## Why
When Codex starts with a custom CA override such as
`SSL_CERT_FILE=/path/to/corp-ca.pem codex`, `rustls-native-certs` treats
that override as a replacement for the platform trust store. The managed
proxy then rewrites child CA variables to its generated bundle, so the
custom root or the ordinary platform roots can be lost. The proxy's
upstream TLS connector must trust the same roots or private and
corporate upstream certificates still fail after interception.
## What
- load platform-native roots without consulting inherited CA override
variables
- append certificates from the existing curated startup CA file
variables and `SSL_CERT_DIR`
- share those platform and startup roots with the MITM upstream rustls
connector
- exclude the Codex managed MITM CA from upstream trust
- normalize OpenSSL `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` blocks while dropping trailing
trust metadata
- skip an inherited current Codex-managed bundle so nested launches do
not duplicate it
- append the Codex managed MITM CA to the child-facing bundle
- copy certificate material only, so a private key or unrelated text
colocated in a startup file is never exposed through the public bundle
This is intentionally limited to CA paths present when Codex starts. It
does not parse inline shell assignments or add per-command bundle
materialization.
This changes only `codex-network-proxy` and dependency metadata; it does
not touch `codex-core` or sandbox orchestration.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy`
- includes an end-to-end upstream TLS test using a server trusted only
by the startup custom CA
- `just fix -p codex-network-proxy`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18240 uses named MITM permissions config.
2. This PR wires managed MITM CA trust into spawned child processes.
## Why
When Codex terminates HTTPS for limited mode or MITM hooks, child HTTPS
clients need to trust Codex's managed MITM CA. Exporting proxy URLs
alone is not enough, but blindly replacing user CA settings would be
wrong: it can break custom enterprise/test roots, leak unreadable CA
files into generated bundles, or make the child env disagree with its
sandbox policy.
## Summary
1. Build immutable managed CA bundles under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy` that
include native roots, the managed MITM CA, and only inherited or
command-scoped CA bundles the child is allowed to read.
2. Export curated CA env vars alongside managed proxy env vars while
preserving user CA override semantics, including nested Codex
`SSL_CERT_FILE` precedence.
3. Thread generated CA bundle paths into child sandbox readable roots,
including debug sandbox execution, so the exported env vars work inside
sandboxed commands.
4. Remove only Codex-generated MITM CA bundle env when a child
intentionally drops managed proxying for escalation or no-proxy retry.
5. Document the managed CA bundle behavior and cover env injection,
per-child bundle generation, sandbox readable roots, and no-proxy
cleanup in tests.
## Validation
1. Ran `just test -p codex-network-proxy`.
2. Ran `just test -p codex-protocol`.
3. Ran `just fix -p codex-network-proxy -p codex-protocol`.
4. Tried focused `codex-core` validation, but the crate currently fails
to compile in `core/tests/suite/guardian_review.rs` because an existing
`Op::UserInput` initializer is missing `additional_context`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eva Wong <evawong@openai.com>
## Why
Recent Auto Review reports show Git traffic hanging through the local
proxy on both SSH and HTTPS paths. Today the support bundle does not
make it obvious whether a request is stuck before upstream dialing,
during the proxy hop, or after the upstream response begins, which slows
down root-cause triage.
This adds a small amount of runtime visibility at the existing proxy
boundaries without changing routing or policy behavior.
## What changed
- log whether HTTP and CONNECT traffic take the direct or upstream-proxy
route
- log start / success / failure timings for CONNECT, HTTP, and SOCKS5
upstream dials
- log CONNECT forwarding lifecycle events
- describe HTTP success at the response-header boundary that is actually
observed, rather than implying the full body finished
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets -- -D warnings`
## Why
The proxy checks the requested host before opening the upstream
connection, but DNS can resolve an allowed hostname to a loopback,
private, or other non-public address after that first decision. Without
a final check on the actual socket target, a request that looks
acceptable at the hostname layer can still connect to a local service
once resolution completes.
## What changed
- add a shared TCP connector check for direct proxy egress
- use that path for HTTP, `CONNECT`, SOCKS5, and MITM upstream
connections
- keep configured upstream proxy hops on the existing proxy path
- add direct-connector coverage for allowed and rejected local targets
## Security impact
Direct proxy egress now rechecks the resolved socket address before
connecting, closing the gap between hostname policy evaluation and the
final network target.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
This add a new crate, `codex-network-proxy`, a local network proxy
service used by Codex to enforce fine-grained network policy (domain
allow/deny) and to surface blocked network events for interactive
approvals.
- New crate: `codex-rs/network-proxy/` (`codex-network-proxy` binary +
library)
- Core capabilities:
- HTTP proxy support (including CONNECT tunneling)
- SOCKS5 proxy support (in the later PR)
- policy evaluation (allowed/denied domain lists; denylist wins;
wildcard support)
- small admin API for polling/reload/mode changes
- optional MITM support for HTTPS CONNECT to enforce “limited mode”
method restrictions (later PR)
Will follow up integration with codex in subsequent PRs.
## Testing
- `cd codex-rs && cargo build -p codex-network-proxy`
- `cd codex-rs && cargo run -p codex-network-proxy -- proxy`
Winston Howes ·
viyatb-oai ·
Michael Bolin ·
Anton Panasenko ·