status strings generic across shell, patch,
    network, and MCP review types
    - forward real sandbox/network retry reasons for shell and unified-exec
    guardian review, but do not pass agent-authored justification as raw
    retry context
    - simplify `guardian.rs` by removing the one-field request wrapper,
    deduping reasoning-effort selection, and cleaning up transcript entry
    collection
    
    ## Testing
    - `just fmt`
    - full validation left to CI
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Add request permissions tool (#13092)
    Adds a built-in `request_permissions` tool and wires it through the
    Codex core, protocol, and app-server layers so a running turn can ask
    the client for additional permissions instead of relying on a static
    session policy.
    
    The new flow emits a `RequestPermissions` event from core, tracks the
    pending request by call ID, forwards it through app-server v2 as an
    `item/permissions/requestApproval` request, and resumes the tool call
    once the client returns an approved subset of the requested permission
    profile.
  • Add guardian approval MVP (#13692)
    ## Summary
    - add the guardian reviewer flow for `on-request` approvals in command,
    patch, sandbox-retry, and managed-network approval paths
    - keep guardian behind `features.guardian_approval` instead of exposing
    a public `approval_policy = guardian` mode
    - route ordinary `OnRequest` approvals to the guardian subagent when the
    feature is enabled, without changing the public approval-mode surface
    
    ## Public model
    - public approval modes stay unchanged
    - guardian is enabled via `features.guardian_approval`
    - when that feature is on, `approval_policy = on-request` keeps the same
    approval boundaries but sends those approval requests to the guardian
    reviewer instead of the user
    - `/experimental` only persists the feature flag; it does not rewrite
    `approval_policy`
    - CLI and app-server no longer expose a separate `guardian` approval
    mode in this PR
    
    ## Guardian reviewer
    - the reviewer runs as a normal subagent and reuses the existing
    subagent/thread machinery
    - it is locked to a read-only sandbox and `approval_policy = never`
    - it does not inherit user/project exec-policy rules
    - it prefers `gpt-5.4` when the current provider exposes it, otherwise
    falls back to the parent turn's active model
    - it fail-closes on timeout, startup failure, malformed output, or any
    other review error
    - it currently auto-approves only when `risk_score < 80`
    
    ## Review context and policy
    - guardian mirrors `OnRequest` approval semantics rather than
    introducing a separate approval policy
    - explicit `require_escalated` requests follow the same approval surface
    as `OnRequest`; the difference is only who reviews them
    - managed-network allowlist misses that enter the approval flow are also
    reviewed by guardian
    - the review prompt includes bounded recent transcript history plus
    recent tool call/result evidence
    - transcript entries and planned-action strings are truncated with
    explicit `<guardian_truncated ... />` markers so large payloads stay
    bounded
    - apply-patch reviews include the full patch content (without
    duplicating the structured `changes` payload)
    - the guardian request layout is snapshot-tested using the same
    model-visible Responses request formatter used elsewhere in core
    
    ## Guardian network behavior
    - the guardian subagent inherits the parent session's managed-network
    allowlist when one exists, so it can use the same approved network
    surface while reviewing
    - exact session-scoped network approvals are copied into the guardian
    session with protocol/port scope preserved
    - those copied approvals are now seeded before the guardian's first turn
    is submitted, so inherited approvals are available during any immediate
    review-time checks
    
    ## Out of scope / follow-ups
    - the sandbox-permission validation split was pulled into a separate PR
    and is not part of this diff
    - a future follow-up can enable `serde_json` preserve-order in
    `codex-core` and then simplify the guardian action rendering further
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat(app-server-protocol): address naming conflicts in json schema exporter (#13819)
    This fixes a schema export bug where two different `WebSearchAction`
    types were getting merged under the same name in the app-server v2 JSON
    schema bundle.
    
    The problem was that v2 thread items use the app-server API's
    `WebSearchAction` with camelCase variants like `openPage`, while
    `ThreadResumeParams.history` and
    `RawResponseItemCompletedNotification.item` pull in the upstream
    `ResponseItem` graph, which uses the Responses API snake_case shape like
    `open_page`. During bundle generation we were flattening nested
    definitions into the v2 namespace by plain name, so the later definition
    could silently overwrite the earlier one.
    
    That meant clients generating code from the bundled schema could end up
    with the wrong `WebSearchAction` definition for v2 thread history. In
    practice this shows up on web search items reconstructed from rollout
    files with persisted extended history.
    
    This change does two things:
    - Gives the upstream Responses API schema a distinct JSON schema name:
    `ResponsesApiWebSearchAction`
    - Makes namespace-level schema definition collisions fail loudly instead
    of silently overwriting
  • Clarify sandbox permission override helper semantics (#13703)
    ## Summary
    Today `SandboxPermissions::requires_additional_permissions()` does not
    actually mean "is `WithAdditionalPermissions`". It returns `true` for
    any non-default sandbox override, including `RequireEscalated`. That
    broad behavior is relied on in multiple `main` callsites.
    
    The naming is security-sensitive because `SandboxPermissions` is used on
    shell-like tool calls to tell the executor how a single command should
    relate to the turn sandbox:
    - `UseDefault`: run with the turn sandbox unchanged
    - `RequireEscalated`: request execution outside the sandbox
    - `WithAdditionalPermissions`: stay sandboxed but widen permissions for
    that command only
    
    ## Problem
    The old helper name reads as if it only applies to the
    `WithAdditionalPermissions` variant. In practice it means "this command
    requested any explicit sandbox override."
    
    That ambiguity made it easy to read production checks incorrectly and
    made the guardian change look like a standalone `main` fix when it is
    not.
    
    On `main` today:
    - `shell` and `unified_exec` intentionally reject any explicit
    `sandbox_permissions` request unless approval policy is `OnRequest`
    - `exec_policy` intentionally treats any explicit sandbox override as
    prompt-worthy in restricted sandboxes
    - tests intentionally serialize both `RequireEscalated` and
    `WithAdditionalPermissions` as explicit sandbox override requests
    
    So changing those callsites from the broad helper to a narrow
    `WithAdditionalPermissions` check would be a behavior change, not a pure
    cleanup.
    
    ## What This PR Does
    - documents `SandboxPermissions` as a per-command sandbox override, not
    a generic permissions bag
    - adds `requests_sandbox_override()` for the broad meaning: anything
    except `UseDefault`
    - adds `uses_additional_permissions()` for the narrow meaning: only
    `WithAdditionalPermissions`
    - keeps `requires_additional_permissions()` as a compatibility alias to
    the broad meaning for now
    - updates the current broad callsites to use the accurately named broad
    helper
    - adds unit coverage that locks in the semantics of all three helpers
    
    ## What This PR Does Not Do
    This PR does not change runtime behavior. That is intentional.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • fix: accept two macOS automation input shapes for approval payload compatibility (#13683)
    ## Summary
    This PR:
    1. fixes a deserialization mismatch for macOS automation permissions in
    approval payloads by making core parsing accept both supported wire
    shapes for bundle IDs.
    2. added `#[serde(default)]` to `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` so
    omitted fields deserialize to secure defaults.
    
    
    ## Why this change is needed
    `MacOsAutomationPermission` uses `#[serde(try_from =
    "MacOsAutomationPermissionDe")]`, so deserialization is controlled by
    `MacOsAutomationPermissionDe`. After we aligned v2
    `additionalPermissions.macos.automations` to the core shape, approval
    payloads started including `{ "bundle_ids": [...] }` in some paths.
    `MacOsAutomationPermissionDe` previously accepted only `"none" | "all"`
    or a plain array, so object-shaped bundle IDs failed with `data did not
    match any variant of untagged enum MacOsAutomationPermissionDe`. This
    change restores compatibility by accepting both forms while preserving
    existing normalization behavior (trim values and map empty bundle lists
    to `None`).
    
    ## Validation
    
    saw this error went away when running
    ```
    cargo run -p codex-app-server-test-client -- \
        --codex-bin ./target/debug/codex \
        -c 'approval_policy="on-request"' \
        -c 'features.shell_zsh_fork=true' \
        -c 'zsh_path="/tmp/codex-zsh-fork/package/vendor/aarch64-apple-darwin/zsh/macos-15/zsh"' \
        send-message-v2 --experimental-api \
        'Use $apple-notes and run scripts/notes_info now.'
    ```
    :
    ```
    Error: failed to deserialize ServerRequest from JSONRPCRequest
    
    Caused by:
        data did not match any variant of untagged enum MacOsAutomationPermissionDe
    ```
  • chore: remove unused legacy macOS permission types (#13677)
    ## Summary
    
    This PR removes legacy macOS permission model types from
    `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`:
    
    - `MacOsPermissions`
    - `MacOsPreferencesValue`
    - `MacOsAutomationValue`
    
    The protocol now relies on the current `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions`
    model for macOS permission data.
  • core/protocol: add structured macOS additional permissions and merge them into sandbox execution (#13499)
    ## Summary
    - Introduce strongly-typed macOS additional permissions across
    protocol/core/app-server boundaries.
    - Merge additional permissions into effective sandbox execution,
    including macOS seatbelt profile extensions.
    - Expand docs, schema/tool definitions, UI rendering, and tests for
    `network`, `file_system`, and `macos` additional permissions.
  • image-gen-core (#13290)
    Core tool-calling for image-gen, handles requesting and receiving logic
    for images using response API
  • chore: Nest skill and protocol network permissions under network.enabled (#13427)
    ## Summary
    
    Changes the permission profile shape from a bare network boolean to a
    nested object.
    
    Before:
    
    ```yaml
    permissions:
      network: true
    ```
    
    After:
    
    ```yaml
    permissions:
      network:
        enabled: true
    ```
    
    This also updates the shared Rust and app-server protocol types so
    `PermissionProfile.network` is no longer `Option<bool>`, but
    `Option<NetworkPermissions>` with `enabled: Option<bool>`.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Updated `PermissionProfile` in `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`:
    - `pub network: Option<bool>` -> `pub network:
    Option<NetworkPermissions>`
    - Added `NetworkPermissions` with:
      - `pub enabled: Option<bool>`
    - Changed emptiness semantics so `network` is only considered empty when
    `enabled` is `None`
    - Updated skill metadata parsing to accept `permissions.network.enabled`
    - Updated core permission consumers to read
    `network.enabled.unwrap_or(false)` where a concrete boolean is needed
    - Updated app-server v2 protocol types and regenerated schema/TypeScript
    outputs
    - Updated docs to mention `additionalPermissions.network.enabled`
  • Add under-development original-resolution view_image support (#13050)
    ## Summary
    
    Add original-resolution support for `view_image` behind the
    under-development `view_image_original_resolution` feature flag.
    
    When the flag is enabled and the target model is `gpt-5.3-codex` or
    newer, `view_image` now preserves original PNG/JPEG/WebP bytes and sends
    `detail: "original"` to the Responses API instead of using the legacy
    resize/compress path.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Added `view_image_original_resolution` as an under-development feature
    flag.
    - Added `ImageDetail` to the protocol models and support for serializing
    `detail: "original"` on tool-returned images.
    - Added `PromptImageMode::Original` to `codex-utils-image`.
      - Preserves original PNG/JPEG/WebP bytes.
      - Keeps legacy behavior for the resize path.
    - Updated `view_image` to:
    - use the shared `local_image_content_items_with_label_number(...)`
    helper in both code paths
      - select original-resolution mode only when:
        - the feature flag is enabled, and
        - the model slug parses as `gpt-5.3-codex` or newer
    - Kept local user image attachments on the existing resize path; this
    change is specific to `view_image`.
    - Updated history/image accounting so only `detail: "original"` images
    use the docs-based GPT-5 image cost calculation; legacy images still use
    the old fixed estimate.
    - Added JS REPL guidance, gated on the same feature flag, to prefer JPEG
    at 85% quality unless lossless is required, while still allowing other
    formats when explicitly requested.
    - Updated tests and helper code that construct
    `FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage` to carry the new `detail`
    field.
    
    ## Behavior
    
    ### Feature off
    - `view_image` keeps the existing resize/re-encode behavior.
    - History estimation keeps the existing fixed-cost heuristic.
    
    ### Feature on + `gpt-5.3-codex+`
    - `view_image` sends original-resolution images with `detail:
    "original"`.
    - PNG/JPEG/WebP source bytes are preserved when possible.
    - History estimation uses the GPT-5 docs-based image-cost calculation
    for those `detail: "original"` images.
    
    
    #### [git stack](https://github.com/magus/git-stack-cli)
    - 👉 `1` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13050
    -  `2` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13331
    -  `3` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13049