## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Parent PR: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy request path.
3. This PR changes the user facing PermissionProfile TOML shape.
## Why
1. The broader goal is to make MITM clamping usable from the same
permission profile that already controls network behavior.
2. This PR is the config UX layer for the stack. It moves MITM policy
into `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` instead of exposing the flat
runtime shape to users.
3. The named hook and action tables belong here because users need
reusable policy blocks that are easy to review, while the proxy runtime
only needs a flat hook list.
4. This PR validates action refs during config parsing so mistakes in
the user facing policy fail before a proxy session starts.
5. Keeping the lowering here lets the proxy keep its simpler runtime
model and lets PermissionProfile remain the single source of network
permission policy.
## Summary
1. Keep MITM policy inside `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` so the
selected PermissionProfile owns network proxy policy.
2. Use named MITM hooks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.hooks.<name>]`.
3. Put host, methods, path prefixes, query, headers, body, and action
refs on the hook table.
4. Define reusable action blocks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.actions.<name>]`.
5. Represent action blocks with `NetworkMitmActionToml`, then lower them
into the proxy runtime action config.
6. Reject unknown refs, empty refs, and empty action blocks during
config parsing.
7. Keep the runtime hook model unchanged by lowering config into the
existing proxy hook list.
8. Preserve the #20659 activation fix for nested MITM policy.
## Example
```toml
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm]
enabled = true
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.hooks.github_write]
host = "api.github.com"
methods = ["POST", "PUT"]
path_prefixes = ["/repos/openai/"]
action = ["strip_auth"]
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.actions.strip_auth]
strip_request_headers = ["authorization"]
```
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the core MITM config parsing and validation tests.
3. Ran the core PermissionProfile MITM proxy activation tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
7. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
---------
Co-authored-by: Winston Howes <winston@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. This PR wires runtime enforcement.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. After the hook model exists, the proxy needs a separate behavior
change that can be tested at the request path.
2. This PR makes hooked HTTPS hosts require MITM, evaluates inner
requests after CONNECT, mutates headers for matching hooks, and blocks
hooked hosts when no hook matches.
3. It also fixes the activation path so a permission profile with MITM
hook policy starts the managed proxy.
4. Keeping this separate from #18868 lets reviewers focus on runtime
effects, telemetry, and request mutation.
## Summary
1. Store compiled MITM hooks in network proxy state.
2. Require MITM for hooked hosts even when network mode is full.
3. Evaluate inner HTTPS requests against host specific hooks.
4. Apply hook actions by replacing request headers before forwarding.
5. Block hooked hosts when no hook matches and record block telemetry.
6. Treat profile MITM hook policy as managed proxy policy so the proxy
starts when needed.
7. Keep the duplicate authorization header replacement and query
preserving request rebuild in this runtime PR.
8. Add runtime tests and README guidance for hook enforcement.
## Validation
1. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
2. Ran the hooked host CONNECT test.
3. Ran the authorization header replacement test.
4. Ran the core permission profile proxy activation test for MITM hooks.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Why
The proxy checks the requested host before opening the upstream
connection, but DNS can resolve an allowed hostname to a loopback,
private, or other non-public address after that first decision. Without
a final check on the actual socket target, a request that looks
acceptable at the hostname layer can still connect to a local service
once resolution completes.
## What changed
- add a shared TCP connector check for direct proxy egress
- use that path for HTTP, `CONNECT`, SOCKS5, and MITM upstream
connections
- keep configured upstream proxy hops on the existing proxy path
- add direct-connector coverage for allowed and rejected local targets
## Security impact
Direct proxy egress now rechecks the resolved socket address before
connecting, closing the gap between hostname policy evaluation and the
final network target.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
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