131 Commits

• Encrypt multi-agent v2 message payloads (#26210)

  ## Why
  
  Multi-agent v2 currently routes agent instructions through normal tool
  arguments and inter-agent context. That means the parent model can emit
  plaintext task text, Codex can persist it in history/rollouts, and the
  recipient can receive it as ordinary assistant-message JSON.
  
  This changes the v2 path so agent instructions stay encrypted between
  model calls: Responses encrypts the `message` argument returned by the
  model, Codex forwards only that ciphertext, and Responses decrypts it
  internally for the recipient model.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Mark the v2 `message` parameter as encrypted for `spawn_agent`,
  `send_message`, and `followup_task`.
  - Treat multi-agent v2 tool `message` values as ciphertext
  unconditionally.
  - Store v2 inter-agent task text in
  `InterAgentCommunication.encrypted_content` with empty plaintext
  `content`.
  - Convert encrypted inter-agent communications into the Responses
  `agent_message` input item before sending the child request.
  - Preserve `agent_message` items across history, rollout, compaction,
  telemetry, and app-server schema paths.
  - Leave multi-agent v1 unchanged.
  
  ## Message shape
  
  The model still calls the v2 tools with a `message` argument, but that
  value is now ciphertext:
  
  ```json
  {
    "name": "spawn_agent",
    "arguments": {
      "task_name": "worker",
      "message": "<ciphertext>"
    }
  }
  ```
  
  Codex stores the task as encrypted inter-agent communication:
  
  ```json
  {
    "author": "/root",
    "recipient": "/root/worker",
    "content": "",
    "encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>",
    "trigger_turn": true
  }
  ```
  
  When Codex builds the recipient request, it forwards the ciphertext
  using the new Responses input item:
  
  ```json
  {
    "type": "agent_message",
    "author": "/root",
    "recipient": "/root/worker",
    "content": [
      {
        "type": "encrypted_content",
        "encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>"
      }
    ]
  }
  ```
  
  Responses decrypts that item internally for the recipient model.
  
  ## Context impact
  
  - Parent context no longer carries plaintext v2 agent task instructions
  from these tool arguments.
  - Codex rollout/history stores ciphertext for v2 agent instructions.
  - Recipient requests receive an `agent_message` item instead of
  assistant commentary JSON for encrypted task delivery.
  - Plaintext completion/status notifications are still plaintext because
  they are Codex-generated status messages, not encrypted model tool
  arguments.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just test -p codex-tools`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-rollout`
  - `just test -p codex-rollout-trace`
  - `just test -p codex-otel`
  - `just write-app-server-schema`

  jif · 2026-06-05 10:25:57 +02:00
  5f4d06ef18
• Expose local image paths to models (#25944)

  ## Why
  
  Local image attachments include image bytes, but the adjacent
  model-visible label omits the source path. Exposing the path lets
  model-selected workflows refer back to the intended local image
  explicitly.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Include an escaped `path` attribute in model-visible local image
  opening tags.
  - Reuse the path-aware marker generator in rollout coverage.
  - Update protocol, replay, and rollout coverage for the new request
  shape.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just fmt`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-core skips_local_image_label_text`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  copy_paste_local_image_persists_rollout_request_shape`
  - `git diff --check`

  Won Park · 2026-06-03 19:49:58 +00:00
  57ab4c89e0
• core: derive built-in permission profiles from raw policies (#25739)

  ## Why
  
  Permission profiles that extend a built-in profile should behave like
  other TOML inheritance: parent entries provide defaults, and child keys
  override matching fields before the profile is compiled.
  
  That was not true for `:workspace`. Previously, a profile with `extends
  = ":workspace"` seeded the compiled runtime
  `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` policy and then appended child
  filesystem entries. A child override such as `":tmpdir" = "read"`
  therefore left the inherited `":tmpdir" = "write"` entry in the final
  policy. Since same-target `write` wins over `read` during runtime
  resolution, the child override was ineffective.
  
  This also needs a clear source of truth for the built-in profiles. The
  protocol-level sandbox policy constructors now define the raw built-in
  filesystem entries, and both `PermissionProfile` presets and
  config-profile inheritance derive from those same values.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Add a canonical `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only()` constructor
  while keeping the read-only and workspace-write raw filesystem entries
  explicit and independent.
  - Derive `PermissionProfile::read_only()` from
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only()`;
  `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` continues to derive from
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()`.
  - Build extensible `:read-only` and `:workspace` parent profiles by
  projecting those canonical sandbox policies into
  `PermissionProfileToml`, then merge user overrides at the TOML layer
  before compilation.
  - Add config parsing support for `:slash_tmp` so the built-in
  `:workspace` parent can be expressed in the same TOML-shaped filesystem
  table as user profiles.
  - Document that `PermissionsToml::resolve_profile()` returns an
  already-merged `PermissionProfileToml`, and return that profile directly
  after removing the resolved-profile wrapper.
  - Extend the config test for `extends = ":workspace"` to assert that
  inherited `":slash_tmp" = "write"` is preserved and that a child
  `":tmpdir" = "read"` entry replaces the inherited `write` entry.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `just test -p codex-config`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  permissions_profiles_resolve_extends_parent_first_with_child_overrides`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  default_permissions_profile_can_extend_builtin_workspace`
  - `just test -p codex-core`
    - Result: 2596 passed, 4 failed, 1 timed out.
  - The failures were existing sandbox/environment-sensitive tests
  unrelated to this permissions change:
  
  `suite::user_shell_cmd::user_shell_command_does_not_set_network_sandbox_env_var`,
  
  `suite::user_shell_cmd::user_shell_command_history_is_persisted_and_shared_with_model`,
  
  `suite::abort_tasks::interrupt_persists_turn_aborted_marker_in_next_request`,
      `suite::abort_tasks::interrupt_tool_records_history_entries`, and
  
  `thread_manager::tests::start_thread_uses_all_default_environments_from_codex_home`.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-06-02 10:57:35 -07:00
  593df8773d
• [codex] Add user input client ids (#24653)

  ## Summary
  
  Adds an optional `clientId` field to app-server v2 `UserInput` and
  carries it through the core `UserInput` model so clients can correlate
  echoed user input items without relying on payload equality.
  
  ## Details
  
  - Adds `client_id: Option<String>` to core `UserInput` variants.
  - Exposes the v2 app-server field as `clientId` on the wire and in
  generated TypeScript.
  - Preserves the id when converting between app-server v2 and core
  protocol types.
  - Regenerates app-server schema fixtures.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just fmt`
  - `just write-app-server-schema`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
  - `git diff --check`

  Alexi Christakis · 2026-05-28 14:54:39 -07:00
  e92c952b2e
• Restore legacy image detail values (#24644)

  ## Why
  
  Older persisted rollouts can contain `input_image.detail` values of
  `auto` or `low` from before `ImageDetail` was narrowed to
  `high`/`original`. Current deserialization rejects those values, which
  can make resume skip later compacted checkpoints and reconstruct an
  oversized raw suffix before the next compaction attempt.
  
  Confirmed Sentry reports fixed by this compatibility path:
  
  - [CODEX-1H3F](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7500642496/)
  - [CODEX-1H6N](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7501025347/)
  - [CODEX-1JDP](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7504549065/)
  - [CODEX-1HW6](https://openai.sentry.io/issues/7503407986/)
  
  ## Background
  
  [openai/codex#20693](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/20693) added
  image-detail plumbing for app-server `UserInput` so input images could
  explicitly request `detail: original`. The Slack discussion behind that
  PR was about ScreenSpot / bridge evals where user input images were
  resized, while tool output images already had MCP/code-mode ways to
  request image detail.
  
  In review, the intended new API surface was narrowed to `high` and
  `original`: default to `high`, allow `original` when callers need
  unchanged image handling, and avoid encouraging new `auto` or `low`
  usage. That policy still makes sense for newly emitted values.
  
  The missing compatibility piece is persisted history. Older rollouts can
  already contain `auto` and `low`, and resume reconstructs typed history
  by deserializing those rollout records. Rejecting old values at that
  boundary causes valid compacted checkpoints to be skipped. This PR
  restores `auto` and `low` as real variants so old records deserialize
  and round-trip without being rewritten as `high`, while product paths
  can continue to default to `high` and avoid emitting `auto` for new
  behavior.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Restored `ImageDetail::Auto` and `ImageDetail::Low` as first-class
  protocol values.
  - Preserved `auto`/`low` through rollout deserialization, MCP image
  metadata, code-mode image output, and schema/type generation.
  - Kept local image byte handling conservative: only `original` switches
  to original-resolution loading; `auto`/`low`/`high` continue through the
  resize-to-fit path while retaining their detail value.
  - Added regression coverage for enum round-tripping and code-mode `low`
  detail handling.
  
  ## Testing
  
  - `just write-app-server-schema`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-tools`
  - `just test -p codex-code-mode`
  - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  suite::rmcp_client::stdio_image_responses_preserve_original_detail_metadata`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  suite::code_mode::code_mode_can_use_mcp_image_result_with_image_helper`
  - Loaded broken rollouts on local fixed builds, and started/completed
  new turns.
  
  I also attempted `just test -p codex-core`; the local broad run did not
  finish green: 2559 tests run, 2467 passed, 55 flaky, 91 failed, 1 timed
  out. The failures were broad timeout/deadline failures across unrelated
  areas; targeted changed-path core tests above passed.

  rhan-oai · 2026-05-26 16:24:33 -07:00
  dc4e54d061
• [codex] remove plain image wrapper spans (#24652)

  ## Why
  
  Remote image submissions currently wrap native `input_image` spans in
  literal `` text spans. Those extra prompt tokens
  add structure without providing label or routing information.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Serialize `UserInput::Image` directly as an `input_image` content
  span.
  - Preserve named local-image framing and legacy wrapper parsing for
  labeled attachments and existing histories.
  - Update existing request-shape expectations for drag-and-drop images,
  model switching, and compaction.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - Focused `codex-core` run covering
  `drag_drop_image_persists_rollout_request_shape`,
  `model_change_from_image_to_text_strips_prior_image_content`, and
  `snapshot_request_shape_pre_turn_compaction_including_incoming_user_message`
  
  ## Notes
  
  - A broader `just test -p codex-core` run was attempted; the affected
  tests passed, while the overall run failed in unrelated CLI, MCP, and
  tooling tests plus a `thread_manager` timeout.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-05-26 15:49:37 -07:00
  46391f7efa
• standalone websearch extension (#23823)

  ## Summary
  
  Add the extension-backed standalone `web.run` tool so Codex can call the
  standalone search endpoint through the `codex-api` search client and
  return its encrypted output to Responses.
  
  - gate the new tool behind `standalone_web_search`
  - install the extension in the app-server thread registry and hide
  hosted `web_search` when standalone search is enabled for OpenAI
  providers so the two paths stay mutually exclusive
  - build search context from persisted history using a small tail
  heuristic: previous user message, assistant text between the last two
  user turns capped at about 1k tokens, and current user message
  
  ## Test Plan
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-web-search-extension`
  - `cargo test -p codex-api`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  hosted_tools_follow_provider_auth_model_and_config_gates`

  sayan-oai · 2026-05-26 11:12:24 -07:00
  a22706dfae
• feat(permissions): resolve permission profile inheritance (#22270)

  ## Stack
  
  This is the foundation PR for the permission-profile inheritance stack.
  
  - This PR adds config-level `extends` resolution and merge semantics.
  - Follow-up: #23705 applies resolved profiles at runtime and updates the
  active-profile protocol surfaces.
  
  ## Why
  
  Permission profiles are starting to carry enough policy that
  copy-pasting near-identical definitions becomes hard to review and easy
  to drift. Before the runtime can consume inherited profiles, the config
  layer needs one explicit resolver that can merge parent chains and
  reject unsafe or invalid inheritance shapes.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Add `extends` to permission-profile TOML and resolve parent chains in
  inheritance order.
  - Merge inherited profile TOML with the existing config merge behavior
  while preserving the permission-specific normalization needed for
  network domain keys.
  - Keep parent descriptions out of resolved child profiles and record
  inherited profile names separately for downstream consumers.
  - Reject undefined parents, unsupported built-in parents, and
  inheritance cycles with targeted errors.
  - Cover resolver behavior with TOML fixture tests and refresh the
  generated config schema.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-config`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core permissions_profiles_`

  viyatb-oai · 2026-05-20 20:12:07 +00:00
  fe7c069fe6
• add encryptedcontent to functioncalloutput (#23500)

  add new `EncryptedContent` variant to `FunctionCallOutputContentItem`
  ahead of standalone websearch.
  
  we need to be able to receive and pass encrypted function call output
  from the new web search endpoint back to responsesapi, as we cannot
  expose direct search results.

  sayan-oai · 2026-05-19 23:47:48 -07:00
  34aad43684
• Make deny canonical for filesystem permission entries (#23493)

  ## Why
  Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which
  is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This
  change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while
  preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`.
  
  ## What changed
  - rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny`
  - serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value
  - retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config
  compatibility
  - update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the
  canonical spelling
  - refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire
  shape
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles
  --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib`
  
  Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached
  unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under
  this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed
  cleanly.

  viyatb-oai · 2026-05-19 11:03:47 -07:00
  3c76081876
• app-server-protocol: remove PermissionProfile from API (#22924)

  ## Why
  
  The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the
  lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the
  compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally;
  exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand
  details that should remain implementation-level.
  
  The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable
  profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass
  back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also
  avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type
  space and the core protocol model.
  
  Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note
  that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so
  we don't need to be too finicky about these changes.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface,
  including generated schema and TypeScript exports.
  - Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to
  `ActivePermissionProfile`.
  - Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the
  command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics.
  - Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types
  directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-15 17:10:15 -07:00
  9025550709
• Preserve image detail in app-server inputs (#20693)

  ## Summary
  
  - Add optional image detail to user image inputs across core, app-server
  v2, thread history/event mapping, and the generated app-server
  schemas/types.
  - Preserve requested detail when serializing Responses image inputs:
  omitted detail stays on the existing `high` default, while explicit
  `original` keeps local images on the original-resolution path.
  - Support `high`/`original` consistently for tool image outputs,
  including MCP `codex/imageDetail`, code-mode image helpers, and
  `view_image`.

  Curtis 'Fjord' Hawthorne · 2026-05-15 15:04:04 -07:00
  8543e39885
• [codex] Use compaction_trigger item for remote compaction v2 (#22809)

  ## Why
  
  Remote compaction v2 was still using `context_compaction` as both the
  request trigger and the compacted output shape. The Responses API now
  has the landed contract for this flow: Codex sends a dedicated `{
  "type": "compaction_trigger" }` input item, and the backend returns the
  standard `compaction` output item with encrypted content.
  
  This aligns the v2 path with that wire contract while preserving the
  existing local compacted-history post-processing behavior.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Add `ResponseItem::CompactionTrigger` and regenerate the app-server
  protocol schema fixtures.
  - Send `compaction_trigger` from `remote_compaction_v2` instead of a
  payload-less `context_compaction`.
  - Collect exactly one backend `compaction` output item, then reuse the
  existing compacted-history rebuilding path.
  - Treat the trigger item as a transient request marker rather than model
  output or persisted rollout/memory content.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol compaction_trigger`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core remote_compact_v2`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core compact_remote_v2`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  responses_websocket_sends_response_processed_after_remote_compaction_v2`
  - `just write-app-server-schema`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`

  jif-oai · 2026-05-15 11:40:35 +02:00
  0322ac3df8
• permissions: support workspace roots in profiles (#22610)

  ## Why
  
  This is the configuration/model half of the alternative permissions
  migration we discussed as a comparison point for
  [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) and
  [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402).
  
  The old `workspace-write` model mixes three concerns that we want to
  keep separate:
  - reusable profile rules that should stay immutable once selected
  - user/runtime workspace roots from `cwd`, `--add-dir`, and legacy
  workspace-write config
  - internal Codex writable roots such as memories, which should not be
  shown as user workspace roots
  
  This PR gives permission profiles first-class `workspace_roots` so users
  can opt multiple repositories into the same `:workspace_roots` rules
  without using broad absolute-path write grants. It also starts
  separating the raw selected profile from the effective runtime profile
  by making `Permissions` expose explicit accessors instead of public
  mutable fields.
  
  A representative `config.toml` looks like this:
  
  ```toml
  default_permissions = "dev"
  
  [permissions.dev.workspace_roots]
  "~/code/openai" = true
  "~/code/developers-website" = true
  
  [permissions.dev.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
  "." = "write"
  ".codex" = "read"
  ".git" = "read"
  ".vscode" = "read"
  ```
  
  If Codex starts in `~/code/codex` with that profile selected, the
  effective workspace-root set becomes:
  - `~/code/codex` from the runtime `cwd`
  - `~/code/openai` from the profile
  - `~/code/developers-website` from the profile
  
  The `:workspace_roots` rules are materialized across each root, so
  `.git`, `.codex`, and `.vscode` stay scoped the same way everywhere.
  Runtime additions such as `--add-dir` can still layer on later stack
  entries without mutating the selected profile.
  
  ## Stack Shape
  
  This PR intentionally stops before the profile-identity cleanup in
  [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) so the base review
  stays focused on config loading, workspace-root materialization, and
  compatibility with legacy `workspace-write`.
  
  The representation in this PR is therefore transitional: `Permissions`
  carries enough state to distinguish the raw constrained profile from the
  effective runtime profile, and there are still call sites that must keep
  the active profile identity and constrained profile value in sync. The
  follow-up PR replaces that with a single resolved profile state
  (`ResolvedPermissionProfile` / `PermissionProfileState`) that keeps the
  profile id, immutable `PermissionProfile`, and profile-declared
  workspace roots together. That follow-up removes APIs such as
  `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` where
  separate arguments could drift out of sync.
  
  Downstream PRs then build on this base to switch app-server turn updates
  to profile ids plus runtime workspace roots and to finish the
  user-visible summary behavior. Reviewers should judge this PR as the
  workspace-roots foundation, not as the final in-memory shape of selected
  permission profiles.
  
  ## Review Guide
  
  Suggested review order:
  
  1. Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs`.
  This is the main shape change in the base slice. `Permissions` now
  stores a private raw `Constrained<PermissionProfile>` plus runtime
  `workspace_roots`. Callers use `permission_profile()` when they need the
  raw constrained value and `effective_permission_profile()` when they
  need a materialized runtime profile. As noted above,
  [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) replaces this
  transitional shape with a resolved profile state that keeps identity and
  profile data together.
  
  2. Review `codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs` and
  `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs`.
  These add `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]`, resolve enabled entries
  relative to the policy cwd, and keep `:workspace_roots` deny-read glob
  patterns symbolic until the actual roots are known.
  
  3. Review `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` and
  `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`.
  These add the policy/profile materialization helpers that expand exact
  `:workspace_roots` entries and scoped deny-read globs over every
  workspace root. This is also where `ActivePermissionProfileModification`
  is removed from the core model.
  
  4. Review the legacy bridge in
  `Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides` and
  `Config::set_legacy_sandbox_policy`.
  This is where legacy `workspace-write` roots become runtime workspace
  roots, while Codex internal writable roots stay internal and do not
  appear as user-facing workspace roots.
  
  5. Then skim downstream call sites.
  The interesting pattern is raw-vs-effective access: state/proxy/bwrap
  paths keep the raw constrained profile, while execution, summaries, and
  user-visible status use the effective profile and workspace-root list.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - added `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` to the config model and
  schema
  - added runtime `workspace_roots` state to `Config`/`Permissions` and
  `ConfigOverrides`
  - made `Permissions` profile fields private and replaced direct mutation
  with accessors/setters
  - added `PermissionProfile` and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for
  materializing `:workspace_roots` exact paths and deny-read globs across
  all roots
  - moved legacy additional writable roots into runtime workspace-root
  state instead of active profile modifications
  - removed `ActivePermissionProfileModification` and its app-server
  protocol/schema export
  - updated sandbox/status summary paths so internal writable roots are
  not reported as user workspace roots
  
  ## Verification Strategy
  
  The targeted tests cover the behavior at the layers where regressions
  are most likely:
  - `codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs` verifies config loading,
  legacy workspace-root seeding, effective profile materialization, and
  memory-root handling.
  - `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs` verifies profile
  `workspace_roots` parsing and `:workspace_roots` scoped/glob
  compilation.
  - `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` unit tests verify exact and
  glob materialization over multiple workspace roots.
  - `codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs` and
  `codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs` verify the
  user-facing summaries show effective workspace roots and hide internal
  writes.
  
  I also ran `cargo check --tests` locally after the latest stack refresh
  to catch cross-crate API breakage from the private-field/accessor
  changes.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22610).
  * #22612
  * #22611
  * #22683
  * __->__ #22610

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-14 18:25:23 -07:00
  c25d905f61
• permissions: canonicalize workspace_roots and danger-full-access names (#22624)

  ## Why
  
  This is a small precursor to the larger permissions-migration work. Both
  the comparison stack in
  [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) /
  [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402) and the alternate
  stack in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) /
  [#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611) /
  [#22612](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22612) are easier to
  review if the terminology is already settled underneath them.
  
  Because `:project_roots` and `:danger-no-sandbox` have not shipped as
  stable user-facing surface area, carrying them forward as aliases would
  just add more migration logic to the later stacks. This PR removes that
  ambiguity now so the follow-on work can rely on one spelling for each
  built-in concept.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - renamed the config-facing special filesystem key from `:project_roots`
  to `:workspace_roots`
  - dropped unpublished `:project_roots` parsing support in
  `core/src/config/permissions.rs`, so new config only recognizes
  `:workspace_roots`
  - renamed the built-in full-access permission profile id from
  `:danger-no-sandbox` to `:danger-full-access`
  - dropped unpublished `:danger-no-sandbox` support entirely, including
  the old active-profile canonicalization path, and added explicit
  rejection coverage for the legacy id
  - introduced shared built-in permission-profile id constants in
  `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`
  - updated `core`, `app-server`, and `tui` call sites that special-case
  built-in profiles to use the shared constants and canonical ids
  - updated tests and the Linux sandbox README to use `:workspace_roots` /
  `:danger-full-access`
  
  ## Verification
  
  I focused verification on the three places this rename can regress:
  config parsing, active-profile identity surfaced back out of `core`, and
  user/server call sites that special-case built-in profiles.
  
  Targeted checks:
  
  -
  `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_table`
  -
  `config::tests::default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications`
  -
  `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile`
  - `config::tests::legacy_danger_no_sandbox_is_rejected`
  - `workspace_root` filtered `codex-core` tests
  -
  `request_processors::thread_processor::thread_processor_tests::thread_processor_behavior_tests::requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
  -
  `suite::v2::turn_start::turn_start_rejects_invalid_permission_selection_before_starting_turn`
  - `status::tests::status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions`
  -
  `status::tests::status_permissions_full_disk_managed_with_network_is_danger_full_access`
  -
  `app_server_session::tests::embedded_turn_permissions_use_active_profile_selection`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-14 08:45:54 -07:00
  01d93fd9fc
• [codex] Remove unused legacy shell tools (#22246)

  ## Why
  
  Recent session history showed no active use of the raw `shell`,
  `local_shell`, or `container.exec` execution surfaces. Keeping those
  handlers/specs wired into core leaves duplicate shell execution paths
  alongside the supported `shell_command` and unified exec tools.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removed the raw `shell` handler/spec and its `ShellToolCallParams`
  protocol helper.
  - Removed the legacy `local_shell` and `container.exec` handler/spec
  plumbing while preserving persisted-history compatibility for old
  response items.
  - Normalized model/config `default` and `local` shell selections to
  `shell_command`.
  - Pruned tests that exercised removed raw-shell/local-shell/apply-patch
  variants and kept coverage on `shell_command`, unified exec, and
  freeform `apply_patch`.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `git diff --check`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tools`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::shell`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::spec`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::router`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  active_call_preserves_triggering_command_context`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_serialization`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_command_`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all local_shell`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all otel::`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all hooks::`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `just fix -p codex-tools`

  pakrym-oai · 2026-05-13 16:43:25 +00:00
  83decfa300
• feat: add remote compaction v2 Responses client path (#20773)

  ## Why
  
  This adds the `remote_compaction_v2` client path so remote compaction
  can run through the normal Responses stream and install a
  `context_compaction` item that trigger a compaction.
  
  The goal is to migrate some of the compaction logic on the client side
  
  We keeps the v2 transport behind a feature flag while letting follow-up
  requests reuse the compacted context instead of falling back to the
  legacy compaction item shape.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - add `ResponseItem::ContextCompaction` and refresh the generated
  app-server / schema / TypeScript fixtures that expose response items on
  the wire
  - add `core/src/compact_remote_v2.rs` to send compaction through the
  standard streamed Responses client, require exactly one
  `context_compaction` output item, and install that item into compacted
  history
  - route manual compact and auto-compaction through the v2 path when
  `remote_compaction_v2` is enabled, while keeping the existing remote
  compaction path as the fallback
  - preserve the new item type across history retention, follow-up request
  construction, telemetry, rollout persistence, and rollout-trace
  normalization
  - add targeted coverage for the feature flag, `context_compaction`
  serialization, rollout-trace normalization, and remote-compaction
  follow-up behavior
  
  ## Verification
  
  - added protocol tests for `context_compaction`
  serialization/deserialization in `protocol/src/models.rs`
  - added rollout-trace coverage for `context_compaction` normalization in
  `rollout-trace/src/reducer/conversation_tests.rs`
  - added remote compaction integration coverage for v2 follow-up reuse
  and mixed compaction output streams in
  `core/tests/suite/compact_remote.rs`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  jif-oai · 2026-05-04 14:15:01 +02:00
  d927f61208
• permissions: expose active profile metadata (#20095)
  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-29 20:54:59 -07:00
  ac4332c05b
• Preserve assistant phase for replayed messages (#19832)
  friel-openai · 2026-04-28 08:46:13 -07:00
  598bbcdb58
• Remove ghost snapshots (#19481)

  ## Summary
  - Remove `ghost_snapshot` / `GhostCommit` from the Responses API surface
  and generated SDK/schema artifacts.
  - Keep legacy config loading compatible, but make undo a no-op that
  reports the feature is unavailable.
  - Clean up core history, compaction, telemetry, rollout, and tests to
  stop carrying ghost snapshot items.
  
  ## Testing
  - Unit tests passed for `codex-protocol`, `codex-core` targeted undo and
  compaction flows, `codex-rollout`, and `codex-app-server-protocol`.
  - Regenerated config and app-server schemas plus Python SDK artifacts
  and verified they match the checked-in outputs.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-27 18:48:57 -07:00
  4e05f3053c
• permissions: derive config defaults as profiles (#19772)

  ## Why
  
  This continues the permissions migration by making legacy config default
  resolution produce the canonical `PermissionProfile` first. The legacy
  `SandboxPolicy` projection should stay available at compatibility
  boundaries, but config loading should not create a legacy policy just to
  immediately convert it back into a profile.
  
  Specifically, when `default_permissions` is not specified in
  `config.toml`, instead of creating a `SandboxPolicy` in
  `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs` and then trying to derive a
  `PermissionProfile` from it, we use `derive_permission_profile()` to
  create a more faithful `PermissionProfile` using the values of
  `ConfigToml` directly.
  
  This also keeps the existing behavior of `sandbox_workspace_write` and
  extra writable roots after #19841 replaced `:cwd` with `:project_roots`.
  Legacy workspace-write defaults are represented as symbolic
  `:project_roots` write access plus symbolic project-root metadata
  carveouts. Extra absolute writable roots are still added directly and
  continue to get concrete metadata protections for paths that exist under
  those roots.
  
  The platform sandboxes differ when a symbolic project-root subpath does
  not exist yet.
  
  * **Seatbelt** can encode literal/subpath exclusions directly, so macOS
  emits project-root metadata subpath policies even if `.git`, `.agents`,
  or `.codex` do not exist.
  * **bwrap** has to materialize bind-mount targets. Binding `/dev/null`
  to a missing `.git` can create a host-visible placeholder that changes
  Git repo discovery. Binding missing `.agents` would not affect Git
  discovery, but it would still create a host-visible project metadata
  placeholder from an automatic compatibility carveout. Linux therefore
  skips only missing automatic `.git` and `.agents` read-only metadata
  masks; missing `.codex` remains protected so first-time project config
  creation goes through the protected-path approval flow. User-authored
  `read` and `none` subpath rules keep normal bwrap behavior, and `none`
  can still mask the first missing component to prevent creation under
  writable roots.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Adds profile-native helpers for legacy workspace-write semantics,
  including `PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with()`,
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()`, and
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots()`.
  - Makes `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write()` the single legacy
  workspace-write constructor so both `from_legacy_sandbox_policy()` and
  `From<&SandboxPolicy>` include the project-root metadata carveouts.
  - Removes the no-carveout `legacy_workspace_write_base_policy()` path
  and the `prune_read_entries_under_writable_roots()` cleanup that was
  only needed by that split construction.
  - Adds `ConfigToml::derive_permission_profile()` for legacy sandbox-mode
  fallback resolution; named `default_permissions` profiles continue
  through the permissions profile pipeline instead of being reconstructed
  from `sandbox_mode`.
  - Updates `Config::load()` to start from the derived profile, validate
  that it still has a legacy compatibility projection, and apply
  additional writable roots directly to managed workspace-write filesystem
  policies.
  - Updates Linux bwrap argument construction so missing automatic
  `.git`/`.agents` symbolic project-root read-only carveouts are skipped
  before emitting bind args; missing `.codex`, user-authored `read`/`none`
  subpath rules, and existing missing writable-root behavior are
  preserved.
  - Adds coverage that legacy workspace-write config produces symbolic
  project-root metadata carveouts, extra legacy workspace writable roots
  still protect existing metadata paths such as `.git`, and bwrap skips
  missing `.git`/`.agents` project-root carveouts while preserving missing
  `.codex` and user-authored missing subpath rules.
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19772).
  * #19776
  * #19775
  * #19774
  * #19773
  * __->__ #19772

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-27 16:50:10 -07:00
  755880ef9c
• permissions: remove cwd special path (#19841)

  ## Why
  
  The experimental `PermissionProfile` API had both `:cwd` and
  `:project_roots` special filesystem paths, which made the permission
  root ambiguous. This PR removes the unstable `current_working_directory`
  special path before the permissions API is stabilized, so callers use
  `:project_roots` for symbolic project-root access.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removes `FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory` from protocol
  and app-server protocol models, plus regenerated app-server
  JSON/TypeScript schemas.
  - Replaces internal `:cwd` permission entries with `:project_roots`
  entries.
  - Keeps the existing cwd-update behavior for legacy-shaped
  workspace-write profiles, while removing the deleted
  `CurrentWorkingDirectory` case from that compatibility path.
  - Keeps `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` as the reusable symbolic
  workspace-write helper, with docs noting that `:project_roots` entries
  resolve at enforcement time.
  - Updates app-server docs/examples and approval UI labeling to stop
  advertising `:cwd` as a permission token.
  
  ## Compatibility
  
  Persisted rollout items may contain the old
  `{"kind":"current_working_directory"}` tag from earlier experimental
  `permissionProfile` snapshots. This PR keeps that tag as a
  deserialize-only alias for `ProjectRoots { subpath: None }`, while
  continuing to serialize only the new `project_roots` tag.
  
  ## Follow-up
  
  This PR intentionally does not introduce an explicit project-root set on
  `SessionConfiguration` or runtime sandbox resolution. Today, the
  resolver still uses the active cwd as the single implicit project root.
  A follow-up should model project roots separately from tool cwd so
  `:project_roots` entries can resolve against the configured project
  roots, and resolve to no entries when there are no project roots.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permissions:: --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_ --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
  command_exec_permission_profile_project_roots_use_command_cwd --test
  all`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile
  --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  preset_matching_accepts_workspace_write_with_extra_roots --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-27 13:41:27 -07:00
  4b55979755
• Delete unused ResponseItem::Message.end_turn (#19605)

  This field is unused. Delete it.

  Andrey Mishchenko · 2026-04-26 17:18:09 -07:00
  35bc6e3d01
• permissions: derive compatibility policies from profiles (#19392)

  ## Why
  
  After #19391, `PermissionProfile` and the split filesystem/network
  policies could still be stored in parallel. That creates drift risk: a
  profile can preserve deny globs, external enforcement, or split
  filesystem entries while a cached projection silently loses those
  details. This PR makes the profile the runtime source and derives
  compatibility views from it.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Removes stored filesystem/network sandbox projections from
  `Permissions` and `SessionConfiguration`; their accessors now derive
  from the canonical `PermissionProfile`.
  - Derives legacy `SandboxPolicy` snapshots from profiles only where an
  older API still needs that field.
  - Updates MCP connection and elicitation state to track
  `PermissionProfile` instead of `SandboxPolicy` for auto-approval
  decisions.
  - Adds semantic filesystem-policy comparison so cwd changes can preserve
  richer profiles while still recognizing equivalent legacy projections
  independent of entry ordering.
  - Updates config/session tests to assert profile-derived projections
  instead of parallel stored fields.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
  requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19392).
  * #19395
  * #19394
  * #19393
  * __->__ #19392

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-26 15:06:42 -07:00
  deaa307fb2
• permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)

  ## Why
  
  This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
  merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
  runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
  
  `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
  because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
  enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
  `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
  still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
  profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
  profiles such as direct write roots.
  
  The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
  has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
  model migration.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
  `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
  while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
  - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
  filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
  synchronized.
  - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
  consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
  `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
  - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
  context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
  construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
  - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
  command/session profiles are narrowed.
  - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
  `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
  defaults.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
  requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
  * #19395
  * #19394
  * #19393
  * #19392
  * __->__ #19606

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-26 13:29:54 -07:00
  4d7ce3447d
• permissions: make legacy profile conversion cwd-free (#19414)

  ## Why
  
  The profile conversion path still required a `cwd` even when it was only
  translating a legacy `SandboxPolicy` into a `PermissionProfile`. That
  made profile producers invent an ambient `cwd`, which is exactly the
  anchoring we are trying to remove from permission-profile data. A legacy
  workspace-write policy can be represented symbolically instead: `:cwd =
  write` plus read-only `:project_roots` metadata subpaths.
  
  This PR creates that cwd-free base so the rest of the stack can stop
  threading cwd through profile construction. Callers that actually need a
  concrete runtime filesystem policy for a specific cwd still have an
  explicitly named cwd-bound conversion.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - `PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` now takes only
  `&SandboxPolicy`.
  - `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` is now the
  symbolic, cwd-free projection for profiles.
  - The old concrete projection is retained as
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd` for
  runtime/boundary code that must materialize legacy cwd behavior.
  - Workspace-write profiles preserve `CurrentWorkingDirectory` and
  `ProjectRoots` special entries instead of materializing cwd into
  absolute paths.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo check -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p
  codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p
  codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p
  codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics --tests`
  - `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol
  -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p
  codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics`
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19414).
  * #19395
  * #19394
  * #19393
  * #19392
  * #19391
  * __->__ #19414

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-24 13:42:05 -07:00
  13e0ec1614
• permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
  but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
  It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
  enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
  when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
  APIs.
  
  The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
  union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
  
  ```rust
  pub enum PermissionProfile {
      Managed {
          file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
          network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
      },
      Disabled,
      External {
          network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
      },
  }
  ```
  
  This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
  outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
  owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
  sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
  inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
  than a permissive one.
  
  ## How Existing Modeling Maps
  
  Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
  into the higher-fidelity profile model:
  
  - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
  with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
  policy.
  - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
  the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
  sandbox.
  - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
  `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
  filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
  - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
  express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
  network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
  `ExternalSandbox`.
  - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
  `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
  complete active runtime permissions.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
  `disabled`, and `external`.
  - Keep partial permission grants separate with
  `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
  - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
  entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
  present.
  - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
  network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
  - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
  round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
  and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
  instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
  - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
  full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
  unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
  entries.
  - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
  update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
  `permissionProfile` shape.
  
  ## Compatibility
  
  Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
  compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
  `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
  `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
  intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `just write-app-server-schema`
  - `cargo check --tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
  preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
  permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
  - `just fix`
  - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `just fix -p codex-app-server`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-23 23:02:18 -07:00
  4816b89204
• app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared
  by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active
  profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when
  starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating
  through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands.
  
  This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform
  enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or
  rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's
  elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile
  overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including
  deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission
  override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as
  `**/*.env = deny`.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`,
  `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`.
  - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and
  the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread
  resume requests.
  - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network
  permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox
  projection used by existing execution paths.
  - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are
  equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests.
  - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when
  applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides.
  - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures
  and regression coverage.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries`
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279).
  * #18288
  * #18287
  * #18286
  * #18285
  * #18284
  * #18283
  * #18282
  * #18281
  * #18280
  * __->__ #18279

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-22 13:34:33 -07:00
  18a26d7bbc
• Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments. (#18813)

  Split DeveloperInstructions into individual fragments.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-21 10:22:36 -07:00
  2a226096f6
• protocol: preserve glob scan depth in permission profiles (#18713)

  ## Why
  
  #18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
  shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
  `PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
  `glob_scan_max_depth`.
  
  That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
  On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
  glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
  loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
  permission entries look equivalent.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
  preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
  - Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
  force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
  not silently dropped.
  - Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
  `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
  and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
  - Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
  merging, and intersection.
  - Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
  deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
  - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
  
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
  * #18288
  * #18287
  * #18286
  * #18285
  * #18284
  * #18283
  * #18282
  * #18281
  * #18280
  * #18279
  * #18278
  * #18277
  * #18276
  * #18275
  * __->__ #18713

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-20 19:42:45 -07:00
  3d2f123895
• protocol: canonicalize file system permissions (#18274)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
  it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
  canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
  profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
  
  ## What changed
  
  This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
  `PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
  entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
  those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
  write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
  full-disk legacy access.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
  root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-20 09:57:03 -07:00
  dcec516313
• Update image outputs to default to high detail (#18386)

  Do not assume the default `detail`.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-18 11:01:12 -07:00
  53b1570367
• Feat/auto review dev message marker (#18369)

  supporting guardian's rebrand to auto-review!

  Won Park · 2026-04-17 18:05:03 -07:00
  a58a0f083d
• Refactor config loading to use filesystem abstraction (#18209)

  Initial pass propagating FileSystem through config loading.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-17 00:51:21 +00:00
  9effa0509f
• Support original-detail metadata on MCP image outputs (#17714)

  ## Summary
  - honor `_meta["codex/imageDetail"] == "original"` on MCP image content
  and map it to `detail: "original"` where supported
  - strip that detail back out when the active model does not support
  original-detail image inputs
  - update code-mode `image(...)` to accept individual MCP image blocks
  - teach `js_repl` / `codex.emitImage(...)` to preserve the same hint
  from raw MCP image outputs
  - document the new `_meta` contract and add generic RMCP-backed coverage
  across protocol, core, code-mode, and js_repl paths

  Curtis 'Fjord' Hawthorne · 2026-04-15 14:43:33 -07:00
  9e2fc31854
• [codex] reduce module visibility (#16978)

  ## Summary
  - reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
  or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
  - update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
  APIs instead of reaching through module trees
  - add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
  before the final fix/format pass
  - `just fix` completed successfully
  - `just fmt` completed successfully
  - `git diff --check` passed

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-07 08:03:35 -07:00
  413c1e1fdf
• chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)

  ## Why
  
  `argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
  many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
  the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
  examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
  `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
  
  This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
  path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
  enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
  the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
  - updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
  `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
  `--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
  - fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
  preserved with a single separator
  - documented the new default behavior in
  `tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
  - updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
  invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
  Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
  
  That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
  already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
  and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
  `--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
  intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
  additional lint findings in those lanes.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
  - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
  - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
  - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`
  - `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
  - `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
  
  ## Follow-up
  
  - Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
  Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
  - Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
  the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-27 19:00:44 -07:00
  61dfe0b86c
• Use codex-utils-template for sandbox mode prompts (#15998)
  jif-oai · 2026-03-27 14:50:36 +01:00
  2c85ca6842
• permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
  still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
  approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
  longer want to expose.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
  `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
  schema/TypeScript artifacts.
  - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
  construction.
  - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
  read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
  profile extension.
  - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
  deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
  - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
  empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
  actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
  permissions.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 17:12:45 -07:00
  e6e2999209
• Move git utilities into a dedicated crate (#15564)

  - create `codex-git-utils` and move the shared git helpers into it with
  file moves preserved for diff readability
  - move the `GitInfo` helpers out of `core` so stacked rollout work can
  depend on the shared crate without carrying its own git info module
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Ahmed Ibrahim · 2026-03-24 13:26:23 -07:00
  0f957a93cd
• chore(context) Include guardian approval context (#15366)

  ## Summary
  Include the guardian context in the developer message for approvals
  
  ## Testing
  - [x] Updated unit tests

  Dylan Hurd · 2026-03-21 16:31:22 +00:00
  0d9bb8ea58
• chore(core) update prefix_rule guidance (#15231)

  ## Summary
  Small tweaks to the prefix_rule guidance.
  
  ## Testing
  - [x] in progress

  Dylan Hurd · 2026-03-20 15:57:06 -07:00
  7754dd1b89
• Return image URL from view_image tool (#15072)

  Cleanup image semantics in code mode.
  
  `view_image` now returns `{image_url:string, details?: string}` 
  
  `image()` now allows both string parameter and `{image_url:string,
  details?: string}`

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-18 13:58:20 -07:00
  5cada46ddf
• Add notify to code-mode (#14842)

  Allows model to send an out-of-band notification.
  
  The notification is injected as another tool call output for the same
  call_id.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-18 09:37:13 -07:00
  606d85055f
• Add FS abstraction and use in view_image (#14960)

  Adds an environment crate and environment + file system abstraction.
  
  Environment is a combination of attributes and services specific to
  environment the agent is connected to:
  File system, process management, OS, default shell.
  
  The goal is to move most of agent logic that assumes environment to work
  through the environment abstraction.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-17 17:36:23 -07:00
  83a60fdb94
• generate an internal json schema for RolloutLine (#14434)

  ### Why
  i'm working on something that parses and analyzes codex rollout logs,
  and i'd like to have a schema for generating a parser/validator.
  
  `codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema` writes an
  `RolloutLine.json` file
  
  while doing this, i noticed we have a writer <> reader mismatch issue on
  `FunctionCallOutputPayload` and reasoning item ID -- added some schemars
  annotations to fix those
  
  ### Test
  
  ```
  $ just codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema --out ./foo
  ```
  
  generates an `RolloutLine.json` file, which i validated against jsonl
  files on disk
  
  `just codex app-server --help` doesn't expose the
  `generate-internal-json-schema` option by default, but you can do `just
  codex app-server generate-internal-json-schema --help` if you know the
  command
  
  everything else still works
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Keyan Zhang · 2026-03-17 11:19:42 -07:00
  904dbd414f
• Improve granular approval policy prompt (#14553)
  Jack Mousseau · 2026-03-13 10:42:17 -07:00
  59b588b8ec
• Rename reject approval policy to granular (#14516)
  Jack Mousseau · 2026-03-12 16:38:04 -07:00
  b7dba72dbd
• feat: search_tool migrate to bring you own tool of Responses API (#14274)

  ## Why
  
  to support a new bring your own search tool in Responses
  API(https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/tools-tool-search#client-executed-tool-search)
  we migrating our bm25 search tool to use official way to execute search
  on client and communicate additional tools to the model.
  
  ## What
  - replace the legacy `search_tool_bm25` flow with client-executed
  `tool_search`
  - add protocol, SSE, history, and normalization support for
  `tool_search_call` and `tool_search_output`
  - return namespaced Codex Apps search results and wire namespaced
  follow-up tool calls back into MCP dispatch

  Anton Panasenko · 2026-03-11 17:51:51 -07:00
  77b0c75267
• Add realtime start instructions config override (#14270)

  - add `realtime_start_instructions` config support
  - thread it into realtime context updates, schema, docs, and tests

  Ahmed Ibrahim · 2026-03-11 12:33:09 -07:00
  39c1bc1c68