## Why
`codex sandbox` previously required an OS subcommand like `linux`,
`macos`, or `windows`, even though the command can only run the sandbox
backend available on the current host. That made the CLI imply a
cross-OS choice that does not exist.
## What changed
- Collapse `codex sandbox <os>` into `codex sandbox [COMMAND]...` by
wiring the `sandbox` parser directly to the host-specific backend args
with `cfg`.
- Keep the existing backend runners for Seatbelt, Linux sandbox, and
Windows restricted token.
- Rename the public Windows debug sandbox runner to
`run_command_under_windows_sandbox` for clarity.
- Update the Rust sandbox docs and related README references to describe
host OS selection and avoid pointing readers at legacy `sandbox_mode`
config.
## Arg0 compatibility
The `codex-linux-sandbox` helper path is still handled before normal CLI
parsing. `arg0_dispatch()` checks whether the executable basename is
`codex-linux-sandbox` and directly calls
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_main()`, so removing the `sandbox linux`
parser branch does not affect the arg0 helper flow.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-cli`
- `cargo test -p codex-arg0`
- `just fix -p codex-cli`
## Why
This is a small precursor to the larger permissions-migration work. Both
the comparison stack in
[#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) /
[#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402) and the alternate
stack in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) /
[#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611) /
[#22612](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22612) are easier to
review if the terminology is already settled underneath them.
Because `:project_roots` and `:danger-no-sandbox` have not shipped as
stable user-facing surface area, carrying them forward as aliases would
just add more migration logic to the later stacks. This PR removes that
ambiguity now so the follow-on work can rely on one spelling for each
built-in concept.
## What Changed
- renamed the config-facing special filesystem key from `:project_roots`
to `:workspace_roots`
- dropped unpublished `:project_roots` parsing support in
`core/src/config/permissions.rs`, so new config only recognizes
`:workspace_roots`
- renamed the built-in full-access permission profile id from
`:danger-no-sandbox` to `:danger-full-access`
- dropped unpublished `:danger-no-sandbox` support entirely, including
the old active-profile canonicalization path, and added explicit
rejection coverage for the legacy id
- introduced shared built-in permission-profile id constants in
`codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`
- updated `core`, `app-server`, and `tui` call sites that special-case
built-in profiles to use the shared constants and canonical ids
- updated tests and the Linux sandbox README to use `:workspace_roots` /
`:danger-full-access`
## Verification
I focused verification on the three places this rename can regress:
config parsing, active-profile identity surfaced back out of `core`, and
user/server call sites that special-case built-in profiles.
Targeted checks:
-
`config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_table`
-
`config::tests::default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications`
-
`config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile`
- `config::tests::legacy_danger_no_sandbox_is_rejected`
- `workspace_root` filtered `codex-core` tests
-
`request_processors::thread_processor::thread_processor_tests::thread_processor_behavior_tests::requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
-
`suite::v2::turn_start::turn_start_rejects_invalid_permission_selection_before_starting_turn`
- `status::tests::status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions`
-
`status::tests::status_permissions_full_disk_managed_with_network_is_danger_full_access`
-
`app_server_session::tests::embedded_turn_permissions_use_active_profile_selection`
**Summary**
- Add `codex-bwrap`, a standalone `bwrap` binary built from the existing
vendored bubblewrap sources.
- Remove the linked vendored bwrap path from `codex-linux-sandbox`;
runtime now prefers system `bwrap` and falls back to bundled
`codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Add bundled SHA-256 verification with missing/all-zero digest as the
dev-mode skip value, then exec the verified file through
`/proc/self/fd`.
- Keep `launcher.rs` focused on choosing and dispatching the preferred
launcher. Bundled lookup, digest verification, and bundled exec now live
in `linux-sandbox/src/bundled_bwrap.rs`; Bazel runfiles lookup lives in
`linux-sandbox/src/bazel_bwrap.rs`; shared argv/fd exec helpers live in
`linux-sandbox/src/exec_util.rs`.
- Teach Bazel tests to surface the Bazel-built `//codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
through `CARGO_BIN_EXE_bwrap`; `codex-linux-sandbox` only honors that
fallback in debug Bazel runfiles environments so release/user runtime
lookup stays tied to `codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Allow `codex-exec-server` filesystem helpers to preserve just the
Bazel bwrap/runfiles variables they need in debug Bazel builds, since
those helpers intentionally rebuild a small environment before spawning
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
- Verify the Bazel bwrap target in Linux release CI with a build-only
check. Running `bwrap --version` is too strong for GitHub runners
because bubblewrap still attempts namespace setup there.
**Verification**
- Latest update: `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- Latest update: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo check --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p codex-linux-sandbox`
could not run locally because this macOS machine does not have
`x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc`; GitHub Linux Bazel CI is expected to cover the
Linux-only modules.
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-bwrap`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo check --release -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox -p
codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel test --nobuild
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-all-test
//codex-rs/core:core-all-test
//codex-rs/exec-server:exec-server-file_system-test
//codex-rs/app-server:app-server-all-test` (analysis completed; Bazel
then refuses to run tests under `--nobuild`)
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel build --nobuild //codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
- Prior to this update: `just bazel-lock-update`, `just
bazel-lock-check`, and YAML parse check for
`.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21255).
* #21257
* #21256
* __->__ #21255
## Summary
- adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns
- expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap,
including canonical symlink targets
- keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal
or Bazel test environments
- adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command`
with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not
reach the model
## Linux glob expansion
```text
Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
```
```
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
glob_scan_max_depth = 2
[permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
"**/*.env" = "none"
```
This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction
depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for
another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently
omitting deny-read masks.
## Platform support
- macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex
deny rules
- Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing
glob matches and masking them in bwrap
- Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main`
from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed
when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement,
rather than silently running unsandboxed
## Stack
1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read
policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows
2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows
fail-closed clarification
3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
## Verification
- Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob
deny-read enforcement
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-core --test all`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- detect WSL1 before Codex probes or invokes the Linux bubblewrap
sandbox
- fail early with a clear unsupported-operation message when a command
would require bubblewrap on WSL1
- document that WSL2 follows the normal Linux bubblewrap path while WSL1
is unsupported
## Why
Codex 0.115.0 made bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox. WSL1 cannot
create the user namespaces that bubblewrap needs, so shell commands
currently fail later with a raw bwrap namespace error. This makes the
unsupported environment explicit and keeps non-bubblewrap paths
unchanged.
The WSL detection reads /proc/version, lets an explicit WSL<version>
marker decide WSL1 vs WSL2+, and only treats a bare Microsoft marker as
WSL1 when no explicit WSL version is present.
addresses https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16076
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- add a Linux startup warning when system `bwrap` is present but cannot
create user namespaces
- keep the Linux-specific probe, sandbox-policy gate, and stderr
matching in `codex-sandboxing`
- polish the missing-`bwrap` warning to point users at the sandbox
prerequisites and OS package-manager install path
## Details
- probes system `bwrap` with `--unshare-user`, `--unshare-net`, and a
minimal bind before command execution
- detects known bubblewrap setup failures for `RTM_NEWADDR`,
`RTM_NEWLINK`, uid-map permission denial, and `No permissions to create
a new namespace`
- preserves the existing suppression for sandbox-bypassed policies such
as `danger-full-access` and `external-sandbox`
- updates the Linux sandbox docs to call out the user-namespace
requirement
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- resolve system bwrap from PATH instead of hardcoding /usr/bin/bwrap
- skip PATH entries that resolve inside the current workspace before
launching the sandbox helper
- keep the vendored bubblewrap fallback when no trusted system bwrap is
found
## Validation
- cargo test -p codex-core bwrap --lib
- cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
- cargo clean
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Why
Fixes [#15283](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15283), where
sandboxed tool calls fail on older distro `bubblewrap` builds because
`/usr/bin/bwrap` does not understand `--argv0`. The upstream [bubblewrap
v0.9.0 release
notes](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.9.0)
explicitly call out `Add --argv0`. Flipping `use_legacy_landlock`
globally works around that compatibility bug, but it also weakens the
default Linux sandbox and breaks proxy-routed and split-policy cases
called out in review.
The follow-up Linux CI failure was in the new launcher test rather than
the launcher logic: the fake `bwrap` helper stayed open for writing, so
Linux would not exec it. This update also closes the user-visibility gap
from review by surfacing the same startup warning when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is present but too old for `--argv0`, not only when it is missing.
## What Changed
- keep `use_legacy_landlock` default-disabled
- teach `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/launcher.rs` to fall back to the
vendored bubblewrap build when `/usr/bin/bwrap` does not advertise
`--argv0` support
- add launcher tests for supported, unsupported, and missing system
`bwrap`
- write the fake `bwrap` test helper to a closed temp path so the
supported-path launcher test works on Linux too
- extend the startup warning path so Codex warns when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is missing or too old to support `--argv0`
- mirror the warning/fallback wording across
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md` and `codex-rs/core/README.md`,
including that the fallback is the vendored bubblewrap compiled into the
binary
- cite the upstream `bubblewrap` release that introduced `--argv0`
## Verification
- `bazel test --config=remote --platforms=//:rbe
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-unit-tests
--test_filter=launcher::tests::prefers_system_bwrap_when_help_lists_argv0
--test_output=errors`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_bwrap_warning`
- `cargo check -p codex-exec -p codex-tui -p codex-tui-app-server -p
codex-app-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Problem
Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path
after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`.
The clearest report is in
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this
investigation
comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751):
on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or
vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid
map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR:
Operation not permitted`.
The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`
profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`.
Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path
was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox
namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise
enabled and `uidmap` was installed.
## What this PR changes
- prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available
- keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is
missing
- when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning
through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly
from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!`
- use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution
path and the `/proc` preflight path
- document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox
and core READMEs
## Why this fix
This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the
runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system
bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored
helper.
The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find
`/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the
vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning
plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level
sandbox stderr.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
## Summary
- preserve Linux bubblewrap semantics for `write -> none -> write`
filesystem policies by recreating masked mount targets before rebinding
narrower writable descendants
- add a Linux runtime regression for `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`,
`/repo/a/b = write` so the nested writable child is exercised under
bubblewrap
- document the supported legacy Landlock fallback and the split-policy
bubblewrap behavior for overlapping carveouts
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
"/repo" = "write"
"/repo/a" = "none"
"/repo/a/b" = "write"
```
this PR keeps `/repo` writable, masks `/repo/a`, and still reopens
`/repo/a/b` as writable again under bubblewrap.
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests -- -D warnings`
## Stack
fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172
-> fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173
fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171
refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174
## Summary
## Summary
- Preserve Linux split filesystem carveouts in bubblewrap by applying
mount masks in the right order, so narrower rules still win under
broader writable roots.
- Preserve unreadable ancestors of writable roots by masking them first
and then rebinding the narrower writable descendants.
- Stop rejecting legacy-plus-split Linux configs that are
sandbox-equivalent after `cwd` resolution by comparing semantics instead
of raw legacy structs.
- Fail closed when callers provide partial split policies, mismatched
legacy-plus-split policies, or force `--use-legacy-landlock` for
split-only shapes that legacy Landlock cannot enforce.
- Add Linux regressions for overlapping writable, read-only, and denied
paths, and document the supported split-policy enforcement path.
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
[permissions.dev.filesystem]
":root" = "read"
"/code" = "write"
"/code/.git" = "read"
"/code/secrets" = "none"
"/code/secrets/tmp" = "write"
```
this PR makes Linux enforce the intended result under bubblewrap:
- `/code` stays writable
- `/code/.git` stays read-only
- `/code/secrets` stays denied
- `/code/secrets/tmp` can still be reopened as writable if explicitly
allowed
Before this, Linux could lose one of those carveouts depending on mount
order or legacy-policy fallback. This PR keeps the split-policy
semantics intact and rejects configurations that legacy Landlock cannot
represent safely.
## Summary
- make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
`use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
- remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
docs surfaces
- update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
tests/docs to match the new default
- fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
Linux read-only sandbox error text
## Summary
- always pass `--unshare-user` in the Linux bubblewrap argv builders
- stop relying on bubblewrap's auto-userns behavior, which is skipped
for `uid 0`
- update argv expectations in tests and document the explicit user
namespace behavior
The installed Codex binary reproduced the same issue with:
- `codex -c features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap=true sandbox linux -- true`
- `bwrap: Creating new namespace failed: Operation not permitted`
This happens because Codex asked bubblewrap for mount/pid/network
namespaces without explicitly asking for a user namespace. In a
root-inside-container environment without ambient `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, that
fails. Adding `--unshare-user` makes bubblewrap create the user
namespace first and then the remaining namespaces succeed.
## Summary
This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The
curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including
Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation
model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some
directories read-only and granular network controls.
This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before
making it the default.
- Added temporary rollout flag:
- `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`
- Preserved existing default path when the flag is off.
- In Bubblewrap mode:
- Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted
by the host/container.
**Description**
This removes the pre‑Landlock read‑only bind‑mount step from the Linux
sandbox so filesystem restrictions rely solely on Landlock again.
`mounts.rs` is kept in place but left unused. The linux‑sandbox README
is updated to match the new behavior and manual test expectations.
### Motivation
- Landlock alone cannot prevent writes to sensitive in-repo files like
`.git/` when the repo root is writable, so explicit mount restrictions
are required for those paths.
- The sandbox must set up any mounts before calling Landlock so Landlock
can still be applied afterwards and the two mechanisms compose
correctly.
### Description
- Add a new `linux-sandbox` helper `apply_read_only_mounts` in
`linux-sandbox/src/mounts.rs` that: unshares namespaces, maps uids/gids
when required, makes mounts private, bind-mounts targets, and remounts
them read-only.
- Wire the mount step into the sandbox flow by calling
`apply_read_only_mounts(...)` before network/seccomp and before applying
Landlock rules in `linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`.
Historically, we spawned the Seatbelt and Landlock sandboxes in
substantially different ways:
For **Seatbelt**, we would run `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` with our policy
specified as an arg followed by the original command:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/d1de7bb383552e8fadd94be79d65d188e00fd562/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs#L147-L219
For **Landlock/Seccomp**, we would do
`tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()`, _invoke
Landlock/Seccomp APIs to modify the permissions of that new thread_, and
then spawn the command:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/d1de7bb383552e8fadd94be79d65d188e00fd562/codex-rs/core/src/exec_linux.rs#L28-L49
While it is neat that Landlock/Seccomp supports applying a policy to
only one thread without having to apply it to the entire process, it
requires us to maintain two different codepaths and is a bit harder to
reason about. The tipping point was
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1061, in which we had to start
building up the `env` in an unexpected way for the existing
Landlock/Seccomp approach to continue to work.
This PR overhauls things so that we do similar things for Mac and Linux.
It turned out that we were already building our own "helper binary"
comparable to Mac's `sandbox-exec` as part of the `cli` crate:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/d1de7bb383552e8fadd94be79d65d188e00fd562/codex-rs/cli/Cargo.toml#L10-L12
We originally created this to build a small binary to include with the
Node.js version of the Codex CLI to provide support for Linux
sandboxing.
Though the sticky bit is that, at this point, we still want to deploy
the Rust version of Codex as a single, standalone binary rather than a
CLI and a supporting sandboxing binary. To satisfy this goal, we use
"the arg0 trick," in which we:
* use `std::env::current_exe()` to get the path to the CLI that is
currently running
* use the CLI as the `program` for the `Command`
* set `"codex-linux-sandbox"` as arg0 for the `Command`
A CLI that supports sandboxing should check arg0 at the start of the
program. If it is `"codex-linux-sandbox"`, it must invoke
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_main()`, which runs the CLI as if it were
`codex-linux-sandbox`. When acting as `codex-linux-sandbox`, we make the
appropriate Landlock/Seccomp API calls and then use `execvp(3)` to spawn
the original command, so do _replace_ the process rather than spawn a
subprocess. Incidentally, we do this before starting the Tokio runtime,
so the process should only have one thread when `execvp(3)` is called.
Because the `core` crate that needs to spawn the Linux sandboxing is not
a CLI in its own right, this means that every CLI that includes `core`
and relies on this behavior has to (1) implement it and (2) provide the
path to the sandboxing executable. While the path is almost always
`std::env::current_exe()`, we needed to make this configurable for
integration tests, so `Config` now has a `codex_linux_sandbox_exe:
Option<PathBuf>` property to facilitate threading this through,
introduced in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1089.
This common pattern is now captured in
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_with_sandbox()` and all of the `main.rs`
functions that should use it have been updated as part of this PR.
The `codex-linux-sandbox` crate added to the Cargo workspace as part of
this PR now has the bulk of the Landlock/Seccomp logic, which makes
`core` a bit simpler. Indeed, `core/src/exec_linux.rs` and
`core/src/landlock.rs` were removed/ported as part of this PR. I also
moved the unit tests for this code into an integration test,
`linux-sandbox/tests/landlock.rs`, in which I use
`env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox")` as the value for
`codex_linux_sandbox_exe` since `std::env::current_exe()` is not
appropriate in that case.
Michael Bolin ·
viyatb-oai ·