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Wire managed MITM CA trust into child env (#22668)

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## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18240 uses named MITM permissions config.
2. This PR wires managed MITM CA trust into spawned child processes.

## Why
When Codex terminates HTTPS for limited mode or MITM hooks, child HTTPS
clients need to trust Codex's managed MITM CA. Exporting proxy URLs
alone is not enough, but blindly replacing user CA settings would be
wrong: it can break custom enterprise/test roots, leak unreadable CA
files into generated bundles, or make the child env disagree with its
sandbox policy.

## Summary
1. Build immutable managed CA bundles under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy` that
include native roots, the managed MITM CA, and only inherited or
command-scoped CA bundles the child is allowed to read.
2. Export curated CA env vars alongside managed proxy env vars while
preserving user CA override semantics, including nested Codex
`SSL_CERT_FILE` precedence.
3. Thread generated CA bundle paths into child sandbox readable roots,
including debug sandbox execution, so the exported env vars work inside
sandboxed commands.
4. Remove only Codex-generated MITM CA bundle env when a child
intentionally drops managed proxying for escalation or no-proxy retry.
5. Document the managed CA bundle behavior and cover env injection,
per-child bundle generation, sandbox readable roots, and no-proxy
cleanup in tests.

## Validation
1. Ran `just test -p codex-network-proxy`.
2. Ran `just test -p codex-protocol`.
3. Ran `just fix -p codex-network-proxy -p codex-protocol`.
4. Tried focused `codex-core` validation, but the crate currently fails
to compile in `core/tests/suite/guardian_review.rs` because an existing
`Op::UserInput` initializer is missing `additional_context`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Eva Wong <evawong@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
Winston Howes
2026-06-01 16:23:59 -07:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent b89bf1ef47
commit bca18cba40
14 changed files with 509 additions and 41 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
codex-rs/network-proxy/src/proxy.rs
+117 -9
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use crate::state::NetworkProxyState;
use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use clap::Parser;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::TcpListener as StdTcpListener;
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ impl NetworkProxyBuilder {
socks_enabled: current_cfg.network.enable_socks5,
runtime_settings: Arc::new(RwLock::new(NetworkProxyRuntimeSettings::from_config(
&current_cfg,
))),
)?)),
reserved_listeners,
policy_decider: self.policy_decider,
})
@@ -299,15 +300,26 @@ struct NetworkProxyRuntimeSettings {
allow_local_binding: bool,
allow_unix_sockets: Arc<[String]>,
dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: bool,
mitm_ca_trust_bundle: Option<crate::certs::ManagedMitmCaTrustBundle>,
}
impl NetworkProxyRuntimeSettings {
fn from_config(config: &config::NetworkProxyConfig) -> Self {
Self {
fn from_config(config: &config::NetworkProxyConfig) -> Result<Self> {
let mitm_ca_trust_bundle = if config.network.mitm {
let env = crate::certs::CUSTOM_CA_ENV_KEYS
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|key| std::env::var(key).ok().map(|value| (key, value)))
.collect();
Some(crate::certs::managed_ca_trust_bundle(&env)?)
} else {
None
};
Ok(Self {
allow_local_binding: config.network.allow_local_binding,
allow_unix_sockets: config.network.allow_unix_sockets().into(),
dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: config.network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets,
}
mitm_ca_trust_bundle,
})
}
}
@@ -477,6 +489,7 @@ fn apply_proxy_env_overrides(
socks_addr: SocketAddr,
socks_enabled: bool,
allow_local_binding: bool,
mitm_ca_trust_bundle: Option<&crate::certs::ManagedMitmCaTrustBundle>,
) {
let http_proxy_url = format!("http://{http_addr}");
let socks_proxy_url = format!("socks5h://{socks_addr}");
@@ -556,6 +569,27 @@ fn apply_proxy_env_overrides(
}
}
}
if let Some(mitm_ca_trust_bundle) = mitm_ca_trust_bundle {
let managed_path = mitm_ca_trust_bundle.path.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
for key in crate::certs::CUSTOM_CA_ENV_KEYS {
if env
.get(key)
.filter(|value| !value.is_empty())
.is_some_and(|value| {
value != &managed_path
&& mitm_ca_trust_bundle.startup_env_values.get(key) != Some(value)
})
{
// TODO(winston): Materialize policy-checked per-child bundles for readable
// startup and command-scoped CA overrides. For now startup overrides are
// replaced with the default bundle and later command-scoped overrides are
// preserved, either of which can make intercepted TLS fail.
continue;
}
env.insert(key.to_string(), managed_path.clone());
}
}
}
impl NetworkProxy {
@@ -595,16 +629,28 @@ impl NetworkProxy {
self.runtime_settings().dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets
}
/// Returns the generated MITM CA bundle path child sandboxes should expose to TLS clients.
pub fn managed_mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path(&self) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
self.runtime_settings()
.mitm_ca_trust_bundle
.and_then(|bundle| {
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(bundle.path)
.map_err(|err| warn!("managed MITM CA trust bundle path is invalid: {err}"))
.ok()
})
}
pub fn apply_to_env(&self, env: &mut HashMap<String, String>) {
let allow_local_binding = self.allow_local_binding();
// Enforce proxying for child processes. We intentionally override existing values so
// command-level environment cannot bypass the managed proxy endpoint.
let runtime_settings = self.runtime_settings();
// Enforce proxying for child processes. Proxy endpoint values are always rewritten;
// managed MITM CA vars preserve child-scoped overrides after proxy startup.
apply_proxy_env_overrides(
env,
self.http_addr,
self.socks_addr,
self.socks_enabled,
allow_local_binding,
runtime_settings.allow_local_binding,
runtime_settings.mitm_ca_trust_bundle.as_ref(),
);
}
@@ -631,7 +677,7 @@ impl NetworkProxy {
"cannot update network.enable_socks5_udp on a running proxy"
);
let settings = NetworkProxyRuntimeSettings::from_config(&new_state.config);
let settings = NetworkProxyRuntimeSettings::from_config(&new_state.config)?;
self.state.replace_config_state(new_state).await?;
let mut guard = self
.runtime_settings
@@ -791,6 +837,7 @@ mod tests {
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::path::Path;
#[tokio::test]
async fn managed_proxy_builder_uses_loopback_ports() {
@@ -979,6 +1026,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1042,6 +1090,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
for key in env.keys() {
@@ -1054,6 +1103,60 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_proxy_env_overrides_sets_mitm_ca_trust_bundle_vars() {
let mut env = HashMap::new();
let mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path = Path::new("/tmp/codex-proxy/ca-bundle.pem");
let mitm_ca_trust_bundle = crate::certs::ManagedMitmCaTrustBundle {
path: mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path.to_path_buf(),
startup_env_values: HashMap::new(),
};
apply_proxy_env_overrides(
&mut env,
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 3128),
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
Some(&mitm_ca_trust_bundle),
);
for key in crate::certs::CUSTOM_CA_ENV_KEYS {
assert_eq!(
env.get(key),
Some(&mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path.display().to_string())
);
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_proxy_env_overrides_preserves_command_scoped_mitm_ca_override() {
let command_ca_bundle_path = "/tmp/command-ca.pem".to_string();
let mut env = HashMap::from([(
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE".to_string(),
command_ca_bundle_path.clone(),
)]);
let mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path = Path::new("/tmp/codex-proxy/ca-bundle.pem");
let mitm_ca_trust_bundle = crate::certs::ManagedMitmCaTrustBundle {
path: mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path.to_path_buf(),
startup_env_values: HashMap::new(),
};
apply_proxy_env_overrides(
&mut env,
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 3128),
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
Some(&mitm_ca_trust_bundle),
);
assert_eq!(env.get("REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE"), Some(&command_ca_bundle_path));
assert_eq!(
env.get("SSL_CERT_FILE"),
Some(&mitm_ca_trust_bundle_path.display().to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn apply_proxy_env_overrides_uses_http_for_all_proxy_without_socks() {
let mut env = HashMap::new();
@@ -1063,6 +1166,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ false,
/*allow_local_binding*/ true,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1081,6 +1185,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1129,6 +1234,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 8081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1151,6 +1257,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 48081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1174,6 +1281,7 @@ mod tests {
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 48081),
/*socks_enabled*/ true,
/*allow_local_binding*/ false,
/*mitm_ca_trust_bundle*/ None,
);
assert_eq!(