## Why
It's hard to change the set of required jobs when they're managed in the
GitHub UI, and when each workflow is responsible for choosing it's own
scheduling it's easy to end up with skew between what we enforce on PRs
vs. on main.
## What
- add a `blocking-ci` caller workflow, triggered by pull requests and
pushes to `main`, for Bazel, blob size, cargo-deny, Codespell,
`repo-checks`, rust CI, and SDK CI
- add an `always()` terminal job named `CI required` that fails unless
every called workflow succeeds
- add a `postmerge-ci` caller workflow for `rust-ci-full` and
`v8-canary`, with a terminal `Postmerge CI results` job
- centralize V8 relevance detection in `v8_canary_changes.py`; unrelated
PR and postmerge runs execute metadata only and skip the expensive build
matrices
- leave `v8-canary` outside the blocking gate and leave the external
`cla` check independent
## Rollout
A repository admin must replace the existing required GitHub Actions
contexts with `CI required` in the main-branch ruleset. Retain `cla` as
a separate required check. Until that change is coordinated, this PR
cannot satisfy the old standalone check names. In-flight PRs will need
to be rebased after this lands.
## Why
CI jobs should not silently leave tracked changes or untracked files in
the repository worktree.
## What
- Add a shared final worktree-cleanliness action to 19 checkout-bearing
PR and main CI jobs.
- Ignore the intentional SDK scratch directory and nested V8 checkout.
- Pin Bazelisk in shared CI setup so `.bazelversion` remains
authoritative, avoiding `MODULE.bazel.lock` deltas on Windows runners.
- Leave `rust-ci-full` and release-only workflows unchanged.
- Update `AGENTS.md` to discourage review bots from asking for
`MODULE.bazel.lock` changes.
## Why
PR CI should test the exact commit that was pushed to the PR branch. By
default, GitHub's `pull_request` event checks out a synthetic merge
commit from `refs/pull/<number>/merge`, so the tested tree can include
an implicit merge with the current base branch instead of matching the
pushed head SHA.
Using the PR head SHA makes each check result correspond to a concrete
commit the author submitted. This also behaves better for stacked PR
workflows, including Sapling stacks and other Git stack tooling: a
middle PR's head commit already contains the lower stack changes in its
tree, without pulling in commits above it or GitHub's temporary merge
ref.
## What Changed
- Set every `actions/checkout` in `pull_request` workflows under
`.github/workflows` to use `github.event.pull_request.head.sha` on PR
events and `github.sha` otherwise.
- Updated `blob-size-policy` to compare
`github.event.pull_request.base.sha` and
`github.event.pull_request.head.sha`, since it no longer checks out
GitHub's merge commit where `HEAD^1`/`HEAD^2` represented the PR range.
## Verification
- Parsed the edited workflow YAML files with Ruby.
- Checked that every checkout block in the `pull_request` workflows has
the PR-head `ref`.
This does two things:
- We use `persist-credentials: false` everywhere now. This is
unfortunately not the default in GitHub Actions, but it prevents
`actions/checkout` from dropping `secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN` onto disk.
- We interpose (some) template expansions through environment variables.
I've limited this to contexts that have non-fixed values; contexts that
are fixed (like `*.result`) are not dangerous to expand directly inline
(but maybe we should clean those up in the future for consistency
anyways).
This is a medium-risk change in terms of CI breakage: I did a scan for
usage of `git push` and other commands that implicitly use the persisted
credential, but couldn't find any. Even still, some implicit usages of
the persisted credentials may be lurking. Please ping ww@ if any issues
arise.
This builds on top of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15828 by
ensuring that hash-pinned actions with version comments are fully
qualified, rather than referencing floating/mutable comments like "v7".
This makes actions management tools behave more consistently.
This shouldn't break anything, since it's comment only. But if it does,
ping ww@ 馃檪
Prevent binaries >500KB from being committed. And maintain an allowlist
if we need to bypass on a case-by-case basis.
I checked the currently tracked binary-like assets in the repo. There
are only 5 obvious committed binaries by extension/MIME type:
- `.github/codex-cli-splash.png`: `838,131` bytes, about `818 KiB`
- `codex-rs/vendor/bubblewrap/bubblewrap.jpg`: `40,239` bytes, about `39
KiB`
-
`codex-rs/skills/src/assets/samples/skill-creator/assets/skill-creator.png`:
`1,563` bytes
- `codex-rs/skills/src/assets/samples/openai-docs/assets/openai.png`:
`1,429` bytes
-
`codex-rs/skills/src/assets/samples/skill-installer/assets/skill-installer.png`:
`1,086` bytes
So `500 KB` looks like a good default for this repo. It would only trip
on one existing intentional asset, which keeps the allowlist small and
the policy easy to understand.
Here's a smoke-test from a throwaway branch that tries to commit a large
binary:
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/22971558828/job/66689330435?pr=14383
Adam Perry @ OpenAI 路
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