diff --git a/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs b/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
index c85da0f5f..c1776c5bf 100644
--- a/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
 use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR;
 use codex_protocol::config_types::SandboxMode;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_sandboxing::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
+use codex_sandboxing::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
+use codex_sandboxing::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
 use codex_sandboxing::seatbelt::CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
@@ -222,19 +223,14 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
                 .codex_linux_sandbox_exe
                 .expect("codex-linux-sandbox executable not found");
             let use_legacy_landlock = config.features.use_legacy_landlock();
-            let file_system_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
             let network_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.network_sandbox_policy();
-            let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+            let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
                 command,
                 cwd.as_path(),
-                &config
-                    .permissions
-                    .legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path()),
-                &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-                network_sandbox_policy,
+                &config.permissions.permission_profile(),
                 sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
                 use_legacy_landlock,
-                /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
+                allow_network_for_proxy(managed_network_requirements_enabled),
             );
             spawn_debug_sandbox_child(
                 codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs
index 56059f8ee..c117f706e 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs
@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@ use crate::spawn::StdioPolicy;
 use crate::spawn::spawn_child_async;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
 use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
-use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
-use codex_sandboxing::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
+use codex_sandboxing::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::Path;
@@ -17,9 +16,8 @@ use tokio::process::Child;
 /// isolation plus seccomp for network restrictions.
 ///
 /// Unlike macOS Seatbelt where we directly embed the policy text, the Linux
-/// helper is a separate executable. We pass both the canonical split
-/// filesystem/network policies and a compatibility legacy projection as JSON
-/// until the helper protocol no longer needs the legacy field.
+/// helper is a separate executable. We pass the canonical permission profile
+/// as JSON and let the helper derive the runtime filesystem/network policies.
 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
     codex_linux_sandbox_exe: P,
@@ -35,20 +33,11 @@ pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
 where
     P: AsRef<Path>,
 {
-    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
-        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
-    let sandbox_policy = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-        permission_profile,
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
-    );
-    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+    let network_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy();
+    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
         command,
         command_cwd.as_path(),
-        &sandbox_policy,
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+        permission_profile,
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
         use_legacy_landlock,
         allow_network_for_proxy(/*enforce_managed_network*/ false),
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
index e191a924d..ff40f3663 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
@@ -1036,7 +1036,6 @@ mod tests {
     use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
     use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
     use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSpecialPath;
-    use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
     use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
     use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
@@ -1066,7 +1065,7 @@ mod tests {
         let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
         let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
             command.clone(),
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
+            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
             Path::new("/"),
             Path::new("/"),
             BwrapOptions {
@@ -1085,7 +1084,7 @@ mod tests {
         let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
         let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
             command,
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
+            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
             Path::new("/"),
             Path::new("/"),
             BwrapOptions {
@@ -1399,22 +1398,18 @@ mod tests {
         let missing_root = temp_dir.path().join("missing");
         std::fs::create_dir(&existing_root).expect("create existing root");
 
-        let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-            writable_roots: vec![
+        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
+            &[
                 AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(existing_root.as_path()).expect("absolute existing root"),
                 AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(missing_root.as_path()).expect("absolute missing root"),
             ],
-            network_access: false,
-            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-        };
+            /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
+            /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
+        );
 
-        let args = create_filesystem_args(
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy),
-            temp_dir.path(),
-            NO_UNREADABLE_GLOB_SCAN_MAX_DEPTH,
-        )
-        .expect("filesystem args");
+        let args =
+            create_filesystem_args(&policy, temp_dir.path(), NO_UNREADABLE_GLOB_SCAN_MAX_DEPTH)
+                .expect("filesystem args");
         let existing_root = path_to_string(&existing_root);
         let missing_root = path_to_string(&missing_root);
 
@@ -1532,15 +1527,14 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn mounts_dev_before_writable_dev_binds() {
-        let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-            writable_roots: vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(Path::new("/dev")).expect("/dev path")],
-            network_access: false,
-            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-        };
+        let sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
+            &[AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(Path::new("/dev")).expect("/dev path")],
+            /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
+            /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
+        );
 
         let args = create_filesystem_args(
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+            &sandbox_policy,
             Path::new("/"),
             NO_UNREADABLE_GLOB_SCAN_MAX_DEPTH,
         )
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
index 50ea87bd1..3f95224ab 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use codex_protocol::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_protocol::error::Result;
 use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 
 use landlock::ABI;
@@ -39,14 +39,15 @@ use seccompiler::apply_filter;
 /// - installing the network seccomp filter when network access is disabled.
 ///
 /// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.
-pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+pub(crate) fn apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
     cwd: &Path,
     apply_landlock_fs: bool,
     allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
     proxy_routed_network: bool,
 ) -> Result<()> {
+    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
+        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
     let network_seccomp_mode = network_seccomp_mode(
         network_sandbox_policy,
         allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
     // we avoid this unless we need seccomp or we are explicitly using the
     // legacy Landlock filesystem pipeline.
     if network_seccomp_mode.is_some()
-        || (apply_landlock_fs && !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access())
+        || (apply_landlock_fs && !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access())
     {
         set_no_new_privs()?;
     }
@@ -67,15 +68,15 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
         install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread(mode)?;
     }
 
-    if apply_landlock_fs && !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
-        if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
+    if apply_landlock_fs && !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
+        if !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
             return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(
                 "Restricted read-only access is not supported by the legacy Linux Landlock filesystem backend."
                     .to_string(),
             ));
         }
 
-        let writable_roots = sandbox_policy
+        let writable_roots = file_system_sandbox_policy
             .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
             .into_iter()
             .map(|writable_root| writable_root.root)
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
index 0eede8bb8..21fbbe826 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
@@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::bwrap::BwrapNetworkMode;
 use crate::bwrap::BwrapOptions;
 use crate::bwrap::create_bwrap_command_args;
-use crate::landlock::apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread;
+use crate::landlock::apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread;
 use crate::launcher::exec_bwrap;
 use crate::launcher::preferred_bwrap_supports_argv0;
 use crate::proxy_routing::activate_proxy_routes_in_netns;
 use crate::proxy_routing::prepare_host_proxy_route_spec;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
@@ -41,18 +41,13 @@ pub struct LandlockCommand {
     #[arg(long = "command-cwd", hide = true)]
     pub command_cwd: Option<PathBuf>,
 
-    /// Legacy compatibility policy.
-    ///
-    /// Newer callers pass split filesystem/network policies as well so the
-    /// helper can migrate incrementally without breaking older invocations.
-    #[arg(long = "sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
-    pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
-
-    #[arg(long = "file-system-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
-    pub file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
-
-    #[arg(long = "network-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
-    pub network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,
+    /// Canonical runtime permissions for the command.
+    #[arg(
+        long = "permission-profile",
+        hide = true,
+        value_parser = parse_permission_profile
+    )]
+    pub permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
 
     /// Opt-in: use the legacy Landlock Linux sandbox fallback.
     ///
@@ -102,9 +97,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
     let LandlockCommand {
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
         command_cwd,
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+        permission_profile,
         use_legacy_landlock,
         apply_seccomp_then_exec,
         allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -117,17 +110,11 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
         panic!("No command specified to execute.");
     }
     ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec, use_legacy_landlock);
-    let EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-        sandbox_policy,
+    let EffectivePermissions {
+        permission_profile,
         file_system_sandbox_policy,
         network_sandbox_policy,
-    } = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
-    )
-    .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("{err}"));
+    } = resolve_permission_profile(permission_profile).unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("{err}"));
     ensure_legacy_landlock_mode_supports_policy(
         use_legacy_landlock,
         &file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -147,9 +134,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
             }
         }
         let proxy_routing_active = allow_network_for_proxy;
-        if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
-            &sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
+        if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
+            &permission_profile,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             /*apply_landlock_fs*/ false,
             allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -161,9 +147,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
     }
 
     if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
-        if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
-            &sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
+        if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
+            &permission_profile,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             /*apply_landlock_fs*/ false,
             allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -189,9 +174,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
         let inner = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
             sandbox_policy_cwd: &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             command_cwd: command_cwd.as_deref(),
-            sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
+            permission_profile: &permission_profile,
             allow_network_for_proxy,
             proxy_route_spec,
             command,
@@ -208,9 +191,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
     }
 
     // Legacy path: Landlock enforcement only, when bwrap sandboxing is not enabled.
-    if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
-        &sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+    if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
+        &permission_profile,
         &sandbox_policy_cwd,
         /*apply_landlock_fs*/ true,
         allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -222,164 +204,41 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-struct EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-    sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
+struct EffectivePermissions {
+    permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
     file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
     network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-enum ResolveSandboxPoliciesError {
-    PartialSplitPolicies,
-    SplitPoliciesRequireDirectRuntimeEnforcement(String),
-    FailedToDeriveLegacyPolicy(String),
-    MismatchedLegacyPolicy {
-        provided: SandboxPolicy,
-        derived: SandboxPolicy,
-    },
+enum ResolvePermissionProfileError {
     MissingConfiguration,
 }
 
-impl fmt::Display for ResolveSandboxPoliciesError {
+impl fmt::Display for ResolvePermissionProfileError {
     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
         match self {
-            Self::PartialSplitPolicies => {
-                write!(
-                    f,
-                    "file-system and network sandbox policies must be provided together"
-                )
-            }
-            Self::SplitPoliciesRequireDirectRuntimeEnforcement(err) => {
-                write!(
-                    f,
-                    "split sandbox policies require direct runtime enforcement and cannot be paired with legacy sandbox policy: {err}"
-                )
-            }
-            Self::FailedToDeriveLegacyPolicy(err) => {
-                write!(
-                    f,
-                    "failed to derive legacy sandbox policy from split policies: {err}"
-                )
-            }
-            Self::MismatchedLegacyPolicy { provided, derived } => {
-                write!(
-                    f,
-                    "legacy sandbox policy must match split sandbox policies: provided={provided:?}, derived={derived:?}"
-                )
-            }
-            Self::MissingConfiguration => write!(f, "missing sandbox policy configuration"),
+            Self::MissingConfiguration => write!(f, "missing permission profile configuration"),
         }
     }
 }
 
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies(
-    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
-    network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,
-) -> Result<EffectiveSandboxPolicies, ResolveSandboxPoliciesError> {
-    // Accept either a fully legacy policy, a fully split policy pair, or all
-    // three views together. Reject partial split-policy input so the helper
-    // never runs with mismatched filesystem/network state.
-    let split_policies = match (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) {
-        (Some(file_system_sandbox_policy), Some(network_sandbox_policy)) => {
-            Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))
-        }
-        (None, None) => None,
-        _ => return Err(ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::PartialSplitPolicies),
-    };
-
-    match (sandbox_policy, split_policies) {
-        (Some(sandbox_policy), Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))) => {
-            if file_system_sandbox_policy
-                .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
-            {
-                return Ok(EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-                    sandbox_policy,
-                    file_system_sandbox_policy,
-                    network_sandbox_policy,
-                });
-            }
-            let derived_legacy_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
-                .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
-                .map_err(|err| {
-                    ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::SplitPoliciesRequireDirectRuntimeEnforcement(
-                        err.to_string(),
-                    )
-                })?;
-            if !legacy_sandbox_policies_match_semantics(
-                &sandbox_policy,
-                &derived_legacy_policy,
-                sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            ) {
-                return Err(ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::MismatchedLegacyPolicy {
-                    provided: sandbox_policy,
-                    derived: derived_legacy_policy,
-                });
-            }
-            Ok(EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-                sandbox_policy,
-                file_system_sandbox_policy,
-                network_sandbox_policy,
-            })
-        }
-        (Some(sandbox_policy), None) => Ok(EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-            file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
-                &sandbox_policy,
-                sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            ),
-            network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-            sandbox_policy,
-        }),
-        (None, Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))) => {
-            let sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
-                .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
-                .map_err(|err| {
-                    ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::FailedToDeriveLegacyPolicy(err.to_string())
-                })?;
-            Ok(EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
-                sandbox_policy,
-                file_system_sandbox_policy,
-                network_sandbox_policy,
-            })
-        }
-        (None, None) => Err(ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::MissingConfiguration),
-    }
+fn parse_permission_profile(value: &str) -> std::result::Result<PermissionProfile, String> {
+    serde_json::from_str(value).map_err(|err| format!("invalid permission profile JSON: {err}"))
 }
 
-fn legacy_sandbox_policies_match_semantics(
-    provided: &SandboxPolicy,
-    derived: &SandboxPolicy,
-    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-) -> bool {
-    NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(provided) == NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(derived)
-        && file_system_sandbox_policies_match_semantics(
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
-                provided,
-                sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            ),
-            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
-                derived,
-                sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            ),
-            sandbox_policy_cwd,
-        )
-}
-
-fn file_system_sandbox_policies_match_semantics(
-    provided: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    derived: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-) -> bool {
-    provided.has_full_disk_read_access() == derived.has_full_disk_read_access()
-        && provided.has_full_disk_write_access() == derived.has_full_disk_write_access()
-        && provided.include_platform_defaults() == derived.include_platform_defaults()
-        && provided.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-            == derived.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-        && provided.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-            == derived.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-        && provided.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-            == derived.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
+fn resolve_permission_profile(
+    permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
+) -> Result<EffectivePermissions, ResolvePermissionProfileError> {
+    let permission_profile =
+        permission_profile.ok_or(ResolvePermissionProfileError::MissingConfiguration)?;
+    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
+        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
+    Ok(EffectivePermissions {
+        permission_profile,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+    })
 }
 
 fn ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec: bool, use_legacy_landlock: bool) {
@@ -399,7 +258,7 @@ fn ensure_legacy_landlock_mode_supports_policy(
             .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
     {
         panic!(
-            "split sandbox policies requiring direct runtime enforcement are incompatible with --use-legacy-landlock"
+            "permission profiles requiring direct runtime enforcement are incompatible with --use-legacy-landlock"
         );
     }
 }
@@ -656,9 +515,7 @@ fn is_proc_mount_failure(stderr: &str) -> bool {
 struct InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'a> {
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
     command_cwd: Option<&'a Path>,
-    sandbox_policy: &'a SandboxPolicy,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &'a FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &'a PermissionProfile,
     allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
     proxy_route_spec: Option<String>,
     command: Vec<String>,
@@ -669,9 +526,7 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(args: InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'_>) -> Vec<String>
     let InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
         command_cwd,
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+        permission_profile,
         allow_network_for_proxy,
         proxy_route_spec,
         command,
@@ -680,17 +535,9 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(args: InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'_>) -> Vec<String>
         Ok(path) => path,
         Err(err) => panic!("failed to resolve current executable path: {err}"),
     };
-    let policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy) {
+    let permission_profile_json = match serde_json::to_string(permission_profile) {
         Ok(json) => json,
-        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize sandbox policy: {err}"),
-    };
-    let file_system_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy) {
-        Ok(json) => json,
-        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize filesystem sandbox policy: {err}"),
-    };
-    let network_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy) {
-        Ok(json) => json,
-        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize network sandbox policy: {err}"),
+        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize permission profile: {err}"),
     };
 
     let mut inner = vec![
@@ -703,12 +550,8 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(args: InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'_>) -> Vec<String>
         inner.push(command_cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string());
     }
     inner.extend([
-        "--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        policy_json,
-        "--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        file_system_policy_json,
-        "--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        network_policy_json,
+        "--permission-profile".to_string(),
+        permission_profile_json,
         "--apply-seccomp-then-exec".to_string(),
     ]);
     if allow_network_for_proxy {
@@ -746,5 +589,6 @@ fn exec_or_panic(command: Vec<String>) -> ! {
     panic!("Failed to execvp {}: {err}", command[0].as_str());
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
 #[path = "linux_run_main_tests.rs"]
 mod tests;
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
index 89dd12751..2b3f96355 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
@@ -1,16 +1,24 @@
 #[cfg(test)]
 use super::*;
 #[cfg(test)]
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
+#[cfg(test)]
 use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 #[cfg(test)]
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 #[cfg(test)]
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
-#[cfg(test)]
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 #[cfg(test)]
 use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
 
+fn read_only_permission_profile() -> PermissionProfile {
+    PermissionProfile::read_only()
+}
+
+fn read_only_file_system_policy() -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
+    read_only_permission_profile().file_system_sandbox_policy()
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn detects_proc_mount_invalid_argument_failure() {
     let stderr = "bwrap: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc: Invalid argument";
@@ -37,10 +45,10 @@ fn ignores_non_proc_mount_errors() {
 
 #[test]
 fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
     let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv(
         vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         Path::new("/"),
         Path::new("/"),
         BwrapOptions {
@@ -80,10 +88,10 @@ fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
 
 #[test]
 fn rewrites_inner_command_path_when_bwrap_lacks_argv0() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
     let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv(
         vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         Path::new("/"),
         Path::new("/"),
         BwrapOptions {
@@ -148,10 +156,10 @@ fn rewrites_bwrap_helper_command_not_nested_user_command_when_current_exe_appear
 
 #[test]
 fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
     let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
         vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         Path::new("/"),
         Path::new("/"),
         BwrapOptions {
@@ -166,10 +174,10 @@ fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
 
 #[test]
 fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
     let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
         vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         Path::new("/"),
         Path::new("/"),
         BwrapOptions {
@@ -250,7 +258,7 @@ fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
     let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
         Path::new("/"),
         Path::new("/"),
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
+        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
         mode,
     )
     .args;
@@ -259,13 +267,11 @@ fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
 
 #[test]
 fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let permission_profile = read_only_permission_profile();
     let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
         sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
         command_cwd: Some(Path::new("/tmp/link")),
-        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        permission_profile: &permission_profile,
         allow_network_for_proxy: true,
         proxy_route_spec: Some("{\"routes\":[]}".to_string()),
         command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
@@ -276,21 +282,18 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn inner_command_includes_split_policy_flags() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+fn inner_command_includes_permission_profile_flag() {
+    let permission_profile = read_only_permission_profile();
     let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
         sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
         command_cwd: Some(Path::new("/tmp/link")),
-        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        permission_profile: &permission_profile,
         allow_network_for_proxy: false,
         proxy_route_spec: None,
         command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
     });
 
-    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--file-system-sandbox-policy"));
-    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--network-sandbox-policy"));
+    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--permission-profile"));
     assert!(
         args.windows(2)
             .any(|window| { window == ["--command-cwd", "/tmp/link"] })
@@ -299,13 +302,11 @@ fn inner_command_includes_split_policy_flags() {
 
 #[test]
 fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let permission_profile = read_only_permission_profile();
     let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
         sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
         command_cwd: Some(Path::new("/tmp/link")),
-        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        permission_profile: &permission_profile,
         allow_network_for_proxy: false,
         proxy_route_spec: None,
         command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
@@ -317,13 +318,11 @@ fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
 #[test]
 fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
     let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
-        let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+        let permission_profile = read_only_permission_profile();
         build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
             sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
             command_cwd: Some(Path::new("/tmp/link")),
-            sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-            network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            permission_profile: &permission_profile,
             allow_network_for_proxy: true,
             proxy_route_spec: None,
             command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
@@ -333,89 +332,28 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_split_policies_from_legacy_policy() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+fn resolve_permission_profile_derives_runtime_policies() {
+    let permission_profile = read_only_permission_profile();
+    let resolved = resolve_permission_profile(Some(permission_profile.clone()))
+        .expect("profile should resolve");
 
-    let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        Some(sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        /*file_system_sandbox_policy*/ None,
-        /*network_sandbox_policy*/ None,
-    )
-    .expect("legacy policy should resolve");
-
-    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
+    assert_eq!(resolved.permission_profile, permission_profile);
     assert_eq!(
         resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
+        read_only_file_system_policy()
     );
     assert_eq!(
         resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
     );
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_legacy_policy_from_split_policies() {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
-    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
-    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
-
-    let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        /*sandbox_policy*/ None,
-        Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        Some(network_sandbox_policy),
-    )
-    .expect("split policies should resolve");
-
-    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
-    assert_eq!(
-        resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy
-    );
-    assert_eq!(resolved.network_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_partial_split_policies() {
-    let err = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
-        Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::default()),
-        /*network_sandbox_policy*/ None,
-    )
-    .expect_err("partial split policies should fail");
-
-    assert_eq!(err, ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::PartialSplitPolicies);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_mismatched_legacy_and_split_inputs() {
-    let err = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
-        Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted()),
-        Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled),
-    )
-    .expect_err("mismatched legacy and split policies should fail");
-
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            err,
-            ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::MismatchedLegacyPolicy { .. }
-        ),
-        "{err}"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_split_policies_requiring_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
+fn resolve_permission_profile_preserves_direct_runtime_profile() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&docs).expect("absolute docs");
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
     let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -428,16 +366,14 @@ fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_split_policies_requiring_direct_runtime_enfo
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
+    let resolved = resolve_permission_profile(Some(permission_profile.clone()))
+        .expect("profile should resolve");
 
-    let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        temp_dir.path(),
-        Some(sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted),
-    )
-    .expect("split-only policy should preserve provided legacy fallback");
-
-    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
+    assert_eq!(resolved.permission_profile, permission_profile);
     assert_eq!(
         resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
         file_system_sandbox_policy
@@ -449,37 +385,11 @@ fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_split_policies_requiring_direct_runtime_enfo
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_semantically_equivalent_workspace_write_inputs() {
-    let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
-    let workspace = temp_dir.path().join("workspace");
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).expect("create workspace");
-    let workspace = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&workspace).expect("absolute workspace");
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![workspace],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: false,
-    };
-    let file_system_sandbox_policy =
-        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy());
+fn resolve_permission_profile_rejects_missing_configuration() {
+    let err = resolve_permission_profile(/*permission_profile*/ None)
+        .expect_err("missing profile should fail");
 
-    let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
-        temp_dir.path().join("workspace").as_path(),
-        Some(sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
-        Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted),
-    )
-    .expect("semantically equivalent legacy workspace-write policy should resolve");
-
-    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
-    assert_eq!(
-        resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
-    );
+    assert_eq!(err, ResolvePermissionProfileError::MissingConfiguration);
 }
 
 #[test]
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs
index d1e84b89e..3b97e933b 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs
@@ -11,14 +11,12 @@ use codex_protocol::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_protocol::error::Result;
 use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
 use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
-use codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -83,37 +81,32 @@ async fn run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
     use_legacy_landlock: bool,
     network_access: bool,
 ) -> Result<codex_protocol::exec_output::ExecToolCallOutput> {
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: writable_roots
-            .iter()
-            .map(|p| AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(p.as_path()).unwrap())
-            .collect(),
-        network_access,
+    let writable_roots = writable_roots
+        .iter()
+        .map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path.as_path()).unwrap())
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
+        &writable_roots,
+        if network_access {
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
+        } else {
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
+        },
         // Exclude tmp-related folders from writable roots because we need a
         // folder that is writable by tests but that we intentionally disallow
         // writing to in the sandbox.
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
-    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
-    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
-    run_cmd_result_with_policies(
-        cmd,
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
-        timeout_ms,
-        use_legacy_landlock,
-    )
-    .await
+        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/
+        true,
+        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
+    );
+    run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile(cmd, permission_profile, timeout_ms, use_legacy_landlock)
+        .await
 }
 
 #[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
-async fn run_cmd_result_with_policies(
+async fn run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile(
     cmd: &[&str],
-    sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
     timeout_ms: u64,
     use_legacy_landlock: bool,
 ) -> Result<codex_protocol::exec_output::ExecToolCallOutput> {
@@ -134,11 +127,6 @@ async fn run_cmd_result_with_policies(
     };
     let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
     let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
-        SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
-    );
 
     process_exec_tool_call(
         params,
@@ -396,10 +384,9 @@ async fn assert_network_blocked(cmd: &[&str]) {
         arg0: None,
     };
 
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
     let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
     let codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf> = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
     let result = process_exec_tool_call(
         params,
         &permission_profile,
@@ -561,12 +548,6 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_explicit_split_policy_carveouts_under_bwrap() {
         .expect("sandbox helper should have a parent")
         .to_path_buf();
 
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(tmpdir.path()).expect("absolute tempdir")],
-        network_access: true,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -594,16 +575,18 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_explicit_split_policy_carveouts_under_bwrap() {
             access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+    );
     let output = expect_denied(
-        run_cmd_result_with_policies(
+        run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile(
             &[
                 "bash",
                 "-lc",
                 &format!("echo denied > {}", blocked_target.to_string_lossy()),
             ],
-            sandbox_policy,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+            permission_profile,
             LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
             /*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
         )
@@ -633,12 +616,6 @@ async fn sandbox_reenables_writable_subpaths_under_unreadable_parents() {
         .expect("sandbox helper should have a parent")
         .to_path_buf();
 
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(tmpdir.path()).expect("absolute tempdir")],
-        network_access: true,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -672,7 +649,11 @@ async fn sandbox_reenables_writable_subpaths_under_unreadable_parents() {
             access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
         },
     ]);
-    let output = run_cmd_result_with_policies(
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+    );
+    let output = run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile(
         &[
             "bash",
             "-lc",
@@ -682,9 +663,7 @@ async fn sandbox_reenables_writable_subpaths_under_unreadable_parents() {
                 allowed_target.to_string_lossy()
             ),
         ],
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+        permission_profile,
         LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
         /*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
     )
@@ -708,9 +687,6 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_root_read_carveouts_under_bwrap() {
     let blocked_target = blocked.join("secret.txt");
     std::fs::write(&blocked_target, "secret").expect("seed blocked file");
 
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
-        network_access: true,
-    };
     let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -725,16 +701,18 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_root_read_carveouts_under_bwrap() {
             access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+    );
     let output = expect_denied(
-        run_cmd_result_with_policies(
+        run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile(
             &[
                 "bash",
                 "-lc",
                 &format!("cat {}", blocked_target.to_string_lossy()),
             ],
-            sandbox_policy,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
+            permission_profile,
             LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
             /*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
         )
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/managed_proxy.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/managed_proxy.rs
index e906facac..932b7981d 100644
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/managed_proxy.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/managed_proxy.rs
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 use codex_core::exec_env::create_env;
 use codex_protocol::config_types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::io::Read;
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ async fn should_skip_bwrap_tests() -> bool {
 
     let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
         &["bash", "-c", "true"],
-        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
+        &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
         env,
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_skip_reason() -> Option<String> {
 
     let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
         &["bash", "-c", "true"],
-        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+        &PermissionProfile::Disabled,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
         env,
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_skip_reason() -> Option<String> {
 
 async fn run_linux_sandbox_direct(
     command: &[&str],
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
     allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
     env: HashMap<String, String>,
     timeout_ms: u64,
@@ -123,16 +123,16 @@ async fn run_linux_sandbox_direct(
         Ok(cwd) => cwd,
         Err(err) => panic!("cwd should exist: {err}"),
     };
-    let policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy) {
-        Ok(policy_json) => policy_json,
-        Err(err) => panic!("policy should serialize: {err}"),
+    let permission_profile_json = match serde_json::to_string(permission_profile) {
+        Ok(permission_profile_json) => permission_profile_json,
+        Err(err) => panic!("permission profile should serialize: {err}"),
     };
 
     let mut args = vec![
         "--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),
         cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
-        "--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        policy_json,
+        "--permission-profile".to_string(),
+        permission_profile_json,
     ];
     if allow_network_for_proxy {
         args.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_mode_fails_closed_without_proxy_env() {
 
     let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
         &["bash", "-c", "true"],
-        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+        &PermissionProfile::Disabled,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
         env,
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_mode_routes_through_bridge_and_blocks_direct_egress() {
             "-c",
             "proxy=\"${HTTP_PROXY#*://}\"; host=\"${proxy%%:*}\"; port=\"${proxy##*:}\"; exec 3<>/dev/tcp/${host}/${port}; printf 'GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: example.com\\r\\n\\r\\n' >&3; IFS= read -r line <&3; printf '%s\\n' \"$line\"",
         ],
-        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+        &PermissionProfile::Disabled,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
         env.clone(),
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_mode_routes_through_bridge_and_blocks_direct_egress() {
 
     let direct_egress_output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
         &["bash", "-c", "echo hi > /dev/tcp/192.0.2.1/80"],
-        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+        &PermissionProfile::Disabled,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
         env,
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ async fn managed_proxy_mode_denies_af_unix_creation_for_user_command() {
             "-c",
             "import socket,sys\ntry:\n    socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nexcept PermissionError:\n    sys.exit(0)\nexcept OSError:\n    sys.exit(2)\nsys.exit(1)\n",
         ],
-        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+        &PermissionProfile::Disabled,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
         env,
         NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
diff --git a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock.rs
index d948d23d1..0ff3f6977 100644
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use std::path::Path;
 
 /// Basename used when the Codex executable self-invokes as the Linux sandbox
@@ -14,30 +12,24 @@ pub fn allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network: bool) -> bool {
     enforce_managed_network
 }
 
-/// Converts the sandbox policies into the CLI invocation for
+/// Converts the permission profile into the CLI invocation for
 /// `codex-linux-sandbox`.
 ///
-/// The helper performs the actual sandboxing (bubblewrap by default + seccomp) after
-/// parsing these arguments. Policy JSON flags are emitted before helper feature
-/// flags so the argv order matches the helper's CLI shape. See
+/// The helper performs the actual sandboxing (bubblewrap by default + seccomp)
+/// after parsing these arguments. The profile JSON flag is emitted before
+/// helper feature flags so the argv order matches the helper's CLI shape. See
 /// `docs/linux_sandbox.md` for the Linux semantics.
 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
-pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
     command: Vec<String>,
     command_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
     use_legacy_landlock: bool,
     allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
-    let sandbox_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize sandbox policy: {err}"));
-    let file_system_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize filesystem sandbox policy: {err}"));
-    let network_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize network sandbox policy: {err}"));
+    let permission_profile_json = serde_json::to_string(permission_profile)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize permission profile: {err}"));
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = sandbox_policy_cwd
         .to_str()
         .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must be valid UTF-8"))
@@ -52,12 +44,8 @@ pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
         "--command-cwd".to_string(),
         command_cwd,
-        "--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        sandbox_policy_json,
-        "--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        file_system_policy_json,
-        "--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
-        network_policy_json,
+        "--permission-profile".to_string(),
+        permission_profile_json,
     ];
     if use_legacy_landlock {
         linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());
diff --git a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock_tests.rs b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock_tests.rs
index b1dd6236a..14b1c047e 100644
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/landlock_tests.rs
@@ -52,20 +52,16 @@ fn proxy_flag_is_included_when_requested() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn split_policy_flags_are_included() {
+fn permission_profile_flag_is_included() {
     let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
     let command_cwd = Path::new("/tmp/link");
     let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
-    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
-    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
-    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
 
-    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
         command,
         command_cwd,
-        &sandbox_policy,
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+        &permission_profile,
         cwd,
         /*use_legacy_landlock*/ true,
         /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
@@ -73,12 +69,7 @@ fn split_policy_flags_are_included() {
 
     assert_eq!(
         args.windows(2)
-            .any(|window| { window[0] == "--file-system-sandbox-policy" && !window[1].is_empty() }),
-        true
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        args.windows(2)
-            .any(|window| window[0] == "--network-sandbox-policy" && window[1] == "\"restricted\""),
+            .any(|window| { window[0] == "--permission-profile" && !window[1].is_empty() }),
         true
     );
     assert_eq!(
diff --git a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
index 900130ee6..82c49f790 100644
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use crate::bwrap::WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING;
 use crate::bwrap::is_wsl1;
 use crate::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
 use crate::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
-use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
+use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile;
 use crate::policy_transforms::effective_permission_profile;
 use crate::policy_transforms::should_require_platform_sandbox;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
@@ -186,12 +186,6 @@ impl SandboxManager {
             effective_permission_profile(permissions, additional_permissions.as_ref());
         let (effective_file_system_policy, effective_network_policy) =
             effective_permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
-        let effective_policy = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-            &effective_permission_profile,
-            &effective_file_system_policy,
-            effective_network_policy,
-            sandbox_policy_cwd,
-        );
         let mut argv = Vec::with_capacity(1 + command.args.len());
         argv.push(command.program);
         argv.extend(command.args.into_iter().map(OsString::from));
@@ -231,12 +225,10 @@ impl SandboxManager {
                     allow_proxy_network,
                     is_wsl1(),
                 )?;
-                let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+                let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
                     os_argv_to_strings(argv),
                     command.cwd.as_path(),
-                    &effective_policy,
-                    &effective_file_system_policy,
-                    effective_network_policy,
+                    &effective_permission_profile,
                     sandbox_policy_cwd,
                     use_legacy_landlock,
                     allow_proxy_network,