Commit Graph
32 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael BolinandGitHub 425fff7ad6 feat: add Reject approval policy with granular prompt rejection controls (#12087)
## Why

We need a way to auto-reject specific approval prompt categories without
switching all approvals off.

The goal is to let users independently control:
- sandbox escalation approvals,
- execpolicy `prompt` rule approvals,
- MCP elicitation prompts.

## What changed

- Added a new primary approval mode in `protocol/src/protocol.rs`:

```rust
pub enum AskForApproval {
    // ...
    Reject(RejectConfig),
    // ...
}

pub struct RejectConfig {
    pub sandbox_approval: bool,
    pub rules: bool,
    pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
}
```

- Wired `RejectConfig` semantics through approval paths in `core`:
  - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
    - rejects rule-driven prompts when `rules = true`
    - rejects sandbox/escalation prompts when `sandbox_approval = true`
- preserves rule priority when both rule and sandbox prompt conditions
are present
  - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- applies `sandbox_approval` to default exec approval decisions and
sandbox-failure retry gating
  - `core/src/safety.rs`
- keeps `Reject { all false }` behavior aligned with `OnRequest` for
patch safety
    - rejects out-of-root patch approvals when `sandbox_approval = true`
  - `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
    - auto-declines MCP elicitations when `mcp_elicitations = true`

- Ensured approval policy used by MCP elicitation flow stays in sync
with constrained session policy updates.

- Updated app-server v2 conversions and generated schema/TypeScript
artifacts for the new `Reject` shape.

## Verification

Added focused unit coverage for the new behavior in:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- `core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs`

Key cases covered include rule-vs-sandbox prompt precedence, MCP
auto-decline behavior, and patch/sandbox retry behavior under
`RejectConfig`.
2026-02-19 11:41:49 -08:00
Owen LinandGitHub edacbf7b6e feat(core): zsh exec bridge (#12052)
zsh fork PR stack:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052 👈 

### Summary
This PR introduces a feature-gated native shell runtime path that routes
shell execution through a patched zsh exec bridge, removing MCP-specific
behavior from the shell hot path while preserving existing
CommandExecution lifecycle semantics.

When shell_zsh_fork is enabled, shell commands run via patched zsh with
per-`execve` interception through EXEC_WRAPPER. Core receives wrapper
IPC requests over a Unix socket, applies existing approval policy, and
returns allow/deny before the subcommand executes.

### What’s included
**1) New zsh exec bridge runtime in core**
- Wrapper-mode entrypoint (maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode) for
EXEC_WRAPPER invocations.
- Per-execution Unix-socket IPC handling for wrapper requests/responses.
- Approval callback integration using existing core approval
orchestration.
- Streaming stdout/stderr deltas to existing command output event
pipeline.
- Error handling for malformed IPC, denial/abort, and execution
failures.

**2) Session lifecycle integration**
SessionServices now owns a `ZshExecBridge`.
Session startup initializes bridge state; shutdown tears it down
cleanly.

**3) Shell runtime routing (feature-gated)**
When `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled:
- Build execution env/spec as usual.
- Add wrapper socket env wiring.
- Execute via `zsh_exec_bridge.execute_shell_request(...)` instead of
the regular shell path.
- Non-zsh-fork behavior remains unchanged.

**4) Config + feature wiring**
- Added `Feature::ShellZshFork` (under development).
- Added config support for `zsh_path` (optional absolute path to patched
zsh):
- `Config`, `ConfigToml`, `ConfigProfile`, overrides, and schema.
- Session startup validates that `zsh_path` exists/usable when zsh-fork
is enabled.
- Added startup test for missing `zsh_path` failure mode.

**5) Seatbelt/sandbox updates for wrapper IPC**
- Extended seatbelt policy generation to optionally allow outbound
connection to explicitly permitted Unix sockets.
- Wired sandboxing path to pass wrapper socket path through to seatbelt
policy generation.
- Added/updated seatbelt tests for explicit socket allow rule and
argument emission.

**6) Runtime entrypoint hooks**
- This allows the same binary to act as the zsh wrapper subprocess when
invoked via `EXEC_WRAPPER`.

**7) Tool selection behavior**
- ToolsConfig now prefers ShellCommand type when shell_zsh_fork is
enabled.
- Added test coverage for precedence with unified-exec enabled.
2026-02-17 20:19:53 -08:00
Owen LinandGitHub db4d2599b5 feat(core): plumb distinct approval ids for command approvals (#12051)
zsh fork PR stack:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 👈 
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052

With upcoming support for a fork of zsh that allows us to intercept
`execve` and run execpolicy checks for each subcommand as part of a
`CommandExecution`, it will be possible for there to be multiple
approval requests for a shell command like `/path/to/zsh -lc 'git status
&& rg \"TODO\" src && make test'`.

To support that, this PR introduces a new `approval_id` field across
core, protocol, and app-server so that we can associate approvals
properly for subcommands.
2026-02-18 01:55:57 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 825a4af42f feat: use shell policy in shell snapshot (#11759)
Honor `shell_environment_policy.set` even after a shell snapshot
2026-02-16 09:11:00 +00:00
viyatb-oaiGitHubCodex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
b527ee2890 feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals

#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.

#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.

#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-14 04:18:12 +00:00
62d0f302fd fix(core): canonicalize wrapper approvals and support heredoc prefix … (#10941)
## Summary
- Reduced repeated approvals for equivalent wrapper commands and fixed
execpolicy matching for heredoc-style shell invocations, with minimal
behavior change and fail-closed defaults.

## Fixes
1. Canonicalized approval matching for wrappers so equivalent commands
map to the same approval intent.
2. Added heredoc-aware prefix extraction for execpolicy so commands like
`python3 <<'PY' ... PY` match rules such as `prefix_rule(["python3"],
...)`.
3. Kept fallback behavior conservative: if parsing is ambiguous,
existing prompt behavior is preserved.

## Edge Cases Covered
- Wrapper path/name differences: `/bin/bash` vs `bash`, `/bin/zsh` vs
`zsh`.
- Shell modes: `-c` and `-lc`.
- Heredoc forms: quoted delimiter (`<<'PY'`) and unquoted delimiter (`<<
PY`).
- Multi-command heredoc scripts are rejected by the fallback
- Non-heredoc redirections (`>`, etc.) are not treated as heredoc prefix
matches.
- Complex scripts still fall back to prior behavior rather than
expanding permissions.

---------

Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com>
2026-02-10 11:46:40 -08:00
viyatb-oaiandGitHub 3391e5ea86 feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
## Summary
- expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
(`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
tool-specific variants)
- harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
malformed
- thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
- add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
and Linux sandbox argument wiring
2026-02-10 07:44:21 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub ffd4bd345c feat: tie shell snapshot to cwd (#11231)
Fix for this: https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/11223

Basically we tie the shell snapshot to a `cwd` to handle `cwd`-based env
setups
2026-02-09 22:14:39 +00:00
Michael BolinandGitHub 383b45279e feat: include NetworkConfig through ExecParams (#11105)
This PR adds the following field to `Config`:

```rust
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
```

Though for the moment, it will always be initialized as `None` (this
will be addressed in a subsequent PR).

This PR does the work to thread `network` through to `execute_exec_env()`, `process_exec_tool_call()`, and `UnifiedExecRuntime.run()` to ensure it is available whenever we span a process.
2026-02-09 03:32:17 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 83c74125bc Bootstrap shell commands via user shell snapshot (#10909)
Summary
- wrap `shell -lc` executions that use a snapshot with the session shell
so the saved environment is sourced before delegating to the original
shell
- escape single quotes in the generated wrapper and add tests covering
Bash/Zsh/sh session bootstrapping

Testing
- Not run (not requested)
2026-02-07 17:36:44 +01:00
jif-oaiandGitHub b75024c465 feat: async shell snapshot (#9600) 2026-01-21 10:41:13 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 577e1fd1b2 feat: adding piped process to replace PTY when needed (#8797) 2026-01-14 18:44:04 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub bc6d9ef6fc feat: only source shell snapshot if the file exists (#9197) 2026-01-14 01:28:25 -08:00
jif-oaiandGitHub e2e3f4490e chore: add approval metric (#8970) 2026-01-09 13:10:31 +00:00
Owen LinandGitHub 66450f0445 fix: implement 'Allow this session' for apply_patch approvals (#8451)
**Summary**
This PR makes “ApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession / don’t ask again this
session” actually work for `apply_patch` approvals by caching approvals
based on absolute file paths in codex-core, properly wiring it through
app-server v2, and exposing the choice in both TUI and TUI2.
- This brings `apply_patch` calls to be at feature-parity with general
shell commands, which also have a "Yes, and don't ask again" option.
- This also fixes VSCE's "Allow this session" button to actually work.

While we're at it, also split the app-server v2 protocol's
`ApprovalDecision` enum so execpolicy amendments are only available for
command execution approvals.

**Key changes**
- Core: per-session patch approval allowlist keyed by absolute file
paths
- Handles multi-file patches and renames/moves by recording both source
and destination paths for `Update { move_path: Some(...) }`.
- Extend the `Approvable` trait and `ApplyPatchRuntime` to work with
multiple keys, because an `apply_patch` tool call can modify multiple
files. For a request to be auto-approved, we will need to check that all
file paths have been approved previously.
- App-server v2: honor AcceptForSession for file changes
- File-change approval responses now map AcceptForSession to
ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession (no longer downgraded to plain
Approved).
- Replace `ApprovalDecision` with two enums:
`CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and `FileChangeApprovalDecision`
- TUI / TUI2: expose “don’t ask again for these files this session”
- Patch approval overlays now include a third option (“Yes, and don’t
ask again for these files this session (s)”).
    - Snapshot updates for the approval modal.

**Tests added/updated**
- Core:
- Integration test that proves ApprovedForSession on a patch skips the
next patch prompt for the same file
- App-server:
- v2 integration test verifying
FileChangeApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession works properly

**User-visible behavior**
- When the user approves a patch “for session”, future patches touching
only those previously approved file(s) will no longer prompt gain during
that session (both via app-server v2 and TUI/TUI2).

**Manual testing**
Tested both TUI and TUI2 - see screenshots below.

TUI:
<img width="1082" height="355" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/adcf45ad-d428-498d-92fc-1a0a420878d9"
/>


TUI2:
<img width="1089" height="438" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/dd768b1a-2f5f-4bd6-98fd-e52c1d3abd9e"
/>
2026-01-07 20:11:12 +00:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 4cef89a122 chore: rename unified exec sessions (#8822)
Renaming done by Codex
2026-01-07 16:12:47 +00:00
Dylan HurdandGitHub 33e1d0844a feat(windows) start powershell in utf-8 mode (#7902)
## Summary
Adds a FeatureFlag to enforce UTF8 encoding in powershell, particularly
Windows Powershell v5. This should help address issues like #7290.

Notably, this PR does not include the ability to parse `apply_patch`
invocations within UTF8 shell commands (calls to the freeform tool
should not be impacted). I am leaving this out of scope for now. We
should address before this feature becomes Stable, but those cases are
not the default behavior at this time so we're okay for experimentation
phase. We should continue cleaning up the `apply_patch::invocation`
logic and then can handle it more cleanly.

## Testing
- [x] Adds additional testing
2025-12-22 09:36:44 -08:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 29381ba5c2 feat: add shell snapshot for shell command (#7786) 2025-12-11 13:46:43 +00:00
Eric TrautandGitHub c4af707e09 Removed experimental "command risk assessment" feature (#7799)
This experimental feature received lukewarm reception during internal
testing. Removing from the code base.
2025-12-10 09:48:11 -08:00
zhao-oaiandGitHub e0fb3ca1db refactoring with_escalated_permissions to use SandboxPermissions instead (#7750)
helpful in the future if we want more granularity for requesting
escalated permissions:
e.g when running in readonly sandbox, model can request to escalate to a
sandbox that allows writes
2025-12-10 17:18:48 +00:00
zhao-oaiandGitHub c2bdee0946 proposing execpolicy amendment when prompting due to sandbox denial (#7653)
Currently, we only show the “don’t ask again for commands that start
with…” option when a command is immediately flagged as needing approval.
However, there is another case where we ask for approval: When a command
is initially auto-approved to run within sandbox, but it fails to run
inside sandbox, we would like to attempt to retry running outside of
sandbox. This will require a prompt to the user.

This PR addresses this latter case
2025-12-08 17:55:20 +00:00
zhao-oaiandGitHub 3d35cb4619 Refactor execpolicy fallback evaluation (#7544)
## Refactor of the `execpolicy` crate

To illustrate why we need this refactor, consider an agent attempting to
run `apple | rm -rf ./`. Suppose `apple` is allowed by `execpolicy`.
Before this PR, `execpolicy` would consider `apple` and `pear` and only
render one rule match: `Allow`. We would skip any heuristics checks on
`rm -rf ./` and immediately approve `apple | rm -rf ./` to run.

To fix this, we now thread a `fallback` evaluation function into
`execpolicy` that runs when no `execpolicy` rules match a given command.
In our example, we would run `fallback` on `rm -rf ./` and prevent
`apple | rm -rf ./` from being run without approval.
2025-12-03 23:39:48 -08:00
zhao-oaiandGitHub e925a380dc whitelist command prefix integration in core and tui (#7033)
this PR enables TUI to approve commands and add their prefixes to an
allowlist:
<img width="708" height="605" alt="Screenshot 2025-11-21 at 4 18 07 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/56a19893-4553-4770-a881-becf79eeda32"
/>

note: we only show the option to whitelist the command when 
1) command is not multi-part (e.g `git add -A && git commit -m 'hello
world'`)
2) command is not already matched by an existing rule
2025-12-03 23:17:02 -08:00
zhao-oaiandGitHub 87b211709e bypass sandbox for policy approved commands (#7110)
allowing cmds greenlit by execpolicy to bypass sandbox + minor refactor
for a world where we have execpolicy rules with specific sandbox
requirements
2025-11-21 18:03:23 -05:00
Michael BolinandGitHub f56d1dc8fc feat: update process_exec_tool_call() to take a cancellation token (#6972)
This updates `ExecParams` so that instead of taking `timeout_ms:
Option<u64>`, it now takes a more general cancellation mechanism,
`ExecExpiration`, which is an enum that includes a
`Cancellation(tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken)` variant.

If the cancellation token is fired, then `process_exec_tool_call()`
returns in the same way as if a timeout was exceeded.

This is necessary so that in #6973, we can manage the timeout logic
external to the `process_exec_tool_call()` because we want to "suspend"
the timeout when an elicitation from a human user is pending.








---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/6972).
* #7005
* #6973
* __->__ #6972
2025-11-20 16:29:57 -08:00
65c13f1ae7 execpolicy2 core integration (#6641)
This PR threads execpolicy2 into codex-core.

activated via feature flag: exec_policy (on by default)

reads and parses all .codexpolicy files in `codex_home/codex`

refactored tool runtime API to integrate execpolicy logic

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
2025-11-19 16:50:43 -08:00
pakrym-oaiandGitHub 807e2c27f0 Add unified exec escalation handling and tests (#6492)
Similar implementation to the shell tool
2025-11-11 08:19:35 -08:00
pakrym-oaiandGitHub 91b16b8682 Don't request approval for safe commands in unified exec (#6380) 2025-11-07 16:36:04 -08:00
Eric TrautandGitHub f8af4f5c8d Added model summary and risk assessment for commands that violate sandbox policy (#5536)
This PR adds support for a model-based summary and risk assessment for
commands that violate the sandbox policy and require user approval. This
aids the user in evaluating whether the command should be approved.

The feature works by taking a failed command and passing it back to the
model and asking it to summarize the command, give it a risk level (low,
medium, high) and a risk category (e.g. "data deletion" or "data
exfiltration"). It uses a new conversation thread so the context in the
existing thread doesn't influence the answer. If the call to the model
fails or takes longer than 5 seconds, it falls back to the current
behavior.

For now, this is an experimental feature and is gated by a config key
`experimental_sandbox_command_assessment`.

Here is a screen shot of the approval prompt showing the risk assessment
and summary.

<img width="723" height="282" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4597dd7c-d5a0-4e9f-9d13-414bd082fd6b"
/>
2025-10-24 15:23:44 -07:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 892eaff46d fix: approval issue (#5525) 2025-10-23 11:13:53 +01:00
pakrym-oaiandGitHub 789e65b9d2 Pass TurnContext around instead of sub_id (#5421)
Today `sub_id` is an ID of a single incoming Codex Op submition. We then
associate all events triggered by this operation using the same
`sub_id`.

At the same time we are also creating a TurnContext per submission and
we'd like to start associating some events (item added/item completed)
with an entire turn instead of just the operation that started it.

Using turn context when sending events give us flexibility to change
notification scheme.
2025-10-21 08:04:16 -07:00
jif-oaiandGitHub 5e4f3bbb0b chore: rework tools execution workflow (#5278)
Re-work the tool execution flow. Read `orchestrator.rs` to understand
the structure
2025-10-20 20:57:37 +01:00