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Run fs helper through Windows sandbox wrapper (#28359)
## Why This is the final PR in the Windows fs-helper sandbox stack and contains the actual bug fix. The exec-server filesystem helper is a direct-spawn path: it asks `SandboxManager` for a `SandboxExecRequest`, then launches the returned argv itself. That works on macOS and Linux because the transformed argv is already a self-contained sandbox wrapper. On Windows, the transformed request carried `WindowsRestrictedToken` metadata, but the direct-spawn fs-helper runner still launched the helper argv directly. That means Windows filesystem built-ins backed by the fs-helper could run with the parent Codex process permissions instead of the configured Windows sandbox. This PR makes the direct-spawn transform produce a self-contained Windows wrapper argv before fs-helper launches it. ## What Changed - Added `SandboxManager::transform_for_direct_spawn()` for callers that launch the returned argv themselves. - Wrapped Windows restricted-token direct-spawn requests with `codex.exe --run-as-windows-sandbox` and then marked the outer request as unsandboxed, matching the macOS/Linux wrapper argv shape. - Updated `exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs` to use the direct-spawn transform for fs-helper launches. - Materialized the inner `codex.exe --codex-run-as-fs-helper` executable into `.sandbox-bin` so the sandboxed user can run it. - Carried runtime workspace roots through `FileSystemSandboxContext` as `PathUri` values so `:workspace_roots` policies resolve correctly without sending native client paths over exec-server JSON. - Preserved wrapper setup identity environment needed by Windows sandbox setup without changing the serialized inner helper environment. ## Verification - `just bazel-lock-update` - `just bazel-lock-check` - `just test -p codex-sandboxing transform_for_direct_spawn_windows` - `just test -p codex-exec-server fs_sandbox::tests` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core -p codex-file-system` Local note: `just fmt` completed Rust formatting, but this workstation still fails the non-Rust formatter phases because uv cannot open its cache and the local buildifier/dotslash path is missing.
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxDirectSpawnTransformRequest;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxExecRequest;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
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@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
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&file_system_policy,
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network_policy,
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);
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let command = self.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd.uri, sandbox)?;
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let command = self.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd, sandbox)?;
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let request_json = serde_json::to_vec(&request).map_err(json_error)?;
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run_command(command, request_json).await
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}
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@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
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fn sandbox_exec_request(
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&self,
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permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
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cwd: &PathUri,
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cwd: &SandboxCwd,
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sandbox_context: &FileSystemSandboxContext,
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) -> Result<SandboxExecRequest, JSONRPCErrorError> {
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let helper = &self.runtime_paths.codex_self_exe;
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@@ -112,22 +113,36 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
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let command = SandboxCommand {
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program: helper.as_path().as_os_str().to_owned(),
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args: vec![CODEX_FS_HELPER_ARG1.to_string()],
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cwd: cwd.clone(),
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cwd: cwd.uri.clone(),
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env: self.helper_env.clone(),
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additional_permissions: None,
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};
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let native_workspace_roots = sandbox_context
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.workspace_roots
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.iter()
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.map(native_workspace_root)
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.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
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let workspace_roots = if native_workspace_roots.is_empty() {
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std::slice::from_ref(&cwd.native)
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} else {
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native_workspace_roots.as_slice()
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};
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sandbox_manager
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.transform(SandboxTransformRequest {
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command,
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permissions: permission_profile,
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sandbox,
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enforce_managed_network: false,
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network: None,
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sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd,
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codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.runtime_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
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use_legacy_landlock: sandbox_context.use_legacy_landlock,
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windows_sandbox_level: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
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windows_sandbox_private_desktop: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
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.transform_for_direct_spawn(SandboxDirectSpawnTransformRequest {
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workspace_roots,
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transform: SandboxTransformRequest {
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command,
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permissions: permission_profile,
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sandbox,
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enforce_managed_network: false,
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network: None,
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sandbox_policy_cwd: &cwd.uri,
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codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.runtime_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
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use_legacy_landlock: sandbox_context.use_legacy_landlock,
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windows_sandbox_level: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
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windows_sandbox_private_desktop: sandbox_context
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.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
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},
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})
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.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("failed to prepare fs sandbox: {err}")))
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}
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@@ -158,6 +173,14 @@ fn native_sandbox_cwd(cwd: &PathUri) -> Result<AbsolutePathBuf, JSONRPCErrorErro
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.map_err(|err| invalid_request(err.to_string()))
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}
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fn native_workspace_root(root: &PathUri) -> Result<AbsolutePathBuf, JSONRPCErrorError> {
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root.to_abs_path().map_err(|err| {
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invalid_request(format!(
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"file system sandbox workspace root is not native to this exec-server host: {err}"
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))
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})
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}
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fn helper_read_roots(runtime_paths: &ExecServerRuntimePaths) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
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let mut roots = Vec::new();
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for path in std::iter::once(runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path())
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@@ -517,15 +540,21 @@ mod tests {
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let runner = FileSystemSandboxRunner::new(runtime_paths);
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let native_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
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let cwd = PathUri::from_abs_path(&native_cwd);
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let file_system_policy =
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restricted_policy(vec![path_entry(native_cwd, FileSystemAccessMode::Write)]);
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let file_system_policy = restricted_policy(vec![path_entry(
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native_cwd.clone(),
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FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
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)]);
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let network_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted;
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let permission_profile =
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PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&file_system_policy, network_policy);
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let sandbox_context = sandbox_context_with_cwd(&file_system_policy, cwd.clone());
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let sandbox_cwd = SandboxCwd {
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uri: cwd,
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native: native_cwd,
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};
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let request = runner
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.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd, &sandbox_context)
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.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &sandbox_cwd, &sandbox_context)
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.expect("sandbox exec request");
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assert_eq!(request.env.get(&path_key), Some(&path));
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