Run fs helper through Windows sandbox wrapper (#28359)

## Why

This is the final PR in the Windows fs-helper sandbox stack and contains
the actual bug fix.

The exec-server filesystem helper is a direct-spawn path: it asks
`SandboxManager` for a `SandboxExecRequest`, then launches the returned
argv itself. That works on macOS and Linux because the transformed argv
is already a self-contained sandbox wrapper. On Windows, the transformed
request carried `WindowsRestrictedToken` metadata, but the direct-spawn
fs-helper runner still launched the helper argv directly.

That means Windows filesystem built-ins backed by the fs-helper could
run with the parent Codex process permissions instead of the configured
Windows sandbox. This PR makes the direct-spawn transform produce a
self-contained Windows wrapper argv before fs-helper launches it.

## What Changed

- Added `SandboxManager::transform_for_direct_spawn()` for callers that
launch the returned argv themselves.
- Wrapped Windows restricted-token direct-spawn requests with `codex.exe
--run-as-windows-sandbox` and then marked the outer request as
unsandboxed, matching the macOS/Linux wrapper argv shape.
- Updated `exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs` to use the direct-spawn
transform for fs-helper launches.
- Materialized the inner `codex.exe --codex-run-as-fs-helper` executable
into `.sandbox-bin` so the sandboxed user can run it.
- Carried runtime workspace roots through `FileSystemSandboxContext` as
`PathUri` values so `:workspace_roots` policies resolve correctly
without sending native client paths over exec-server JSON.
- Preserved wrapper setup identity environment needed by Windows sandbox
setup without changing the serialized inner helper environment.

## Verification

- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
- `just test -p codex-sandboxing transform_for_direct_spawn_windows`
- `just test -p codex-exec-server fs_sandbox::tests`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing -p
codex-exec-server -p codex-core -p codex-file-system`

Local note: `just fmt` completed Rust formatting, but this workstation
still fails the non-Rust formatter phases because uv cannot open its
cache and the local buildifier/dotslash path is missing.
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai
2026-06-17 10:00:42 -07:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent c78911e37f
commit ef75171f18
16 changed files with 861 additions and 399 deletions
+46 -17
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxDirectSpawnTransformRequest;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxExecRequest;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
&file_system_policy,
network_policy,
);
let command = self.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd.uri, sandbox)?;
let command = self.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd, sandbox)?;
let request_json = serde_json::to_vec(&request).map_err(json_error)?;
run_command(command, request_json).await
}
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
fn sandbox_exec_request(
&self,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
cwd: &PathUri,
cwd: &SandboxCwd,
sandbox_context: &FileSystemSandboxContext,
) -> Result<SandboxExecRequest, JSONRPCErrorError> {
let helper = &self.runtime_paths.codex_self_exe;
@@ -112,22 +113,36 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
let command = SandboxCommand {
program: helper.as_path().as_os_str().to_owned(),
args: vec![CODEX_FS_HELPER_ARG1.to_string()],
cwd: cwd.clone(),
cwd: cwd.uri.clone(),
env: self.helper_env.clone(),
additional_permissions: None,
};
let native_workspace_roots = sandbox_context
.workspace_roots
.iter()
.map(native_workspace_root)
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
let workspace_roots = if native_workspace_roots.is_empty() {
std::slice::from_ref(&cwd.native)
} else {
native_workspace_roots.as_slice()
};
sandbox_manager
.transform(SandboxTransformRequest {
command,
permissions: permission_profile,
sandbox,
enforce_managed_network: false,
network: None,
sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.runtime_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
use_legacy_landlock: sandbox_context.use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
.transform_for_direct_spawn(SandboxDirectSpawnTransformRequest {
workspace_roots,
transform: SandboxTransformRequest {
command,
permissions: permission_profile,
sandbox,
enforce_managed_network: false,
network: None,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &cwd.uri,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.runtime_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
use_legacy_landlock: sandbox_context.use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: sandbox_context
.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
},
})
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("failed to prepare fs sandbox: {err}")))
}
@@ -158,6 +173,14 @@ fn native_sandbox_cwd(cwd: &PathUri) -> Result<AbsolutePathBuf, JSONRPCErrorErro
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(err.to_string()))
}
fn native_workspace_root(root: &PathUri) -> Result<AbsolutePathBuf, JSONRPCErrorError> {
root.to_abs_path().map_err(|err| {
invalid_request(format!(
"file system sandbox workspace root is not native to this exec-server host: {err}"
))
})
}
fn helper_read_roots(runtime_paths: &ExecServerRuntimePaths) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
let mut roots = Vec::new();
for path in std::iter::once(runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path())
@@ -517,15 +540,21 @@ mod tests {
let runner = FileSystemSandboxRunner::new(runtime_paths);
let native_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
let cwd = PathUri::from_abs_path(&native_cwd);
let file_system_policy =
restricted_policy(vec![path_entry(native_cwd, FileSystemAccessMode::Write)]);
let file_system_policy = restricted_policy(vec![path_entry(
native_cwd.clone(),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
)]);
let network_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted;
let permission_profile =
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&file_system_policy, network_policy);
let sandbox_context = sandbox_context_with_cwd(&file_system_policy, cwd.clone());
let sandbox_cwd = SandboxCwd {
uri: cwd,
native: native_cwd,
};
let request = runner
.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &cwd, &sandbox_context)
.sandbox_exec_request(&permission_profile, &sandbox_cwd, &sandbox_context)
.expect("sandbox exec request");
assert_eq!(request.env.get(&path_key), Some(&path));
+4
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ pub(crate) mod exec_server;
pub(crate) const DELAYED_OUTPUT_AFTER_EXIT_PARENT_ARG: &str =
"--codex-test-delayed-output-after-exit-parent";
const CODEX_WINDOWS_SANDBOX_ARG1: &str = "--run-as-windows-sandbox";
const DELAYED_OUTPUT_AFTER_EXIT_CHILD_ARG: &str = "--codex-test-delayed-output-after-exit-child";
#[ctor]
@@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ pub static TEST_BINARY_DISPATCH_GUARD: Option<TestBinaryDispatchGuard> = {
if argv1 == Some(CODEX_FS_HELPER_ARG1) {
return TestBinaryDispatchMode::DispatchArg0Only;
}
if argv1 == Some(CODEX_WINDOWS_SANDBOX_ARG1) {
return TestBinaryDispatchMode::DispatchArg0Only;
}
if exe_name == CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0 {
return TestBinaryDispatchMode::DispatchArg0Only;
}
@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@ use std::path::Path;
use std::process::Command;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_exec_server::FileSystemSandboxContext;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use test_case::test_case;
use crate::support::FileSystemImplementation;
use crate::support::create_file_system_context;
fn create_directory_junction(target: &Path, alias: &Path) -> Result<()> {
let output = Command::new("cmd")
@@ -54,3 +59,58 @@ async fn file_system_sandboxed_canonicalize_resolves_directory_junction(
)
.await
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn file_system_remote_fs_helper_respects_windows_sandbox_write_policy() -> Result<()> {
let context = create_file_system_context(FileSystemImplementation::Remote).await?;
let file_system = context.file_system;
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new()?;
let readonly_dir = tmp.path().join("readonly");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&readonly_dir)?;
let mut sandbox = read_only_sandbox_for_cwd(readonly_dir.clone())?;
sandbox.windows_sandbox_level = WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken;
let readable_file = readonly_dir.join("readable.txt");
std::fs::write(&readable_file, b"readable")?;
let read_result = file_system
.read_file(&PathUri::from_path(&readable_file)?, Some(&sandbox))
.await;
// Some local Windows hosts cannot create restricted tokens. Reaching that
// error still proves the remote fs helper went through the Windows sandbox
// launcher; before the wrapper fix this read would have run unsandboxed.
if is_unsupported_restricted_token_host(&read_result) {
return Ok(());
}
assert_eq!(read_result?, b"readable");
let blocked_file = readonly_dir.join("blocked.txt");
let error = file_system
.write_file(
&PathUri::from_path(&blocked_file)?,
b"blocked".to_vec(),
Some(&sandbox),
)
.await
.expect_err("write outside the sandbox should fail");
assert!(
!blocked_file.exists(),
"sandboxed fs helper must not create blocked file after error: {error}"
);
Ok(())
}
fn read_only_sandbox_for_cwd(cwd: std::path::PathBuf) -> Result<FileSystemSandboxContext> {
Ok(FileSystemSandboxContext::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
PathUri::from_path(cwd)?,
)?)
}
fn is_unsupported_restricted_token_host<T>(result: &std::io::Result<T>) -> bool {
result.as_ref().err().is_some_and(|err| {
err.to_string()
.contains("windows sandbox failed: CreateRestrictedToken failed: 87")
})
}