config: express implicit sandbox defaults as permission profiles (#25926)

## Why

`PermissionProfile` is becoming the default way to represent Codex
permissions, but the implicit default behavior should stay the same for
now:

- trusted projects use `:workspace`
- untrusted projects also use `:workspace`
- roots without a trust decision use `:read-only`
- unsandboxed Windows falls back to `:read-only`

This keeps the existing sandbox semantics while making silent config
defaults observable as built-in permission profiles instead of treating
the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection as the primary shape.

## What Changed

- Refactored legacy sandbox derivation to resolve the configured sandbox
mode once, then apply the implicit project fallback only when no sandbox
mode was configured.
- Preserved the existing trust-decision fallback: trusted and untrusted
projects default to workspace-write where supported.
- Added empty-config coverage asserting that an untrusted project
resolves to the built-in active permission profile (`:workspace` outside
unsandboxed Windows).

## Verification

- `just fmt`
- `just test -p codex-core 'config::'`
- `just test -p codex-config`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/25926).
* __->__ #25926
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-06-02 16:26:36 -07:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent 6471f8b31a
commit a28b32a835
2 changed files with 69 additions and 16 deletions
+59
View File
@@ -2548,6 +2548,65 @@ async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_profile_for_trusted_project() -> std::
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_profile_for_untrusted_project() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
let project_key = cwd.path().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let config = Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides(
ConfigToml {
projects: Some(HashMap::from([(
project_key,
ProjectConfig {
trust_level: Some(TrustLevel::Untrusted),
},
)])),
..Default::default()
},
ConfigOverrides {
cwd: Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()),
..Default::default()
},
codex_home.abs(),
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert_eq!(
config
.permissions
.active_permission_profile()
.as_ref()
.map(|active| active.id.as_str()),
Some(if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY
} else {
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE
})
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to allow reads, policy: {policy:?}"
);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to stay read-only without Windows sandbox support, policy: {policy:?}"
);
} else {
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to use :workspace, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".codex"), cwd.path()),
"expected :workspace metadata carveouts, policy: {policy:?}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_sandbox_workspace_write_settings()
-> std::io::Result<()> {