## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Summary
- move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
- move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
## Validation
- git diff --check
- skipped heavier local tests per request
Follow-up to #15791.
## Why
`SandboxCommand.program` represents an executable path, but keeping it
as `String` forced path-backed callers to run `to_string_lossy()` before
the sandbox layer ever touched the command. That loses fidelity earlier
than necessary and adds avoidable conversions in runtimes that already
have a `PathBuf`.
## What changed
- Changed `SandboxCommand.program` to `OsString`.
- Updated `SandboxManager::transform` to keep the program and argv in
`OsString` form until the `SandboxExecRequest` conversion boundary.
- Switched the path-backed `apply_patch` and `js_repl` runtimes to pass
`into_os_string()` instead of `to_string_lossy()`.
- Updated the remaining string-backed builders and tests to match the
new type while preserving the existing Linux helper `arg0` behavior.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in unrelated existing
config tests: `config::tests::approvals_reviewer_*` and
`config::tests::smart_approvals_alias_*`
## Problem
Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.
If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
the intended protection for project-local Codex state.
## What this changes
This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:
- `codex-protocol`
- treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
even when it does not exist yet
- avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
explicit rule for that exact path
- macOS Seatbelt
- deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
- Linux bubblewrap
- preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
under `./.codex`
- tests
- add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
collisions
- add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
- tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths
## Scope
This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
`.codex` subtree from agent writes.
It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
is untrusted.
## Why this shape
The fix is pointed rather than broad:
- it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
writes”
- it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
- it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Summary
- move the pure sandbox policy transform helpers from `codex-core` into
`codex-sandboxing`
- move the corresponding unit tests with the extracted implementation
- update `core` and `app-server` callers to import the moved APIs
directly, without re-exports or proxy methods
## Testing
- cargo test -p codex-sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-core sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib
- just fix -p codex-sandboxing
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-app-server
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
## Summary
- move macOS permission merging/intersection logic and tests from
`codex-core` into `codex-sandboxing`
- move seatbelt policy builders, permissions logic, SBPL assets, and
their tests into `codex-sandboxing`
- keep `codex-core` owning only the seatbelt spawn wrapper and switch
call sites to import the moved APIs directly
## Notes
- no re-exports added
- moved the seatbelt tests with the implementation so internal helpers
could stay private
- local verification is still finishing while this PR is open
## Summary
- add a new `codex-sandboxing` crate for sandboxing extraction work
- move the pure Linux sandbox argv builders and their unit tests out of
`codex-core`
- keep `core::landlock` as the spawn wrapper and update direct callers
to use `codex_sandboxing::landlock`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core landlock`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Notes
- this is step 1 of the move plan aimed at minimizing per-PR diffs
- no re-exports or no-op proxy methods were added
Michael Bolin ·
viyatb-oai ·
rreichel3-oai ·
pakrym-oai ·