Route process tools to selected environments (#20647)

## Why
When a turn exposes multiple selected environments, shell-style tools
need a model-facing way to identify the intended target environment and
handlers need to resolve that target before parsing cwd-relative
permission fields or launching processes.

This PR scopes that rollout to process tools. Filesystem-oriented tools
such as `apply_patch`, `view_image`, and `list_dir` are intentionally
left for follow-up slices.

## What Changed
- Adds an `include_environment_id` option to shell-style tool schema
builders.
- Exposes optional `environment_id` on `shell`, `shell_command`, and
`exec_command` only when `ToolEnvironmentMode::Multiple` is active.
- Adds a shared handler helper that parses `environment_id` and
`workdir` from JSON function-call arguments and returns the selected
`Environment` plus effective absolute cwd.
- Uses that helper in `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
handling so process execution uses the selected environment filesystem
and cwd.
- Changes `ExecCommandRequest` to carry a required resolved `cwd`,
removing the process-manager fallback to the primary turn cwd for new
exec commands.
- Leaves `write_stdin` unchanged because it targets an existing process
id, not a new environment.

## Testing
- Added unit coverage for process-tool schema exposure, selected
environment resolution, primary fallback, no-environment handling,
unknown environment ids, and resolving cwd-relative permission paths
against the selected environment cwd.
- Added a remote-suite e2e coverage case for `exec_command` routing
across explicit zero environments, one local environment, and
local+remote environments.
- Ran `just fmt` and `git diff --check`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
starr-openai
2026-05-05 12:12:03 -07:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent fb7e1eb6fc
commit 78421face0
13 changed files with 313 additions and 91 deletions
+3 -1
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::Weak;
use codex_exec_server::Environment;
use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
use codex_protocol::models::AdditionalPermissionProfile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
@@ -93,7 +94,8 @@ pub(crate) struct ExecCommandRequest {
pub process_id: i32,
pub yield_time_ms: u64,
pub max_output_tokens: Option<usize>,
pub workdir: Option<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
pub environment: Arc<Environment>,
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
pub tty: bool,
pub sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
@@ -371,10 +371,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
request: ExecCommandRequest,
context: &UnifiedExecContext,
) -> Result<ExecCommandToolOutput, UnifiedExecError> {
let cwd = request
.workdir
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| context.turn.cwd.clone());
let cwd = request.cwd.clone();
let process = self
.open_session_with_sandbox(&request, cwd.clone(), context)
.await;
@@ -1012,7 +1009,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
approval_policy: context.turn.approval_policy.value(),
permission_profile: context.turn.permission_profile(),
file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_sandbox_policy,
sandbox_cwd: context.turn.cwd.as_path(),
sandbox_cwd: cwd.as_path(),
sandbox_permissions: if request.additional_permissions_preapproved {
crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions::UseDefault
} else {
@@ -1026,6 +1023,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
hook_command: request.hook_command.clone(),
process_id: request.process_id,
cwd,
environment: Arc::clone(&request.environment),
env,
exec_server_env_config: Some(exec_server_env_config),
explicit_env_overrides: context.turn.shell_environment_policy.r#set.clone(),
@@ -175,7 +175,11 @@ async fn failed_initial_end_for_unstored_process_uses_fallback_output() {
process_id: 123,
yield_time_ms: 1000,
max_output_tokens: None,
workdir: None,
cwd: turn.cwd.clone(),
environment: turn
.environments
.primary_environment()
.expect("primary environment"),
network: None,
tty: true,
sandbox_permissions: crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,