We received a bug report that Codex CLI crashes when an env var contains
a non-ASCII character, or more specifically, cannot be decoded as UTF-8:
```shell
$ RUST_BACKTRACE=full RÖDBURK=1 codex
thread '<unnamed>' panicked at library/std/src/env.rs:162:57:
called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: "RÃ\xB6DBURK"
stack backtrace:
0: 0x101905c18 - __mh_execute_header
1: 0x1012bd76c - __mh_execute_header
2: 0x1019050e4 - __mh_execute_header
3: 0x101905ad8 - __mh_execute_header
4: 0x101905874 - __mh_execute_header
5: 0x101904f38 - __mh_execute_header
6: 0x1019347bc - __mh_execute_header
7: 0x10193472c - __mh_execute_header
8: 0x101937884 - __mh_execute_header
9: 0x101b3bcd0 - __mh_execute_header
10: 0x101b3c0bc - __mh_execute_header
11: 0x101927a20 - __mh_execute_header
12: 0x1005c58d8 - __mh_execute_header
thread '<unnamed>' panicked at library/core/src/panicking.rs:225:5:
panic in a function that cannot unwind
stack backtrace:
0: 0x101905c18 - __mh_execute_header
1: 0x1012bd76c - __mh_execute_header
2: 0x1019050e4 - __mh_execute_header
3: 0x101905ad8 - __mh_execute_header
4: 0x101905874 - __mh_execute_header
5: 0x101904f38 - __mh_execute_header
6: 0x101934794 - __mh_execute_header
7: 0x10193472c - __mh_execute_header
8: 0x101937884 - __mh_execute_header
9: 0x101b3c144 - __mh_execute_header
10: 0x101b3c1a0 - __mh_execute_header
11: 0x101b3c158 - __mh_execute_header
12: 0x1005c5ef8 - __mh_execute_header
thread caused non-unwinding panic. aborting.
```
I discovered I could reproduce this on a release build, but not a dev
build, so between that and the unhelpful stack trace, my mind went to
the pre-`main()` logic we run in prod builds. Sure enough, we were
operating on `std::env::vars()` instead of `std::env::vars_os()`, which
is why the non-UTF-8 environment variable was causing an issue.
This PR updates the logic to use `std::env::vars_os()` and adds a unit
test.
And to be extra sure, I also verified the fix works with a local release
build:
```
$ cargo build --bin codex --release
$ RÖDBURK=1 ./target/release/codex --version
codex-cli 0.0.0
```
## Summary
Builds on FreeBSD and OpenBSD were failing due to globally enabled
Linux-specific keyring features and hardening code paths not gated by
OS. This PR scopes keyring native backends to the
appropriate targets, disables default features at the workspace root,
and adds a BSD-specific hardening function. Linux/macOS/Windows behavior
remains unchanged, while FreeBSD/OpenBSD
now build and run with a supported backend.
## Key Changes
- Keyring features:
- Disable keyring default features at the workspace root to avoid
pulling Linux backends on non-Linux.
- Move native backend features into target-specific sections in the
affected crates:
- Linux: linux-native-async-persistent
- macOS: apple-native
- Windows: windows-native
- FreeBSD/OpenBSD: sync-secret-service
- Process hardening:
- Add pre_main_hardening_bsd() for FreeBSD/OpenBSD, applying:
- Set RLIMIT_CORE to 0
- Clear LD_* environment variables
- Simplify process-hardening Cargo deps to unconditional libc (avoid
conflicting OS fragments).
- No changes to CODEX_SANDBOX_* behavior.
## Rationale
- Previously, enabling keyring native backends globally pulled
Linux-only features on BSD, causing build errors.
- Hardening logic was tailored for Linux/macOS; BSD builds lacked a
gated path with equivalent safeguards.
- Target-scoped features and BSD hardening make the crates portable
across these OSes without affecting existing behavior elsewhere.
## Impact by Platform
- Linux: No functional change; backends now selected via target cfg.
- macOS: No functional change; explicit apple-native mapping.
- Windows: No functional change; explicit windows-native mapping.
- FreeBSD/OpenBSD: Builds succeed using sync-secret-service; BSD
hardening applied during startup.
## Testing
- Verified compilation across affected crates with target-specific
features.
- Smoke-checked that Linux/macOS/Windows feature sets remain identical
functionally after scoping.
- On BSD, confirmed keyring resolves to sync-secret-service and
hardening compiles.
## Risks / Compatibility
- Minimal risk: only feature scoping and OS-gated additions.
- No public API changes in the crates; runtime behavior on non-BSD
platforms is preserved.
- On BSD, the new hardening clears LD_*; this is consistent with
security posture on other Unix platforms.
## Reviewer Notes
- Pay attention to target-specific sections for keyring in the affected
Cargo.toml files.
- Confirm pre_main_hardening_bsd() mirrors the safe subset of
Linux/macOS hardening without introducing Linux-only calls.
- Confirm no references to CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR or
CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR were added/modified.
## Checklist
- Disable keyring default features at workspace root.
- Target-specific keyring features mapped per OS
(Linux/macOS/Windows/BSD).
- Add BSD hardening (RLIMIT_CORE=0, clear LD_*).
- Simplify process-hardening dependencies to unconditional libc.
- No changes to sandbox env var code.
- Formatting and linting: just fmt + just fix -p for changed crates.
- Project tests pass for changed crates; broader suite unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: celia-oai <celia@openai.com>
Michael Bolin ·
Thomas Klausner ·
Xiao-Yong Jin ·