## Summary
- add `skill_approval` to `RejectConfig` and the app-server v2
`AskForApproval::Reject` payload so skill-script prompts can be
configured independently from sandbox and rule-based prompts
- update Unix shell escalation to reject prompts based on the actual
decision source, keeping prefix rules tied to `rules`, unmatched command
fallbacks tied to `sandbox_approval`, and skill scripts tied to
`skill_approval`
- regenerate the affected protocol/config schemas and expand
unit/integration coverage for the new flag and skill approval behavior
## Summary
We need to support allowing request_permissions calls when using
`Reject` policy
<img width="1133" height="588" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-09 at 12 06
40 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a8df987f-c225-4866-b8ab-5590960daec5"
/>
Note that this is a backwards-incompatible change for Reject policy. I'm
not sure if we need to add a default based on our current use/setup
## Testing
- [x] Added tests
- [x] Tested locally
## Summary
- distinguish reject-policy handling for prefix-rule approvals versus
sandbox approvals in Unix shell escalation
- keep prompting for skill-script execution when `rules=true` but
`sandbox_approval=false`, instead of denying the command up front
- add regression coverage for both skill-script reject-policy paths in
`codex-rs/core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs`
## Summary
- Treat skill scripts with no permission profile, or an explicitly empty
one, as permissionless and run them with the turn's existing sandbox
instead of forcing an exec approval prompt.
- Keep the approval flow unchanged for skills that do declare additional
permissions.
- Update the skill approval tests to assert that permissionless skill
scripts do not prompt on either the initial run or a rerun.
## Why
Permissionless skills should inherit the current turn sandbox directly.
Prompting for exec approval in that case adds friction without granting
any additional capability.
- add a local Fast mode setting in codex-core (similar to how model id
is currently stored on disk locally)
- send `service_tier=priority` on requests when Fast is enabled
- add `/fast` in the TUI and persist it locally
- feature flag
## Summary
This change removes the compiled permissions field from skill metadata
and keeps permission_profile as the single source of truth.
Skill loading no longer compiles skill permissions eagerly. Instead, the
zsh-fork skill escalation path compiles `skill.permission_profile` when
it needs to determine the sandbox to apply for a skill script.
## Behavior change
For skills that declare:
```
permissions: {}
```
we now treat that the same as having no skill permissions override,
instead of creating and using a default readonly sandbox. This change
makes the behavior more intuitive:
- only non-empty skill permission profiles affect sandboxing
- omitting permissions and writing permissions: {} now mean the same
thing
- skill metadata keeps a single permissions representation instead of
storing derived state too
Overall, this makes skill sandbox behavior easier to understand and more
predictable.
## Why
[#12964](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12964) added
`host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, but the zsh-fork
interception path in `unix_escalation.rs` was still evaluating commands
with the default exact-token matcher.
That meant an intercepted absolute executable such as `/usr/bin/git
status` could still miss basename rules like `prefix_rule(pattern =
["git", "status"])`, even when the policy also defined a matching
`host_executable(name = "git", ...)` entry.
This PR adopts the new matching behavior in the zsh-fork runtime only.
That keeps the rollout intentionally narrow: zsh-fork already requires
explicit user opt-in, so it is a safer first caller to exercise the new
`host_executable()` scheme before expanding it to other execpolicy call
sites.
It also brings zsh-fork back in line with the current `prefix_rule()`
execution model. Until prefix rules can carry their own permission
profiles, a matched `prefix_rule()` is expected to rerun the intercepted
command unsandboxed on `allow`, or after the user accepts `prompt`,
instead of merely continuing inside the inherited shell sandbox.
## What Changed
- added `evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy()` in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` to centralize
execpolicy evaluation for intercepted commands
- switched intercepted direct execs in the zsh-fork path to
`check_multiple_with_options(...)` with `MatchOptions {
resolve_host_executables: true }`
- added `commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy()` so zsh-fork policy
evaluation works from intercepted `(program, argv)` data instead of
reconstructing a synthetic command before matching
- left shell-wrapper parsing intentionally disabled by default behind
`ENABLE_INTERCEPTED_EXEC_POLICY_SHELL_WRAPPER_PARSING`, so
path-sensitive matching relies on later direct exec interception rather
than shell-script parsing
- made matched `prefix_rule()` decisions rerun intercepted commands with
`EscalationExecution::Unsandboxed`, while unmatched-command fallback
keeps the existing sandbox-preserving behavior
- extracted the zsh-fork test harness into
`core/tests/common/zsh_fork.rs` so both the skill-focused and
approval-focused integration suites can exercise the same runtime setup
- limited this change to the intercepted zsh-fork path rather than
changing every execpolicy caller at once
- added runtime coverage in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs` for allowed and
disallowed `host_executable()` mappings and the wrapper-parsing modes
- added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/approvals.rs` to
verify a saved `prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")` reruns
under zsh-fork outside a restrictive `WorkspaceWrite` sandbox
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13046).
* #13065
* __->__ #13046
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths
at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the
shared type too permissive and blurred together three different
deserialization cases:
- skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should
resolve against the skill directory
- app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute
paths
- local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and
`exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may
legitimately be relative to the command `workdir`
This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing
local command flow.
## What Changed
- changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server
`AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf`
- wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so
relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the
containing skill directory
- kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative
`additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary
- restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call
payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command
working directory
- simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only
canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to
recover relative ones later
- updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and
the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior
Summary is a required parameter on UserTurn. Ideally we'd like the core
to decide the appropriate summary level.
Make the summary optional and don't send it when not needed.
## Why
Before this change, an escalation approval could say that a command
should be rerun, but it could not carry the sandbox configuration that
should still apply when the escalated command is actually spawned.
That left an unsafe gap in the `zsh-fork` skill path: skill scripts
under `scripts/` that did not declare permissions could be escalated
without a sandbox, and scripts that did declare permissions could lose
their bounded sandbox on rerun or cached session approval.
This PR extends the escalation protocol so approvals can optionally
carry sandbox configuration all the way through execution. That lets the
shell runtime preserve the intended sandbox instead of silently widening
access.
We likely want a single permissions type for this codepath eventually,
probably centered on `Permissions`. For now, the protocol needs to
represent both the existing `PermissionProfile` form and the fuller
`Permissions` form, so this introduces a temporary disjoint union,
`EscalationPermissions`, to carry either one.
Further, this means that today, a skill either:
- does not declare any permissions, in which case it is run using the
default sandbox for the turn
- specifies permissions, in which case the skill is run using that exact
sandbox, which might be more restrictive than the default sandbox for
the turn
We will likely change the skill's permissions to be additive to the
existing permissions for the turn.
## What Changed
- Added `EscalationPermissions` to `codex-protocol` so escalation
requests can carry either a `PermissionProfile` or a full `Permissions`
payload.
- Added an explicit `EscalationExecution` mode to the shell escalation
protocol so reruns distinguish between `Unsandboxed`, `TurnDefault`, and
`Permissions(...)` instead of overloading `None`.
- Updated `zsh-fork` shell reruns to resolve `TurnDefault` at execution
time, which keeps ordinary `UseDefault` commands on the turn sandbox and
preserves turn-level macOS seatbelt profile extensions.
- Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with no declared
permissions inherits the conversation's effective sandbox instead of
escalating unsandboxed.
- Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with declared permissions
reruns with exactly those permissions, including when a cached session
approval is reused.
## Testing
- Added unit coverage in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for the explicit
`UseDefault` / `RequireEscalated` / `WithAdditionalPermissions`
execution mapping.
- Added unit coverage in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for macOS seatbelt
extension preservation in both the `TurnDefault` and
explicit-permissions rerun paths.
- Added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs` for
permissionless skills inheriting the turn sandbox and explicit skill
permissions remaining bounded across cached approval reuse.
Command-approval clients currently infer which choices to show from
side-channel fields like `networkApprovalContext`,
`proposedExecpolicyAmendment`, and `additionalPermissions`. That makes
the request shape harder to evolve, and it forces each client to
replicate the server's heuristics instead of receiving the exact
decision list for the prompt.
This PR introduces a mapping between `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision`
and `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision`:
```rust
impl From<CoreReviewDecision> for CommandExecutionApprovalDecision {
fn from(value: CoreReviewDecision) -> Self {
match value {
CoreReviewDecision::Approved => Self::Accept,
CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
} => Self::AcceptWithExecpolicyAmendment {
execpolicy_amendment: proposed_execpolicy_amendment.into(),
},
CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => Self::AcceptForSession,
CoreReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment,
} => Self::ApplyNetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment: network_policy_amendment.into(),
},
CoreReviewDecision::Abort => Self::Cancel,
CoreReviewDecision::Denied => Self::Decline,
}
}
}
```
And updates `CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams` to have a new field:
```rust
available_decisions: Option<Vec<CommandExecutionApprovalDecision>>
```
when, if specified, should make it easier for clients to display an
appropriate list of options in the UI.
This makes it possible for `CoreShellActionProvider::prompt()` in
`unix_escalation.rs` to specify the `Vec<ReviewDecision>` directly,
adding support for `ApprovedForSession` when approving a skill script,
which was previously missing in the TUI.
Note this results in a significant change to `exec_options()` in
`approval_overlay.rs`, as the displayed options are now derived from
`available_decisions: &[ReviewDecision]`.
## What Changed
- Add `available_decisions` to
[`ExecApprovalRequestEvent`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/protocol/src/approvals.rs#L111-L175),
including helpers to derive the legacy default choices when older
senders omit the field.
- Map `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision` to app-server
`CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and expose the ordered list as
experimental `availableDecisions` in
[`CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2.rs#L3798-L3807).
- Thread optional `available_decisions` through the core approval path
so Unix shell escalation can explicitly request `ApprovedForSession` for
session-scoped approvals instead of relying on client heuristics.
[`unix_escalation.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs#L194-L214)
- Update the TUI approval overlay to build its buttons from the ordered
decision list, while preserving the legacy fallback when
`available_decisions` is missing.
- Update the app-server README, test client output, and generated schema
artifacts to document and surface the new field.
## Testing
- Add `approval_overlay.rs` coverage for explicit decision lists,
including the generic `ApprovedForSession` path and network approval
options.
- Update `chatwidget/tests.rs` and app-server protocol tests to populate
the new optional field and keep older event shapes working.
## Developers Docs
- If we document `item/commandExecution/requestApproval` on
[developers.openai.com/codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex), add
experimental `availableDecisions` as the preferred source of approval
choices and note that older servers may omit it.
This reverts commit https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12633. We no
longer need this PR, because we favor sending normal exec command
approval server request with `additional_permissions` of skill
permissions instead
This reverts commit daf0f03ac8.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
## Why
Zsh fork execution was still able to bypass the `WorkspaceWrite` model
in edge cases because the fork path reconstructed command execution
without preserving sandbox wrappers, and command extraction only
accepted shell invocations in a narrow positional shape. This can allow
commands to run with broader filesystem access than expected, which
breaks the sandbox safety model.
## What changed
- Preserved the sandboxed `ExecRequest` produced by
`attempt.env_for(...)` when entering the zsh fork path in
[`unix_escalation.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs).
- Updated `CoreShellCommandExecutor` to execute the sandboxed command
and working directory captured from `attempt.env_for(...)`, instead of
re-running a freshly reconstructed shell command.
- Made zsh-fork script extraction robust to wrapped invocations by
scanning command arguments for `-c`/`-lc` rather than only matching the
first positional form.
- Added unit tests in `unix_escalation.rs` to lock in wrapper-tolerant
parsing behavior and keep unsupported shell forms rejected.
- Tightened the regression in
[`skill_approval.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs):
- `shell_zsh_fork_still_enforces_workspace_write_sandbox` now uses an
explicit `WorkspaceWrite` policy with `exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true` and
`exclude_slash_tmp: true`.
- The test attempts to write to `/tmp/...`, which is only reliably
outside writable roots with those explicit exclusions set.
## Verification
- Added and passed the new unit tests around `extract_shell_script`
parsing behavior with wrapped command shapes.
- `extract_shell_script_supports_wrapped_command_prefixes`
- `extract_shell_script_rejects_unsupported_shell_invocation`
- Verified the regression with the focused integration test:
`shell_zsh_fork_still_enforces_workspace_write_sandbox`.
## Manual Testing
Prior to this change, if I ran Codex via:
```
just codex --config zsh_path=/Users/mbolin/code/codex2/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh --enable shell_zsh_fork
```
and asked:
```
what is the output of /bin/ps
```
it would run it, even though the default sandbox should prevent the
agent from running `/bin/ps` because it is setuid on MacOS.
But with this change, I now see the expected failure because it is
blocked by the sandbox:
```
/bin/ps exited with status 1 and produced no output in this environment.
```
## Summary
- Preserve each skill’s raw permissions block as a permission_profile on
SkillMetadata during skill loading.
- Keep compiling that same metadata into the existing runtime
Permissions object, so current enforcement
behavior stays intact.
- When zsh-fork intercepts execution of a script that belongs to a
skill, include the skill’s
permission_profile in the exec approval request.
- This lets approval UIs show the extra filesystem access the skill
declared when prompting for approval.
Direct skill-script matches force `Decision::Prompt`, so skill-backed
scripts require explicit approval before they run. (Note "allow for
session" is not supported in this PR, but will be done in a follow-up.)
In the process of implementing this, I fixed an important bug:
`ShellZshFork` is supposed to keep ordinary allowed execs on the
client-side `Run` path so later `execve()` calls are still intercepted
and reviewed. After the shell-escalation port, `Decision::Allow` still
mapped to `Escalate`, which moved `zsh` to server-side execution too
early. That broke the intended flow for skill-backed scripts and made
the approval prompt depend on the wrong execution path.
## What changed
- In `codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`,
`Decision::Allow` now returns `Run` unless escalation is actually
required.
- Removed the zsh-specific `argv[0]` fallback. With the `Allow -> Run`
fix in place, zsh's later `execve()` of the script is intercepted
normally, so the skill match happens on the script path itself.
- Kept the skill-path handling in `determine_action()` focused on the
direct `program` match path.
## Verification
- Updated `shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution` in
`codex-rs/core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs` (gated behind `cfg(unix)`)
to:
- run under `SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy()` instead of
`DangerFullAccess`
- assert the approval command contains only the script path
- assert the approved run returns both stdout and stderr markers in the
shell output
- Ran `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution -- --nocapture`
## Manual Testing
Run the dev build:
```
just codex --config zsh_path=/Users/mbolin/code/codex2/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh --enable shell_zsh_fork
```
I have created `/Users/mbolin/.agents/skills/mbolin-test-skill` with:
```
├── scripts
│ └── hello-mbolin.sh
└── SKILL.md
```
The skill:
```
---
name: mbolin-test-skill
description: Used to exercise various features of skills.
---
When this skill is invoked, run the `hello-mbolin.sh` script and report the output.
```
The script:
```
set -e
# Note this script will fail if run with network disabled.
curl --location openai.com
```
Use `$mbolin-test-skill` to invoke the skill manually and verify that I
get prompted to run `hello-mbolin.sh`.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/12730).
* #12750
* __->__ #12730
Summary
- detect skill-invoking shell commands based on the original command
string, request approvals when needed, and cache positive decisions per
session
- keep implicit skill invocation emitted after approval and keep skill
approval decline messaging centralized to the shell handler
- expand and adjust skill approval tests to cover shell-based skill
scripts while matching the new detection expectations
Testing
- Not run (not requested)
Jack Mousseau ·
Celia Chen ·
Dylan Hurd ·
pash-openai ·
Michael Bolin ·
pakrym-oai ·