11 Commits

  • Run fs helper through Windows sandbox wrapper (#28359)
    ## Why
    
    This is the final PR in the Windows fs-helper sandbox stack and contains
    the actual bug fix.
    
    The exec-server filesystem helper is a direct-spawn path: it asks
    `SandboxManager` for a `SandboxExecRequest`, then launches the returned
    argv itself. That works on macOS and Linux because the transformed argv
    is already a self-contained sandbox wrapper. On Windows, the transformed
    request carried `WindowsRestrictedToken` metadata, but the direct-spawn
    fs-helper runner still launched the helper argv directly.
    
    That means Windows filesystem built-ins backed by the fs-helper could
    run with the parent Codex process permissions instead of the configured
    Windows sandbox. This PR makes the direct-spawn transform produce a
    self-contained Windows wrapper argv before fs-helper launches it.
    
    ## What Changed
    
    - Added `SandboxManager::transform_for_direct_spawn()` for callers that
    launch the returned argv themselves.
    - Wrapped Windows restricted-token direct-spawn requests with `codex.exe
    --run-as-windows-sandbox` and then marked the outer request as
    unsandboxed, matching the macOS/Linux wrapper argv shape.
    - Updated `exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs` to use the direct-spawn
    transform for fs-helper launches.
    - Materialized the inner `codex.exe --codex-run-as-fs-helper` executable
    into `.sandbox-bin` so the sandboxed user can run it.
    - Carried runtime workspace roots through `FileSystemSandboxContext` as
    `PathUri` values so `:workspace_roots` policies resolve correctly
    without sending native client paths over exec-server JSON.
    - Preserved wrapper setup identity environment needed by Windows sandbox
    setup without changing the serialized inner helper environment.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `just bazel-lock-update`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    - `just test -p codex-sandboxing transform_for_direct_spawn_windows`
    - `just test -p codex-exec-server fs_sandbox::tests`
    - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing -p
    codex-exec-server -p codex-core -p codex-file-system`
    
    Local note: `just fmt` completed Rust formatting, but this workstation
    still fails the non-Rust formatter phases because uv cannot open its
    cache and the local buildifier/dotslash path is missing.
  • sandboxing: migrate cwd inputs to PathUri (#27816)
    ## Why
    
    Sandbox cwd values can cross app-server and exec-server host boundaries.
    They should retain URI semantics until the receiving host validates them
    instead of being interpreted early as native paths.
    
    ## What
    
    - Carry `PathUri` through filesystem sandbox contexts, sandbox commands,
    and transform inputs.
    - Convert command and policy cwd once in `SandboxManager::transform`,
    then keep launch requests native.
    - Preserve sandbox cwd over remote filesystem transport and reject
    non-native URIs without fallback.
    - Cache paired native/URI turn-environment cwd values during migration,
    with immutable access to keep them synchronized.
    - Extend existing protocol, forwarding, transform, and core runtime
    tests.
  • [codex] Remove async_trait from first-party code (#27475)
    ## Why
    
    First-party async traits should expose their `Send` contracts explicitly
    without requiring `async_trait`. This completes the migration pattern
    established in #27303 and #27304.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Replaced the remaining first-party `async_trait` traits with native
    return-position `impl Future + Send` where statically dispatched and
    explicit boxed `Send` futures where object safety is required.
    - Kept implementations behavior-preserving, outlining existing async
    bodies into inherent methods where that keeps the diff reviewable.
    - Removed all direct first-party `async-trait` dependencies and the
    workspace dependency declaration.
    - Added a cargo-deny policy that permits `async-trait` only through the
    remaining transitive wrapper crates.
    - Updated `rand` from 0.8.5 to 0.8.6 to resolve RUSTSEC-2026-0097 and
    keep the full cargo-deny check passing.
    
    ## Validation
    
    - `just test -p codex-exec-server`: 216 passed, 2 skipped.
    - `just test -p codex-model-provider`: 39 passed.
    - `just test -p codex-core` and `just test`: changed tests passed;
    remaining failures are environment-sensitive suites unrelated to this
    migration.
    - `cargo deny check`
    - `just fix`
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo shear`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
  • Disable empty Cargo test targets (#21584)
    ## Summary
    
    `cargo test` has entails both running standard Rust tests and doctests.
    It turns out that the doctest discovery is fairly slow, and it's a cost
    you pay even for crates that don't include any doctests.
    
    This PR disables doctests with `doctest = false` for crates that lack
    any doctests.
    
    For the collection of crates below, this speeds up test execution by
    >4x.
    
    E.g., before this PR:
    
    ```
    Benchmark 1: cargo test     -p codex-utils-absolute-path     -p codex-utils-cache     -p codex-utils-cli     -p codex-utils-home-dir     -p codex-utils-output-truncation     -p codex-utils-path     -p codex-utils-string     -p codex-utils-template     -p codex-utils-elapsed     -p codex-utils-json-to-toml
      Time (mean ± σ):      1.849 s ±  4.455 s    [User: 0.752 s, System: 1.367 s]
      Range (min … max):    0.418 s … 14.529 s    10 runs
    ```
    
    And after:
    
    ```
    Benchmark 1: cargo test     -p codex-utils-absolute-path     -p codex-utils-cache     -p codex-utils-cli     -p codex-utils-home-dir     -p codex-utils-output-truncation     -p codex-utils-path     -p codex-utils-string     -p codex-utils-template     -p codex-utils-elapsed     -p codex-utils-json-to-toml
      Time (mean ± σ):     428.6 ms ±   6.9 ms    [User: 187.7 ms, System: 219.7 ms]
      Range (min … max):   418.0 ms … 436.8 ms    10 runs
    ```
    
    For a single crate, with >2x speedup, before:
    
    ```
    Benchmark 1: cargo test -p codex-utils-string
      Time (mean ± σ):     491.1 ms ±   9.0 ms    [User: 229.8 ms, System: 234.9 ms]
      Range (min … max):   480.9 ms … 512.0 ms    10 runs
    ```
    
    And after:
    
    ```
    Benchmark 1: cargo test -p codex-utils-string
      Time (mean ± σ):     213.9 ms ±   4.3 ms    [User: 112.8 ms, System: 84.0 ms]
      Range (min … max):   206.8 ms … 221.0 ms    13 runs
    ```
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement (#18096)
    ## Summary
    - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns
    - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap,
    including canonical symlink targets
    - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal
    or Bazel test environments
    - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command`
    with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not
    reach the model
    
    ## Linux glob expansion
    
    ```text
    Prefer:   rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
    Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
    Failure:  any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
    ```
    
    ```
    [permissions.workspace.filesystem]
    glob_scan_max_depth = 2
    
    [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
    "**/*.env" = "none"
    ```
    
    
    This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction
    depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for
    another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently
    omitting deny-read masks.
    
    ## Platform support
    - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex
    deny rules
    - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing
    glob matches and masking them in bwrap
    - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main`
    from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed
    when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement,
    rather than silently running unsandboxed
    
    ## Stack
    1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read
    policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows
    2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows
    fail-closed clarification
    3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
    
    ## Verification
    - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob
    deny-read enforcement
    - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests`
    - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all`
    - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
    - `just bazel-lock-check`
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
  • Support Unix socket allowlists in macOS sandbox (#17654)
    ## Changes
    
    Allows sandboxes to restrict overall network access while granting
    access to specific unix sockets on mac.
    
    ## Details
    
    - `codex sandbox macos`: adds a repeatable `--allow-unix-socket` option.
    - `codex-sandboxing`: threads explicit Unix socket roots into the macOS
    Seatbelt profile generation.
    - Preserves restricted network behavior when only Unix socket IPC is
    requested, and preserves full network behavior when full network is
    already enabled.
    
    ## Verification
    
    - `cargo test -p codex-cli -p codex-sandboxing`
    - `cargo build -p codex-cli --bin codex`
    - verified that `codex sandbox macos --allow-unix-socket /tmp/test.sock
    -- test-client` grants access as expected
  • permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)
    ## Why
    
    `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
    still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
    `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
    approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
    longer want to expose.
    
    ## What changed
    
    - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
    `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
    schema/TypeScript artifacts.
    - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
    `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
    construction.
    - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
    read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
    profile extension.
    - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
    deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
    - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
    empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
    actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
    permissions.
  • chore: move bwrap config helpers into dedicated module (#15898)
    ## Summary
    - move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
    - move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
    
    ## Validation
    - git diff --check
    - skipped heavier local tests per request
    
    Follow-up to #15791.
  • Move sandbox policy transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15599)
    ## Summary
    - move the pure sandbox policy transform helpers from `codex-core` into
    `codex-sandboxing`
    - move the corresponding unit tests with the extracted implementation
    - update `core` and `app-server` callers to import the moved APIs
    directly, without re-exports or proxy methods
    
    ## Testing
    - cargo test -p codex-sandboxing
    - cargo test -p codex-core sandboxing
    - cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib
    - just fix -p codex-sandboxing
    - just fix -p codex-core
    - just fix -p codex-app-server
    - just fmt
    - just argument-comment-lint
  • Move macOS sandbox builders into codex-sandboxing (#15593)
    ## Summary
    - move macOS permission merging/intersection logic and tests from
    `codex-core` into `codex-sandboxing`
    - move seatbelt policy builders, permissions logic, SBPL assets, and
    their tests into `codex-sandboxing`
    - keep `codex-core` owning only the seatbelt spawn wrapper and switch
    call sites to import the moved APIs directly
    
    ## Notes
    - no re-exports added
    - moved the seatbelt tests with the implementation so internal helpers
    could stay private
    - local verification is still finishing while this PR is open
  • Extract landlock helpers into codex-sandboxing (#15592)
    ## Summary
    - add a new `codex-sandboxing` crate for sandboxing extraction work
    - move the pure Linux sandbox argv builders and their unit tests out of
    `codex-core`
    - keep `core::landlock` as the spawn wrapper and update direct callers
    to use `codex_sandboxing::landlock`
    
    ## Testing
    - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core landlock`
    - `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
    - `just argument-comment-lint`
    
    ## Notes
    - this is step 1 of the move plan aimed at minimizing per-PR diffs
    - no re-exports or no-op proxy methods were added