40 Commits

• Support openai/form extended form elicitations (#27500)

  # Summary
  Allow App Server clients to opt into `openai/form` MCP elicitations.

  Gabriel Peal · 2026-06-18 11:54:49 -07:00
  21a599fa56
• unified-exec: retain PathUri in command events (#28780)

  ## Why
  
  App-server must report command events containing foreign-platform paths
  without changing existing client or rollout path-string formats.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - retain `PathUri` through exec command begin/end events
  - convert cwd values to `LegacyAppPathString` at the app-server
  compatibility boundary
  - drop command actions with foreign paths and log them
  - serialize rollout-trace cwd values using their inferred native path
  representation
  - restore Wine coverage for retained Windows cwd values and successful
  completion

  Adam Perry @ OpenAI · 2026-06-18 05:00:04 +00:00
  3931bc2bde
• Scope command approvals by execution environment (#28738)

  ## Why
  
  Command approval cache keys included the command and working directory,
  but not the execution environment. An approval for `/workspace` locally
  could therefore be reused for the same command and path on an executor.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Include the selected environment ID in shell and unified-exec approval
  cache keys.
  - Carry that ID through the normal command approval request so clients
  can show which environment is being approved.
  - Expose the environment through app-server as a required nullable
  `environmentId` and show it in the inline TUI approval prompt.
  - Keep older recorded approval events compatible when the environment is
  absent.
  
  For example, `echo ok` in local `/workspace` and `echo ok` in executor
  `/workspace` now produce different approval keys and separate prompts.
  
  ## Scope
  
  This PR does not change network approvals, Guardian review actions, MCP
  elicitation, full-screen TUI rendering, or environment-ID validation.
  Remote `shell_command` execution itself remains in #28722; this PR only
  makes its approval key environment-aware.

  jif · 2026-06-17 19:52:43 +02:00
  1391d786bc
• Clarify model-generated and legacy app path types (#28577)

  ## Why
  
  `ApiPathString` kind of implies that it can be used anywhere we pull a
  path out of JSON, but it's not really appropriate for tool arguments
  when the model might generate relative paths.
  
  Prefer `String` for model-generated paths and we can handle the
  conversion per feature for now and define a shared abstraction later if
  it makes sense.
  
  # What
  
  Rename `ApiPathString` to `AppLegacyPathString` to clarify its role.
  
  Expand the `path-types` skill to tell the model to leave tool args as
  bare strings.

  Adam Perry @ OpenAI · 2026-06-16 20:47:43 +00:00
  322b83de5e
• Use ApiPathString in app-server filesystem permission paths (#28367)

  ## Why
  
  Clients running an app-server on one OS and an exec-server on another OS
  need to be able to pass sandbox config to app-server that refers to
  resources on the executor's foreign OS.
  
  ## What
  
  `AbsolutePathBuf` can't represent these paths and we don't want users to
  be exposed to `PathUri` yet, so this moves the public app-server API to
  be expressed in terms of `ApiPathString`.
  
  Stacked on #28165.
  
  - change app-server v2 filesystem permission paths, including legacy
  read/write roots, to `ApiPathString`
  - localize API paths through `PathUri` when converting into the current
  native core permission types
  - make path-bearing permission conversions fallible and surface
  localization failures instead of silently treating malformed grants as
  ordinary denials
  - propagate conversion failures through app-server and TUI approval
  handling
  - regenerate the app-server JSON and TypeScript schemas
  - leave migration TODOs on native-path conversions so they can be
  removed once core permission paths use `PathUri`

  Adam Perry @ OpenAI · 2026-06-15 19:25:54 -07:00
  ecfe174d5f
• Add request_user_input auto-resolution window contract (#27256)

  ## Why
  
  `request_user_input` is moving beyond its original plan-mode-only
  workflow, and future default/goal-mode usage needs a way for the model
  to ask helpful but non-blocking questions without forcing the turn to
  wait forever. This PR adds an explicit `autoResolutionMs` contract so a
  later client/runtime change can auto-resolve unanswered prompts after a
  bounded window while leaving truly blocking questions unchanged.
  
  This is contract plumbing only; it does not implement the client-side
  timer or auto-selection behavior, and the model-facing description
  treats the field as reserved unless the current runtime explicitly
  supports auto-resolution.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Added optional `autoResolutionMs` to the model-facing
  `request_user_input` args and core `RequestUserInputEvent`.
  - Added model-facing schema text for `autoResolutionMs` while marking it
  reserved for runtimes that explicitly support auto-resolution.
  - Bounds `autoResolutionMs` to `60_000..=240_000` ms during argument
  normalization by clamping out-of-range model-provided values.
  - Propagated the field through app-server v2
  `ToolRequestUserInputParams`, app-server request forwarding, generated
  TypeScript, and JSON schema fixtures.
  - Updated app-server, core, protocol, and TUI call sites/tests so
  omitted values preserve existing `None`/`null` behavior and coverage
  verifies a `Some(60_000)` round trip.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-core request_user_input`
  - `just test -p codex-app-server request_user_input_round_trip`
  - `just test -p codex-tui request_user_input`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`

  Shijie Rao · 2026-06-11 22:30:41 -07:00
  216ce03031
• Encrypt multi-agent v2 message payloads (#26210)

  ## Why
  
  Multi-agent v2 currently routes agent instructions through normal tool
  arguments and inter-agent context. That means the parent model can emit
  plaintext task text, Codex can persist it in history/rollouts, and the
  recipient can receive it as ordinary assistant-message JSON.
  
  This changes the v2 path so agent instructions stay encrypted between
  model calls: Responses encrypts the `message` argument returned by the
  model, Codex forwards only that ciphertext, and Responses decrypts it
  internally for the recipient model.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Mark the v2 `message` parameter as encrypted for `spawn_agent`,
  `send_message`, and `followup_task`.
  - Treat multi-agent v2 tool `message` values as ciphertext
  unconditionally.
  - Store v2 inter-agent task text in
  `InterAgentCommunication.encrypted_content` with empty plaintext
  `content`.
  - Convert encrypted inter-agent communications into the Responses
  `agent_message` input item before sending the child request.
  - Preserve `agent_message` items across history, rollout, compaction,
  telemetry, and app-server schema paths.
  - Leave multi-agent v1 unchanged.
  
  ## Message shape
  
  The model still calls the v2 tools with a `message` argument, but that
  value is now ciphertext:
  
  ```json
  {
    "name": "spawn_agent",
    "arguments": {
      "task_name": "worker",
      "message": "<ciphertext>"
    }
  }
  ```
  
  Codex stores the task as encrypted inter-agent communication:
  
  ```json
  {
    "author": "/root",
    "recipient": "/root/worker",
    "content": "",
    "encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>",
    "trigger_turn": true
  }
  ```
  
  When Codex builds the recipient request, it forwards the ciphertext
  using the new Responses input item:
  
  ```json
  {
    "type": "agent_message",
    "author": "/root",
    "recipient": "/root/worker",
    "content": [
      {
        "type": "encrypted_content",
        "encrypted_content": "<ciphertext>"
      }
    ]
  }
  ```
  
  Responses decrypts that item internally for the recipient model.
  
  ## Context impact
  
  - Parent context no longer carries plaintext v2 agent task instructions
  from these tool arguments.
  - Codex rollout/history stores ciphertext for v2 agent instructions.
  - Recipient requests receive an `agent_message` item instead of
  assistant commentary JSON for encrypted task delivery.
  - Plaintext completion/status notifications are still plaintext because
  they are Codex-generated status messages, not encrypted model tool
  arguments.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `just test -p codex-tools`
  - `just test -p codex-protocol`
  - `just test -p codex-rollout`
  - `just test -p codex-rollout-trace`
  - `just test -p codex-otel`
  - `just write-app-server-schema`

  jif · 2026-06-05 10:25:57 +02:00
  5f4d06ef18
• Propagate permission approval environment id (#25862)

  ## Stack
  
  1. #25850 - Key request-permission grants by environment: stores and
  applies sticky permission grants per environment id.
  2. #25858 - Add `environmentId` to `request_permissions`: lets the model
  target a selected environment and resolves relative permission paths
  against it.
  3. This PR (#25862) - Propagate permission approval environment id:
  carries the selected environment id through approval events, app-server
  requests, TUI prompts, and delegate forwarding.
  4. #25867 - Add remote request permissions integration coverage:
  verifies the selected remote environment across request, approval, grant
  reuse, and exec.
  
  This PR is stacked on #25858, and #25867 is stacked on this PR.
  
  ## Why
  
  PR2 lets the model bind a `request_permissions` call to a selected
  environment, but the approval event and client-facing request still
  needed to carry that binding. For CCA, the user-facing prompt and
  delegated approval path should know which environment the grant applies
  to instead of relying on cwd alone.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Added optional `environmentId` to `RequestPermissionsEvent`.
  - Emit the selected environment id from core permission approval events.
  - Preserve the environment id through delegate forwarding, including
  cwd-based delegated requests.
  - Added `environmentId` to app-server permission approval params,
  generated schema/TypeScript artifacts, and README examples.
  - Preserve and display the environment id in TUI permission approval
  prompts.
  - Updated focused core, app-server protocol, and TUI conversion
  coverage.
  
  ## Testing
  
  Not run locally per instruction. Performed read-only `git diff --check`.

  jif · 2026-06-02 21:09:34 +02:00
  9de568372d
• Make deny canonical for filesystem permission entries (#23493)

  ## Why
  Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which
  is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This
  change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while
  preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`.
  
  ## What changed
  - rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny`
  - serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value
  - retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config
  compatibility
  - update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the
  canonical spelling
  - refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire
  shape
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles
  --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib`
  
  Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached
  unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under
  this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed
  cleanly.

  viyatb-oai · 2026-05-19 11:03:47 -07:00
  3c76081876
• [codex] request desktop attestation from app (#20619)

  ## Summary
  
  TL;DR: teaches `codex-rs` / app-server to request a desktop-provided
  attestation token and attach it as `x-oai-attestation` on the scoped
  ChatGPT Codex request paths.
  
  ![DeviceCheck attestation
  interface](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openai/codex/dev/jm/devicecheck-diagram-assets/pr-assets/devicecheck-attestation-interface.png)
  
  ## Details
  
  This PR teaches the Codex app-server runtime how to request and attach
  an attestation token. It does not generate DeviceCheck tokens directly;
  instead, it relies on the connected desktop app to advertise that it can
  generate attestation and then asks that app for a fresh header value
  when needed.
  
  The flow is:
  
  1. The Codex desktop app connects to app-server.
  2. During `initialize`, the app can advertise that it supports
  `requestAttestation`.
  3. Before app-server calls selected ChatGPT Codex endpoints, it sends
  the internal server request `attestation/generate` to the app.
  4. app-server receives a pre-encoded header value back.
  5. app-server forwards that value as `x-oai-attestation` on the scoped
  outbound requests.
  
  The code in this repo is mostly protocol and runtime plumbing: it adds
  the app-server request/response shape, introduces an attestation
  provider in core, wires that provider into Responses / compaction /
  realtime setup paths, and covers the intended scoping with tests. The
  signed macOS DeviceCheck generation remains owned by the desktop app PR.
  
  ## Related PR
  
  - Codex desktop app implementation:
  https://github.com/openai/openai/pull/878649
  
  ## Validation
  
  <details>
  <summary>Tests run</summary>
  
  ```sh
  cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
  cargo test -p codex-core attestation --lib
  cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib attestation
  ```
  
  Also ran:
  
  ```sh
  just fix -p codex-core
  just fix -p codex-app-server
  just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol
  just fmt
  just write-app-server-schema
  ```
  
  </details>
  
  <details>
  <summary>E2E DeviceCheck validation</summary>
  
  First validated the signed desktop app boundary directly: launched a
  packaged signed `Codex.app`, sent `attestation/generate`, decoded the
  returned `v1.` attestation header, and validated the extracted
  DeviceCheck token with `personal/jm/verify_devicecheck_token.py` using
  bundle ID `com.openai.codex`. Apple returned `status_code: 200` and
  `is_ok: true`.
  
  Then ran the fuller app + app-server flow. The packaged `Codex.app`
  launched a current-branch app-server via `CODEX_CLI_PATH`, and a local
  MITM proxy intercepted outbound `chatgpt.com` traffic. The app-server
  requested `attestation/generate` from the real Electron app process, and
  the intercepted `/backend-api/codex/responses` traffic included
  `x-oai-attestation` on both routes:
  
  ```text
  GET  /backend-api/codex/responses  Upgrade: websocket  x-oai-attestation: present
  POST /backend-api/codex/responses  Upgrade: none       x-oai-attestation: present
  ```
  
  The captured header decoded to a DeviceCheck token that also validated
  with Apple for `com.openai.codex` (`status_code: 200`, `is_ok: true`,
  team `2DC432GLL2`).
  
  </details>
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Jiaming Zhang · 2026-05-08 12:36:02 -07:00
  5f4d0ec343
• [codex-analytics] plumb protocol-native review timing (#21434)

  ## Why
  
  We want terminal tool review analytics, but the reducer should not stamp
  review timing from its own wall clock.
  
  This PR plumbs review timing through the real protocol and app-server
  seams so downstream analytics can consume the emitter's timestamps
  directly. Guardian reviews keep their enriched `started_at` /
  `completed_at` analytics fields by deriving those legacy second-based
  values from the same protocol-native millisecond lifecycle timestamps,
  rather than sampling a separate analytics clock.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - add `started_at_ms` to user approval request payloads
  - add `started_at_ms` / `completed_at_ms` to guardian review
  notifications
  - preserve Guardian review `started_at` / `completed_at` enrichment from
  the protocol-native timing source
  - stamp typed `ServerResponse` analytics facts with app-server-observed
  `completed_at_ms`
  - thread the new timing fields through core, protocol, app-server, TUI,
  and analytics fixtures
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server outgoing_message --manifest-path
  codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol guardian --manifest-path
  codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui guardian --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
  - `cargo test -p codex-analytics analytics_client_tests --manifest-path
  codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21434).
  * #18748
  * __->__ #21434
  * #18747
  * #17090
  * #17089
  * #20514

  rhan-oai · 2026-05-07 20:31:41 -07:00
  99016ec732
• permissions: remove cwd special path (#19841)

  ## Why
  
  The experimental `PermissionProfile` API had both `:cwd` and
  `:project_roots` special filesystem paths, which made the permission
  root ambiguous. This PR removes the unstable `current_working_directory`
  special path before the permissions API is stabilized, so callers use
  `:project_roots` for symbolic project-root access.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removes `FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory` from protocol
  and app-server protocol models, plus regenerated app-server
  JSON/TypeScript schemas.
  - Replaces internal `:cwd` permission entries with `:project_roots`
  entries.
  - Keeps the existing cwd-update behavior for legacy-shaped
  workspace-write profiles, while removing the deleted
  `CurrentWorkingDirectory` case from that compatibility path.
  - Keeps `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` as the reusable symbolic
  workspace-write helper, with docs noting that `:project_roots` entries
  resolve at enforcement time.
  - Updates app-server docs/examples and approval UI labeling to stop
  advertising `:cwd` as a permission token.
  
  ## Compatibility
  
  Persisted rollout items may contain the old
  `{"kind":"current_working_directory"}` tag from earlier experimental
  `permissionProfile` snapshots. This PR keeps that tag as a
  deserialize-only alias for `ProjectRoots { subpath: None }`, while
  continuing to serialize only the new `project_roots` tag.
  
  ## Follow-up
  
  This PR intentionally does not introduce an explicit project-root set on
  `SessionConfiguration` or runtime sandbox resolution. Today, the
  resolver still uses the active cwd as the single implicit project root.
  A follow-up should model project roots separately from tool cwd so
  `:project_roots` entries can resolve against the configured project
  roots, and resolve to no entries when there are no project roots.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permissions:: --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_ --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server
  command_exec_permission_profile_project_roots_use_command_cwd --test
  all`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile
  --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  preset_matching_accepts_workspace_write_with_extra_roots --lib`
  - `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-27 13:41:27 -07:00
  4b55979755
• permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
  but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
  It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
  enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
  when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
  APIs.
  
  The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
  union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
  
  ```rust
  pub enum PermissionProfile {
      Managed {
          file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
          network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
      },
      Disabled,
      External {
          network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
      },
  }
  ```
  
  This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
  outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
  owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
  sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
  inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
  than a permissive one.
  
  ## How Existing Modeling Maps
  
  Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
  into the higher-fidelity profile model:
  
  - `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
  with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
  policy.
  - `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
  the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
  sandbox.
  - `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
  `PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
  filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
  - Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
  express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
  network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
  `ExternalSandbox`.
  - Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
  `AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
  complete active runtime permissions.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
  `disabled`, and `external`.
  - Keep partial permission grants separate with
  `AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
  - Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
  entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
  present.
  - Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
  network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
  - Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
  round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
  and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
  instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
  - Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
  full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
  unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
  entries.
  - Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
  update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
  `permissionProfile` shape.
  
  ## Compatibility
  
  Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
  compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
  `PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
  `permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
  intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `just write-app-server-schema`
  - `cargo check --tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
  preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
  permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
  - `just fix`
  - `just fix -p codex-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `just fix -p codex-app-server`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-23 23:02:18 -07:00
  4816b89204
• app-server: include filesystem entries in permission requests (#19086)

  ## Why
  
  `item/permissions/requestApproval` sends a requested permission profile
  to app-server clients. The core profile already stores filesystem
  permissions as `entries`, but the v2 compatibility conversion used the
  legacy `read`/`write` projection whenever possible and left `entries`
  unset.
  
  That made the request ambiguous for clients that consume the canonical
  v2 shape: `permissions.fileSystem.entries` was missing even though
  filesystem access was being requested. A client that rendered or echoed
  grants from `entries` could treat the request as having no filesystem
  permission entries, then return an empty or incomplete grant. The
  app-server intersects responses with the original request, so omitted
  filesystem permissions are denied.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Populate `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions.entries` when converting
  legacy read/write roots for request permission payloads, while
  preserving `read` and `write` for compatibility.
  - Mark `read` and `write` as transitional schema fields in the generated
  app-server schema.
  - Add regression coverage for the v2 conversion, the app-server
  `item/permissions/requestApproval` round trip, and TUI app-server
  approval conversion expectations.
  - Refresh generated JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `just fmt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_round_trip`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  converts_request_permissions_into_granted_permissions`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  resolves_permissions_and_user_input_through_app_server_request_id`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-23 00:21:59 -07:00
  8bc667b07b
• sandboxing: intersect permission profiles semantically (#18275)

  ## Why
  
  Permission approval responses must not be able to grant more access than
  the tool requested. Moving this flow to `PermissionProfile` means the
  comparison must be profile-shaped instead of `SandboxPolicy`-shaped, and
  cwd-relative special paths such as `:cwd` and `:project_roots` must stay
  anchored to the turn that produced the request.
  
  ## What changed
  
  This implements semantic `PermissionProfile` intersection in
  `codex-sandboxing` for file-system and network permissions. The
  intersection accepts narrower path grants, rejects broader grants,
  preserves deny-read carve-outs and glob scan depth, and materializes
  cwd-dependent special-path grants to absolute paths before they can be
  recorded for reuse.
  
  The request-permissions response paths now use that intersection
  consistently. App-server captures the request turn cwd before waiting
  for the client response, includes that cwd in the v2 approval params,
  and core stores the requested profile plus cwd for direct TUI/client
  responses and Guardian decisions before recording turn- or
  session-scoped grants. The TUI app-server bridge now preserves the
  app-server request cwd when converting permission approval params into
  core events.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing intersect_permission_profiles --
  --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_response --
  --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core
  request_permissions_response_materializes_session_cwd_grants_before_recording
  -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
  - `cargo check --tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui
  app_server_request_permissions_preserves_file_system_permissions`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-21 10:23:01 -07:00
  f8562bd47b
• [tool search] support namespaced deferred dynamic tools (#18413)

  Deferred dynamic tools need to round-trip a namespace so a tool returned
  by `tool_search` can be called through the same registry key that core
  uses for dispatch.
  
  This change adds namespace support for dynamic tool specs/calls,
  persists it through app-server thread state, and routes dynamic tool
  calls by full `ToolName` while still sending the app the leaf tool name.
  Deferred dynamic tools must provide a namespace; non-deferred dynamic
  tools may remain top-level.
  
  It also introduces `LoadableToolSpec` as the shared
  function-or-namespace Responses shape used by both `tool_search` output
  and dynamic tool registration, so dynamic tools use the same wrapping
  logic in both paths.
  
  Validation:
  - `cargo test -p codex-tools`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tool_search`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Sayan Sisodiya <sayan@openai.com>

  pash-openai · 2026-04-21 14:13:08 +08:00
  dc1a8f2190
• protocol: preserve glob scan depth in permission profiles (#18713)

  ## Why
  
  #18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
  shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
  `PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
  `glob_scan_max_depth`.
  
  That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
  On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
  glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
  loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
  permission entries look equivalent.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
  preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
  - Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
  force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
  not silently dropped.
  - Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
  `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
  and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
  - Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
  merging, and intersection.
  - Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
  `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
  deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
  - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
  
  
  
  
  
  ---
  [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
  Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
  with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
  * #18288
  * #18287
  * #18286
  * #18285
  * #18284
  * #18283
  * #18282
  * #18281
  * #18280
  * #18279
  * #18278
  * #18277
  * #18276
  * #18275
  * __->__ #18713

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-20 19:42:45 -07:00
  3d2f123895
• protocol: canonicalize file system permissions (#18274)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
  it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
  canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
  profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
  
  ## What changed
  
  This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
  `PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
  entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
  those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
  write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
  full-disk legacy access.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol
  root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
  - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-04-20 09:57:03 -07:00
  dcec516313
• Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)

  Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-14 14:26:10 -07:00
  dd1321d11b
• permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
  still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
  approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
  longer want to expose.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
  `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
  schema/TypeScript artifacts.
  - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
  construction.
  - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
  read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
  profile extension.
  - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
  deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
  - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
  empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
  actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
  permissions.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 17:12:45 -07:00
  e6e2999209
• chore: remove skill metadata from command approval payloads (#15906)

  ## Why
  
  This is effectively a follow-up to
  [#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
  removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
  still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
  approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
  
  Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
  without changing behavior.
  
  Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
  carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
  `skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
  protocol
  - removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
  - updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
  plumbing to stop forwarding the field
  - cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
  `skillMetadata`
  
  ## Testing
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
  - `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 15:32:03 -07:00
  5906c6a658
• Use request permission profile in app server (#14665)
  Jack Mousseau · 2026-03-16 10:12:23 -07:00
  7a6e30b55b
• feat: Add additional macOS Sandbox Permissions for Launch Services, Contacts, Reminders (#14155)

  Add additional macOS Sandbox Permissions levers for the following:
  
  - Launch Services
  - Contacts
  - Reminders

  Leo Shimonaka · 2026-03-11 12:33:09 -07:00
  889b4796fc
• Add request permissions tool (#13092)

  Adds a built-in `request_permissions` tool and wires it through the
  Codex core, protocol, and app-server layers so a running turn can ask
  the client for additional permissions instead of relying on a static
  session policy.
  
  The new flow emits a `RequestPermissions` event from core, tracks the
  pending request by call ID, forwards it through app-server v2 as an
  `item/permissions/requestApproval` request, and resumes the tool call
  once the client returns an approved subset of the requested permission
  profile.

  Jack Mousseau · 2026-03-08 20:23:06 -07:00
  e6b93841c5
• app-server: include experimental skill metadata in exec approval requests (#13929)

  ## Summary
  
  This change surfaces skill metadata on command approval requests so
  app-server clients can tell when an approval came from a skill script
  and identify the originating `SKILL.md`.
  
  - add `skill_metadata` to exec approval events in the shared protocol
  - thread skill metadata through core shell escalation and delegated
  approval handling for skill-triggered approvals
  - expose the field in app-server v2 as experimental `skillMetadata`
  - regenerate the JSON/TypeScript schemas and cover the new field in
  protocol, transport, core, and TUI tests
  
  ## Why
  
  Skill-triggered approvals already carry skill context inside core, but
  app-server clients could not see which skill caused the prompt. Sending
  the skill metadata with the approval request makes it possible for
  clients to present better approval UX and connect the prompt back to the
  relevant skill definition.
  
  
  ## example event in app-server-v2
  verified that we see this event when experimental api is on:
  ```
  < {
  <   "id": 11,
  <   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
  <   "params": {
  <     "additionalPermissions": {
  <       "fileSystem": null,
  <       "macos": {
  <         "accessibility": false,
  <         "automations": {
  <           "bundle_ids": [
  <             "com.apple.Notes"
  <           ]
  <         },
  <         "calendar": false,
  <         "preferences": "read_only"
  <       },
  <       "network": null
  <     },
  <     "approvalId": "25d600ee-5a3c-4746-8d17-e2e61fb4c563",
  <     "availableDecisions": [
  <       "accept",
  <       "acceptForSession",
  <       "cancel"
  <     ],
  <     "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
  <     "commandActions": [
  <       {
  <         "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
  <         "type": "unknown"
  <       }
  <     ],
  <     "cwd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes",
  <     "itemId": "call_jZp3xFpNg4D8iKAD49cvEvZy",
  <     "skillMetadata": {
  <       "pathToSkillsMd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/SKILL.md"
  <     },
  <     "threadId": "019ccc10-b7d3-7ff2-84fe-3a75e7681e69",
  <     "turnId": "019ccc10-b848-76f1-81b3-4a1fa225493f"
  <   }
  < }`
  ```
  
  & verified that this is the event when experimental api is off:
  ```
  < {
  <   "id": 13,
  <   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
  <   "params": {
  <     "approvalId": "5fbbf776-261b-4cf8-899b-c125b547f2c0",
  <     "availableDecisions": [
  <       "accept",
  <       "acceptForSession",
  <       "cancel"
  <     ],
  <     "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
  <     "commandActions": [
  <       {
  <         "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
  <         "type": "unknown"
  <       }
  <     ],
  <     "cwd": "/Users/celia/code/codex/codex-rs",
  <     "itemId": "call_OV2DHzTgYcbYtWaTTBWlocOt",
  <     "threadId": "019ccc16-2a2b-7be1-8500-e00d45b892d4",
  <     "turnId": "019ccc16-2a8e-7961-98ec-649600e7d06a"
  <   }
  < }
  ```

  Celia Chen · 2026-03-08 18:07:46 -07:00
  340f9c9ecb
• [elicitations] Switch to use MCP style elicitation payload for mcp tool approvals. (#13621)

  - [x] Switch to use MCP style elicitation payload for mcp tool
  approvals.
  - [ ] TODO: Update the UI to support the full spec.

  Matthew Zeng · 2026-03-06 01:50:26 -08:00
  98dca99db7
• core/protocol: add structured macOS additional permissions and merge them into sandbox execution (#13499)

  ## Summary
  - Introduce strongly-typed macOS additional permissions across
  protocol/core/app-server boundaries.
  - Merge additional permissions into effective sandbox execution,
  including macOS seatbelt profile extensions.
  - Expand docs, schema/tool definitions, UI rendering, and tests for
  `network`, `file_system`, and `macos` additional permissions.

  Celia Chen · 2026-03-05 16:21:45 -08:00
  aaefee04cd
• feat(app-server): support mcp elicitations in v2 api (#13425)

  This adds a first-class server request for MCP server elicitations:
  `mcpServer/elicitation/request`.
  
  Until now, MCP elicitation requests only showed up as a raw
  `codex/event/elicitation_request` event from core. That made it hard for
  v2 clients to handle elicitations using the same request/response flow
  as other server-driven interactions (like shell and `apply_patch`
  tools).
  
  This also updates the underlying MCP elicitation request handling in
  core to pass through the full MCP request (including URL and form data)
  so we can expose it properly in app-server.
  
  ### Why not `item/mcpToolCall/elicitationRequest`?
  This is because MCP elicitations are related to MCP servers first, and
  only optionally to a specific MCP tool call.
  
  In the MCP protocol, elicitation is a server-to-client capability: the
  server sends `elicitation/create`, and the client replies with an
  elicitation result. RMCP models it that way as well.
  
  In practice an elicitation is often triggered by an MCP tool call, but
  not always.
  
  ### What changed
  - add `mcpServer/elicitation/request` to the v2 app-server API
  - translate core `codex/event/elicitation_request` events into the new
  v2 server request
  - map client responses back into `Op::ResolveElicitation` so the MCP
  server can continue
  - update app-server docs and generated protocol schema
  - add an end-to-end app-server test that covers the full round trip
  through a real RMCP elicitation flow
  - The new test exercises a realistic case where an MCP tool call
  triggers an elicitation, the app-server emits
  mcpServer/elicitation/request, the client accepts it, and the tool call
  resumes and completes successfully.
  
  ### app-server API flow
  - Client starts a thread with `thread/start`.
  - Client starts a turn with `turn/start`.
  - App-server sends `item/started` for the `mcpToolCall`.
  - While that tool call is in progress, app-server sends
  `mcpServer/elicitation/request`.
  - Client responds to that request with `{ action: "accept" | "decline" |
  "cancel" }`.
  - App-server sends `serverRequest/resolved`.
  - App-server sends `item/completed` for the mcpToolCall.
  - App-server sends `turn/completed`.
  - If the turn is interrupted while the elicitation is pending,
  app-server still sends `serverRequest/resolved` before the turn
  finishes.

  Owen Lin · 2026-03-05 07:20:20 -08:00
  926b2f19e8
• chore: Nest skill and protocol network permissions under network.enabled (#13427)

  ## Summary
  
  Changes the permission profile shape from a bare network boolean to a
  nested object.
  
  Before:
  
  ```yaml
  permissions:
    network: true
  ```
  
  After:
  
  ```yaml
  permissions:
    network:
      enabled: true
  ```
  
  This also updates the shared Rust and app-server protocol types so
  `PermissionProfile.network` is no longer `Option<bool>`, but
  `Option<NetworkPermissions>` with `enabled: Option<bool>`.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Updated `PermissionProfile` in `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`:
  - `pub network: Option<bool>` -> `pub network:
  Option<NetworkPermissions>`
  - Added `NetworkPermissions` with:
    - `pub enabled: Option<bool>`
  - Changed emptiness semantics so `network` is only considered empty when
  `enabled` is `None`
  - Updated skill metadata parsing to accept `permissions.network.enabled`
  - Updated core permission consumers to read
  `network.enabled.unwrap_or(false)` where a concrete boolean is needed
  - Updated app-server v2 protocol types and regenerated schema/TypeScript
  outputs
  - Updated docs to mention `additionalPermissions.network.enabled`

  Celia Chen · 2026-03-03 20:57:29 -08:00
  d622bff384
• fix: use AbsolutePathBuf for permission profile file roots (#12970)

  ## Why
  `PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths
  at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the
  shared type too permissive and blurred together three different
  deserialization cases:
  
  - skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should
  resolve against the skill directory
  - app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute
  paths
  - local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and
  `exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may
  legitimately be relative to the command `workdir`
  
  This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing
  local command flow.
  
  ## What Changed
  - changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server
  `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf`
  - wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so
  relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the
  containing skill directory
  - kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative
  `additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary
  - restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call
  payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
  arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command
  working directory
  - simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only
  canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to
  recover relative ones later
  - updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and
  the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-27 17:42:52 +00:00
  d09a7535ed
• feat: include available decisions in command approval requests (#12758)

  Command-approval clients currently infer which choices to show from
  side-channel fields like `networkApprovalContext`,
  `proposedExecpolicyAmendment`, and `additionalPermissions`. That makes
  the request shape harder to evolve, and it forces each client to
  replicate the server's heuristics instead of receiving the exact
  decision list for the prompt.
  
  This PR introduces a mapping between `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision`
  and `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision`:
  
  ```rust
  impl From<CoreReviewDecision> for CommandExecutionApprovalDecision {
      fn from(value: CoreReviewDecision) -> Self {
          match value {
              CoreReviewDecision::Approved => Self::Accept,
              CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
                  proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
              } => Self::AcceptWithExecpolicyAmendment {
                  execpolicy_amendment: proposed_execpolicy_amendment.into(),
              },
              CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => Self::AcceptForSession,
              CoreReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
                  network_policy_amendment,
              } => Self::ApplyNetworkPolicyAmendment {
                  network_policy_amendment: network_policy_amendment.into(),
              },
              CoreReviewDecision::Abort => Self::Cancel,
              CoreReviewDecision::Denied => Self::Decline,
          }
      }
  }
  ```
  
  And updates `CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams` to have a new field:
  
  ```rust
  available_decisions: Option<Vec<CommandExecutionApprovalDecision>>
  ```
  
  when, if specified, should make it easier for clients to display an
  appropriate list of options in the UI.
  
  This makes it possible for `CoreShellActionProvider::prompt()` in
  `unix_escalation.rs` to specify the `Vec<ReviewDecision>` directly,
  adding support for `ApprovedForSession` when approving a skill script,
  which was previously missing in the TUI.
  
  Note this results in a significant change to `exec_options()` in
  `approval_overlay.rs`, as the displayed options are now derived from
  `available_decisions: &[ReviewDecision]`.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Add `available_decisions` to
  [`ExecApprovalRequestEvent`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/protocol/src/approvals.rs#L111-L175),
  including helpers to derive the legacy default choices when older
  senders omit the field.
  - Map `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision` to app-server
  `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and expose the ordered list as
  experimental `availableDecisions` in
  [`CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2.rs#L3798-L3807).
  - Thread optional `available_decisions` through the core approval path
  so Unix shell escalation can explicitly request `ApprovedForSession` for
  session-scoped approvals instead of relying on client heuristics.
  [`unix_escalation.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs#L194-L214)
  - Update the TUI approval overlay to build its buttons from the ordered
  decision list, while preserving the legacy fallback when
  `available_decisions` is missing.
  - Update the app-server README, test client output, and generated schema
  artifacts to document and surface the new field.
  
  ## Testing
  
  - Add `approval_overlay.rs` coverage for explicit decision lists,
  including the generic `ApprovedForSession` path and network approval
  options.
  - Update `chatwidget/tests.rs` and app-server protocol tests to populate
  the new optional field and keep older event shapes working.
  
  ## Developers Docs
  
  - If we document `item/commandExecution/requestApproval` on
  [developers.openai.com/codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex), add
  experimental `availableDecisions` as the preferred source of approval
  choices and note that older servers may omit it.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-26 01:10:46 +00:00
  14116ade8d
• Revert "Add skill approval event/response (#12633)" (#12811)

  This reverts commit https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12633. We no
  longer need this PR, because we favor sending normal exec command
  approval server request with `additional_permissions` of skill
  permissions instead

  Celia Chen · 2026-02-26 01:02:42 +00:00
  4f45668106
• feat(ui): add network approval persistence plumbing (#12358)

  ## Summary
  - add TUI approval options for persistent network host rules
  - add app-server v2 approval payload plumbing for network approval
  context + proposed network policy amendments
  - add app-server handling to translate `applyNetworkPolicyAmendment`
  decisions back into core review decisions
  - update docs/test client output and generated app-server schemas/types

  viyatb-oai · 2026-02-25 07:06:19 +00:00
  c086b36b58
• feat: add experimental additionalPermissions to v2 command execution approval requests (#12737)

  This adds additionalPermissions to the app-server v2
  item/commandExecution/requestApproval payload as an experimental field.
  
  The field is now exposed on CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams and is
  populated from the existing core approval event when a command requests
  additional sandbox permissions.
  
  This PR also contains changes to make server requests to support
  experiment API.
  
  A real app server test client test:
  
  sample payload with experimental flag off:
  ```
   {
  <   "id": 0,
  <   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
  <   "params": {
  <     "command": "/bin/zsh -lc 'mkdir -p ~/some/test && touch ~/some/test/file'",
  <     "commandActions": [
  <       {
  <         "command": "mkdir -p '~/some/test'",
  <         "type": "unknown"
  <       },
  <       {
  <         "command": "touch '~/some/test/file'",
  <         "type": "unknown"
  <       }
  <     ],
  <     "cwd": "/Users/celia/code/codex/codex-rs",
  <     "itemId": "call_QLp0LWkQ1XkU6VW9T2vUZFWB",
  <     "proposedExecpolicyAmendment": [
  <       "mkdir",
  <       "-p",
  <       "~/some/test"
  <     ],
  <     "reason": "Do you want to allow creating ~/some/test/file outside the workspace?",
  <     "threadId": "019c9309-e209-7d82-a01b-dcf9556a354d",
  <     "turnId": "019c9309-e27a-7f33-834f-6011e795c2d6"
  <   }
  < }
  ```
  with experimental flag on: 
  ```
  < {
  <   "id": 0,
  <   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
  <   "params": {
  <     "additionalPermissions": {
  <       "fileSystem": null,
  <       "macos": null,
  <       "network": true
  <     },
  <     "command": "/bin/zsh -lc 'install -D /dev/null ~/some/test/file'",
  <     "commandActions": [
  <       {
  <         "command": "install -D /dev/null '~/some/test/file'",
  <         "type": "unknown"
  <       }
  <     ],
  <     "cwd": "/Users/celia/code/codex/codex-rs",
  <     "itemId": "call_K3U4b3dRbj3eMCqslmncbGsq",
  <     "proposedExecpolicyAmendment": [
  <       "install",
  <       "-D"
  <     ],
  <     "reason": "Do you want to allow creating the file at ~/some/test/file outside the workspace sandbox?",
  <     "threadId": "019c9303-3a8e-76e1-81bf-d67ac446d892",
  <     "turnId": "019c9303-3af1-7143-88a1-73132f771234"
  <   }
  < }
  ```

  Celia Chen · 2026-02-25 05:16:35 +00:00
  1151972fb2
• Add skill approval event/response (#12633)

  Set the stage for skill-level permission approval in addition to
  command-level.
  
  Behind a feature flag.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-02-23 22:28:58 -08:00
  58763afa0f
• chore: remove codex-core public protocol/shell re-exports (#12432)

  ## Why
  
  `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exported a broad set of types and modules
  from `codex-protocol` and `codex-shell-command`. That made it easy for
  workspace crates to import those APIs through `codex-core`, which in
  turn hides dependency edges and makes it harder to reduce compile-time
  coupling over time.
  
  This change removes those public re-exports so call sites must import
  from the source crates directly. Even when a crate still depends on
  `codex-core` today, this makes dependency boundaries explicit and
  unblocks future work to drop `codex-core` dependencies where possible.
  
  ## What Changed
  
  - Removed public re-exports from `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` for:
  - `codex_protocol::protocol` and related protocol/model types (including
  `InitialHistory`)
    - `codex_protocol::config_types` (`protocol_config_types`)
  - `codex_shell_command::{bash, is_dangerous_command, is_safe_command,
  parse_command, powershell}`
  - Migrated workspace Rust call sites to import directly from:
    - `codex_protocol::protocol`
    - `codex_protocol::config_types`
    - `codex_protocol::models`
    - `codex_shell_command`
  - Added explicit `Cargo.toml` dependencies (`codex-protocol` /
  `codex-shell-command`) in crates that now import those crates directly.
  - Kept `codex-core` internal modules compiling by using `pub(crate)`
  aliases in `core/src/lib.rs` (internal-only, not part of the public
  API).
  - Updated the two utility crates that can already drop a `codex-core`
  dependency edge entirely:
    - `codex-utils-approval-presets`
    - `codex-utils-cli`
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-utils-approval-presets`
  - `cargo test -p codex-utils-cli`
  - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`
  - `just clippy`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-20 23:45:35 -08:00
  1af2a37ada
• Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)

  ## Summary
  Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
  moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
  Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
  treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
  
  - Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
  - Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
  prompts.
  - Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
  - Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
  future matching requests.
  - Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
  
  Example:
  - 3 calls: 
    - a.com (line 443)
    - b.com (line 443)
    - a.com (line 443)
  => 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
  - a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
  
  ## Testing
  - `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
  - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
  integration-suite failures remain in this environment)

  viyatb-oai · 2026-02-20 10:39:55 -08:00
  e8afaed502
• feat(core): plumb distinct approval ids for command approvals (#12051)

  zsh fork PR stack:
  - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 👈 
  - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052
  
  With upcoming support for a fork of zsh that allows us to intercept
  `execve` and run execpolicy checks for each subcommand as part of a
  `CommandExecution`, it will be possible for there to be multiple
  approval requests for a shell command like `/path/to/zsh -lc 'git status
  && rg \"TODO\" src && make test'`.
  
  To support that, this PR introduces a new `approval_id` field across
  core, protocol, and app-server so that we can associate approvals
  properly for subcommands.

  Owen Lin · 2026-02-18 01:55:57 +00:00
  db4d2599b5
• fix(app-server): for external auth, replace id_token with chatgpt_acc… (#11240)

  …ount_id and chatgpt_plan_type
  
  ### Summary
  Following up on external auth mode which was introduced here:
  https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/10012
  
  Turns out some clients have a differently shaped ID token and don't have
  a chosen workspace (aka chatgpt_account_id) encoded in their ID token.
  So, let's replace `id_token` param with `chatgpt_account_id` and
  `chatgpt_plan_type` (optional) when initializing the external ChatGPT
  auth mode (`account/login/start` with `chatgptAuthTokens`).
  
  The client was able to test end-to-end with a Codex build from this
  branch and verified it worked!

  Owen Lin · 2026-02-09 20:48:58 -08:00
  53741013ab
• feat: vendor app-server protocol schema fixtures (#10371)

  Similar to what @sayan-oai did in openai/codex#8956 for
  `config.schema.json`, this PR updates the repo so that it includes the
  output of `codex app-server generate-json-schema` and `codex app-server
  generate-ts` and adds a test to verify it is in sync with the current
  code.
  
  Motivation:
  - This makes any schema changes introduced by a PR transparent during
  code review.
  - In particular, this should help us catch PRs that would introduce a
  non-backwards-compatible change to the app schema (eventually, this
  should also be enforced by tooling).
  - Once https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/10231 is in to formalize the
  notion of "experimental" fields, we can work on ensuring the
  non-experimental bits are backwards-compatible.
  
  `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/tests/schema_fixtures.rs` was added as the
  test and `just write-app-server-schema` can be use to generate the
  vendored schema files.
  
  Incidentally, when I run:
  
  ```
  rg _ codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2
  ```
  
  I see a number of `snake_case` names that should be `camelCase`.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-02-01 23:38:43 -08:00
  974355cfdd