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refactor: prepare unified exec for zsh-fork backend (#13392)
## Why `shell_zsh_fork` already provides stronger guarantees around which executables receive elevated permissions. To reuse that machinery from unified exec without pushing Unix-specific escalation details through generic runtime code, the escalation bootstrap and session lifetime handling need a cleaner boundary. That boundary also needs to be safe for long-lived sessions: when an intercepted shell session is closed or pruned, any in-flight approval workers and any already-approved escalated child they spawned must be torn down with the session, and the inherited escalation socket must not leak into unrelated subprocesses. ## What Changed - Extracted a reusable `EscalationSession` and `EscalateServer::start_session(...)` in `shell-escalation` so callers can get the wrapper/socket env overlay and keep the escalation server alive without immediately running a one-shot command. - Documented that `EscalationSession::env()` and `ShellCommandExecutor::run(...)` exchange only that env overlay, which callers must merge into their own base shell environment. - Clarified the prepared-exec helper boundary in `core` by naming the new helper APIs around `ExecRequest`, while keeping the legacy `execute_env(...)` entrypoints as thin compatibility wrappers for existing callers that still use the older naming. - Added a small post-spawn hook on the prepared execution path so the parent copy of the inheritable escalation socket is closed immediately after both the existing one-shot shell-command spawn and the unified-exec spawn. - Made session teardown explicit with session-scoped cancellation: dropping an `EscalationSession` or canceling its parent request now stops intercept workers, and the server-spawned escalated child uses `kill_on_drop(true)` so teardown cannot orphan an already-approved child. - Added `UnifiedExecBackendConfig` plumbing through `ToolsConfig`, a `shell::zsh_fork_backend` facade, and an opaque unified-exec spawn-lifecycle hook so unified exec can prepare a wrapped `zsh -c/-lc` request without storing `EscalationSession` directly in generic process/runtime code. - Kept the existing `shell_command` zsh-fork behavior intact on top of the new bootstrap path. Tool selection is unchanged in this PR: when `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled, `ShellCommand` still wins over `exec_command`. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation` - includes coverage for `start_session_exposes_wrapper_env_overlay` - includes coverage for `exec_closes_parent_socket_after_shell_spawn` - includes coverage for `dropping_session_aborts_intercept_workers_and_kills_spawned_child` - `cargo test -p codex-core shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13392). * #13432 * __->__ #13392
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@@ -231,10 +231,11 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
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crate::sandboxing::execute_env(exec_req, stdout_stream).await
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}
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pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_env(
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env: ExecRequest,
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pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_request(
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exec_request: ExecRequest,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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stdout_stream: Option<StdoutStream>,
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after_spawn: Option<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>,
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) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
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let ExecRequest {
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command,
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@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_env(
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sandbox_policy: _sandbox_policy_from_env,
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justification,
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arg0,
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} = env;
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} = exec_request;
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let params = ExecParams {
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command,
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@@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_env(
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};
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let start = Instant::now();
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let raw_output_result = exec(params, sandbox, sandbox_policy, stdout_stream).await;
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let raw_output_result = exec(params, sandbox, sandbox_policy, stdout_stream, after_spawn).await;
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let duration = start.elapsed();
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finalize_exec_result(raw_output_result, sandbox, duration)
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}
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@@ -693,6 +694,7 @@ async fn exec(
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sandbox: SandboxType,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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stdout_stream: Option<StdoutStream>,
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after_spawn: Option<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>,
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) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
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#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
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if sandbox == SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken
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@@ -738,6 +740,9 @@ async fn exec(
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env,
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})
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.await?;
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if let Some(after_spawn) = after_spawn {
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after_spawn();
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}
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consume_truncated_output(child, expiration, stdout_stream).await
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}
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@@ -1136,6 +1141,7 @@ mod tests {
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SandboxType::None,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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None,
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None,
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)
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.await?;
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assert!(output.timed_out);
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