67 Commits

• chore(core) rm AskForApproval::OnFailure (#28418)

  ## Summary
  Deletes the OnFailure variant of the `AskForApproval` enum. This option
  has been deprecated since #11631.
  
  ## Testing
  - [x] Tests pass

  Dylan Hurd · 2026-06-23 12:13:54 -07:00
  2cf2a6a844
• Prepare managed network sandbox context (#29456)

  ## Why
  
  Managed network configures commands to use local HTTP and SOCKS proxies.
  For commands delegated to the exec server, the proxy environment and the
  sandbox policy were prepared separately. On macOS, that meant a command
  could receive `HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123` while Seatbelt still
  denied access to port `43123`.
  
  ## What changed
  
  `NetworkProxy` now prepares the command environment and sandbox context
  together from the same runtime snapshot:
  
  ```text
  Prepared managed network
  ├── command environment: HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123
  └── sandbox context: allow outbound to 127.0.0.1:43123
  ```
  
  That context travels with remote exec requests. The exec server
  preserves the managed proxy and CA environment, and macOS Seatbelt
  allows only the prepared loopback proxy ports without enabling broad
  network access or local binding.
  
  The protocol field is optional and the existing enforcement flag remains
  in place, preserving compatibility with callers that do not send the new
  context.

  jif · 2026-06-23 20:07:09 +01:00
  e476fc16ce
• Apply sandbox intent inside remote exec servers (#29113)

  ## Why
  
  PR #29108 lets the orchestrator send sandbox intent with `process/start`
  without wrapping the command for its own operating system.
  
  This PR completes that boundary by making the executor interpret and
  enforce the intent using its own filesystem paths and sandbox
  implementation.
  
  For example, a macOS TUI targeting a Linux devbox sends `/bin/bash -lc
  pwd`. The Linux executor turns that into its own `codex-linux-sandbox
  ... /bin/bash -lc pwd` launch.
  
  ## What changes
  
  - Keep `process/start` unchanged when no sandbox intent is present.
  - Convert sandbox `PathUri` values into native paths on the executor.
  - Bind symbolic `:workspace_roots` permissions to the executor's native
  sandbox cwd.
  - Select the sandbox implementation on the executor and wrap the
  original command immediately before spawning it.
  - Reject sandbox-required execution before spawning when the executor
  cannot enforce the intent.
  - Pass exec-server runtime paths into process creation so Linux can
  locate `codex-linux-sandbox`.
  
  The boundary is therefore:
  
  ```text
  orchestrator                         executor
  original argv + sandbox intent  ->  select and enforce local sandbox
  ```
  
  This PR intentionally treats a denied remote command as an ordinary
  command failure. Draft follow-up #29424 carries a semantic
  `sandboxDenied` result back to unified exec for the existing approval
  and retry flow.
  
  ## Platform scope
  
  Linux and macOS use their existing direct-spawn sandbox transforms.
  
  Windows sandboxed remote process launch is intentionally unsupported in
  this PR. The current Windows direct-spawn wrapper does not correctly
  preserve arbitrary argv, TTY behavior, or pass the full child
  environment out of band. The executor rejects the request instead of
  running it incorrectly or unsandboxed.
  
  ## Known follow-ups
  
  - The transported permission profile can still contain
  orchestrator-materialized helper or explicit paths. A `TODO(jif)` marks
  where the executor boundary should receive pre-host-materialization
  permission intent.
  - The sandbox wrapper currently replaces a requested custom inner
  `arg0`. A `TODO(jif)` marks where this must be preserved or rejected
  explicitly.
  - Draft PR #29424 contains the deferred sandbox-denial classification
  and approval/retry behavior.
  
  ## Rollout assumption
  
  This executor-sandbox stack is unreleased and its client and executor
  are expected to move together. This PR does not add mixed-version
  negotiation with older exec servers.

  jif · 2026-06-22 12:45:37 +02:00
  9c3b10e5d4
• Carry sandbox intent to remote exec servers (#29108)

  ## What changed
  
  PR #29099 stopped sending the orchestrator's concrete sandbox wrapper to
  a remote exec-server. Remote commands now arrive as plain native argv.
  
  This PR adds the next piece: Codex also sends portable sandbox intent
  next to that plain argv.
  
  For a remote unified-exec command, the request can now include:
  
  - the canonical permission profile before local workspace-root
  materialization
  - the sandbox cwd and workspace roots as `PathUri` values
  - Windows sandbox settings
  - the legacy Landlock setting
  - whether managed networking must be enforced
  
  The important part is that symbolic entries such as `:workspace_roots`
  stay symbolic while crossing the boundary. The executor can then bind
  them to its own workspace-root paths instead of receiving
  orchestrator-local absolute paths.
  
  The data travels through `ExecRequest` into `ExecParams`. Older
  exec-servers can still deserialize requests because the new fields have
  defaults.
  
  ## Why
  
  The orchestrator should not decide how another machine implements
  sandboxing.
  
  For example:
  
  - a local macOS Codex would normally build a Seatbelt command
  - a remote Linux executor needs a Linux sandbox command instead
  
  The orchestrator now sends the plain command plus the policy it intended
  to enforce. A later PR can let the exec-server choose and build the
  correct sandbox for its own operating system.
  
  ## Important detail
  
  This keeps the portable intent separate from the local `SandboxType`.
  
  `SandboxType::None` is ambiguous:
  
  - it can mean the command was explicitly approved to run without a
  sandbox
  - it can also mean the orchestrator host has no concrete sandbox
  implementation available
  
  Those cases are different for remote execution. This PR adds
  `sandbox_requested` so an executor can still receive sandbox intent when
  the orchestrator cannot build a local wrapper. Explicit unsandboxed
  retries still send no sandbox context.
  
  ## Behavior today
  
  This PR only transports the intent. The exec-server accepts the new
  fields but does not apply them yet.
  
  Remote commands therefore remain unsandboxed after this PR, just as they
  are after PR #29099.
  
  ## Follow-up
  
  The next PR will make exec-server read this portable intent, bind
  symbolic workspace permissions to executor-native roots, choose the
  sandbox for its own operating system, build the wrapper locally, and
  then spawn the command.

  jif · 2026-06-21 12:33:21 +02:00
  bd2968a4db
• Keep remote exec commands native to the executor (#29099)

  ## Summary
  
  - Remote unified-exec now sends the original command argv to exec-server
  instead of materializing the orchestrator's sandbox wrapper first.
  - Local unified-exec keeps the existing sandbox path unchanged.
  - Add a focused regression test for a macOS-selected sandbox producing
  plain remote argv.
  
  Before:
  
      macOS orchestrator -> /usr/bin/sandbox-exec ... -> Linux exec-server
  
  After:
  
      macOS orchestrator -> /bin/bash -lc pwd -> Linux exec-server
  
  This is intentionally only the first cleanup step. Remote unified-exec
  commands are sent without a process sandbox until the targeted
  follow-ups below land. For the macOS-to-Linux path this is not a
  practical regression: the old sandboxed attempt failed before process
  launch because the Linux executor could not spawn macOS sandbox paths.
  
  ## Targeted follow-ups
  
  1. Carry sandbox intent separately from argv.
     - Add an optional sandbox field to exec-server process params.
  - Reuse FileSystemSandboxContext rather than introducing a new sandbox
  model.
     - Carry managed-network enforcement as one explicit bit.
     - Keep argv plain.
  
  2. Apply that intent inside exec-server.
     - Add a small process-start adapter before LocalProcess::exec.
  - Reuse the existing codex-sandboxing SandboxManager and exec-server
  runtime paths.
  - Follow the same shape already used by exec-server filesystem
  sandboxing.
     - Do not duplicate or move the sandbox implementations.
  
  3. Report the sandbox actually used.
     - Return the executor-selected sandbox type from process/start.
  - Use that value in core for sandbox-denial detection and retry
  behavior.
  
  ## End state
  
  The orchestrator sends plain commands plus portable sandbox intent. The
  executor chooses and applies its own native sandbox: Linux executors use
  Linux sandboxing, macOS executors use Seatbelt, and Windows executors
  use Windows sandboxing. Concrete wrapper argv, helper paths, and sandbox
  env markers never cross the executor boundary.

  jif · 2026-06-19 17:05:51 +02:00
  04483f4ce5
• Scope network approvals by environment (#28899)

  Stacked on #28766.
  
  ## Why
  
  Network approvals are environment-scoped: allowing a host in one
  execution environment should not allow the same host in another
  environment.
  
  #28766 adds the inert IDs and constructor plumbing. This PR applies the
  behavior on top.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Route managed network traffic through per-environment HTTP and SOCKS
  proxy listeners.
  - Stamp HTTP, HTTPS CONNECT, SOCKS TCP, and SOCKS UDP policy requests
  with the source environment at the proxy boundary.
  - Carry the selected execution environment through shell, unified exec,
  zsh-fork, and sandbox transform paths.
  - Include the environment in pending, approved-for-session, and
  denied-for-session network approval cache keys.
  - Include the environment in approval IDs and approval prompts.
  - Preserve legacy fallback for unattributed requests, but deny when
  active-call attribution is ambiguous.
  - Fail closed if an environment-specific proxy endpoint cannot be
  prepared.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - just fmt
  - CI will run tests and clippy

  jif · 2026-06-19 13:49:45 +02:00
  bd5d31b250
• Add network environment ID plumbing (#28766)

  ## Why
  
  Prepare network approval scoping to distinguish execution environments
  without changing behavior yet.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Add optional environment IDs to network policy requests.
  - Add optional network environment IDs to exec and sandbox request
  structs.
  - Thread default None values through existing construction points.
  - Fix stale constructor call sites that caused the CI compile failures.
  
  ## Not included
  
  - Per-environment proxy listeners.
  - Network approval cache or prompt behavior changes.
  - Ambiguous request attribution handling.
  
  Those behavior changes moved to stacked follow-up #28899.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - just fmt
  - CI will run tests and clippy

  jif · 2026-06-18 14:09:38 +02:00
  0369b24d54
• unified-exec: preserve PathUri through exec-server (#28681)

  ## Why
  
  It should be possible for app-server to handle "foreign" OS paths in
  unified_exec working directories, allowing e.g. a Linux app-server to
  run processes on e.g. a Windows exec-server.
  
  ## What
  
  Convert the core unified_exec cwd values to use `PathUri`.
  
  Adds fallible path conversion in several places to try to minimize the
  scope of this change. The only time this change suppresses errors from
  converting `PathUri` to an `AbsolutePathBuf` is when the turn is
  configured with no sandboxing at all to allow us to make progress
  testing without sandboxing.
  
  Future changes to apply_patch and sandboxing will clean up these error
  paths.
  
  A tool's cwd is resolved from joining a model-provided workdir to the
  environment's cwd. When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()`, an
  absolute-path workdir would overwrite the environment's cwd and we would
  resolve permissions/sandboxing against the model-provided path. This
  change extends `PathUri::join()` to also treat an absolute rhs as an
  override of the base/lhs.
  
  This also removes some coverage from the remove_env_windows tests until
  a follow-up converts foreign paths in command exec events correctly.
  
  ## Breaking Changes
  
  When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()` for workdir resolution, we ended up
  resolving tilde-prefixed paths against the app-server's `$HOME`, e.g.
  `~/foo/bar` becomes `/home/anp/foo/bar`. It's difficult to do this with
  `PathUri` joining, so after offline discussion this PR no longer
  implements it.
  
  A quick check of some power users' rollouts suggests that models don't
  actually generate home-prefixed absolute working directories for their
  spawns, so this shouldn't have any real blast radius.

  Adam Perry @ OpenAI · 2026-06-17 19:36:16 +00:00
  5867b529ae
• sandboxing: migrate cwd inputs to PathUri (#27816)

  ## Why
  
  Sandbox cwd values can cross app-server and exec-server host boundaries.
  They should retain URI semantics until the receiving host validates them
  instead of being interpreted early as native paths.
  
  ## What
  
  - Carry `PathUri` through filesystem sandbox contexts, sandbox commands,
  and transform inputs.
  - Convert command and policy cwd once in `SandboxManager::transform`,
  then keep launch requests native.
  - Preserve sandbox cwd over remote filesystem transport and reject
  non-native URIs without fallback.
  - Cache paired native/URI turn-environment cwd values during migration,
  with immutable access to keep them synchronized.
  - Extend existing protocol, forwarding, transform, and core runtime
  tests.

  Adam Perry @ OpenAI · 2026-06-12 11:38:01 -07:00
  52a50aec70
• fix: preserve deny-read sandboxing for safe commands (#23943)

  ## Why
  
  Permission profiles can mark filesystem entries as unreadable with
  `deny` rules, including glob patterns. Several shell execution paths
  treated known-safe commands or execpolicy `allow` rules as sufficient to
  run outside the filesystem sandbox. That is not valid for read-capable
  commands: for example, `cat` or `ls` may be reasonable to allow
  generally, but dropping the sandbox would also drop deny-read
  constraints such as `**/*.env`.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Added a shared check that treats active deny-read restrictions as
  incompatible with unsandboxed execution.
  - Kept first-attempt execution sandboxed for explicit escalation and
  execpolicy allow bypasses when deny-read entries are present.
  - Prevented no-sandbox retry after a sandbox denial when the active
  filesystem policy contains deny-read entries.
  - Updated the zsh-fork execve path so prefix-rule `allow` decisions
  continue inside the current sandbox when deny-read restrictions are
  active.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::sandboxing::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  shell_command_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-28 22:49:37 -07:00
  6e10142199
• windows-sandbox: pass workspace roots to runner (#24108)

  ## Why
  
  #23813 switches the Windows sandbox runner path to `PermissionProfile`,
  but it still left one runtime anchor for resolving symbolic
  `:workspace_roots` entries. That is not enough once a turn has multiple
  effective workspace roots: exact entries and deny globs under
  `:workspace_roots` need to be materialized for every runtime root before
  the command runner chooses token mode or builds ACL plans.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Replaces the Windows runner/setup `permission_profile_cwd` plumbing
  with `workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>`.
  - Resolves Windows-local `PermissionProfile` data with
  `materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(...)` instead of the
  single-cwd helper.
  - Threads `Config::effective_workspace_roots()` through core execution,
  unified exec, TUI setup/read-grant flows, app-server setup, app-server
  `command/exec`, and `debug sandbox` on Windows.
  - Preserves those workspace roots through the zsh-fork escalation
  executor instead of rebuilding them from `sandbox_policy_cwd`.
  - Makes `ExecRequest::new(...)` and the remaining
  `build_exec_request(...)` helper path take
  `windows_sandbox_workspace_roots` explicitly so new call sites cannot
  silently fall back to `vec![cwd]`.
  - Clarifies the `debug sandbox` non-Windows comment: remaining
  cwd-dependent resolution still uses `sandbox_policy_cwd`, while
  `:workspace_roots` entries are already materialized from config roots.
  - Updates elevated runner IPC `SpawnRequest` to send `workspace_roots`
  and bumps the framed IPC protocol version to `3` for the payload shape
  change.
  - Adds Windows-local resolver coverage for expanding exact and glob
  `:workspace_roots` entries across multiple roots, plus core helper
  coverage proving explicit roots are preserved.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p
  codex-cli -p codex-app-server`
  - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core unix_escalation`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server windows_sandbox`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui windows_sandbox`
  - `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
  - `just test -p codex-core unified_exec`
  - `just test -p codex-core
  build_exec_request_preserves_windows_workspace_roots`
  - `env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u
  CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING just test -p codex-app-server --lib
  command_exec`
  - `just test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
  - `just test -p codex-exec sandbox`
  - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-windows-sandbox`
  
  A local macOS cross-check with `cargo check --target
  x86_64-pc-windows-msvc ...` did not reach crate Rust code because native
  dependencies require Windows SDK headers (`windows.h` / `assert.h`) in
  this environment; Windows CI remains the real target validation.
  
  Two local targeted filters compile but do not run assertions on macOS:
  `env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING
  just test -p codex-app-server --lib command_exec_processor` matched zero
  tests, and `just test -p codex-linux-sandbox landlock` matched zero
  tests because the landlock suite is Linux-only.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-28 15:26:55 -07:00
  986c60467b
• test: reduce core sandbox policy test setup (#23036)

  ## Why
  
  `SandboxPolicy` is a legacy compatibility shape, but several core tests
  still used it for ordinary turn setup even when the runtime path now
  carries `PermissionProfile`. With the first cleanup PR merged, this
  follow-up trims more core test scaffolding so remaining `SandboxPolicy`
  matches are easier to classify as production compatibility,
  legacy-boundary coverage, or explicit conversion tests.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Updated apply-patch handler and runtime tests to pass
  `PermissionProfile` directly.
  - Changed sandboxing test helpers to build permission profiles without
  first creating `SandboxPolicy` values.
  - Converted request-permissions integration turns to pass
  `PermissionProfile` through the test helper, leaving legacy sandbox
  projection at the `Op::UserTurn` boundary.
  - Converted unified exec integration helpers and direct turn submissions
  to use `PermissionProfile` values instead of `SandboxPolicy` setup.
  - Removed now-unused `SandboxPolicy` imports from the touched core
  tests.
  
  ## Test Plan
  
  - `just fmt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::sandboxing::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::runtimes::apply_patch::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::apply_patch::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib unified_exec::process_manager::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions::`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all unified_exec::`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-05-17 08:39:41 -07:00
  0a83353ca3
• fix(permissions): preserve managed deny-read during escalation (#15977)

  ## Why
  
  Managed filesystem `deny_read` requirements are administrator-enforced
  restrictions on specific paths. Once those requirements are active,
  Codex should not drop them just because an execution path would
  otherwise leave the sandbox.
  
  Before this change, an explicit escalation, a prefix-rule allow, a
  sandbox-denial retry, or an app-server legacy sandbox override could
  rebuild the runtime policy without those managed read-deny entries and
  expose a path the administrator had marked unreadable.
  
  This is narrower than general sandbox-mode constraints. If an enterprise
  only sets `allowed_sandbox_modes`, a trusted `prefix_rule(..., decision
  = "allow")` can still run its matching command unsandboxed; this PR only
  preserves managed filesystem `deny_read` restrictions across those
  paths.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Mark filesystem policies built from managed `deny_read` requirements
  so callers can tell when those deny entries must survive escalation.
  - Preserve managed deny-read entries when runtime permission profiles
  are rebuilt through protocol, app-server, or legacy sandbox-policy
  compatibility paths.
  - Keep managed deny-read attempts inside the selected sandbox on the
  first attempt and after sandbox-denial retries.
  - Preserve the same behavior in the zsh-fork escalation path, including
  prefix-rule-driven escalation.
  - Add a regression test showing the opposite case too: without managed
  deny-read, a prefix-rule allow still chooses unsandboxed execution.
  
  ## Verification
  
  Targeted automated verification:
  
  ```shell
  cargo test -p codex-core shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit -- --nocapture
  cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_uses_unsandboxed_execution_without_managed_deny_read -- --nocapture
  cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_preserves_managed_deny_read_escalation -- --nocapture
  cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_filesystem_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
  cargo test -p codex-protocol preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable -- --nocapture
  cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol permission_profile_file_system_permissions_preserves_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
  cargo check -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui
  ```
  
  Smoke-test invocations:
  
  ```shell
  # macOS exact deny + allowed control
  codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
    -c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
    -c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
    'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
  
  # Linux exact deny + allowed control
  codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
    -c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
    -c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",glob_scan_max_depth=3,":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
    'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
  ```
  
  Observed manual smoke matrix:
  
  | Case | macOS Seatbelt | Linux bubblewrap |
  | --- | --- | --- |
  | `cat allowed.txt` | Pass | Pass |
  | `cat secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
  | `cat envs/root.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
  | `cat envs/nested/one.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
  | `cat envs/nested/two.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
  | `cat alias-to-secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
  | Missing denied path | A file created after sandbox setup remained
  unreadable | Creation was blocked by the reserved missing-path
  placeholder, and the placeholder was cleaned up after exit |
  | Real `codex exec` shell turn | Pass | Pass |
  
  Notes:
  
  - The Linux smoke run used the fallback glob walker because the devbox
  did not have `rg` installed.
  - The smoke matrix verifies the end-to-end filesystem behavior on macOS
  and Linux; the escalation-specific behavior is covered by the focused
  tests above.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  Co-authored-by: Charlie Marsh <charliemarsh@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-05-11 11:49:44 -07:00
  6506765168
• Remove ToolName display helper (#21465)

  ## Why
  
  `ToolName::display()` made it too easy to flatten tool identity and
  accidentally compare rendered strings. Tool identity should stay
  structural until a legacy string boundary actually requires the
  flattened spelling.
  
  ## What
  
  - Removes `ToolName::display()` and relies on the existing `Display`
  impl for messages and errors.
  - Adds structural ordering for `ToolName` and uses it for
  sorting/deduping deferred tools.
  - Carries `ToolName` through tool/sandbox plumbing, flattening only at
  legacy boundaries such as hook payloads, telemetry tags, and Responses
  tool names.
  - Updates MCP normalization tests to assert `ToolName` structure instead
  of rendered strings.
  
  ## Testing
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-mcp test_normalize_tools`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core unavailable_tool`
  - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-mcp`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`

  pakrym-oai · 2026-05-08 12:17:48 -07:00
  61142b6169
• Route process tools to selected environments (#20647)

  ## Why
  When a turn exposes multiple selected environments, shell-style tools
  need a model-facing way to identify the intended target environment and
  handlers need to resolve that target before parsing cwd-relative
  permission fields or launching processes.
  
  This PR scopes that rollout to process tools. Filesystem-oriented tools
  such as `apply_patch`, `view_image`, and `list_dir` are intentionally
  left for follow-up slices.
  
  ## What Changed
  - Adds an `include_environment_id` option to shell-style tool schema
  builders.
  - Exposes optional `environment_id` on `shell`, `shell_command`, and
  `exec_command` only when `ToolEnvironmentMode::Multiple` is active.
  - Adds a shared handler helper that parses `environment_id` and
  `workdir` from JSON function-call arguments and returns the selected
  `Environment` plus effective absolute cwd.
  - Uses that helper in `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
  handling so process execution uses the selected environment filesystem
  and cwd.
  - Changes `ExecCommandRequest` to carry a required resolved `cwd`,
  removing the process-manager fallback to the primary turn cwd for new
  exec commands.
  - Leaves `write_stdin` unchanged because it targets an existing process
  id, not a new environment.
  
  ## Testing
  - Added unit coverage for process-tool schema exposure, selected
  environment resolution, primary fallback, no-environment handling,
  unknown environment ids, and resolving cwd-relative permission paths
  against the selected environment cwd.
  - Added a remote-suite e2e coverage case for `exec_command` routing
  across explicit zero environments, one local environment, and
  local+remote environments.
  - Ran `just fmt` and `git diff --check`.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  starr-openai · 2026-05-05 12:12:03 -07:00
  78421face0
• fix: handle deferred network proxy denials (#19184)

  ## Why
  
  This bug is exposed by Guardian/auto-review approvals. With the managed
  network proxy enabled, a blocked network request can be reported back
  through the network approval service as an approval denial after the
  command has already started. Before this change, the shell and unified
  exec runtimes registered those network approval calls, but did not have
  a way to observe an async proxy denial as a cancellation/failure signal
  for the running process.
  
  The result was confusing: Guardian/auto-review could correctly deny
  network access, but the command path could keep running or unregister
  the approval without surfacing the denial as the command failure.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - `NetworkApprovalService` now attaches a cancellation token to active
  and deferred network approvals.
  - Proxy-denial outcomes are recorded only for active registrations,
  cancel the owning token, and are consumed when the approval is
  finalized.
  - The shell runtime combines the normal command timeout with the
  network-denial cancellation token.
  - Unified exec stores the deferred network approval object, terminates
  tracked processes when the proxy denial arrives, and returns the denial
  as a process failure while polling or completing the process.
  - Tool orchestration passes the active network approval cancellation
  token into the sandbox attempt and preserves deferred approval errors
  instead of silently unregistering them.
  - App-server `command/exec` now handles the combined
  timeout-or-cancellation expiration variant used by the runtime.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core network_approval --lib`
  - `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
  - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-29 19:13:57 +00:00
  07c8b8c77c
• permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)

  ## Why
  
  This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
  merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
  runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
  
  `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
  because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
  enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
  `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
  still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
  profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
  profiles such as direct write roots.
  
  The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
  has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
  model migration.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
  `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
  while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
  - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
  filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
  synchronized.
  - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
  consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
  `SandboxPolicy` exactly.
  - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
  context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
  construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
  - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
  command/session profiles are narrowed.
  - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
  `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
  defaults.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
  requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
  * #19395
  * #19394
  * #19393
  * #19392
  * __->__ #19606

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-26 13:29:54 -07:00
  4d7ce3447d
• [codex] Bypass managed network for escalated exec (#19595)

  ## Why
  
  `sandbox_permissions = "require_escalated"` is treated as an explicit
  request to approve the command and run it outside the
  filesystem/platform sandbox. Before this change, shell and unified exec
  still registered managed network approval context and could inject
  Codex-managed proxy state into the child process, which meant an
  approved escalated command could still hit a second network approval
  path.
  
  This PR makes that escalation boundary consistent: once a command is
  explicitly approved to run outside the sandbox, Codex does not also
  route that process through the managed network proxy.
  
  ## Security impact
  
  Command/filesystem sandbox approval now implies network approval for
  that command. If an untrusted command or script is allowed to run with
  `require_escalated`, its network calls are unsandboxed: Codex-managed
  network allowlists and denylists are not respected for that process, so
  the command can exfiltrate any data it can read.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Skip managed network approval specs for
  `SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated`.
  - Pass `network: None` into shell, zsh-fork shell, and unified exec
  sandbox preparation for explicitly escalated requests.
  - Strip Codex-managed proxy environment variables when
  `CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE` is present, while preserving user proxy env
  when the Codex marker is absent.
  - Add regression coverage for the prepared exec request so the old
  behavior cannot silently reappear.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-core explicit_escalation`
  - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-25 23:23:58 +00:00
  9aaa5d9358
• Support MCP tools in hooks (#18385)

  ## Summary
  
  Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
  `PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
  - hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
  - hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
  - core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings
  
  That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
  model-visible and stable
  
  This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
  payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.
  
  ## Reviewer Notes
  
  I think these are the key files
  - `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
  - `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`
  
  Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
  mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
  `command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.
  
  ## Changes
  
  - Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
  to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
  hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
  - Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
  model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
  as `tool_input`.
  - Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
  `McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
  - Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
  remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
  elicitation.
  - Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
  `mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
  patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Abhinav · 2026-04-23 07:33:57 +00:00
  305825abd9
• fix(core): emit hooks for apply_patch edits (#18391)

  Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16732.
  
  ## Why
  
  `apply_patch` is Codex's primary file edit path, but it was not emitting
  `PreToolUse` or `PostToolUse` hook events. That meant hook-based policy,
  auditing, and write coordination could observe shell commands while
  missing the actual file mutation performed by `apply_patch`.
  
  The issue also exposed that the hook runtime serialized command hook
  payloads with `tool_name: "Bash"` unconditionally. Even if `apply_patch`
  supplied hook payloads, hooks would either fail to match it directly or
  receive misleading stdin that identified the edit as a Bash tool call.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Added `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` payload support to
  `ApplyPatchHandler`.
  - Exposed the raw patch body as `tool_input.command` for both
  JSON/function and freeform `apply_patch` calls.
  - Taught tool hook payloads to carry a handler-supplied hook-facing
  `tool_name`.
  - Preserved existing shell compatibility by continuing to emit `Bash`
  for shell-like tools.
  - Serialized the selected hook `tool_name` into hook stdin instead of
  hardcoding `Bash`.
  - Relaxed the generated hook command input schema so `tool_name` can
  represent tools other than `Bash`.
  
  ## Verification
  
  Added focused handler coverage for:
  
  - JSON/function `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
  - Freeform `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
  - Successful `apply_patch` output producing a `PostToolUse` payload.
  - Shell and `exec_command` handlers continuing to expose `Bash`.
  
  Added end-to-end hook coverage for:
  
  - A `PreToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` blocking the patch before
  the target file is created.
  - A `PostToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` receiving the patch
  input and tool response, then adding context to the follow-up model
  request.
  - Non-participating tools such as the plan tool continuing not to emit
  `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` hook events.
  
  Also validated manually with a live `codex exec` smoke test using an
  isolated temp workspace and temp `CODEX_HOME`. The smoke test confirmed
  that a real `apply_patch` edit emits `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` with
  `tool_name: "apply_patch"`, a shell command still emits `tool_name:
  "Bash"`, and a denying `PreToolUse` hook prevents the blocked patch file
  from being created.

  Felipe Coury · 2026-04-21 22:00:40 -03:00
  09ebc34f17
• Add Windows sandbox unified exec runtime support (#15578)

  ## Summary
  
  This is the runtime/foundation half of the Windows sandbox unified-exec
  work.
  
  - add Windows sandbox `unified_exec` session support in
  `windows-sandbox-rs` for both:
    - the legacy restricted-token backend
    - the elevated runner backend
  - extend the PTY/process runtime so driver-backed sessions can support:
    - stdin streaming
    - stdout/stderr separation
    - exit propagation
    - PTY resize hooks
  - add Windows sandbox runtime coverage in `codex-windows-sandbox` /
  `codex-utils-pty`
  
  This PR does **not** enable Windows sandbox `UnifiedExec` for product
  callers yet because hooking this up to app-server comes in the next PR.
  
  Windows sandbox advertising is intentionally kept aligned with `main`,
  so sandboxed Windows callers still fall back to `ShellCommand`.
  
  This PR isolates the runtime/session layer so it can be reviewed
  independently from product-surface enablement.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  iceweasel-oai · 2026-04-21 10:44:49 -07:00
  8612714aa6
• Move codex module under session (#18249)

  ## Summary
  - rename the core codex module root to session/mod.rs without using
  #[path]
  - move the codex module directory and tests under core/src/session
  - remove session/mod.rs reexports so call sites use explicit child
  module paths
  
  ## Testing
  - cargo test -p codex-core --lib
  - cargo check -p codex-core --tests
  - just fmt
  - just fix -p codex-core
  - git diff --check

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-17 16:18:53 +00:00
  71e4c6fa17
• Add PermissionRequest hooks support (#17563)

  ## Why
  
  We need `PermissionRequest` hook support!
  
  Also addresses:
  - https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16301
  - run a script on Hook to do things like play a sound to draw attention
  but actually no-op so user can still approve
  - can omit the `decision` object from output or just have the script
  exit 0 and print nothing
  - https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15311
    - let the script approve/deny on its own
    - external UI what will run on Hook and relay decision back to codex
  
  
  ## Reviewer Note
  
  There's a lot of plumbing for the new hook, key files to review are:
  - New hook added in `codex-rs/hooks/src/events/permission_request.rs`
  - Wiring for network approvals
  `codex-rs/core/src/tools/network_approval.rs`
  - Wiring for tool orchestrator `codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs`
  - Wiring for execve
  `codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`
  
  ## What
  
  - Wires shell, unified exec, and network approval prompts into the
  `PermissionRequest` hook flow.
  - Lets hooks allow or deny approval prompts; quiet or invalid hooks fall
  back to the normal approval path.
  - Uses `tool_input.description` for user-facing context when it helps:
    - shell / `exec_command`: the request justification, when present
    - network approvals: `network-access <domain>`
  - Uses `tool_name: Bash` for shell, unified exec, and network approval
  permission-request hooks.
  - For network approvals, passes the originating command in
  `tool_input.command` when there is a single owning call; otherwise falls
  back to the synthetic `network-access ...` command.
  
  <details>
  <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a shell
  approval</summary>
  
  ```json
  {
    "session_id": "<session-id>",
    "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
    "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
    "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
    "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
    "model": "gpt-5",
    "permission_mode": "default",
    "tool_name": "Bash",
    "tool_input": {
      "command": "rm -f /tmp/example"
    }
  }
  ```
  
  </details>
  
  <details>
  <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for an escalated
  `exec_command` request</summary>
  
  ```json
  {
    "session_id": "<session-id>",
    "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
    "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
    "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
    "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
    "model": "gpt-5",
    "permission_mode": "default",
    "tool_name": "Bash",
    "tool_input": {
      "command": "cp /tmp/source.json /Users/alice/export/source.json",
      "description": "Need to copy a generated file outside the workspace"
    }
  }
  ```
  
  </details>
  
  <details>
  <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a network
  approval</summary>
  
  ```json
  {
    "session_id": "<session-id>",
    "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
    "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
    "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
    "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
    "model": "gpt-5",
    "permission_mode": "default",
    "tool_name": "Bash",
    "tool_input": {
      "command": "curl http://codex-network-test.invalid",
      "description": "network-access http://codex-network-test.invalid"
    }
  }
  ```
  
  </details>
  
  ## Follow-ups
  
  - Implement the `PermissionRequest` semantics for `updatedInput`,
  `updatedPermissions`, `interrupt`, and suggestions /
  `permission_suggestions`
  - Add `PermissionRequest` support for the `request_permissions` tool
  path
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Abhinav · 2026-04-17 14:45:47 +00:00
  8494e5bd7b
• Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)

  Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-14 14:26:10 -07:00
  dd1321d11b
• fix(guardian, app-server): introduce guardian review ids (#17298)

  ## Description
  
  This PR introduces `review_id` as the stable identifier for guardian
  reviews and exposes it in app-server `item/autoApprovalReview/started`
  and `item/autoApprovalReview/completed` events.
  
  Internally, guardian rejection state is now keyed by `review_id` instead
  of the reviewed tool item ID. `target_item_id` is still included when a
  review maps to a concrete thread item, but it is no longer overloaded as
  the review lifecycle identifier.
  
  ## Motivation
  
  We'd like to give users the ability to preempt a guardian review while
  it's running (approve or decline).
  
  However, we can't implement the API that allows the user to override a
  running guardian review because we didn't have a unique `review_id` per
  guardian review. Using `target_item_id` is not correct since:
  - with execve reviews, there can be multiple execve calls (and therefore
  guardian reviews) per shell command
  - with network policy reviews, there is no target item ID
  
  The PR that actually implements user overrides will use `review_id` as
  the stable identifier.

  Owen Lin · 2026-04-10 16:21:02 -07:00
  a3be74143a
• Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063)

  ## Summary
  - Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
  resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
  - Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
  `ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
  requests.
  - Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
  existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
  - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
  - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `just fmt`
  
  Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
  kept local validation targeted.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-08 10:54:12 -07:00
  35b5720e8d
• remove temporary ownership re-exports (#16626)

  Stacked on #16508.
  
  This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
  from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
  `codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
  `codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
  
  No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
  split out from the ownership move.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Ahmed Ibrahim · 2026-04-03 00:33:34 -07:00
  af8a9d2d2b
• core: remove cross-crate re-exports from lib.rs (#16512)

  ## Why
  
  `codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates,
  which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module
  instead of the actual owner crate.
  
  Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf
  crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this
  reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following
  files:
  
  ```
  codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml
  codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml
  ```
  
  ## What
  
  - Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by
  `codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`,
  `codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`,
  `codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`.
  - Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`.
  - Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the
  owning `codex-*` crate.
  - Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner
  crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-01 23:06:24 -07:00
  aa2403e2eb
• permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
  still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
  approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
  longer want to expose.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
  `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
  schema/TypeScript artifacts.
  - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
  construction.
  - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
  read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
  profile extension.
  - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
  deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
  - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
  empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
  actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
  permissions.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 17:12:45 -07:00
  e6e2999209
• Extract sandbox manager and transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15603)

  Extract sandbox manager

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-24 08:20:57 -07:00
  f49eb8e9d7
• Apply argument comment lint across codex-rs (#14652)

  ## Why
  
  Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
  checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
  applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
  positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
  
  The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
  by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
  intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
  existing signatures stay in place.
  
  After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
  introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
  of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
  almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
  crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
  update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
  overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
  - mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
  `codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
  `tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
  - keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
  `/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
  - cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
  registry/git metadata in the lint job
  - split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
  runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
  - continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
  product-code enforcement is unchanged
  
  Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
  comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
  - parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
  
  ---
  
  * -> #14652
  * #14651

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-16 16:48:15 -07:00
  b77fe8fefe
• Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400)

  ## Summary
  - launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
  `Winsta0\Default`
  - make private desktop the default while keeping
  `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
  - centralize process launch through the shared
  `create_process_as_user(...)` path
  - scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
  
  ## Why
  Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
  leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
  spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
  commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
  no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
  
  The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
  fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
  
  If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
  explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo build -p codex-cli`
  - elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
  `CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
  - elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
  `pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
  - unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
  exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`

  iceweasel-oai · 2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00
  6b3d82daca
• Rename reject approval policy to granular (#14516)
  Jack Mousseau · 2026-03-12 16:38:04 -07:00
  b7dba72dbd
• fix: move inline codex-rs/core unit tests into sibling files (#14444)

  ## Why
  PR #13783 moved the `codex.rs` unit tests into `codex_tests.rs`. This
  applies the same extraction pattern across the rest of `codex-rs/core`
  so the production modules stay focused on runtime code instead of large
  inline test blocks.
  
  Keeping the tests in sibling files also makes follow-up edits easier to
  review because product changes no longer have to share a file with
  hundreds or thousands of lines of test scaffolding.
  
  ## What changed
  - replaced each inline `mod tests { ... }` in `codex-rs/core/src/**`
  with a path-based module declaration
  - moved each extracted unit test module into a sibling `*_tests.rs`
  file, using `mod_tests.rs` for `mod.rs` modules
  - preserved the existing `cfg(...)` guards and module-local structure so
  the refactor remains structural rather than behavioral
  
  ## Testing
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` (`1653 passed; 0 failed; 5 ignored`)
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `cargo fmt --check`
  - `cargo shear`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-12 08:16:36 -07:00
  0c8a36676a
• refactor: make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox (#13996)

  ## Summary
  - make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
  `use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
  - remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
  docs surfaces
  - update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
  tests/docs to match the new default
  - fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
  Linux read-only sandbox error text

  viyatb-oai · 2026-03-11 23:31:18 -07:00
  04892b4ceb
• fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies (#14171)

  ## Stack
  
     fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172
     fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173
  -> fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171
     refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174
  
  ## Why This PR Exists
  
  This PR is intentionally narrower than the title may suggest.
  
  Most of the original split-permissions migration already landed in the
  earlier `#13434 -> #13453` stack. In particular:
  
  - `#13439` already did the broad runtime plumbing for split filesystem
  and network policies.
  - `#13445` already moved `apply_patch` safety onto filesystem-policy
  semantics.
  - `#13448` already switched macOS Seatbelt generation to split policies.
  - `#13449` and `#13453` already handled Linux helper and bubblewrap
  enforcement.
  - `#13440` already introduced the first protocol-side helpers for
  deriving effective filesystem access.
  
  The reason this PR still exists is that after the follow-on
  `[permissions]` work and the new shared precedence helper in `#14174`, a
  few core approval paths were still deciding behavior from the legacy
  `SandboxPolicy` projection instead of the split filesystem policy that
  actually carries the carveouts.
  
  That means this PR is mostly a cleanup and alignment pass over the
  remaining core consumers, not a fresh sandbox backend migration.
  
  ## What Is Actually New Here
  
  - make unmatched-command fallback decisions consult
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` instead of only legacy `DangerFullAccess` /
  `ReadOnly` / `WorkspaceWrite` categories
  - thread `file_system_sandbox_policy` into the shell, unified-exec, and
  intercepted-exec approval paths so they all use the same split-policy
  semantics
  - keep `apply_patch` safety on the same effective-access rules as the
  shared protocol helper, rather than letting it drift through
  compatibility projections
  - add loader-level regression coverage proving legacy `sandbox_mode`
  config still builds split policies and round-trips back without semantic
  drift
  
  ## What This PR Does Not Do
  
  This PR does not introduce new platform backend enforcement on its own.
  
  - Linux backend parity remains in `#14173`.
  - Windows fail-closed handling remains in `#14172`.
  - The shared precedence/model changes live in `#14174`.
  
  ## Files To Focus On
  
  - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`: unmatched-command fallback and approval
  rendering now read the split filesystem policy directly
  - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`: default exec-approval requirement keys
  off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind`
  - `core/src/tools/handlers/shell.rs`: shell approval requests now carry
  the split filesystem policy
  - `core/src/unified_exec/process_manager.rs`: unified-exec approval
  requests now carry the split filesystem policy
  - `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`: intercepted exec
  fallback now uses the same split-policy approval semantics
  - `core/src/safety.rs`: `apply_patch` safety keeps using effective
  filesystem access rather than legacy sandbox categories
  - `core/src/config/config_tests.rs`: new regression coverage for legacy
  `sandbox_mode` no-drift behavior through the split-policy loader
  
  ## Notes
  
  - `core/src/codex.rs` and `core/src/codex_tests.rs` are just small
  fallout updates for `RequestPermissionsResponse.scope`; they are not the
  point of the PR.
  - If you reviewed the earlier `#13439` / `#13445` stack, the main review
  question here is simply: “are there any remaining approval or
  patch-safety paths that still reconstruct semantics from legacy
  `SandboxPolicy` instead of consuming the split filesystem policy
  directly?”
  
  ## Testing
  - cargo test -p codex-core
  legacy_sandbox_mode_config_builds_split_policies_without_drift
  - cargo test -p codex-core request_permissions
  - cargo test -p codex-core intercepted_exec_policy
  - cargo test -p codex-core
  restricted_sandbox_requires_exec_approval_on_request
  - cargo test -p codex-core
  unmatched_on_request_uses_split_filesystem_policy_for_escalation_prompts
  - cargo test -p codex-core explicit_
  - cargo clippy -p codex-core --tests -- -D warnings

  viyatb-oai · 2026-03-12 02:23:22 +00:00
  c2d5458d67
• chore: add a separate reject-policy flag for skill approvals (#14271)

  ## Summary
  - add `skill_approval` to `RejectConfig` and the app-server v2
  `AskForApproval::Reject` payload so skill-script prompts can be
  configured independently from sandbox and rule-based prompts
  - update Unix shell escalation to reject prompts based on the actual
  decision source, keeping prefix rules tied to `rules`, unmatched command
  fallbacks tied to `sandbox_approval`, and skill scripts tied to
  `skill_approval`
  - regenerate the affected protocol/config schemas and expand
  unit/integration coverage for the new flag and skill approval behavior

  Celia Chen · 2026-03-11 12:33:09 -07:00
  c1a424691f
• add(core): arc_monitor (#13936)

  ## Summary
  - add ARC monitor support for MCP tool calls by serializing MCP approval
  requests into the ARC action shape and sending the relevant
  conversation/policy context to the `/api/codex/safety/arc` endpoint
  - route ARC outcomes back into MCP approval flow so `ask-user` falls
  back to a user prompt and `steer-model` blocks the tool call, with
  guardian/ARC tests covering the new request shape
  - update the TUI approval copy from “Approve Once” to “Allow” / “Allow
  for this session” and refresh the related
    snapshots
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Fouad Matin <fouad@openai.com>
  Co-authored-by: Fouad Matin <169186268+fouad-openai@users.noreply.github.com>

  Matthew Zeng · 2026-03-11 12:33:08 -07:00
  f2d66fadd8
• feat(approvals) RejectConfig for request_permissions (#14118)

  ## Summary
  We need to support allowing request_permissions calls when using
  `Reject` policy
  
  <img width="1133" height="588" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-09 at 12 06
  40 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a8df987f-c225-4866-b8ab-5590960daec5"
  />
  
  Note that this is a backwards-incompatible change for Reject policy. I'm
  not sure if we need to add a default based on our current use/setup
  
  ## Testing
  - [x] Added tests
  - [x] Tested locally

  Dylan Hurd · 2026-03-09 18:16:54 -07:00
  6da84efed8
• Add guardian approval MVP (#13692)

  ## Summary
  - add the guardian reviewer flow for `on-request` approvals in command,
  patch, sandbox-retry, and managed-network approval paths
  - keep guardian behind `features.guardian_approval` instead of exposing
  a public `approval_policy = guardian` mode
  - route ordinary `OnRequest` approvals to the guardian subagent when the
  feature is enabled, without changing the public approval-mode surface
  
  ## Public model
  - public approval modes stay unchanged
  - guardian is enabled via `features.guardian_approval`
  - when that feature is on, `approval_policy = on-request` keeps the same
  approval boundaries but sends those approval requests to the guardian
  reviewer instead of the user
  - `/experimental` only persists the feature flag; it does not rewrite
  `approval_policy`
  - CLI and app-server no longer expose a separate `guardian` approval
  mode in this PR
  
  ## Guardian reviewer
  - the reviewer runs as a normal subagent and reuses the existing
  subagent/thread machinery
  - it is locked to a read-only sandbox and `approval_policy = never`
  - it does not inherit user/project exec-policy rules
  - it prefers `gpt-5.4` when the current provider exposes it, otherwise
  falls back to the parent turn's active model
  - it fail-closes on timeout, startup failure, malformed output, or any
  other review error
  - it currently auto-approves only when `risk_score < 80`
  
  ## Review context and policy
  - guardian mirrors `OnRequest` approval semantics rather than
  introducing a separate approval policy
  - explicit `require_escalated` requests follow the same approval surface
  as `OnRequest`; the difference is only who reviews them
  - managed-network allowlist misses that enter the approval flow are also
  reviewed by guardian
  - the review prompt includes bounded recent transcript history plus
  recent tool call/result evidence
  - transcript entries and planned-action strings are truncated with
  explicit `<guardian_truncated ... />` markers so large payloads stay
  bounded
  - apply-patch reviews include the full patch content (without
  duplicating the structured `changes` payload)
  - the guardian request layout is snapshot-tested using the same
  model-visible Responses request formatter used elsewhere in core
  
  ## Guardian network behavior
  - the guardian subagent inherits the parent session's managed-network
  allowlist when one exists, so it can use the same approved network
  surface while reviewing
  - exact session-scoped network approvals are copied into the guardian
  session with protocol/port scope preserved
  - those copied approvals are now seeded before the guardian's first turn
  is submitted, so inherited approvals are available during any immediate
  review-time checks
  
  ## Out of scope / follow-ups
  - the sandbox-permission validation split was pulled into a separate PR
  and is not part of this diff
  - a future follow-up can enable `serde_json` preserve-order in
  `codex-core` and then simplify the guardian action rendering further
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Charley Cunningham · 2026-03-07 05:40:10 -08:00
  e84ee33cc0
• sandboxing: plumb split sandbox policies through runtime (#13439)

  ## Why
  
  `#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
  `NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
  sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
  
  That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
  filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
  means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
  the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
  has already separated those concerns.
  
  This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
  selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
  that actually matters.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
  `TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
  unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
  - updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
  `core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
  `NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
  legacy `SandboxPolicy`
  - updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
  wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
  `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
  - kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
  compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
  explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
  - updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
  pass the split policies explicitly
  
  ## Verification
  
  - added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
  verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
  `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
  - added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
  sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
  - updated Linux sandbox coverage in
  `linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
  exec path
  - verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
  * #13453
  * #13452
  * #13451
  * #13449
  * #13448
  * #13445
  * #13440
  * __->__ #13439
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-07 02:30:21 +00:00
  22ac6b9aaa
• chore(otel): rename OtelManager to SessionTelemetry (#13808)

  ## Summary
  This is a purely mechanical refactor of `OtelManager` ->
  `SessionTelemetry` to better convey what the struct is doing. No
  behavior change.
  
  ## Why
  
  `OtelManager` ended up sounding much broader than what this type
  actually does. It doesn't manage OTEL globally; it's the session-scoped
  telemetry surface for emitting log/trace events and recording metrics
  with consistent session metadata (`app_version`, `model`, `slug`,
  `originator`, etc.).
  
  `SessionTelemetry` is a more accurate name, and updating the call sites
  makes that boundary a lot easier to follow.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just fmt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-otel`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core`

  Owen Lin · 2026-03-06 16:23:30 -08:00
  289ed549cf
• feat: include sandbox config with escalation request (#12839)

  ## Why
  
  Before this change, an escalation approval could say that a command
  should be rerun, but it could not carry the sandbox configuration that
  should still apply when the escalated command is actually spawned.
  
  That left an unsafe gap in the `zsh-fork` skill path: skill scripts
  under `scripts/` that did not declare permissions could be escalated
  without a sandbox, and scripts that did declare permissions could lose
  their bounded sandbox on rerun or cached session approval.
  
  This PR extends the escalation protocol so approvals can optionally
  carry sandbox configuration all the way through execution. That lets the
  shell runtime preserve the intended sandbox instead of silently widening
  access.
  
  We likely want a single permissions type for this codepath eventually,
  probably centered on `Permissions`. For now, the protocol needs to
  represent both the existing `PermissionProfile` form and the fuller
  `Permissions` form, so this introduces a temporary disjoint union,
  `EscalationPermissions`, to carry either one.
  
  Further, this means that today, a skill either:
  
  - does not declare any permissions, in which case it is run using the
  default sandbox for the turn
  - specifies permissions, in which case the skill is run using that exact
  sandbox, which might be more restrictive than the default sandbox for
  the turn
  
  We will likely change the skill's permissions to be additive to the
  existing permissions for the turn.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Added `EscalationPermissions` to `codex-protocol` so escalation
  requests can carry either a `PermissionProfile` or a full `Permissions`
  payload.
  - Added an explicit `EscalationExecution` mode to the shell escalation
  protocol so reruns distinguish between `Unsandboxed`, `TurnDefault`, and
  `Permissions(...)` instead of overloading `None`.
  - Updated `zsh-fork` shell reruns to resolve `TurnDefault` at execution
  time, which keeps ordinary `UseDefault` commands on the turn sandbox and
  preserves turn-level macOS seatbelt profile extensions.
  - Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with no declared
  permissions inherits the conversation's effective sandbox instead of
  escalating unsandboxed.
  - Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with declared permissions
  reruns with exactly those permissions, including when a cached session
  approval is reused.
  
  ## Testing
  
  - Added unit coverage in
  `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for the explicit
  `UseDefault` / `RequireEscalated` / `WithAdditionalPermissions`
  execution mapping.
  - Added unit coverage in
  `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for macOS seatbelt
  extension preservation in both the `TurnDefault` and
  explicit-permissions rerun paths.
  - Added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs` for
  permissionless skills inheriting the turn sandbox and explicit skill
  permissions remaining bounded across cached approval reuse.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-26 12:00:18 -08:00
  7fa9d9ae35
• feat(core) Introduce Feature::RequestPermissions (#11871)

  ## Summary
  Introduces the initial implementation of Feature::RequestPermissions.
  RequestPermissions allows the model to request that a command be run
  inside the sandbox, with additional permissions, like writing to a
  specific folder. Eventually this will include other rules as well, and
  the ability to persist these permissions, but this PR is already quite
  large - let's get the core flow working and go from there!
  
  <img width="1279" height="541" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-15 at 2 26 22 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ee3ec0f-02ec-4509-91a2-809ac80be368"
  />
  
  ## Testing
  - [x] Added tests
  - [x] Tested locally
  - [x] Feature

  Dylan Hurd · 2026-02-24 09:48:57 -08:00
  f6053fdfb3
• Use Arc-based ToolCtx in tool runtimes (#12583)

  ## Why
  Tool handlers and runtimes needed to pass the same turn/session context
  for shell and non-shell workflows without duplicative ownership churn.
  Using shared pointers avoids temporary lifetimes and keeps existing
  behavior unchanged while simplifying call sites.
  
  ## What changed
  - Converted `ToolCtx` to store shared context handles (`Arc`-based),
  including updates across shell, apply-patch, and unified-exec paths.
  - Updated orchestrator/runtime call sites to consume the shared context
  consistently and remove brittle move/borrow patterns.
  - Kept behavior unchanged while preparing the type surface for the new
  shell escalation integration in the next stack commit.
  
  ## Verification
  - Validated this commit stack point with `just clippy` and confirmed
  workspace compiles cleanly in this stack state.
  
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/12583).
  * #12584
  * __->__ #12583
  * #12556

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-23 18:29:26 +00:00
  7f75e74201
• Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)

  ## Summary
  Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
  moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
  Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
  treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
  
  - Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
  - Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
  prompts.
  - Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
  - Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
  future matching requests.
  - Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
  
  Example:
  - 3 calls: 
    - a.com (line 443)
    - b.com (line 443)
    - a.com (line 443)
  => 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
  - a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
  
  ## Testing
  - `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
  integration-suite failures remain in this environment)

  viyatb-oai · 2026-02-20 10:39:55 -08:00
  e8afaed502
• feat: add Reject approval policy with granular prompt rejection controls (#12087)

  ## Why
  
  We need a way to auto-reject specific approval prompt categories without
  switching all approvals off.
  
  The goal is to let users independently control:
  - sandbox escalation approvals,
  - execpolicy `prompt` rule approvals,
  - MCP elicitation prompts.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Added a new primary approval mode in `protocol/src/protocol.rs`:
  
  ```rust
  pub enum AskForApproval {
      // ...
      Reject(RejectConfig),
      // ...
  }
  
  pub struct RejectConfig {
      pub sandbox_approval: bool,
      pub rules: bool,
      pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
  }
  ```
  
  - Wired `RejectConfig` semantics through approval paths in `core`:
    - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
      - rejects rule-driven prompts when `rules = true`
      - rejects sandbox/escalation prompts when `sandbox_approval = true`
  - preserves rule priority when both rule and sandbox prompt conditions
  are present
    - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
  - applies `sandbox_approval` to default exec approval decisions and
  sandbox-failure retry gating
    - `core/src/safety.rs`
  - keeps `Reject { all false }` behavior aligned with `OnRequest` for
  patch safety
      - rejects out-of-root patch approvals when `sandbox_approval = true`
    - `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
      - auto-declines MCP elicitations when `mcp_elicitations = true`
  
  - Ensured approval policy used by MCP elicitation flow stays in sync
  with constrained session policy updates.
  
  - Updated app-server v2 conversions and generated schema/TypeScript
  artifacts for the new `Reject` shape.
  
  ## Verification
  
  Added focused unit coverage for the new behavior in:
  - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
  - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
  - `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
  - `core/src/safety.rs`
  - `core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs`
  
  Key cases covered include rule-vs-sandbox prompt precedence, MCP
  auto-decline behavior, and patch/sandbox retry behavior under
  `RejectConfig`.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-19 11:41:49 -08:00
  425fff7ad6
• feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)

  ### Description
  #### Summary
  Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
  
  #### What changed
  - Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
  - Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
  semantics.
  - Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
  decisions.
  - Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
  - Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
  - Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
  layer.
  
  #### Why
  establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
  yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
  
  #### Notes
  - Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
  - Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
  integration.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-02-14 04:18:12 +00:00
  b527ee2890
• feat: make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess (#11387)

  `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
  not express a narrower read surface.
  This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
  user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
  current behavior today.
  
  It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
  policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
  
  ## What
  
  - Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
    - `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
    - `FullAccess`
  - Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
    - `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
    - `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
  - Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
  to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
  - Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
  sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
  related tests.
  - Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
  emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
  - Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
  restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
  (`UnsupportedOperation`).
  - Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
  including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
  
  ## Compatibility / rollout
  
  - Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
  - API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
  restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-11 18:31:14 -08:00
  abbd74e2be
• feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)

  ## Summary
  - expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
  (`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
  tool-specific variants)
  - harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
  inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
  malformed
  - thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
  isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
  - add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
  and Linux sandbox argument wiring

  viyatb-oai · 2026-02-10 07:44:21 +00:00
  3391e5ea86